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“Th e great strength of this book lies in its com-
parative nature. Th e author off ers a balanced and 
elegantly nuanced conception of a complex his-
torical reality that will be a lasting contribution 
to scholarship on the modern economic history of 
Southeast and East Asia.” 
—J. Th omas Lindblad, Leiden University
It is well known that Taiwan and South 
Korea, both former Japanese colonies, 
achieved rapid growth and industrializa-
tion after 1960. Th e performance of former 
European and American colonies (Malaysia, 
Singapore, Burma, Vietnam, Laos, Cambo-
dia, Indonesia, and the Philippines) has been 
less impressive. Some scholars have attributed 
the diff erence to better infrastructure and 
greater access to education in Japan’s colonies. 
Anne Booth examines and critiques such 
arguments in this ambitious comparative 
study of economic development in East and 
Southeast Asia from the beginning of the 
twentieth century until the 1960s. 
Booth takes an in-depth look at the 
nature and consequences of colonial poli-
cies for a wide range of factors, including the 
growth of export-oriented agriculture and the 
development of manufacturing industry. She 
evaluates the impact of colonial policies on 
the growth and diversifi cation of the market 
economy and on the welfare of indigenous 
populations. Indicators such as educational 
enrollments, infant mortality rates, and crude 
death rates are used to compare living stan-
dards across East and Southeast Asia in the 
1930s. Her analysis of the impact that Japan’s 
Greater Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere and 
later invasion and conquest had on the region 
and the living standards of its people leads 
to a discussion of the painful and protracted 
transition to independence following Japan’s 
defeat. Th roughout, Booth emphasizes the 
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great variety of economic and social policies 
pursued by the various colonial governments 
and the diversity of outcomes.
Lucidly and accessibly written, Colonial 
Legacies will guide readers through the argu-
ments and literatures of comparative co-
lonialism for many years to come. It will be of 
special interest to those concerned with the 
dynamics of development and the history of 
colonial regimes. 
Anne Booth is professor of economics at the 
School of Oriental and African Studies, 
University of London.
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I n this study, the colonies in East and Southeast Asia will usually be referred to by the names that came into popular use in the postcolonial era rather 
than by the names that were in use before 1945 or their offi cial names in 
more recent decades. Thus what was the Netherlands Indies will be referred 
to as Indonesia, and the island of Taiwan will be referred to as Taiwan rather 
than Formosa or the Republic of China. Thailand will be used in preference to 
Siam (the offi cial name until 1939). Korea will be used rather than Chosen and 
Burma rather than Myanmar. The term “British Malaya” refers to the Straits 
Settlements, the Federated Malay States (Selangor, Pahang, Negeri Sembilan, 
and Perak), and the Unfederated Malay States (Johore, Trengganu, Kedah, Per-
lis, Kelantan, and Brunei). During the 1950s, all these territories were often 
referred to as the Malayan Federation. The term “Malaysia” is used to refer 
to the modern state of that name, which includes all parts of British Malaya 
except the island of Singapore and Brunei as well as the former British protec-
torates of Sarawak and Sabah (formerly North Borneo). Throughout the study, 
the term “Southeast Asia” will be used to refer to the region now covered by 
the ten member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). 
In 2006, these were Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore, Malaysia, and Thai-
land (the original fi ve member states) plus Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, 
and Burma (Myanmar). East Asia refers to China (including the Hong Kong 
SAR), Taiwan (Republic of China), North and South Korea, and Japan. 
A Note on Terminology

1T his book attempts a comparative study of the economic and social devel-opment of colonial territories in East and Southeast Asia in the fi rst four 
decades of the twentieth century and of the consequences of that develop-
ment for the transition to independence after 1945. At the beginning of the 
twentieth century, fi ve colonial powers were active in East and Southeast Asia. 
Three were European. The British controlled from Delhi the vast South Asian 
subcontinent that extended from the Khyber Pass in the west to the borders of 
Burma with China, and with the independent Kingdom of Thailand in the east. 
In Southeast Asia, they controlled most of the Malayan peninsula, including 
the strategic port of Singapore, which was developed into an important Brit-
ish naval base. The Dutch governed the huge Indonesian archipelago, from 
Sumatra to New Guinea, and the French controlled the contiguous territories 
of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, a region known as French Indochina. 
After the defeat of Spain by American forces in 1898, President McKin-
ley decided to impose an American administration on the Philippine islands. 
After a bloody struggle with Philippine nationalists, William Howard Taft was 
dispatched in 1900 to form a civilian government. McKinley instructed Taft 
to promote the “happiness, peace and prosperity of the people of the Philip-
pine Islands” (Hutchcroft 2000: 277). This refl ected the strongly moralistic 
view that the administration took of its new colonial mission. Although Taft 
and several other supporters of the American occupation of the Philippines 
thought that the Americans could learn from both British and Dutch colonial 
policies in Asia, especially as they related to the development of infrastructure 
and commerce, by the 1920s the idea of the “exceptionalism” of American 
colonialism was widely held (Adas 1998: 46–50). Unlike the policies of the 
Europeans, who (according to many Americans) viewed their colonies as eco-
nomic assets to be exploited mainly for the benefi t of the metropolitan power, 
American policy in the Philippines was dominated by the need to prepare 
the population of the Philippines for self-government and ultimate indepen-
dence. Crucial to this strategy was mass education. In 1935, substantial self-
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government was granted to the Philippines, with a promise of complete inde-
pendence after a further ten years.
The fi fth colonial power in Asia in 1900 was Japan. As the only Asian 
country to acquire colonial possessions in the twentieth century, Japan was 
an “anomaly” in the history of colonial Asia (Peattie 1984: 6). Japan’s empire 
in East Asia was created between 1895 and 1913, largely as a result of mili-
tary victories over two decaying imperial states, China and Czarist Russia. The 
island of Taiwan (or Formosa, as it was known during the Japanese period) 
was annexed from China under the Treaty of Shimonoseki, and an admin-
istration was established under a Japanese governor-general in March 1896. 
The military pacifi cation of the island in the latter part of the 1890s was not 
unlike similar exercises carried out by the French in Tonkin, the Americans in 
the Philippines, or the Dutch in northern Sumatra at about the same time and 
was probably no more ruthless than these other military campaigns (ibid.: 19). 
By 1900, the island was largely under Japanese control. The Treaty of Ports-
mouth, signed in the wake of the Russo-Japanese confl ict, gave Japan control 
over the Liaotung peninsula, which became known as the Kwantung Leased 
Territory. Finally in 1910, Japanese control over the Korean peninsula was 
consolidated in its formal annexation. Unlike in Taiwan, colonial status was 
fi ercely resented and resisted by Korean nationalists, but their opposition was 
put down by massive and often brutal police and military force.
Japanese military strength in the fi rst decade of the twentieth century was 
based on its growing economic and industrial might. But Japan at that time 
was still very much a developing economy. Its per capita national income was 
well below that of the European colonial powers in Asia, and little more than 
a quarter of that of the United States (Table 1.1). By 1910, American national 
income per capita had overtaken that of the United Kingdom, while the total 
size of the American economy exceeded that of the United Kingdom and Ger-
many combined (Maddison 2003: tables 1a, 1b, 2a, 2b, and 5b). Compared 
with the economic might of the United States at this time, Japan was still a 
minnow. 
Because Japan’s per capita national income was still quite low, the eco-
nomic gap between Japan and its colonies was much narrower than was the 
case with the other colonial powers in Asia. In 1913, per capita GDP in Taiwan 
and Korea was between 50 and 60 percent of that in Japan, according to Mad-
dison (Table 1.2). Other estimates suggest that the gap was even smaller, espe-
cially for Taiwan, where per capita GDP in 1915 may well have been almost 
80 percent of that in Japan, once appropriate adjustment is made for differ-
ences in the prices of goods and services in the two economies (Fukao, Ma, 
and Yuan 2005: table 6). This can be compared with the Philippines, which 
by 1913 had recovered from the devastation of war and conquest, but its per 
capita national income was only about 20 percent of that in the United States. 
A similar gap could be found between the Netherlands and Indonesia in 1913, 
and an even larger one existed between Britain and Burma (Table 1.2).
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Thus Japan in the early twentieth century was a colonizing power whose 
economic strength, while growing, was still quite restricted relative to the 
other colonial powers in Asia and to the regions it was controlling. This was 
both an advantage and a disadvantage. The main advantage was that, with 
the memories of its own “superbly successful modernization efforts” in the 
decades after the Meiji Restoration still fresh in their minds, the Japanese colo-
nial administrators (several of whom had played key policy roles in Japan 
after 1870) could implement the same kind of developmental policies in the 
colonial territories, especially in the agricultural sector (Peattie 1984: 23). The 
disadvantage was that the Japanese inevitably tended to view their colonial 
territories as assets to be exploited in their own race to catch up with the top 
industrial powers. This attitude became more pronounced over the 1930s, as 
the Japanese state shifted to a war economy footing with inevitable conse-
quences for its colonial territories.
The French, Dutch, and British colonies also faced different, and chang-
ing, demands from the metropolitan powers during the fi rst four decades of 
Table 1.1. Per Capita GDP in East and Southeast Asia as a Percentage of Per 
Capita GDP in the United States, 1913–2000
Year  China India Burma Taiwan South Korea Thailand
1913 10.4 12.7 12.9 14.1 15.5 15.9
1929 8.1 10.6 n.a. 16.6 14.7 11.5
1938 9.2 10.9 12.1 21.3 23.8 13.5
1950 4.6 6.5 4.1 9.7 8.1 8.5
1960 5.9 6.6 5.0 13.2 9.8 9.5
1970 5.2 5.8 3.8 19.8 13.0 11.3
1980 5.7 5.0 4.4 31.6 22.1 13.7
1990 8.0 5.6 3.4 42.6 37.5 20.0
2000 12.2 6.8 4.8 59.2 51.0 22.5
 Malaysia Indonesia Philippines Hong Kong Singapore  Japan
1913 17.0 17.1 19.9 24.1 24.1 26.2
1929 24.4 17.0 21.8 n.a. n.a. 29.4
1938 22.2 19.2 24.8 n.a. n.a. 40.0
1950 16.3 8.8 11.2 23.2 23.2 20.1
1960 13.5 9.0 13.0 27.7 20.4 35.2
1970 13.8 7.9 11.7 37.9 29.5 64.6
1980 19.7 10.1 12.8 56.5 48.8 72.3
1990 22.1 10.8 9.6 75.6 61.9 81.0
2000 28.0 11.4 8.5 76.4 78.9 74.9
Source: Maddison 2003.
Note: n.a. = data not available in the source document.
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the twentieth century. The United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and France all 
underwent considerable political and social change over these decades, with 
consequences for colonial policies. A particularly important trend after 1900 
was the granting of the franchise to groups previously disempowered, includ-
ing working-class men and eventually women. Related to this was the increased 
demand for government social spending on unemployment and sickness 
benefi ts, pensions, health, and housing. In all three countries, government 
social spending more than doubled relative to GDP between 1900 and 1930 
(Lindert 2004: table 1.2). Faced with increasing demands from the home elec-
torates, European governments were under great pressure to make their impe-
rial possessions fi nancially self-suffi cient. This implied using a minimum of 
force; British colonial administrators in both Africa and Asia were expected to 
operate with quite small military establishments, paid for out of local budgets 
(Gann 1984: 510). Pride in imperial possessions undoubtedly existed among 
Table 1.2. Per Capita GDP in East and Southeast Asia as a Percentage of 
Per Capita GDP in the Metropolitan Power, 1913 – 2000
 British Colonies
Year  India Burma Malaysia Hong Kong Singapore
1913 13.7 13.9 18.3 26.0 26.0
1929 13.2 n.a. 30.6 n.a. n.a.
1938 10.7 11.8 21.7 n.a. n.a.
1950 8.9 5.7 22.5 32.0 32.0
1960 8.7 6.5 17.7 36.3 26.7
1970 8.1 5.2 19.3 52.9 41.2
1980 7.3 6.4 28.3 81.2 70.0
1990 8.0 4.9 31.2 106.8 87.4
2000 9.6 6.8 39.7 108.5 112.1
 Japanese Colonies Dutch US
 China Taiwan South Korea Indonesia  Philippines
1913 39.8 53.9 59.1 22.3 19.9
1929 27.7 56.6 50.0 20.6 21.8
1938 22.9 53.2 59.6 22.4 24.8
1950 22.9 48.1 40.1 14.0 11.2
1960 16.9 37.4 27.7 12.3 13.0
1970 8.1 30.7 20.1 10.0 11.7
1980 7.9 43.7 30.6 12.7 12.8
1990 9.9 52.6 46.3 14.6 9.6
2000 16.3 79.0 68.1 14.8 8.5
Source: Maddison 2003.
Note: n.a. = not available. 
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the British, the French, and the Dutch public, but increasingly after 1900, 
home populations wanted governments to spend more on their welfare rather 
than on the governance of Asians living thousands of miles away. 
Assembling and Governing Empires in Southeast Asia 
Japan’s colonial empire was only acquired in the late nineteenth century, and 
Japan was deprived of all its colonial territories after defeat in 1945. Thus its 
colonial experience in Asia was relatively short, at most six decades. America’s 
full colonial control of the Philippines was even shorter, from 1900 to 1935. 
By contrast, European colonial control over Southeast Asia was imposed in 
stages from the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries, although in many parts 
of the region effective colonial administrative systems were only established 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In all cases, colonial gov-
ernments after 1900 adopted new approaches to taxation and revenue policy, 
to budgetary expenditures, and to the role of government in directing eco-
nomic activity ( Elson 1992: 149–154). 
By the late nineteenth century, probably the most dense and intrusive sys-
tem of colonial governance in Southeast Asia was that built up by the Dutch in 
Java, although more liberal economic policies favoring private enterprise had 
been adopted after 1870, when the system of coercive cultivation of export 
crops was offi cially terminated. But Dutch control, both economic and politi-
cal, over the other parts of the vast Indonesian archipelago was at best patchy. 
Lindblad has pointed out that, during the nineteenth century, many of the 
islands outside Java were still integrated into the wider Southeast Asian trading 
system and only very loosely under Dutch control (Dick, Houben, Lindblad, 
and Thee 2002: 82). It was only after 1900 that Dutch colony policy in Indo-
nesia became characterized by a “systematic mise en valeur and an active role 
on the part of the state” (Wesseling 1988: 68). As the new century dawned, 
Dutch colonial offi cials were determined to transform their huge Southeast 
Asian colony into something more than just a loosely integrated free trade 
area, even if that meant disrupting traditional fl ows of goods, money, and 
people to and from regions outside Dutch control. They also became increas-
ingly concerned about improving “native welfare,” a concern that was in part 
prompted by a realization that a poverty-stricken colony could become a seri-
ous economic liability for the mother country (Booth 1998: 2–6). 
By 1900, the phrase mise en valeur had also become the watchword of 
French offi cials in Indochina, who viewed ambitious infrastructure develop-
ment as the main means of developing their Southeast Asian colonial posses-
sions (Doumer 1902: 24). Although French Indochina consisted of contiguous 
territories in mainland Southeast Asia, rather than a chain of islands, it shared 
one crucial characteristic with Indonesia. Population densities varied con-
siderably; in much of northern and central Vietnam, the pressure of people 
on land was as great as in Java, but southern Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos 
6 Chapter 1
were more lightly populated and still had considerable land available for more 
intensive agricultural cultivation. Like the Dutch, the French saw population 
movement as one way of dealing with problems of overpopulation, on the 
one hand, and underutilized agricultural resources on the other. For much of 
the period from 1900 to 1940, French offi cials studied Dutch colonial policies 
in Indonesia closely; they also examined policies relating to agriculture and 
public works in the Philippines, British Malaya, and India. French offi cials 
published the results of these studies in offi cial outlets such as the Bulletin 
économique de l’Indochine.
In several respects, the two British colonies in Southeast Asia, Burma and 
British Malaya, had very different experiences from other parts of region, and 
from each other, during the fi rst part of the twentieth century. British control 
over Burma was established in a series of punitive expeditions through the 
nineteenth century, culminating in the deportation of King Thibaw in late 
1885 and the subsequent establishment of Upper Burma as a province of the 
British Indian Empire. For the next fi ve decades, Burma was ruled from Delhi; 
it was only in April 1937 that Burma was made a crown colony in its own 
right, with some degree of self-government. 
British Malaya by contrast was never governed as a single colony before 
1942. The British established a settlement in Penang in the late eighteenth 
century, and in 1819, Stamford Raffl es acquired the island of Singapore for 
the East India Company. In 1867, Singapore, Malacca, Penang, and some terri-
tory close to Penang on the mainland of peninsular Malaya were formed into 
a colony known as the Straits Settlements. In 1896, four Malay states in the 
center of the peninsula, which had come under British control between 1874 
and 1889, and had accepted the presence of British advisers, were formed 
into the Federated Malay States (FMS), with an administrative center in Kuala 
Lumpur. Other parts of the peninsula, including the northern states of Treng-
ganu, Perak, Perlis, and Kelantan and the southern state of Johore became the 
Unfederated Malay States (UMS) in the early part of the twentieth century. 
These states were more independent of British control, although government 
of both the FMS and the UMS was at fi rst rather indirect, with the British 
administrators operating through traditional rulers. White has pointed out 
that Malaya was not expected to fulfi ll any grand imperial economic role and 
was indeed an “afterthought of empire,” a territory that the British acquired 
mainly in order to protect vital sea-lanes (1999: 176). But gradually the offi -
cial British attitude toward its possessions on the Malayan peninsula began to 
change. These changes were related to a growing awareness of the potential of 
the region as a producer of strategic raw materials, increasingly in demand by 
the rapidly industrializing economies of Europe and North America. 
This growing awareness was also shared by the Dutch and the French 
and to an increasing extent by the Americans in the Philippines. By the late 
nineteenth century, it was clear that the economic future of many tropical 
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regions lay not so much in export of foodstuffs such as rice, sugar, coffee, 
cocoa, tea, and spices but in new crops, such as rubber and vegetable oils, and 
in mineral products including tin, bauxite, and petroleum, which were crucial 
inputs into new and rapidly growing industries in Europe and North America. 
The traditional food exports remained important, but everywhere in South-
east Asia, colonial offi cialdom became more concerned with promoting “new 
exports,” which would be produced by capitalist companies, usually incorpo-
rated in the metropole, using modern, large-scale production technologies. 
The agricultural estate, which had not, with the partial exception of Java, been 
widely found in Southeast Asia in the nineteenth century, became the favored 
vehicle for the production of new crops such as rubber and palm oil (neither 
indigenous to Southeast Asia), while mining companies were established to 
exploit reserves of minerals and petroleum. 
As the production of new export commodities accelerated, colonial gov-
ernments also became much more aware of the need for better infrastructure 
and for a disciplined labor force prepared to work long hours under arduous 
conditions. Ports, roads, and railways were increasingly provided by govern-
ments, using revenues raised locally through taxes and monopolies and also 
from foreign loans. The problem of securing a labor force was more diffi cult to 
solve, as in regions where land was abundant, local populations were under-
standably reluctant to abandon traditional farming activities for a harsh life as 
wage laborers. Increasingly labor was brought into export-producing regions 
in Southeast Asia from India and China, or from labor-surplus regions within 
the colonies; in Indonesia the Dutch encouraged Javanese workers to move 
to Sumatra, while the estates in Cochinchina used migrants from central and 
northern Vietnam. 
The rapid growth of both traditional and new export industries in the 
decades from 1870 to 1930 transformed the economies of several regions of 
Southeast Asia. But although these transformations involved large fl ows of 
capital and people, their impact on the economic and social status of indig-
enous peoples was limited. To a considerable extent, this was the result of 
deliberate policies on the part of colonial offi cials anxious to protect local 
populations from what they viewed as the ill effects of exposure to “high capi-
talism.” Urbanization in much of the region was limited, and although port 
cities grew, their populations were often dominated by migrants from other 
parts of Asia as well as from the metropoles and other parts of the world. It 
has been argued that Southeast Asia in 1900 was less urbanized than in the 
sixteenth century: 
The colonial regimes believed that they were “opening” Southeast Asian 
economies and societies to the world by exporting their produce and 
building infrastructure. In social and cultural terms the reverse was more 
nearly the case. As never before Southeast Asians became a peasant people 
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living in rural villages insulated by paternalistic offi cials and culturally 
distant traders from the changes that were transforming the world outside. 
(Reid 2001: 59) 
This argument has important implications for the models of colonial eco-
nomic development in East and Southeast Asia drawn up by economists in 
the postcolonial era. 
How Did Colonial Economies Function? 
Vent for Surplus Theory and the Open Dualistic Model of 
Colonial Development
Although British, Dutch, and French scholars made important contributions 
to the study of the precolonial history of Southeast Asia, including the study of 
precolonial economic systems, their work seems to have had very little impact 
on postcolonial studies of economic development in East and Southeast Asia. 
Instead most scholars who have written on the economic development of East 
and Southeast Asia in the second part of the twentieth century have used ana-
lytical tools drawn from Western classical and neoclassical economic theory. 
One infl uential concept, particularly associated with the work of the Burmese 
economist Hla Myint (1958, 1987), is that of “vent for surplus.” In developing 
this concept, Myint drew on the work of the classical economists, especially 
Adam Smith.
Myint argued that many underdeveloped economies in Asia and Africa 
had responded to the challenges of international trade, especially after 1870, 
by drawing on previously underutilized resources of land and labor to pro-
duce crops such as rice, coffee, cocoa, and spices, and after 1910 new crops 
such as rubber for the world market. In contrast to conventional compara-
tive advantage theory, in which producers operating in an economy where all 
resources are already fully employed respond to international trade by reallo-
cating factors of production away from home goods and toward exportables, 
the vent for surplus approach assumes that in developing economies there are 
idle resources of both land and labor that can be put to work to produce more 
exportables without necessarily reducing output of home goods such as food 
and clothing. According to Myint: 
The vent for surplus theory was particularly suited to explain the rapid 
expansion of agricultural exports from the relatively sparsely populated 
countries of Southeast Asia and West Africa. After the initial opening up 
of these countries in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
agricultural exports grew typically about 5 per cent a year for many 
decades. This happened without any important change in agricultural 
techniques, simply by bringing more land under cultivation. The addi-
tional labour was drawn from the subsistence sector. (1987: 121) 
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Over the years, attempts have been made to integrate the vent for surplus 
approach with other theories of export-led development, including the sta-
ples theory developed by Canadian economic historians. However, economic 
historians have not found it easy to explain why countries with apparently 
similar factor endowments in the late nineteenth century have evolved so dif-
ferently during the twentieth century (Findlay and Lundhal 1994: 90). Why, 
at the end of the century, did Ghana and Burma have a much lower per capita 
GDP than Malaysia? Why has Argentina performed less well than Canada or 
Australia? According to Findlay and Lundhal, much of the explanation lies in 
political economy factors, including ownership patterns and the distribution 
of productive assets and incomes. 
As is clear from the above quotation, Myint argued that the vent for sur-
plus theory was only applicable to sparsely populated regions with consider-
able land resources. As we will see, several parts of East and Southeast Asia by 
the early twentieth century did not really fi t this description. Myint’s analysis 
has also been criticized for not taking into account the full range of prod-
ucts produced by the pretrade, subsistence economy, especially handicrafts. 
Hymer and Resnick have pointed out that the process of opening up to trade 
would involve not just more production for export, but also inward fl ows of 
imported manufactures that would compete down labor-intensive handicrafts 
produced by the subsistence sector (1971: 484 – 486). The extended vent for 
surplus model developed by Smith (1976) allows for the partial demise of the 
handicraft sector and also examines the implications of the failure to bring 
about signifi cant technological progress in the food-crop sector. 
Another analytical framework that has gained attention in the Asian con-
text is that of the open dualistic colonial economy, developed by Hicks and 
McNicoll (1971) in their study of the Philippines, and Paauw and Fei (1973), 
who examined the economic transition from colonial to postcolonial econo-
mies in Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Thailand. It has also been used 
by Ho to analyze the impact of Japanese colonialism in East Asia (1984: 380–
386). In developing the model, these scholars drew on much previous work 
on economic development by W. Arthur Lewis, Hla Myint, Albert Hirschman, 
Paul Baran, Richard Caves, and Robert Baldwin, and also on a number of 
empirical studies of economic development in East and Southeast Asia. Vari-
ants of the model have also been used to analyze the impact of export-process-
ing zones in Asia (Warr 1989).
At the core of the open dualistic framework are fl ows of commodities, 
labor, technology, and capital between the modern and traditional sectors of 
the economy, and between both these sectors and the rest of the world. In 
the basic version of the model, used by Paauw and Fei to describe the opera-
tion of the colony economy (1973: 4 – 5), the traditional sector was largely 
insulated from both the modern enclave and the foreign sector. The mod-
ern enclave comprises both export agriculture and the nonagricultural sector, 
which imports manufactures from abroad. There is also a domestic market 
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within the enclave, where purchasing power is generated by primary exports. 
To complete the triangularism, the nonagricultural sector sells goods and ser-
vices to the domestic market serving commercial agriculture.
This triangular mode of the economy’s operation serves to achieve 
colonialism’s fundamental goal, the realization of profi ts through produc-
tion and exports of primary products. Export surplus may be defi ned as 
the surplus from exports over and above imports required to maintain the 
existing level of production. . . . The economic goal of colonialism was to 
extract from the colony a tangible gain in the form of this export surplus. 
(Paauw and Fei 1973: 5) 
Paauw and Fei argued that one of the main legacies of this “triangular 
mode” was that the domestic economy of the colony was compartmental-
ized into two largely insulated parts: a modern, export-oriented enclave and a 
large, backward, and stagnant agricultural sector. It was implicit in the model 
that investment would be concentrated in the export sector and that the pace 
of investment would be a function of foreign demand for the colony’s exports. 
It was also assumed that very few “inter-industry or commercial linkages take 
place between the enclave and the hinterland, so the economic growth expe-
rienced by the enclave is never transmitted to the hinterland, where most of 
the native population reside.” Furthermore the colony’s exports and imports 
would be tightly tied to the requirements of the metropole so that bilateral-
ism would be a strong feature of colonial trade fl ows (Ho 1984: 382). Thus the 
industrial and modern service sector, including fi nancial services, “developed 
no internal momentum” of their own (Paauw and Fei 1973: 7). 
Several aspects of this model seem unrealistic in the context of colonies in 
East and Southeast Asia in the early decades of the twentieth century. Perhaps 
the most serious drawback is that, unlike the vent for surplus approach, it 
treats the “traditional” sector as largely cut off from both the modern enclave 
and the foreign sector. The model thus seems to make no provision for the 
direct involvement of indigenous agricultural producers in the export econ-
omy. Nor is there any provision for movement of goods, labor, capital, or 
technologies between the traditional economy and the modern enclave. As 
Ho points out, the Japanese did try, with considerable success, to disseminate 
new technologies in the rice sector to farmers in both Taiwan and Korea. The 
role of government is also largely ignored, and there is no discussion of either 
the impact of taxation on the traditional sector or the effect of government 
expenditures on, for example, infrastructure development. 
In their exposition of the open, dualistic model, Hicks and McNicoll aban-
don the assumption of a completely closed traditional sector and allow for 
export fl ows from the traditional sector and also fl ows of commodities such 
as food between the traditional sector and the modern enclave (1971: 35–37). 
But for a fuller exposition of both the positive and negative consequences of 
 Introduction 11
fl ows between the traditional sector and the modern enclave, we should turn 
to Lewis (1976: 26–30). Lewis lists a number of benefi ts that can accrue to the 
traditional sector from the development of an export enclave:
1  Payments for commodities such as food and raw materials sold to the 
modern enclave;
2  Payments for labor services supplied by workers from the traditional sec-
tor, some of which are likely to be remitted back to households in the 
sector;
3  Provision of goods and services from the modern enclave, including 
imported inputs and possibly credit, at cheaper prices than prevailed pre-
viously;
4  Provision of infrastructure services such as ports, railways and roads, water 
supplies, and health facilities, that may have been built for enterprises and 
residents in the modern enclave but could be also used by the population 
of the traditional sector, often at prices below average cost;
5  Provision of public services, including roads, irrigation, health, and edu-
cation, paid for out of tax revenues that may accrue partly from the tradi-
tional sector and partly from the modern sector;
6  Provision of new crops and technologies including new agricultural sta-
ples (such as rubber) and also new public health technologies (such as 
smallpox vaccination) that can have important demographic implica-
tions;
7  Provision of new institutions in (for example) land and property rights or 
an enhanced role for local government.
To offset these possible benefi ts, Lewis lists a number of negative effects 
that the development of the modern enclave might have on the traditional 
sector:
1  The enclave may be predatory on the traditional sector through the 
enforced provision of labor, the compulsory acquisition of their lands at 
low or zero prices, or the compulsory provision of food and other com-
modities;
2  The products produced by the enclave or imported from abroad may 
destroy traditional handicraft industries and traditional services (e.g., rail-
ways or trucking displacing porters); 
3  The above argument can be extended into the “Dutch disease” analy-
sis of the negative impact of a booming export enclave—producing, for 
example, minerals — on producers of traditional traded goods through the 
effect of a real appreciation of the exchange rate. While in theory the 
negative effects can be offset by government taxation of the booming sec-
tor and use of the revenues to create jobs in nontraded goods and services, 
this in practice may not happen in a colonial economy where mining 
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and estate companies have considerable infl uence with the metropolitan 
government;
4  The development of the enclave will attract the brightest and most ambi-
tious among the indigenous population leading to a brain drain from the 
traditional sector and increased polarization of the national economy; 
5  It is also likely that the provision of a limited number of highly paid jobs 
in the modern enclave for people from the traditional sector will induce 
large-scale migration to and unemployment in the modern enclave;
6  The gradual dissemination of modern health technologies from the 
enclave to the traditional sector will lead to falling mortality and faster 
population growth in the traditional sector, which in turn could lead to 
pressure on available land and growing landlessness and rural impover-
ishment;
7  Although not specifi cally mentioned by Lewis, it is implicit in the open 
dualistic model that export surpluses sustained over long periods of time 
will reduce the growth of gross national income (as distinct from gross 
domestic product) and thus resources available to the domestic economy 
for both investment and consumption. 
The above list of possible negative effects is indeed a formidable one, as 
Lewis acknowledged (1976: 29). It is true that these negative effects might 
accrue from any process of economic growth based on a dynamic export 
enclave and not just one taking place under a colonial government. Accord-
ing to Lewis, whether the net impact of the export enclave on the traditional 
sector is positive or negative depends crucially on whether the government 
“coerces or helps the traditional sectors, and on the nature of the enclaves” 
(ibid.). The so-called staple theory of development as well as the linkage con-
cept stress that some export staples appear to have had a more positive effect 
on broad-based economic development than others, with sugar often appear-
ing to be the “development villain” (Hirschman 1977: 92). But as Hanson has 
pointed out, the problem with these arguments is that the growth experience 
of economies producing the same staples is often very different, owing some-
times to the role of government and sometimes to the emergence of private 
entrepreneurs (1980: 46–50). 
Questions  Addressed in This Study
The debates triggered by both the vent for surplus and the open dualistic mod-
els have raised a complex set of questions that continue to be analyzed in the 
context of many former colonial territories, in Asia and elsewhere. Answers to 
these questions can in turn help us to explain the very different postcolonial 
outcomes that we observe in the second part of the twentieth century. That 
these outcomes have varied considerably in East and Southeast Asia is obvious 
from Tables 1.1 and 1.2. By 2000, the two former Japanese colonies of Taiwan 
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and Korea (the Republic of Korea or South Korea) had achieved a substantial 
measure of “catch-up” both with the United States and with Japan. This was 
also true of the two city-states, one of which (Hong Kong) remained a Brit-
ish colony until 1997, while Singapore became an independent republic after 
it withdrew from the Federation of Malaysia in 1965. Of the other former 
colonies in Asia, India, Indonesia, Burma, and the Philippines all had lower 
per capita GDP, relative to the United States, in 2000 than in 1913. In other 
words, per capita GDP growth was slower during the twentieth century in 
these economies than in the United States. Far from catching up with the 
world’s leading economy, these countries were falling further behind. Even in 
Malaysia, widely considered to be among the more successful economies in 
Southeast Asia in recent decades, per capita GDP relative to that of the United 
States was only slightly higher in 2000 than in 1929.
Confronted with the evidence on growth of GDP in the twentieth century, 
several scholars have claimed that because the two former Japanese colonies 
have performed better since 1950 than the former British, Dutch, French, or 
American colonies in Asia, or indeed than Thailand, which was never formally 
a colony, Japanese colonialism was exceptional, especially in its emphasis 
on economic development. For example, Reynolds, in a survey of economic 
growth in the third world since 1850, argued that “Japan has always been 
growth-oriented, in colonial areas as well as at home; and it is clear that Japa-
nese rule helped to initiate intensive growth in both Korea and Taiwan” (1983: 
956). Maddison argued that “Japanese colonialism was more developmental 
than that of other countries, because it involved a greater effort to transfer 
and develop technology, higher physical investment and better development 
of local development and human capital” (1990: 365). Similar claims for the 
developmental impact of Japanese colonialism in Korea have been made by 
Kohli (1994) and Cumings (1984a: 481). 
It is possible that these writers have fallen into the trap of writing history 
backward and have simply concluded that because the postcolonial perfor-
mance of Taiwan and South Korea has been better than elsewhere in Asia 
(including the independent state of Thailand), Japanese colonialism must 
have been more developmental. But this would be unfair to scholars with a 
deep knowledge of processes of economic growth and structural change in 
Asia and elsewhere. This study will argue that there is evidence that the Japa-
nese approached their colonial mission in both Taiwan and Korea with dif-
ferent goals from those of the European colonial powers and that these goals 
did make a difference to the policies they adopted. But as we have seen, the 
Americans also believed that their colonial policies were different and were 
more concerned with fostering the capacity of Filipinos to govern themselves. 
Why then has the economic performance of the Philippines been so different 
from the performances of Taiwan and South Korea after 1960?
To answer this question, it is necessary to go back to the early decades of 
the twentieth century and to look in detail at economic trends during these 
14 Chapter 1
decades, and then to review a number of economic and social indicators for all 
the colonial territories in East and Southeast Asia in the 1930s. If indeed the 
difference between the Japanese colonies and the rest was suffi ciently striking 
on the eve of the Pacifi c War to give a clear indication of their post-1950 tra-
jectories, then the case for Japanese developmental colonialism would seem 
to be confi rmed. But if the differences were not obvious, then that would 
strengthen the case of those who argue that it was the process of decoloniza-
tion itself and the policies adopted by independent regimes, some of which 
were intended to reverse colonial polices, that were decisive in putting the 
former Japanese colonies on a different development trajectory after 1945. 
Chapters 2 and 3 present a review of the evidence on economic and demo-
graphic growth and structural change across East and Southeast Asia from 
the late nineteenth century to 1940. To what extent was agricultural growth 
driven by exports rather than home consumption? How important were new 
technologies in agricultural growth? How much industrial growth took place, 
and what were the effects of industrial growth on employment? And how 
much growth occurred in services? To the extent that growing populations 
were largely accommodated in agriculture, what were the implications for 
access to land? Was economic growth accompanied by a growing polarization 
of the agricultural population into landlords, tenants, and landless laborers? 
Or did a robust landowning peasantry manage to coexist with the large-scale 
estates owned by both foreign and domestic interests? 
Lewis (1976) stressed that the role of government is crucial in determin-
ing the impact of enclave development on the traditional economy. Other 
scholars of colonial development have also stressed that colonial govern-
ments, through both taxation and expenditure policies, have played a crucial 
role in shaping the development environment, and that to ignore the role of 
government is to “omit crucial economic linkages in the development pro-
cess” (Birnberg and Resnick 1975: 250). It is implicit in most criticisms of 
colonial economic policies, in Asia and elsewhere, that governments either 
had little effect at all on the economy, beyond the “nightwatchman role” of 
raising enough revenues to run a minimalist administration and maintain 
law and order, or favored the modern enclave in creating infrastructure and 
were coercive or even predatory in their treatment of the traditional sector. 
The concept of the colonial state as the precursor of the developmental state 
has had very little currency in Asia beyond the work of Kohli (1994) on Korea. 
But it is arguable that this concept has wider applicability in at least parts of 
Southeast Asia. The role of government in colonial East and Southeast Asia is 
discussed further in Chapter 4.
An important consequence of the open dualistic model, as expounded 
by Paauw and Fei, is that colonial economies will run large export surpluses 
that are used to fi nance remittances abroad, on either government or private 
account. It is also widely argued by postcolonial critics of colonial policies in 
East and Southeast Asia that most of these remittances went to governments 
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or corporate enterprises, or to private citizens in the metropolitan country. 
A number of studies have shown that colonial trade and investment fl ows 
were usually biased in the direction of the metropolitan power (Kleiman 1976; 
Svedberg 1981). These arguments are reviewed in Chapter 5, which also exam-
ines the evolution of both trade and exchange rate policies in the various 
colonies in East and Southeast Asia in the period from 1900 to 1940 and the 
consequences of these policies for economic growth and structural change.
Another important strand in the postcolonial literature concerns the 
impact of colonial policies on the development of entrepreneurship. In the 
Southeast Asian context, an important concept is that of the “plural economy,” 
which is associated with the work of Furnivall (1948, 1957). His argument was 
that, throughout much of the region, colonial policies encouraged in-migra-
tion from both China and India, and these migrants, together with the usually 
quite small European populations, mixed but did not combine with the many 
different indigenous groups that peopled Burma, Thailand, Malaya, Indonesia, 
the Philippines, and Indochina. According to Furnivall, the division of labor 
along ethnic lines became especially rigid in the European colonies, with each 
racial group performing different economic functions with little or no mobil-
ity between occupations. It has been argued that this rigidity contrasted with 
both the Philippines and Taiwan and Korea, where American and Japanese 
policies were more supportive of the development of a robust class of indig-
enous entrepreneurs. These arguments are evaluated in Chapter 6.
Another issue that has occasioned much debate and controversy con-
cerns the impact of colonial economic policies on living standards of the 
indigenous populations. A frequent criticism is that such economic growth 
as occurred in the colonial era did not benefi t the great majority of the popu-
lation. Even while exports were booming, it is argued, food consumption per 
capita was stagnant or actually falling, and social indicators such as mortality 
rates, literacy, and educational enrollments showed little improvement. On 
the one hand, arguments about the “pauperization” of colonial populations 
have been made in the context of Korea as well as several Southeast Asian 
colonies. On the other hand, it has also been argued that, especially in Taiwan 
and the Philippines, Japanese and American policies led to improvements not 
just in incomes, but also in health and educational indicators. Using a range 
of economic and social indicators, Chapter 7 attempts to evaluate the impact 
of colonialism on living standards in East and Southeast Asia during the fi rst 
four decades of the twentieth century.
By the late 1930s, the evidence reviewed in Chapter 7 suggests, there were 
signifi cant differences between the various colonies in incomes and living 
standards. After the bombing of Pearl Harbor and the rapid conquest by the 
Japanese Imperial Army of Burma, Malaya, Indonesia, and the Philippines, 
together with the strengthening of Japanese control over cooperating regimes 
in Thailand and French Indochina, the Japanese were able to impose tight eco-
nomic control over much of East and Southeast Asia. The Greater East Asian 
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Co-Prosperity Sphere was intended not just to destroy all vestiges of European 
and American control over Southeast Asia, but also to integrate both the Japa-
nese colonies and the conquered territories of East and Southeast Asia into 
a huge single market, centered on Japan. Many Japanese sincerely believed 
this would lead to faster economic development and higher living standards 
throughout the region. 
But in fact the years of the Japanese occupation were both an economic 
disaster and a political watershed for all the territories that fell under Japanese 
control. The reasons for this are examined in Chapter 8. It is probable that, by 
August 1945, when the Japanese were forced into an unconditional surrender, 
the lives of at least fi ve million people in Southeast Asia had been brought 
to a premature end through starvation and disease. In addition, heavy Allied 
bombing had destroyed infrastructure and productive enterprises throughout 
Southeast Asia, and also in Taiwan and Korea. Virtually everywhere in the 
region, as well as in Japan itself, per capita domestic output was well below 
prewar levels, and most experts thought that the recovery period would be 
prolonged. 
In fact there was considerable variation in the economic strategies adopted 
by the various governments in the region in the years after 1945, which 
affected both the speed of recovery and the prospects for continued economic 
growth and structural change. Much of the explanation for the differences lies 
with the very different processes of decolonization that took place after 1945. 
Chapter 9 examines these differences and the consequences for economic pol-
icy making in the fi fteen years from 1945 to 1960. During these years several 
countries in Southeast Asia adopted what Myint (1967) termed inward-looking 
policies, which stressed national self-reliance rather than continued reliance 
on exports as an engine of growth. Others adopted more outward-looking 
policies that encouraged both the rehabilitation and expansion of traditional 
exports and diversifi cation away from primary products and toward manufac-
tures. While there is a strong consensus in the literature that countries that 
implemented outward-looking policies achieved faster economic growth, it 
is argued in Chapter 9 that other initiatives were also crucial in laying the 
foundations for accelerated growth after 1960. Of particular importance were 
policies directed toward the reform of agrarian systems and toward the elimi-
nation of the legacies of the plural economy. 
To what extent do the different colonial legacies explain the different 
policies adopted by postindependence governments? Or were the differences 
in policies mainly the result of the different regimes that emerged as a result 
of the post-1945 decolonization process? That these regimes differed widely 
can hardly be disputed. By the late 1960s, many countries in Asia were ruled 
by regimes in which the military played a dominant role and that had little or 
no democratic legitimacy. This was true of South Korea and Taiwan as well as 
Burma, Thailand, Indonesia, and South Vietnam. But economic policies and 
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outcomes varied considerably among these countries, in spite of the apparent 
similarities in the political regimes. In the Philippines and the Federation of 
Malaysia, from which Singapore broke away in 1965, the military had a much 
lower profi le in government, and the political leadership was largely civilian 
and had greater popular support, although this hardly meant economic poli-
cies were similar in the Philippines, Malaysia, and Singapore. What explained 
these differences? The fi nal chapter concludes by drawing together the main 
themes and arguments of the book and tries to provide some answers to the 
above questions. 
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C H A P T E R  2
Economic Growth and 
Structural Change: 
1900 –1940
Population Growth
By the end of the 1930s, the population of colonial Southeast Asia together 
with independent Thailand amounted to around 150 million people. The 
population of Korea and Taiwan together came to almost 30 million. By the 
1930s, all colonial governments had carried out population censuses and were 
also collecting a range of other data on landholdings, employment, and lit-
eracy. It is therefore possible to estimate with reasonable accuracy population 
growth during the early decades of the twentieth century (Table 2.1). Every-
where in East and Southeast Asia growth rates exceeded 1 percent per annum, 
and in Thailand, the Philippines, and British Malaya they were over 2 percent 
per annum, which were high growth rates for that period. Although popula-
tion growth rates tended to be higher in the relatively less densely settled 
parts of the region, there were still, by the end of the 1930s, striking regional 
differences in population densities, with Java, Korea, and Taiwan having the 
highest populations per square kilometer of area, and Laos, Cambodia, and 
the Outer Islands of Indonesia the lowest. 
Three variables determine the rate of growth of population in a given 
region or country: the birth rate, the death rate, and the rate of inward and 
outward migration. Changes in each of these variables had important demo-
graphic consequences in East and Southeast Asia in the early decades of the 
twentieth century, to varying degrees in different parts of the region. Although 
birth rates remained quite high virtually everywhere, mortality rates had 
begun to fall by the early twentieth century, mainly as a result of the dissemi-
nation of modern medical technology and the active implementation of pub-
lic health measures by colonial offi cials. In the more land-abundant countries 
and regions, in-migration was often encouraged, either from more densely 
settled regions within the colony or from abroad. In Southeast Asia, most 
of the overseas migration was from either India or China. In addition, most 
colonial territories experienced in-migration from the metropolitan power. 
This migration had the biggest demographic impact in the Japanese colonies, 
especially Taiwan. Overseas out-migration also occurred in some areas; its 
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impact was probably greatest in Korea, where it was estimated that by the 
1930s, 10 percent of the total population was “earning its bread abroad.” By 
1940, there were more Koreans in Japan than Japanese in Korea (Grajdanzev 
1944: 76 – 81). 
Although international migration was important in most parts of the 
region, its impact on the composition of populations within different colonies 
should not be exaggerated. Census data from the 1930s reveal that, in most 
parts of East and Southeast Asia, the vast majority of the population was indig-
enous. The main exception was British Malaya, where Chinese and Indian 
migrants and their descendants accounted for over half of the population 
in 1931 (Table 2.2). The population of Thailand who identifi ed themselves 
as Chinese by race in the 1937 census amounted to more than 4 percent of 
the total population, although it is probable that many descendants of ear-
lier migrants who had made Thailand their home either no longer considered 
themselves Chinese or did not wish to identify themselves as such in the cen-
sus. Manarungsan has estimated that almost 12 percent of the population of 
Thailand was of Chinese descent in 1937 (1989: 32). Everywhere apart from 
Table 2.1. Population Density and Growth in East and Southeast Asia
   Population Growth: 
 Population: 1939 Population Density c. 1913 –1939
Colony (millions) ( per square km.) ( percent annual growth)
Taiwan 5.7 160 2.1
Korea 24.0 109 1.7
Tonkin 10.4 88 1.4
Annam 8.0 54 0.7
Cochinchina 6.1 95 1.1
 All Vietnam 24.5 74 1.1
Cambodia 3.1 17 1.6
Laos 1.0 4 1.3
Thailand 15.2 30 2.2
Burma 16.4 27 1.2
Philippines 16.2 53 2.4
British Malaya 5.4 39 2.5
Java 47.0 356 1.1
Outer Islands 21.4 12 1.5
All Indonesia 68.4 36 1.3
Sources: Korea: Grajdanzev 1944: 71–74; Taiwan: Barclay 1954: 13; Indonesia: Central Bureau of 
Statistics 1947: 6, with additional data from Boomgaard and Gooszen 1991; Vietnam: Banens 2000: 
33; Cambodia and Laos: Direction des Services Économiques 1947: 271; Thailand: Manarungsan 
1989: 32; Burma: Saito and Lee 1999: 7; Philippines: Bureau of Census and Statistics 1941: 13; 
 British Malaya: Department of Statistics 1939: 36.
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British Malaya, indigenous populations accounted for more than 85 percent of 
the total. Migrant Asians and their descendants tended to account for a higher 
proportion of urban populations than rural ones, although this too varied 
considerably by country and region. Chinese were estimated to account for 74 
percent of the population of Singapore in 1931, 39 percent of the combined 
populations of Saigon and Cholon, but only 15 percent of the population 
of Batavia and the adjoining suburb of Meester Cornelis (Purcell 1965: 177; 
Boomgaard and Gooszen 1991: table 15.2b). 
The extent of urbanization itself varied considerably across East and South-
east Asia in the early decades of the twentieth century. Although as Reid (2001) 
has argued, it is probable that urban populations declined as a proportion of 
total populations in several parts of the region after 1600, the early decades 
of the twentieth century did witness considerable urban growth. The most 
urbanized colony by the 1930s was without doubt British Malaya. Over 10 
percent of the population lived in the largest city, Singapore, and more than 
18 percent lived in the fi ve largest cities. Sixteen percent lived in cities with 
populations in excess of 100,000 (Table 2.3). All these percentages were higher 
than in Taiwan, which was probably the next most urbanized colony, although 
Table 2.2. Percentage Breakdown of Colonial Populations by 
Ethnic Background, 1930s
 Europeans / Japanese /
Colony Americans Chinese Other Asians Indigenous
Taiwan (1935) 5.2 1.1a n.a. 93.7
Korea (1939) 2.9 0.2 n.a. 96.9
Tonkin (1937) 0.2 0.4 n.a. 99.4
Annam (1937) 0.1 0.2 n.a. 99.7
Cochinchina (1937) 0.3 3.7 n.a. 96.0
Cambodia (1937) 0.1 3.5 n.a. 96.4
Laos (1937) 0.1 0.3 n.a. 99.6
Thailand (1937) n.a. 11.8 0.8 87.4
Burma (1931) 0.2 1.3 8.2 b 90.3
British Malaya (1931) 0.4 39.0 15.8 44.7
Philippines (1939) 0.3 0.7 n.a. 99.0
Java (1930) 0.5 1.4 0.1 98.0
Other Indonesia (1930) 0.3 3.4 0.3 96.0
Sources: Korea: Grajdanzev 1944: 76; Taiwan: Barclay 1954: 16; Indonesia: Boomgaard and Gooszen 
1991; French Indochina: Robequain 1944: tables 1 and 6; Thailand: Manarungsan 1989: 32; 
Burma: Saito and Lee 1999: table 1-3; Philippines: Bureau of Census and Statistics 1947: 17; British 
Malaya: Department of Statistics 1939: 36.
Note: n.a. = not available.
a Refers to citizens of mainland China and other foreigners.
b Includes Indo-Burmans. 
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by the end of the 1930s, the largest cities were Keijo (modern Seoul) in Korea, 
Manila in the Philippines, and Bangkok in Thailand. The least urbanized parts 
of Southeast Asia were French Indochina and the Outer Islands of Indonesia; 
less than 3 percent of the population in French Indochina lived in the fi ve 
largest cities and only 2 percent outside Java (Table 2.3). 
The extent of urbanization refl ected the extent of economic diversifi ca-
tion away from agriculture and toward industry and services, although by no 
means all nonagricultural activity was located in urban areas. By the fourth 
decade of the twentieth century, many colonies in East and Southeast Asia 
had achieved both growth in per capita GDP and considerable diversifi cation 
away from small-scale agriculture. In the process, their populations diversifi ed 
their sources of income by seeking new employment opportunities in addi-
tion to or in place of more traditional occupations. 
Growth in National Output and Income: 1913 –1938
In 1913, the United States had already become the world leader in terms of 
both total and per capita GDP (Maddison 2003: tables 8b, 8c). Of the major 
European economies, the United Kingdom still had the highest per capita 
GDP, followed by Belgium and the Netherlands, but in terms of total GDP, 
the United Kingdom had been overtaken by Germany (ibid.: table 1b). Of the 
Table 2.3. Urban Populations as a Percentage of Total Populations, 1930s
    Population of
   All Cities over Largest City
Colony Largest City Largest Five 100,000 (thousands)
Taiwan (1940) 5.7 13.7 10.5 313
Korea (1940)  3.8 7.6 8.3 935
Indochina (1931) 1.2 a 2.8 2.4 256 a
Thailand (1937) 6.1b n.a. n.a. 890 b
Burma (1931) 2.7 4.8 3.7 400
British Malaya (1931) 10.2 18.2 16.1 446
Philippines (1939) 5.3 n.a. n.a. 848
Java (1930) 1.3 c 3.4 3.7 533 c
Other Indonesia (1930) 0.6 2.0 0.6 108
Sources: Korea: Grajdanzev 1944: 80; Taiwan: Barclay 1954: 116; French Indochina: Purcell 1965: 
176; Thailand: Central Statistical Offi ce 1955: table 3; Burma: Saito and Lee 1999: table 1-4; 
 Philippines: Bureau of Census and Statistics 1947: 18; British Malaya: Vlieland 1932: 45 – 47; 
 Indonesia: Boomgaard and Gooszen 1991: tables 15.2b, 22b.
Note: n.a. = not available.
a Saigon and Cholon.
b Changwat of Phra-nakorn and Thonburi.
c Batavia and Meester Cornelis. 
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major Asian economies, only Japan had a per capita GDP that was more than 
one-quarter of that of the United States; in most of the colonial territories 
and in China, per capita GDP was well below 20 percent of that in the United 
States (see Table 1.1). After Japan, the highest per capita GDP in 1913, accord-
ing to the Maddison estimates, was in Hong Kong and Singapore, followed by 
the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand. South Korea and Taiwan 
were below all these countries and above only Burma. Although Hong Kong 
was a British colony and a separate jurisdiction from China, Singapore was 
an integral part of the Straits Settlements, which were in turn part of British 
Malaya. A population-weighted average of the per capita GDP of both Singa-
pore and the rest of British Malaya in 1913 was still below the Philippines, 
although above other colonial territories in the region (Table 2.4). 
By 1929, Taiwan and South Korea had overtaken Thailand but were still 
below the other three Southeast Asian economies, according to Maddison. But 
his estimates have been challenged by Fukao, Ma, and Yuan (2005: table 6), 
who put forward a new set of purchasing-power-adjusted fi gures for both Tai-
wan and Korea, and argue that, by 1930, per capita GDP in Taiwan was 82 per-
cent of that in Japan, compared with only 43 percent in Korea. If their fi gures 
are correct, then Taiwan’s per capita GDP in 1929 would have been above the 
Philippines, although still below that of British Malaya, including Singapore. 
It has been claimed that British Malaya enjoyed very rapid output growth of 
per capita GDP during the second and third decades of the twentieth century, 
probably of around 4 percent per annum (Maddison 2003: 183). We do not yet 
have a comprehensive national income study for all of British Malaya for this 
period, but it is likely that, by 1929, average per capita GDP for all three parts, 
Table 2.4. Per Capita GDP for Japan, Thailand, and Colonies in East and 
Southeast Asia, 1913, 1929, and 1938
 Per Capita GDP (1990 dollars) Percentage Growth Rate
 1913 1929 1938 1913–1929 1913–1938
Japan 1,387 2,026 2,449 2.4 2.3
Philippines 1,053 1,502 1,522 2.2 1.5
Indonesia 904 1,170 1,175 1.6 1.1
Malaysia 900 a 1,682 1,361 4.0 1.7
Thailand 841 793 826 – 0.4 – 0.1
Korea 820 1,014 1,459 1.3 2.3
Taiwan 747 1,146 1,302 2.7 2.2
Burma 685 n.a. 740 n.a. 0.3
Source: Maddison 2003: 180–183.
Note: n.a. = not available.
a Maddison’s fi gures refer to the contemporary state of Malaysia, which excludes Singapore. A 
population-weighted average of per capita GDP for Singapore and Malaysia in 1913 would have 
been $943. 
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including Singapore, was almost 90 percent of that of Japan. Other colonial 
territories in Southeast Asia also grew in per capita terms during these decades, 
although at a slower rate than British Malaya. Only Thailand, which was not 
a colony, stagnated.
It was only during the 1930s, a period of slow or negative growth in most 
parts of Southeast Asia, that the two Japanese colonies grew much faster than 
other parts of Southeast Asia, although in 1938 the Philippines still had a per 
capita GDP above either of them, according to the Maddison estimates (see 
Table 2.4). The revised estimates of Fukao, Ma, and Yuan (2005) suggest that 
Taiwan’s per capita GDP was much closer to that of Japan. If their estimates 
are correct, then per capita GDP in Taiwan would have been above that of the 
Philippines by 1938, although that of Korea would still have been well below 
both the Philippines and British Malaya. It will be argued in subsequent chap-
ters that there is considerable evidence to support this ranking. 
The poor growth performance of most parts of Southeast Asia during the 
1930s was a direct consequence of their high exposure to international mar-
kets for primary products. Not only did prices of most tropical agricultural 
products and most minerals fall, but many commodities became subject to 
international quota agreements, which restricted output. Administering these 
quotas became a major challenge for governments in several colonies in the 
1930s. Those colonies that could sell their exports into protected markets in 
the metropolitan economy or in other parts of the metropolitan power’s impe-
rial possessions had a considerable advantage. The response to the problems 
of the 1930s varied considerably by colony, but in several cases governments 
responded by promoting economic diversifi cation, including the develop-
ment of manufacturing industry. 
Growth of Agricultural Output
As would be expected given the generally low levels of per capita GDP in 1913, 
most Asian economies were predominantly agricultural, with more than 40 
percent of GDP coming from the agricultural sector, except in Japan, where 
the share had already fallen to under 30 percent (Table 2.5). In Korea almost 
60 percent of GDP accrued from agriculture and forestry, which was a higher 
share than in those Southeast Asian countries for which we have estimates, 
with the exception of Burma. Agricultural growth was certainly rapid in both 
Taiwan and Korea after 1913, and by 1938 value added in agriculture had dou-
bled in Taiwan and almost doubled in Korea. The performance in Thailand, 
Indonesia, and Burma was not as impressive, mainly because of the very slow 
growth in the 1930s. But in most parts of Asia over these years, the nonagri-
cultural sectors were growing faster than agriculture so that by 1938 the agri-
cultural share of GDP had fallen everywhere except in Thailand. In Indonesia, 
by 1938 agriculture accounted for about one-third of total GDP, compared 
with 41 percent in Taiwan and 47 percent in Korea (Table 2.5). 
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The rapid agricultural growth in both Korea and Taiwan after 1913 was 
very largely based on smallholder agriculture. Estate agriculture was unfamiliar 
to the Japanese, and the colonial offi cials felt comfortable with the landlord-
tenant regimes that existed in both colonies, which were broadly similar to 
that in Japan. Introducing a plantation system “would have required a radical 
redistribution of rural assets, a change that might be too disruptive and coun-
ter-productive” (Ho 1984: 385). There was a broad similarity between Japan 
and its two colonies by 1920 in the ratio of land area per male agricultural 
worker, output per unit of land, and output per male agricultural worker (Hay-
ami and Ruttan 1979: tables 1-1 and 1-4). By the 1920s, growth in land per 
agricultural worker was negative in both Korea and Taiwan; all the growth in 
output per worker was due to growth in output per unit of land. It is clear that 
the “vent for surplus” theory had little applicability in these two colonies.
Instead, the explanation for growth in agricultural output must be sought 
in technological change that led to rapid growth in crop yields, especially of 
rice. After the serious shortages and rice riots of 1918, the Japanese govern-
ment began to facilitate the transfer of Japanese high-yielding rice varieties to 
both Taiwan and Korea, in the hope that both colonies could provide Japan 
with rice. The ponlai variety in particular diffused rapidly, and fertilizer use 
increased in both colonies (Hayami 1973: table 2.1; Lin 1973: 17–19; Lee and 
Chen 1979: 82 – 86; Myers and Yamada 1984: 437– 439). Government invest-
ment in irrigation also grew, which led to an increase in double cropping, 
especially in Taiwan. By 1925, Korea was supplying Japan with more than 
5 percent of its total rice consumption and Taiwan a further 2.8 percent (Ka 
1995: 135). Taiwan also became an important supplier of sugar to Japan, dis-
Table 2.5. Index of Growth of Real Value Added in Agriculture for Japan, 
Thailand, and Selected Colonies, 1913, 1929, and 1938
Country Index of  V alue Added in Percentage Agriculture as a
 Agriculture Annual Growth Percentage of NDP / GDP a
 1913 1929 1938 1913 –1938 1913 1938
Japan 100 118 129 1.0 28.9 15.6
Korea 100 133 184 2.5 63.3 47.1
Taiwan 100 132 202 2.8 53.8 41.2
Thailand 100 129 168 2.1 44.7 44.3
Burma 100 125 129 0.9 68.6 54.3
Philippines n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 60.4 46.6
Indonesia 100 131 148 1.6 40.5 33.7
Sources: Japan, Korea, and Taiwan: Mizoguchi and Umemura 1988: 230 –239; Thailand: Manarung-
san 1989: 251; Indonesia: van der Eng 2002: 171–172; Burma: Aye Hlaing 1965: 289; Philippines: 
Hooley 1968: table 1. 
Note: n.a. = not available.
a NDP for Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and Burma; GDP for Indonesia and Thailand. 
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placing imports from Java (Lin 1973: 17). There can be little doubt that the 
introduction of a “Meiji agrarian strategy,” including considerable investment 
in irrigation and rural infrastructure, and the large market in metropolitan 
Japan served to accelerate the pace of agricultural growth in both Korea and 
Taiwan, and by the late 1930s, rice yields were much higher than in other 
parts of Asia (Table 2.6). The impact of Japanese agrarian policies on the wel-
fare of the rural population will be discussed further in subsequent chapters.
In much of Southeast Asia after 1900, colonial governments were also 
actively seeking to promote agricultural growth, both for home and for-
eign markets. The growth of rice production was quite rapid in the decades 
after 1910 in land-abundant parts of Southeast Asia such as the Philippines, 
Malaya, and Thailand, and in southern Vietnam (Cochinchina), although 
nowhere was it faster than in Taiwan (see Table 2.6). Much of this growth was 
due to the reproduction of traditional varieties over more land; where the 
cultivation frontier was pushed out to less fertile land, average yields tended 
Table 2.6. Growth of Rice Production, 1916 –1920 to 1937–1939, 
Per Capita Availability, and Planted Area per Agricultural Worker in 
East and Southeast Asia, 1937–1939
 Output Growth  Per Capita  Planted Rice Area
 1916 /1920 to  Yields Availability b  per Agricultural
Colony / 1937/1939 a 1937/1939 1937/1939 Irrigation Worker
Country ( % per annum) (tons / ha.) ( kg. per year) Ratio c ( ha.) 
Taiwan 3.4 2.1 129 d 83.7 0.47
Korea 2.9 2.1 91 68.5 0.21
Indochina 1.6 0.7 140 e n.a. n.a.
Thailand 2.6 0.8 142 9.7 0.56
Burma 0.6 0.8 122 11.8 1.20
Malaya 2.7 1.1 178 n.a. 0.24
Philippines 2.3 0.8 97 24.8 0.57
Java 1.4 1.1 85 30.6 0.30
Sources: Rose 1985 with additional data from van der Eng 1996: tables A.3 and A.6; Saito and Lee 
1999; Grajdanzev 1942: 54; Grajdanzev 1944: 291; Boomgaard and van Zanden 1990: 96; Barnett 
1947: table 26. Data on per capita rice availabilities for Taiwan and Korea from Johnston 1953: 270, 
for the Philippines from Mears et al. 1974: 355, for Java from Mears 1961: 246, for Burma from 
Richter 1976: 6, for Thailand from Manarungsan 1989: 210 –211, for British Malaya from Grist 
1941: table 32, for Indochina from Bulletin économique de l’Indochine 52:5 (May 1949): 146. 
Note: n.a. = not available.
a Output growth for British Malaya: 1917/1919 to 1937/1939; Korea: 1917/1918 to 1937/1938; 
Indochina: 1916/1918 to 1936/1938.
b Milled rice.
c Irrigated area as a percentage of harvested area of rice in the late 1930s.
d Average for 1938 /1939 and 1939/1940.
e Average for 1934 –1938. 
26 Chapter 2
to fall. In Burma and Thailand, yields of paddy per hectare either stagnated 
or declined between 1916 –1920 and 1936 –1940 (Saito and Lee 1999: 80 – 81; 
Manarungsan 1989: 50 – 51). Value added in agriculture in Burma (as estimated 
by Aye Hlaing) did not expand as rapidly as land under occupation during the 
period from 1901–1902 to 1936 –1937 (Table 2.7). In the Philippines, Hooley 
found that land under cultivation also grew faster than agricultural output, 
especially after 1918 (1968: 16–18). He did not, however, consider that falling 
land productivity in the 1920s and 1930s was solely due to the extension of 
the cultivation frontier to less fertile regions. 
Stagnant or falling land productivity, because of falling yields of food 
crops, was not characteristic of all parts of Southeast Asia in the fi rst four 
decades of the twentieth century. In peninsular Malaya, yields per acre of wet 
paddy increased by 57 percent between 1925–1926 and 1938 –1939, while area 
under cultivation increased by around 23 percent (Barnett 1947: table 26). In 
other words, signifi cant yields growth was achieved at the same time culti-
vated area expanded. The yields growth refl ected investment in irrigation and 
also a program to disseminate new seed varieties (Lim 1977: 190). The Dutch 
in Java also tried to encourage greater use of fertilizer and to develop new vari-
eties; these facilitated double cropping and thus increased production (Barker, 
Herdt, and Rose 1985: 58; van der Eng 1996: 81–91). Van der Eng estimates 
that land productivity grew by 0.5 percent per annum in Java between 1900 
and 1920, and 1.2 percent per annum between 1920 and 1937 (1996: 39). Dur-
ing these four decades, the real value of agricultural output almost doubled, 
while land area increased by only 38 percent (see Table 2.7).
From the latter part of the nineteenth century, in peninsular Malaya, in 
Table 2.7. Index of Growth of Value Added in Agriculture and Cultivated 
Land, 1901 to 1938: Burma, the Philippines, and Java (1938 = 100)
 Burma Philippines a Java
Year Value Added Land Value Added Land Value Added Land
1901–1902 76.0 65.6 40.9 29.4 53.6 72.3
1906–1907 67.5 76.9 n.a. n.a. 61.5 74.7
1911–1912 76.1 81.8 n.a. n.a. 72.6 84.6
1916–1917 109.9 86.2 89.8 66.8 77.1 90.1
1921–1922 77.2 90.3 n.a. n.a. 73.7 94.4
1926–1927 94.2 94.9 95.6 n.a. 89.4 97.1
1931–1932 124.5 96.9 n.a. n.a. 97.2 99.6
1936–1937 117.1 99.2 n.a. n.a. 91.3 98.8
1938–1939 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Sources: Burma: Saito and Lee 1999: 37, 214; Philippines: Hooley 1968: tables 1 and 5; Java: van der 
Eng 1996: tables A.1.2. and A.4. 
Note: n.a. = not available.
a Figures for the Philippines refer to calendar years 1902, 1918, 1928, and 1938. 
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Sumatra, and in southern Vietnam, the British, Dutch, and French colonial 
authorities facilitated the acquisition of land by large estate companies to grow 
crops such as tobacco and rubber, while in Java the area under sugar (much of 
it rented from small farmers by the estate companies) increased rapidly after 
1870. In the Philippines, there were few large-scale agricultural proprietors in 
the latter part of the nineteenth century (Legarda 1999: 185–186). The largest 
landlord was the Catholic church, which was induced to sell most of its lands 
by the incoming American administration. During the American period, large 
estates producing sugar, fruits, and other crops were built up, many of them 
owned by Filipinos. In parts of Southeast Asia where large estates emerged, 
whether owned by foreigners, migrants from other parts of Asia, or locals, ten-
sions frequently erupted over landownership and cultivation rights. These ten-
sions and their consequences are examined in more detail in the next chapter. 
But to the extent that they were important by the interwar era, they suggest 
that the simple vent for surplus theory is not entirely satisfactory in explain-
ing agricultural growth in Southeast Asia. Land was increasingly becoming a 
scarce and contested asset. 
By and large, estate companies in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries in most parts of Southeast Asia sought to increase output by rep-
licating known cultivation technologies over more land and did not try to 
increase yields through development of higher-yielding varieties or by other 
means until the interwar years. The most striking exception to this lack of 
interest in improving cultivation technologies was the case of sugar in Java, 
where several research stations were established and funded by estate com-
panies in the late nineteenth century (van der Eng 1996: 78). They achieved 
considerable success in developing and disseminating improved cane varieties 
to estate companies, and by 1910 –1914 sugar yields in Java were higher than 
in any other producing region except Hawai‘i. Yields remained much higher 
in Java than in either the Philippines or Taiwan until the end of the 1930s 
(Evenson and Kislev 1975: table 3.4). Unfortunately, falling prices meant that 
real monetary returns per hectare did not increase at the same rate as yields 
(Booth 1988: 222 – 223). 
Tree crop production for export in Southeast Asia did not just occur on 
large estates owned by foreigners. One of the most remarkable developments 
in Indonesia and British Malaya from the late nineteenth century until 1942 
was the rapid expansion of smallholder production. For some crops such as 
coffee, smallholder cultivators proved themselves better able to cope with 
problems of crop disease and fl uctuating prices. In the 1870s, only 12 per-
cent of coffee in Indonesia was produced by smallholders; by the 1920s, they 
accounted for almost half of total output (Booth 1988: table 6.5). After 1920, 
smallholder production of rubber grew rapidly in Sumatra, Kalimantan, and 
Malaya so that by the late 1930s almost half of all rubber production came 
from small producers in Indonesia and about 30 percent from small producers 
in Malaya (Table 2.8). 
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The robust response of smallholder producers to the opportunities pro-
vided by the rapid growth of world demand for a range of crops was often 
unanticipated by colonial offi cials and posed problems for them in the inter-
war years when they tried to implement output restriction schemes. The small-
holder phenomenon gave the lie to colonial views on the supposed lack of 
entrepreneurial initiative on the part of indigenous cultivators. It also meant 
that the crude version of the open dualistic model that viewed the export 
enclave as exclusively the preserve of foreign capitalist enterprises did not 
conform to the realities of the Southeast Asian situation in the early part of 
the twentieth century. As well as providing employment and income in the 
production of export commodities, the rapid growth of the smallholder sector 
also gave new employment opportunities in processing, trade, and transport. 
The next section examines the diversifi cation that occurred in greater detail. 
Growth of Nonagricultural Activities
Turning from agricultural to industrial growth, there were differences between 
the two Japanese colonies both in the growth of manufacturing between 1911 
and 1938, and in the size of the sector by the late 1930s. From a very small 
base in 1911, industrial growth in Korea was more rapid than in mainland 
Japan; between 1911 and 1938, there was an almost tenfold increase in real 
value added from the mining and manufacturing sectors (Mizoguchi and Ume-
mura 1988: 239). Growth was particularly rapid during the 1930s, and by 
1938, manufacturing and mining accounted for around 16 percent of Korean 
net domestic product. The industrial growth in the 1930s has been attrib-
Table 2.8. Percentage of Rubber from Large Estates, in British Malaya 
and Indonesia, 1929–1938
 Total Production
 (thousand tons) Percentage from Estates
 Malaya Indonesia Malaya Indonesia
1929 457 263 54 59
1930 452 244 52 63
1931 435 255 55 65
1932 417 212 58 71
1933 460 288 52 60
1934 479 379 55 51
1935 377 300 64 52
1936 364 313 64 52
1937 501 454 63 54
1938 360 322 68 54
1939 360 383 68 52
Sources: British Malaya: Sundaram 1988: table 3.4; Indonesia: Creutzberg 1975: table 10. 
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uted to the establishment of large capital-intensive plants by Japanese zaibatsu 
including Mitsui, Mitsubishi, and Sumitomo in sectors such as chemicals, 
metals, and textiles (Grajdanzev 1944: 152–171; see also Ho 1984: 364–369 
and Woo 1991: 35). Until the mid-1930s, light industry accounted for around 
60 percent of total industrial production, but that share fell as heavy industry, 
especially chemicals and metals, expanded rapidly. By 1943, heavy industry 
accounted for almost half of total industrial production (Chung 2006: 221). 
Adding in construction and services, which also grew rapidly after 1920, non-
agricultural output accounted for more than half of total net domestic prod-
uct in Korea by 1938 (Table 2.9). 
In Taiwan, industrial growth was slower than in Korea, especially in the 
1930s, but because the manufacturing and mining sector was larger to begin 
with, it accounted for a greater share of net domestic product by 1938 than in 
Korea, around 24 percent (Mizoguchi and Umemura 1988: 234 –235). In 1938, 
almost 60 percent of net domestic output in Taiwan accrued from nonagri-
cultural sectors, including manufacturing, construction, transport, and other 
services. However, employment in the nonagricultural sectors was a small pro-
portion of total employment in both Taiwan and Korea. Especially in Korea, 
it appears that industrial development was very capital intensive so that the 
percentage of the labor force employed in industry was lower than in Taiwan 
(Table 2.10). Suh argued that total employment in manufacturing actually fell 
in absolute terms in the 1930s (1978: 47–51); this decline was entirely due to 
a very sharp decline in the employment of women. This in turn may have 
Table 2.9. Percentage of Total NDP/GDP Accruing from Nonagricultural 
Sectors, 1900–1938
Year Taiwan Korea Indonesia Burma a Thailand Philippines b
1900 34.4 c n.a. 55.5 36.4 56.3 45.0
1913 46.2 36.7 59.5 36.6 55.3 n.a.
1916 55.4 37.4 59.6 35.3 n.a. 39.6
1921 56.0 37.5 63.1 49.6 n.a. n.a.
1926 55.0 42.4 62.1 49.0 n.a. 46.3
1931 55.6 46.0 62.7 42.4 56.2 d n.a.
1936 60.3 54.6 64.6 45.6 n.a. n.a.
1938 58.8 52.9 66.3 48.7 55.7 53.4
Sources: Mizoguchi and Umemura 1988: 234, 238; Saito and Lee 1999: 214; van der Eng 2002: 
171–172; Manarungsan 1989: 251; Hooley 1968: table 1.  
Note: n.a. = not available.
a Figures for Burma refer to fi scal years 1901–1902, 1911–1912, 1916–1917, 1921–1922, 1926–1927, 
1931–1932, 1936–1937, and 1938–1939 respectively.
b Figures for the Philippines refer to 1902, 1918, 1928, and 1938.
c 1903.
d 1929. 
30 Chapter 2
been linked to a decline in cottage and small-scale industry during the 1930s, 
although Chung has argued that there is little evidence that traditional handi-
crafts did decline in Korea during the Japanese period (2006: 236 –237). 
It is often asserted that, right up until 1940, the industrialization that took 
place in Southeast Asia was largely restricted to agricultural and mineral pro-
cessing. British, French, and Dutch colonial regimes were supposedly intent 
on preserving colonial markets for their own manufactures and had little 
interest in encouraging either their own nationals or anyone else to establish 
industrial plants in their colonies. In fact, the evidence does not support these 
rather crude generalizations, especially in the interwar era. The increase in 
national income that undeniably took place between 1900 and 1930 in British 
Malaya, Indonesia, and the Philippines, and to a lesser extent in Burma and 
Indochina, did lead to increased demand for a range of manufactures, some of 
which by reasons of high transport costs or perishability could profi tably be 
produced in the home market, even without tariff protection. We have already 
seen that the world slump of the 1930s had a serious impact on agricultural 
exports (in terms of both quantity and price) in most parts of Southeast Asia 
and forced many colonial offi cials to consider economic diversifi cation as a 
means of insulating their populations against the vagaries of world markets. 
“Among the solutions offered none was seized upon with more enthusiasm 
than industrialization” (Shepherd 1941: 4). The fl ood of manufactured exports 
from Japan into several Southeast Asian colonies during the interwar years 
also served to increase colonial support for industrialization; after all, if Japan 
could industrialize using its abundant supplies of cheap labor, why not Java 
or Vietnam? 
Already by 1930, the industrial labor force accounted for more than 10 
percent of total employment in British Malaya, Burma, Indonesia, and the 
Table 2.10. Occupational Distribution of the Employed Population, 
Japan, Thailand, and Colonies, c. 1930
Country / Year Agriculture Industry Other Total
Japan (1930) 49.6 20.1 30.3 100.0
Taiwan (1930) 73.0 8.6 18.3 100.0
Korea (1930) 79.6 6.3 14.1 100.0
Thailand (1929) 84.2 2.2 13.6 100.0
Burma (1931) 69.6 11.0 19.4 100.0
British Malaya (1931) 60.8 12.3 26.9 100.0
Philippines (1939) 69.0 12.2 18.8 100.0
Indonesia (1930) 70.0 10.4 19.6 100.0
Sources: Japan: Grajdanzev 1944: 77; Korea: Suh 1978: table 2; Taiwan: Grajdanzev 1942: 33; British 
Malaya: Vlieland 1932: 99; Burma: Saito and Lee 1999: table 1.6; Indonesia: Mertens 1978: 51; 
Philippines: Kurihara 1945: 16; Thailand: Ingram 1971: 57, 144. 
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Philippines, which were higher percentages than in Taiwan and Korea (see 
Table 2.10). Much of this employment was in small-scale and cottage industry, 
but the estimates of van der Eng indicate that value added in the industrial 
sector in Indonesia (manufacturing, utilities, and construction) comprised 
around 15 percent of GDP in 1930 (2002: 171). Indeed, since 1900, output 
from the nonagricultural sectors in Indonesia accounted for a higher propor-
tion of GDP than in either Taiwan or Korea (see Table 2.9). Under a relatively 
liberal trade regime, the manufacturing sectors that emerged in Indonesia 
were those that enjoyed a degree of natural protection. As Dick has shown 
in his study of the manufacturing sector in Surabaya, in 1921 the dominant 
sector was not food processing or textiles and clothing but engineering work-
shops (2002: 268–269). The reason for this was the strong presence of the 
sugar refi ning sector in East Java, which together with ship repair facilities and 
railway yards provided demand for a variety of spare parts. Rather than wait 
several months for spare parts to be brought from Europe, it was in the inter-
ests of all these important sectors to obtain spare parts from local engineering 
workshops. 
Foodstuffs were imported in large quantities from Europe and Australia, 
while textiles were increasingly sourced from Japan. It was only in the lat-
ter part of the 1930s, as a result of more activist government policies, that 
these and other industries expanded within the colony. During the 1930s, the 
Dutch regime made considerable efforts to attract foreign investment into the 
large-scale manufacturing sector, with considerable success. Companies such 
as Goodyear, National Carbon, Unilever, and Bata all built Indonesian plants 
during the decade, and in addition, cement plants, breweries, paper mills, 
canneries, and several large weaving and spinning mills were established or 
enlarged (Booth 1998: 44). By 1941, the industrial sector accounted for around 
20 percent of GDP (van der Eng 2002: 172). 
Although French policies in Indochina were not supportive of industri-
alization that might compete with French imports, as in Indonesia offi cial 
attitudes began to change in the interwar years, especially with regard to yarn 
and textiles. In densely settled Tonkin, concern about rural unemployment 
led to some support for both the spinning and weaving industries, which 
also assisted small producers. Large-scale spinning and weaving factories were 
established in North Vietnam, which supplied local craftspeople with yarn 
and also produced cloth. The factory cloth was of a different quality from that 
produced by small weavers and did not directly compete with their output. 
Certainly many managed to survive the competition from larger enterprises; a 
government survey of 1940 found that Tonkin had 55,000 weavers and a total 
of 120,000 textile workers (Norlund 1991: 86 – 89; see also Shepherd 1941: 
30 –31). 
In the Philippines, much of the industry that emerged in the American 
period was based on agricultural and mineral processing. The Philippine mar-
ket, although small by American standards, was nevertheless an important 
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export destination for some categories of American products. Offi cial Ameri-
can estimates showed that in 1936 the Philippines was the largest export mar-
ket for American cigarettes, steel sheets, wheat, and dairy products, and the 
second largest market for cotton textiles, rubber goods, and chemical fertil-
izers ( Joint Preparatory Committee 1938: 32). Thus powerful interests in the 
United States wanted to preserve the Philippine market for American goods. 
For their part, some Philippine commentators were arguing that only com-
plete autonomy in tariff matters would allow the Philippines to industrialize 
( Espino 1933: 11–12). 
But even under a tariff system that gave most American manufactures 
duty-free access to the local market, the manufacturing industry still accounted 
for around 21 percent of gross value added in 1938 (Hooley 1968: tables 1 and 
3). Output from all nonagricultural sectors comprised around 53 percent of 
total GDP, which was about the same as in Taiwan (see Table 2.9). Goodstein’s 
estimates suggest that an even higher proportion of net value added origi-
nated from the nonagricultural sectors of the economy, almost 70 percent 
(1962: table IV-2). By late 1938, the manufacture of clothing and embroider-
ies together with “native textiles” employed almost 170,000 workers accord-
ing to the 1939 population census, the great majority women. Manufacturing 
industry as a whole employed over 11 percent of all workers (Kurihara 1945: 
16 –17). 
The evidence on growth of output and employment in manufacturing 
industry and in other nonagricultural sectors such as construction and trans-
port in many parts of colonial Asia since 1900 hardly seems to support the 
deindustrialization argument associated with writers such as Furnivall (1957: 
161–164) and Resnick (1970). It may well have been true that imported textiles 
and other products did lead to the demise of traditional handicrafts in some 
parts of Southeast Asia in the latter part of the nineteenth century. Legarda 
discussed the decline of native textile production in southern Panay (around 
Iloilo) and in Ilocos, and argued that the social costs of this decline may have 
been considerable (1999: 154 –156). In contrast, Shepherd, in his survey of 
industrial growth in Southeast Asia, stressed that Ilocano weavers responded 
to the threat of imported cloth by “concentrating their attention on special-
ized articles for which there is both a domestic and foreign demand” (1941: 
89). He pointed out that in the Philippines, as in other parts of Asia, there 
was considerable consumer prejudice in favor of fi nely made handicrafts that 
allowed traditional industries to survive and even fl ourish.
Other indigenous manufactures had a harder time in the face of foreign 
competition. In Burma, Furnivall pointed out, spinning and weaving, salt 
manufacture, and shipbuilding all declined in the last part of the nineteenth 
century. Shepherd argued that the large shipyards in Manila, which survived 
until the end of the nineteenth century, disappeared during the American 
era. Ingram produced evidence for the decline of native industry in Thailand 
(1971: chap. 6). The fi gures on the decline in female employment in Korea in 
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the 1930s have already been mentioned; it is likely that these women were 
engaged in small-scale manufacture of textiles and other products that could 
no longer compete with cheap imports from Japan. In all these cases, it may 
have been diffi cult for displaced workers to fi nd alternative employment either 
in production of export staples or in nontraded sectors such as trade and trans-
port. In addition, as Resnick (1970) argued, increased specialization in export 
production left many people vulnerable to swings in the terms of trade. This 
had an especially harsh impact on the interwar years.
Lessons 
What lessons can we draw from this review of trends in output and in eco-
nomic structure in colonial Asia in the early decades of the twentieth century? 
Taken together, the evidence would hardly seem to constitute an overwhelm-
ing case for “Japanese colonial exceptionalism” on grounds of economic 
growth leading to rapid structural change away from agriculture and toward 
industry and the modern services sector. Per capita GDP growth was quite 
rapid in both Taiwan and Korea in the twenty-fi ve years from 1913 to 1938, 
but it only outpaced that in Southeast Asia after 1929, when the effects of 
the world crisis of the early 1930s were more severe. Certainly the growth in 
rice yields was impressive, especially in Taiwan, but rice production also grew 
rapidly in some of the land-abundant parts of Southeast Asia, at least partly 
as a result of increased yields. There was no parallel in either Taiwan or Korea 
to the remarkable expansion of smallholder agricultural exports of tree crops 
that characterized several parts of Southeast Asia after 1870. 
Nor does it appear that industrial growth was more rapid in Taiwan and 
Korea than in some parts of Southeast Asia. In fact, Taiwan resembled econo-
mies such as the Philippines, Indonesia, and British Malaya in that indus-
trialization was mainly based on agricultural processing, at least until the 
1930s. In Korea, industrial growth was rapid but from a very low base, and the 
acceleration during the 1930s was largely the result of investment in heavy 
industry by Japanese conglomerates. It is probable that women workers in 
particular were displaced from traditional industries by Japanese imports. 
There were parallels with Indonesia, where there was also quite rapid growth 
in manufacturing industry based on investment from foreign multinationals 
in the latter part of the 1930s, although government policy in the 1930s was 
more protective of labor-intensive sectors such as textiles. It seems probable 
that by 1940 industry accounted for roughly the same share of gross domestic 
production in both Korea and Indonesia, although it employed a higher share 
of the labor force in Indonesia. One historian of Korea has claimed that “colo-
nial industrial growth was a powerful historical earthquake” (Park 1999: 158). 
If that was the case, earthquakes of a similar or stronger force were also felt in 
parts of Southeast Asia. 
It must be stressed that the growth in output and GDP that occurred in 
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much of the region between 1900 and 1930 did not automatically lead to 
improved incomes and living standards for the bulk of the population or even 
for those directly employed in the dynamic export sectors. To begin with, 
tenure arrangements often penalized agricultural producers, even when they 
had access to land. Those with little or no land of their own were vulnerable to 
exploitation from politically powerful landlords. As Lewis pointed out, large 
estates or mining companies could be predatory on the traditional sectors, 
usually by encroaching on land or by coercing labor (1976: 28). Large foreign-
owned companies also remitted profi ts abroad, and even where they were 
taxed by colonial governments, the resulting revenues were not always used 
in ways that benefi ted the local populations. Indeed colonial governments 
were not infrequently accused of taxing smallholder producers more heavily 
than the large companies. 
In following chapters, these arguments are reviewed in more detail. I 
begin with a discussion of issues relating to land tenure, land alienation, and 
the emergence of a rural landless class. 
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C H A P T E R  3
Agricultural Expansion, 
Population Growth, and 
Access to Land
Vent for Surplus in Theory and Practice
It was pointed out in Chapter 1 that the vent for surplus theory has been 
widely used by economists to explain the rapid growth in production for 
export in several parts of Southeast Asia from 1870 onward. A crucial assump-
tion of this theory and the models derived from it was that “land suitable for 
the cultivation of food is not a scarce factor” (Findlay and Lundhal 1994: 89). 
In his discussion of the applicability of the vent for surplus theory to West 
Africa, Hopkins emphasized three further implications of the theory: “the 
massive growth in the volume of exports was achieved without a comparable 
increase in population, without a signifi cant reduction in the amount of land 
and time involved in the production of traditional goods and services, and 
without the adoption of any major improvements in agricultural techniques” 
(1973: 232).
It is implied not just that there is abundant land available for producing 
export crops, but also that underutilized labor could easily be drawn out of 
subsistence food production to meet increased world demand for agricultural 
exports, whether food crops, which had always been cultivated, or exotic tree 
crops such as rubber and coffee, which indigenous cultivators would never 
have grown had there not been an expanding world market. It is further 
implied that the land tenure system functioned in such a way that any house-
hold willing and able to cultivate larger holdings could easily obtain more 
land on favorable terms. How realistic are these assumptions in the context of 
East and Southeast Asia by the early twentieth century? 
It was pointed out in the previous chapter that the growth in agricultural 
production for export in both Taiwan and Korea was due in part at least to 
adoption of improved cultivation techniques in rice agriculture. Much of the 
growth that occurred in both Japanese colonies, especially after 1920, was due 
to growth in output per unit of land cultivated and the amount of land per 
agricultural worker contracted (see Table 2.6). Furthermore, there is evidence, 
reviewed below, that the increase in sugar exports from Taiwan was achieved 
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at the expense of food-crop cultivation, while the growth in rice exports from 
Korea led to a steep decline in availability for domestic consumption. Vent 
for surplus would therefore not seem helpful in explaining the export growth 
that occurred in either of these colonies.
The Southeast Asian evidence is more complex. There is little doubt that 
export volume growth was faster than population growth in many parts of 
the region from the late nineteenth century to 1930, even though population 
growth was itself quite rapid compared to other parts of Asia. It was noted in 
the previous chapter that in both Burma and the Philippines land area grew 
more rapidly than agricultural output after 1900 (see Table 2.7). This indicates 
a land-extensive process of agricultural growth, consistent with the vent for 
surplus theory. But did land area grow faster than population or that part of 
the population largely dependent on agriculture for its income? And even if 
area cultivated did expand rapidly, was it the case that land was freely avail-
able to all those who wished to cultivate it? 
Of particular importance in the Southeast Asian context was the effect of 
the expansion of estate agriculture on land available to smallholder produc-
ers. Does it really make sense to assume that there was so much land relative 
to the population in Southeast Asia that both smallholder and estate produc-
tion could expand without any competition for land? The impact of vent for 
surplus production of export crops on land tenure was not directly addressed 
by Myint in his original exposition of the theory; he was mainly concerned 
with the argument that vent for surplus was a more suitable theoretical tool 
for analyzing response to growing world trade than neoclassical comparative 
advantage theory. But it is obvious that over time, the growth in demand for 
tropical crops made land a more valuable commodity, even if it was still in 
relatively abundant supply. 
As exports expanded in the last part of the nineteenth century, land mar-
kets developed where none had existed before, and colonial administrations 
reacted to the increased demand for land by introducing new concepts of 
land titling, usually imported from other parts of the world and quite alien 
to indigenous populations. In both Thailand and the Philippines as well as in 
parts of British Malaya, the Torrens system of land titling from Australia was 
introduced. This system had been developed in Australia to give European 
farms a secure title to land so that they could then invest in improvements 
and capital works. The system required a detailed land cadastre that did not 
exist in most parts of Southeast Asia, even in the more densely settled areas, 
let alone in the frontier zones. Especially in the Philippines, funds were very 
limited for both surveying and the drawing up and issuing of title deeds, and 
many smallholders never received any legal title, thus making them vulner-
able to land grabs on the part of the rich and powerful who could hire lawyers 
and where necessary pay bribes to get titles and expropriate traditional culti-
vators (Miranda 1991: 58–59; Pelzer 1945: 109–110). In Thailand, land titles 
were given to cultivators in the central plains, but in many other parts of the 
 Agricultural Expansion, Population Growth, and Access to Land 37
country, cultivators received no offi cial recognition of their claims to land 
(Feeny 1982: 96–97). 
As large estate companies expanded their operations, especially in Indo-
nesia, Malaya, and the Philippines, they used their infl uence with both colo-
nial administrations and home governments to get access to large blocks of 
land on long leases or freehold tenure. Many small cultivators developed 
hitherto underutilized land close to their food-crop farms so that they could 
grow more rice or tree crops such as coffee and rubber. This was sometimes a 
reasonably peaceful process, with the smallholder acquiring extra assets and 
an extra source of cash income. But often there was the risk of expropriation 
by powerful land grabbers, both local and foreign, who had the tacit if not 
open support of colonial and indigenous ruling elites. In the case of British 
Malaya, Sundaram argued that the imposition of colonial land laws and the 
large-scale alienation of land to estates meant that many shifting cultivators 
were deprived of their traditional livelihoods (1988: 86–87). In the Philip-
pines, those most vulnerable to predatory behavior were cultivators who had 
migrated to the so-called frontier regions, where they developed homesteads 
and smallholdings. In his discussion of the growth of sugar production in 
Negros Occidental in the Philippines, Larkin argues that the peopling and 
exploitation of the western Negros wilderness had 
much in common with the global frontier phenomenon taking place at 
this time. The expansion of agriculture onto hitherto underutilized terri-
tory of the Americas, Eurasia, Africa, and Oceania happened in response 
to social, economic, and political pressures, as well as to an imperative to 
feed the machines of the Industrial Revolution. The cycle of initial pio-
neering, succeeded by intense cash-crop agriculture, the encumbering of 
land, the harnessing of labor, and the gradual imposition of a full range of 
civilization’s amenities and restraints, was repeated on Negros, as on other 
frontiers. As elsewhere, forest lands were reduced and the local aboriginal 
population displaced as a rising entrepreneurial elite rapidly accumulated 
wealth. (1993: 60) 
No doubt mindful of its own recent pioneering history, the American 
administration in the Philippines was, according to Larkin, keen to follow 
“America’s own ideal of turning the frontier into the realm of the yeoman 
farmer” (1993: 68). The Homestead Act of 1902 granted a maximum of sixteen 
hectares of public land to each settler family. This was a generous amount 
for many poor families, and numbers of applications grew steadily over the 
ensuing years. But a large number of applications for homesteads failed, partly 
because many potential settlers were often not aware of the legal status of the 
land they wished to settle. If the land was not considered to be in the “public 
domain,” the application was refused. In addition, if the homesteader was 
not able to cultivate at least one-fi fth of the land allocated within fi ve years, 
38 Chapter 3
he lost the claim, which was then given to another applicant (Pelzer 1945: 
110–114). In parts of Luzon, some homesteaders found that the land they had 
cleared and farmed was registered by some of the powerful landlords in the 
area and in effect taken from them by a legal titling procedure of which the 
homesteaders were ignorant (McLennan 1969: 673–674). 
Other colonial administrations also stated that their goal was to establish 
an agrarian system based on small owner-cultivators. If necessary, the gov-
ernment would facilitate the opening up of “empty lands” with agricultural 
potential on which to settle migrants from the densely settled areas. French 
policy in southern Vietnam from the 1860s onward was “intended to settle 
the majority of the population on the land, and thereby create a secure social 
order based on small proprietors” (Brocheux 1995: 30). After 1900, the Dutch 
began an ambitious land settlement program that involved moving landless 
families from Java to Sumatra and Sulawesi (Pelzer 1945: chap. 7). In the delta 
regions of southern Vietnam, central Thailand, and southern Burma, large 
tracts of agricultural land were opened up for cultivation in the latter part of 
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Siamwalla 1972). The impact 
of these ambitious schemes differed over time and space, but often it led to 
consequences unintended by the governments that had initiated the process 
of land expansion. 
It was noted in the previous chapter that, in the 1930s, agriculture was 
the main source of employment for a large part of the labor force in East 
and Southeast Asia (see Table 2.10). In the fi ve decades or so from 1890 to 
1940, rural populations dependent on agriculture for most, if not all, of their 
incomes grew in absolute terms everywhere in the region. In the relatively 
densely settled regions, the growth of the agricultural labor force outstripped 
the growth of arable land so that, by the end of the 1930s, planted area per 
agricultural worker was well below one hectare in Korea, Taiwan, Java, and 
Thai land (Table 3.1). In all these regions (except Thailand, where reliable labor 
force data were not available before 1937), the growth in the agricultural labor 
force in the decades from 1918 to 1938 exceeded growth in arable area (Table 
3.2). In British Malaya, Burma, Tonkin, and Annam, population growth was 
faster than growth in area under rice cultivation between 1913 and 1938, 
while in Thailand, Cochinchina, and the Philippines, it was roughly the same 
(Table 3.3). By the latter part of the 1930s, planted /cultivated area per head 
of population was below 0.2 hectares in both Korea and Taiwan and in some 
parts of Southeast Asia (Table 3.1). 
These data suggest that the notion of “unlimited supplies of agricultural 
land” was becoming more and more problematic not just in Taiwan and Korea, 
but also in several parts of Southeast Asia by the 1930s. On the one hand, 
indigenous population growth rates were accelerating, at least in part because 
of improved access to modern medical technologies. On the other hand, it 
was becoming more diffi cult for growing populations to be absorbed in tradi-
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tional food-crop agriculture. The rate of growth of land of arable potential was 
slowing down, and there was increasing competition for such land on the part 
of migrants from the same country or colonial jurisdiction, from other parts 
of Asia, or from large capitalist enterprises—whether indigenous, from the 
metropole, or elsewhere—who were in turn often backed by colonial govern-
ments. Scrambles for land on the part of an assortment of competing claim-
ants became more and more frequent in the early decades of the twentieth 
century.
Table 3.1. Planted Area of Main Crops per Agricultural Worker and 
Per Capita, 1930s (hectares)
Colony / Country Planted Area per Agricultural Worker Planted Area Per Capita
Taiwan (1940) 0.84 0.21
Korea (1938) 0.65 0.19
Tonkin (1939) n.a. 0.17
Annam (1939) n.a. 0.30
Cochinchina (1939) n.a. 0.39
Thailand (1937) 0.62 0.26
Burma (1931) 1.62 0.48
FMS (1931, indigenous) 2.20 0.71
FMS (1931, total) 2.12 0.62
British Malaya (1939) n.a. 0.40
Philippines (1939) 1.38 0.30
Java (1940) 0.74 0.20
Sources: Taiwan: Lee and Chen 1979: table T-4; Barclay 1954: table 2. Korea: Grajdanzev 1944: 291; 
Suh 1978: 49. Java: Central Bureau of Statistics 1947: 36–39; van der Eng 1996: table A-3. FMS: Lim 
1977: 259; Vlieland 1932: table 132. British Malaya: Grist 1941: tables 3 and 4. Burma: Saito and 
Lee 1999: tables 1.1, 1.6, 11.1. Philippines: Bureau of Census and Statistics 1947. Thailand: Central 
Service of Statistics c. 1946 with additional data on rubber cultivation from Manarungsan 1989: 
table 3.4. Tonkin, Annam, and Cochinchina: Banens 2000 and Giacometti 2000a: annexes.
Note: n.a. = not available. 
Table 3.2. Growth in Agricultural Labor Force and Arable Land, 1918 –1920 
to 1938 –1940: Taiwan, South Korea, and Java (1918 –1920 = 100)
 Growth in Agricultural Labor Force Growth in Arable Land
Korea (southern) 110.2 102.2
Taiwan 124.7 116.1
Java 124.4 111.9
Sources: Ban 1979: table K-4a; Lee and Chen 1979: table T-4; van der Eng 1996: tables A.3 and A.4. 
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Changing Agrarian Structures under Different Colonial Jurisdictions
What was the effect of the increased competition for available land on agrar-
ian structure and tenancy? In both Korea and Taiwan, what had emerged by 
the 1930s was a broadly “Japanese” agrarian structure, in which a signifi cant 
proportion of holdings were in the smaller holding sizes and where many 
holdings were not owner-cultivated but were farmed under various types of 
tenancy arrangements (Tables 3.4 and 3.5). The agricultural surveys carried 
out in both Taiwan and Korea in the 1930s indicated that over 50 percent of 
all operated holdings were below one hectare. In both Korea and Taiwan, two-
thirds of all holdings were either wholly or partly tenanted. In both colonies, a 
signifi cant proportion of land in the larger holdings was owned or controlled 
by Japanese interests. Lee argued that by 1930 Japanese individuals and com-
panies in Korea controlled over 11 percent of the total taxable land area (1936: 
148). Chung states that by 1944 the Japanese share had increased to 16 per-
cent (2006: 246). Ka estimated that by 1939 Japanese-owned land in Taiwan 
accounted for more than 15 percent of the total (1995: 147).
In spite of the American aim of encouraging the growth of “yeoman farm-
ers” settling and cultivating their own land in the Philippines, what actu-
ally emerged by the 1930s was a pattern of tenure in which around half the 
holdings were under two hectares in size, while 13 percent were over fi ve 
hectares (see Table 3.4). More than 40 percent of all cultivated land was in 
holdings over fi ve hectares (Pelzer 1945: 85). As in Korea and Taiwan, ten-
ancy was widespread. Only 49.2 percent of all farmers in 1939 were owners 
of the land they worked; a further 15.6 percent owned part of the land, and 
the rest were tenants, mainly sharecroppers. Pelzer considered the extent of 
tenancy in the Philippines “astonishingly high” and attributed it to Spanish 
Table 3.3. Growth in Population and Cultivated Area, c. 1913–1938
 Population Growth Cultivated Area Growth a
 (annual average) (annual average)
Tonkin 1.4 0.5
Annam 0.7 0.4
Cochinchina 1.1 1.1
Thailand 2.2 2.3
Burma 0.9 b 1.1
Philippines 2.4 2.5
Sources: Thailand: Manarungsan 1989: tables 1.1 and 2.7; Burma: Saito and Lee 1999: 15, 37; 
 Philippines: Bureau of Census and Statistics 1941: 13; Owen 1972: 59; Tonkin, Annam, and 
 Cochinchina: Banens 2000 and Giacometti 2000a: annexes. 
a In Thailand, Tonkin, Annam, and Cochinchina, cultivated area refers only to rice land. In the 
Philippines, it refers to all cultivated area, and in Burma net sown area. 
b Indigenous population only. 
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policies that favored local chiefs (cacique), many of whom acquired substantial 
holdings and reduced the traditional cultivators to the status of tenant (1945: 
86–89). McLennan stressed the importance of the pacto de retroventa arrange-
ments, whereby moneylenders (often of mixed Chinese-Filipino ancestry) 
acquired parcels of land when loans secured on the land were in default (1969: 
659–662; 1980: 97). He also argued that royal grants and purchase of land, or 
acquisition by occupation were important means by which haciendas were 
Table 3.4. Distribution of Operated Holdings by Size: Japan, Taiwan, Korea, 
and the Philippines, 1930s
 Korea Japan Taiwan Philippines
Holding Size a 1938 1937 1930 1938
Under 0.5 38.4 33.8 30.3
0.5 – 0.99 24.9 34.2 22.9 22.6 b
1.0 –1.99 19.7 22.7 23.7 29.9
2.0 –2.99 10.9 5.7 18.6 c 18.7
3.0 – 4.99 4.7 2.3  15.8
Over 5.00 1.4 1.4 4.5 13.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Grajdanzev 1944: 113; Grajdanzev 1942: 79; Bureau of Census and Statistics 1947.
a The Korean and Japanese data are in cho (0.99 hectares); the Taiwanese data are in ko (0.96 
 hectares). The Philippine data are in hectares.
b Percentage of holdings under one hectare.
c Percentage of holdings between two and fi ve ko. 
Table 3.5. Average Holding Size and Extent of Tenancy, 1930s (hectares)
Colony / Average Percentage of  Percentage of Land
Country Holding Size Holdings Tenanted under Tenancy
Taiwan (1932) 1.9 31.7 53.5
Korea (1938) 1.5 52.6 (15.5) a n.a.
Thailand (1937) n.a. n.a. 15.7
Burma (1938) n.a. n.a. 59.0
Philippines (1939) 2.4 (4.1) b 35.1 (15.6) c 32.5 (15.0) d
Sources: Korea: Grajdanzev 1944: 291–294; Taiwan: Grajdanzev 1942: 76–79; Thailand: Ingram 
1971: 268; Philippines: Bureau of Census and Statistics 1947: table 44; Burma: Pfanner 1969:
table 15.
Note: n.a. = not available.
a Figures in parentheses refer to holdings “chiefl y tenanted.”
b Figure in parentheses refers to total land rather than cultivated land.
c Percent of holdings cultivated by part owners.
d Percent of cultivated land farmed by part owners. 
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established during Spanish rule. By the late nineteenth century, haciendas 
of between 100 and 500 hectares proliferated, with ownership by one family 
quite common (McLennan 1980: 97). 
American policy, while ostensibly favoring the owner-cultivator, in fact did 
little to reduce the extent of tenancy, which could have increased in the fi rst 
four decades of the twentieth century, although the available evidence does 
not permit a clear conclusion on this. Owen argued that the large amounts of 
land acquired from the church (the friar lands) could have been used to settle 
landless families but were in fact sold to wealthy speculators (1972: 50), while 
Larkin pointed out that, in the sugar-growing areas, small land owners were 
not infrequently dispossessed by “the new breed of planters” seeking to build 
up large haciendas and were forced into a precarious living as agricultural 
laborers on large plantations, with few alternative sources of income (1993: 
61). But although the high rates of tenancy in the Philippines have attracted 
considerable critical attention from subsequent scholars, the proportion of 
land under tenancy was in fact lower than in Taiwan or indeed in Burma by 
the late 1930s (see Table 3.5). Even in the central plains of Thailand, the agri-
cultural census of 1937 found that around one-quarter of all land was in ten-
anted holdings, while in Lower Burma it was estimated that almost 60 percent 
of arable land was operated under tenancy by the late 1930s (Pfanner 1969: 
221). The reasons for these high rates of tenancy are examined further below. 
The rather small amount of cultivated land per capita in Thailand by the 
end of the 1930s (less than in Burma and about the same as in the Philippines) 
together with the quite high rates of tenancy, especially in the central plains, 
would suggest that, even in a country that was not a colony and where for-
eign-owned estates were largely absent, competition for agricultural land was 
becoming more intense by the 1930s, and land was not always freely available 
to all those wishing to cultivate it. The rural survey conducted by Zimmerman 
in 1930–1931 indicated that around 36 percent of all households in central 
Thailand owned no land at all (Table 3.6). It is probable that most landless 
households were able to access some land through tenancy arrangements, but 
in many cases they would have had to supplement income from tenant farm-
ing with wage labor and handicraft activities. A further rural household survey 
Table 3.6. Owned and Cultivated Land in Thailand by Region, 1930 –1931
Region Average Holding Size  Percentage Owning Number of Parcels
 Owned or Squatted Cultivated No Land per Holding
 (ha.) (ha.)
Central 4.5 3.9 36.0 1.64
Northern 1.5 1.6 27.4 1.32
Southern 1.2 1.0 14.5 2.08
Northeast 0.9 1.1 18.0 1.30
Source: Zimmerman 1999: 25–36. 
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conducted by Andrews in 1934 –1935 found that income from craft activity, 
labor, and trade accounted for around 35 percent of current income in central 
Thailand and a higher proportion elsewhere ( Wilson 1983: 99). 
In Java, where by 1930 the average holding size was below one hectare, by 
the early decades of the twentieth century, a substantial part of the indigenous 
population had little or no access to agricultural land, either as owners or as 
tenants, and were largely, if not entirely, reliant on handicrafts, trade, and 
wage labor for their incomes. Data collected in 1905 as part of the Declining 
Welfare Surveys found that on average only 5.3 percent of all those engaged 
in agriculture could be classifi ed as tenants, although the percentage was twice 
as high in parts of West Java and in Yogyakarta (Pelzer 1945: 257). The break-
down of the population of Java given by Meijer Ranneft and Huender in the 
1920s indicated that poor farmers comprised 27 percent of the population 
and sharecroppers with no land a further 3.4 percent. Landless laborers were 
estimated to comprise 32 percent of the population. Thus over 60 percent of 
the population was “land poor” (Wertheim 1964: 232). A practice that became 
increasingly common in the 1920s and 1930s was the leasing of land in return 
for an advance payment; usually the landowner continued to work the land, 
and the lessee received a share of the crop. Such arrangements were informal 
and seldom registered, but surveys indicated they were widespread; in one dis-
trict of East Java in 1939 it was found that almost three-quarters of landowners 
had leased part of their land in order to obtain cash (Pelzer 1945: 172). 
In northern Vietnam (Tonkin) by the 1930s, the amount of cultivated 
hectares per person was even smaller than in Java (see Table 3.1). As in Java, 
landholdings were often divided into small parcels, with the great majority 
of cultivators operating very small and often fragmented holdings. Gourou 
argued that it was not possible to establish how many households owned no 
land at all (1945a: 278), although Popkin has estimated that, by 1930, 69 per-
cent of all families in Tonkin were either landless or cultivated less than 0.36 
hectares (1979: 156). As in Java, most cultivators were cultivating small plots 
with their own labor, and there was relatively little land available to be rented 
or sharecropped out. Much the same was true in Annam, where 94 percent of 
all holdings were under 0.5 hectares in 1930, and almost 90 percent of hold-
ings were cultivated directly by owners (Henry 1932: 211–213).
The situation in Cochinchina, in southern Vietnam, was very different. 
Between 1880 and 1910, land under cultivation almost trebled, from 522,000 
to 1.52 million hectares. Thereafter, the rate of expansion slowed (Gran 1975: 
table 2-2; see also table 3.7). This was the only part of Vietnam where growth 
in area under rice cultivation kept up with population growth in the early 
decades of the twentieth century (see Table 3.3). In order to bring more land 
under cultivation, the French invested heavily in land reclamation, dredging, 
and canal building, and to recoup these expenditures, government policy was 
to sell concessions. Especially after 1913, land was sold “to the highest bidder” 
(Brocheux 1995: 30). The result was that agricultural land was very inequita-
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bly distributed; in several provinces between 39 and 66 percent of all agricul-
tural land was in holdings over fi fty hectares (Henry 1932: 189). The process 
of land surveying and land titling was often farmed out to private compa-
nies who “carried out their duties unsystematically and sluggishly” (Brocheux 
1995: 36). Disputes over land rights erupted when squatters were evicted by 
new owners, who farmed the land out to tenants, often on short leases (Gran 
1975: 252).
In the rest of this chapter, the impact of population and agricultural expan-
sion on access to land is examined, fi rst by looking at the competition for 
land to grow different crops and then by examining the confl ict that emerged 
between estates and smallholders, and between foreign and local claimants 
to land. These confl icts varied over time and across regions but in all cases 
gave rise to problems that governments were forced to wrestle with in the 
early decades of the century and that were often not resolved by 1940. They 
remained for the governments that emerged in the post-1945 era to deal with 
in very different ways.
Growth in Rice Production and Land Tenure
Rice was not only the main food staple for the vast majority of the popula-
tion in East and Southeast Asia, but also, by the early twentieth century, an 
important export crop for both Korea and Taiwan as well as Burma, Thailand, 
Table 3.7. Growth of Population, Rice Area, and Rice Exports: 
Three Deltas, 1880 –1930s
 Population Cultivated Area Rice Exports
 (millions) (thousand hectares) (thousand tons)
Thailand
1881–1885 6.2 (1880) 1,046 (1885) 220
1906 –1910 8.3 (1910) 1,755 (1910) 929
1936 –1940 15.0 (1938) 3,481 (1936 –1940) 1,475
Cochinchina
1880 1.7 522 295
1910 3.1 1,528 1,109
1936 4.6 2,110 1,711
Burma a
1880 3.7 (1881) 1,255 807
1910 –1914 6.2 (1911) 4,116 2,383
1935 –1939 8.9 (1941) 4,965 2,909
Source: Manarungsan 1989: 32, 51, 61; Gran 1975: 63; Saito and Lee 1999: 7, 83.
a Population data refer to Lower Burma only. 
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and southern Vietnam. In the two Japanese colonies, the rice export econ-
omy was developed primarily to feed metropolitan Japan, while in the three 
delta regions of Lower Burma, central Thailand, and southern Vietnam, the 
export surplus was sold on regional and world markets, although in the case 
of Burma, the British Indian market was given priority in times of scarcity. But 
even in the major rice-exporting regions, there were signifi cant differences in 
policies used to expand production and the exportable surplus. 
In Korea, it appears that the growth in rice exports occurred at the expense 
of domestic consumption; between 1912 and 1930, the index of rice consumed 
per capita within Korea declined from 100 to 62 (Lee 1936: 275). By 1930, 
Korea was supplying over 700,000 tons of rice to the Japanese market, or about 
7.4 percent of total Japanese consumption. In 1933, as a result of increases in 
production and low prices in Japan, the Koreans were urged to eat more rice 
themselves and export less (Chung 2006: 233). The impact of this policy on 
rice consumption in Korea will be examined in Chapter 7. But by 1938, as a 
result of the expansion of the Japanese empire into China, rice shortages were 
again feared by the Japanese government, and Korea was expected to provide 
an export surplus. Korean people were told to stop eating rice. The amount 
supplied to Japan increased sharply in 1938; in that year Korea was supply-
ing 12.7 percent of total Japanese requirements (Ka 1995: 135). How did the 
colonial government in Korea manage to extract the exportable surplus from 
Korean farmers? Were they coerced into supplying the Japanese market at the 
expense of their own consumption? 
Some historians have argued that there is little evidence that direct coer-
cion was used and that the main reason for the continuing large supplies to 
the Japanese market, even during the 1930s when that market was oversup-
plied and prices were falling, was that the export marketing networks were 
far better developed than internal ones (Gill 1998: 133). Infrastructure devel-
opment also facilitated the export of food grains; thus it was very much in 
the interests of surplus producers to sell their output to Japan (Cha 1998: 
733). It is likely that a signifi cant proportion of the exportable surplus came 
from large farms owned by Japanese and cultivated by Korean tenants; the 
Japanese landlords would have had close ties with rice traders in Japan. The 
issues of tenancy and foreign ownership are examined in more detail below; 
in the Korean case, Japanese landownership was concentrated in the fertile 
rice-growing plains in the southern part of the peninsula. In this area, around 
70 percent of farms were tenanted (Lee 1936: 148–161). 
In Taiwan, the growth in rice exports to Japan was also rapid until the 
mid-1930s; in 1934, Taiwan was supplying almost 7 percent of Japanese total 
rice requirements and a much higher proportion of rice entering the urban 
markets. The high-yielding ponlai variety introduced by the Japanese was 
grown almost entirely for export, with the local population eating inferior 
varieties often grown on poorer land. But by the early 1930s, the Japanese gov-
ernment was concerned with oversupply to the home market and the politi-
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cal consequences of declining rice prices and farm incomes in Japan. In the 
latter part of the 1930s, the colonial government intervened to discourage 
rice production in Taiwan and encourage production of other crops such as 
sugar. Area under paddy cultivation declined in the latter part of the 1930s, 
while that under sugarcane increased. The sugar companies, mostly owned by 
Japanese business groups, acquired dry land in the central and southern part 
of the island. In these areas, land concentration increased, while in the north-
ern rice-growing areas, tenancy declined and land fragmentation increased 
(Ka 1995: 150 –152). It would appear that sugar and rice production did not 
compete for land in Taiwan to the same extent as in other parts of Southeast 
Asia, so the switch from rice to sugar production for export could have led to 
increased rice availability for home consumption. Certainly by the late 1930s 
rice availability per capita in Taiwan was well above that in Korea, in Java, and 
in the Philippines (see Table 2.6). The implications of rice availability for home 
consumption vis-à-vis living standards are discussed further in Chapter 7.
It has already been argued that the growth of export production in Korea 
and Taiwan after 1918 hardly seems to accord with the vent for surplus theory, 
in that land area per worker was falling, and much of the increased output of 
rice was derived from growth in yields, in turn the result of using new seeds 
and production techniques (see Tables 2.6 and 3.2). In contrast, the growth 
of rice production in the delta regions of Southeast Asia in the last part of the 
nineteenth century and the early twentieth century has often been used as 
an example of vent for surplus, in the sense that large tracts of jungle in the 
delta regions were rapidly brought under rice cultivation using existing tech-
nologies. Much of the increased output was exported. Rice exports increased 
faster than population, and unlike in Korea, there was little evidence that this 
increased output was at the expense of domestic consumption. 
In Burma, rice exports grew rapidly in the last part of the nineteenth cen-
tury; by 1880 exports amounted to over 800,000 metric tons (see Table 3.7). 
By 1910 –1914, land under cultivation had increased from 1.2 to 4.1 million 
hectares, and rice exports had increased almost threefold. Adas has described 
how internal migration was important in opening up the delta regions of 
southern Burma, especially from the dry zone in the center of the country 
(1974: chap. 2). British policy was certainly important in removing the restric-
tions on the export of rice and in facilitating internal population movements, 
but the story of the Burma delta in the last part of the nineteenth century 
is essentially one of indigenous populations responding to the opportunities 
created by expanding regional and world markets. The British administration, 
while not preventing the rapid growth of land settlement in the delta, did 
not provide much assistance in bringing land under cultivation. The migrants 
themselves had to fi nd the funds to turn jungle into rice land, and this led to 
increased reliance on Indian moneylenders. 
Adas also stressed that new settlers relied heavily on the rather primitive 
rice technologies with which they had been familiar in the dry zones in the 
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center of Burma (1974: 62 – 65). The crude harrow adopted in many parts of 
the delta had been used in central Burma for a thousand years, and cultivators 
applied little or no fertilizer of any kind, beyond some use of cattle manure. 
The cultivator in Lower Burma “seldom took time to select better seeds” but 
relied on traditional varieties which produced low yields (ibid.: 64). The situ-
ation regarding the adoption of improved cultivation technologies was little 
different in Thailand and Vietnam, with the result that yields were lower than 
in Malaya and Java, and much lower than in Taiwan and Korea by the 1930s 
(see Table 2.6). 
In both Thailand and Cochinchina, the expansion of land under rice cul-
tivation and rice exports were also rapid after 1880 (see Table 3.7). In Thailand, 
Siamwalla pointed out that the liberalization of the rice trade that occurred 
in the latter part of the nineteenth century was not immediately followed by 
the elimination of the corvée system or of slavery (1972: 17–18). He suggested 
that “the fi rst group of people who responded to the signal of rising prices 
were the people who had control over labor and who were thus in a position 
to exploit the labor under their control for commercial gains for the fi rst time” 
(ibid.). In addition, many farmers may have taken new land into rice cultiva-
tion on their own initiative and used the extra money they gained to buy 
out their obligations to their patrons. This would explain the relative lack of 
long-distance migration in the Thai case as compared to Burma. It might also 
explain the slower growth in area under rice cultivation in Thailand between 
1880 and 1910 compared with Burma and Cochinchina (see Table 3.7). 
There has been considerable debate among economic historians of Thai-
land about the failure on the part of government to invest in the development 
of irrigation systems after 1900. The expansion of irrigation in the Rangsit 
area of the central plains was largely carried out by a private company and 
the improved land sold off to members of the Bangkok elite, who cultivated 
it with tenants (Siamwalla 1972: 28–29). A Dutch expert with considerable 
experience in Indonesia, J. Homan van der Heide, was asked by the Thai gov-
ernment to investigate the feasibility of expanding irrigated agriculture in 
central Thailand, and he submitted several reports and memoranda between 
1903 and 1908. But most of his recommendations were not taken up. Brown 
argued that the main reason was budgetary; the Thai government gave prior-
ity to expenditures on railways and strengthening the capacity of the military 
in order to defend the country’s political sovereignty against encroachment 
from the British and the French (1988: 174 –175). 
The experience of Cochinchina was different again; it has already been 
noted that the French invested heavily in land reclamation in the Mekong 
delta around the turn of the century and often disposed of the resulting land 
in large tracts to both expatriates and local residents who had either the money 
to buy the land in auctions or the political infl uence to acquire it as grants. 
The population of the delta area expanded rapidly after 1880, although how 
much of the growth was from natural increase, how much from local migra-
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tion within southern Vietnam, and how much from longer distance migration 
from northern and central Vietnam and from Cambodia is diffi cult to judge 
from the existing data. Owen argued that much of the migration was from less 
fertile and more crowded parts of Cochinchina (1971: 127), while Brocheux 
has shown that the numbers of Cambodians in western Cochinchina more 
than doubled between 1886 and 1908 (1995: table 1). By 1908, Cambodi-
ans accounted for almost 16 percent of the population. Many were probably 
squatters on land to which they had no legal title and were increasingly vul-
nerable to dispossession after 1900. 
Most studies of the development of the agricultural economy of Cochi-
nchina in the fi rst three decades of the twentieth century have relied heavily 
on the work of Henry (1932), who carried out the only detailed survey of 
land distribution in Indochina around 1930. His fi ndings have been widely 
cited by all subsequent writers, although it is diffi cult to judge how accurate 
they are; Gourou suggested that they were “perhaps not incontestable” but 
used them anyway (1945a: 339). Henry claimed that in Cochinchina there 
were only 255,000 agricultural holdings, of which almost 72 percent were 
below fi ve hectares (Henry 1932: 212). If we adopt the population estimates of 
Banens (2000: 33), then it would appear that the total population of Cochin-
china in 1929 was almost 5.5 million. If it is further assumed that the average 
household comprised six people and that 75 percent were largely or wholly 
dependent on agriculture, we can derive a rough estimate of around 680,000 
agricultural households. If indeed only 255,000 (fewer than 40 percent) owned 
land, then it is clear that a substantial majority of all agricultural households 
were either tenants or agricultural laborers. 
This indeed has been assumed by several subsequent writers (Gourou 
1945a: 339–344, 516; Murray 1980: 420 – 421; Ngo 1991: 28). It seems a rea-
sonable assumption; even if Henry’s estimates of the numbers of landowning 
households were to be increased by 50 percent, there would still have been a 
signifi cant minority (around 40 percent) of households that were either ten-
ants or agricultural laborers. Sansom argued that the “attitudes of the land-
lords on matters of production and estate management were determined by 
their efforts to maximize the rent output from their fi elds while minimizing 
the administrative costs” (1970: 31). Although rentals were a fi xed percent-
age (usually 40 to 60 percent) of the crop, there is little evidence that land-
lords made any attempt to increase yields through better cultivation methods. 
Gourou found that rice cultivation techniques in southern Vietnam were not 
very different from those used in Tonkin and Annam (1945a: 355–356). He 
argued that a substantial part of the income of landowners came from lending 
money to their tenants, and many had little interest in improving cultivation 
technologies. 
If indeed tenancy was widespread in all the major rice-exporting regions 
of East and Southeast Asia by the early part of the twentieth century, what 
were the explanations? In both Korea and Taiwan, tenancy was probably wide-
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spread before the consolidation of Japanese rule, although in both cases the 
penetration of Japanese capitalism into the rural economic structure brought 
about considerable changes in land tenure and in the distribution of land. In 
the case of Korea, Lee argued that the main result of Japanese colonialism was 
a polarization of landholdings into a small number of large, often Japanese-
owned holdings and a large number of very small, Korean-owned or -tenanted 
holdings (1936: 161). Cha suggested that, during the 1930s, many farmers 
suffered declining incomes and could not pay off debts incurred for irrigation 
and other land improvements (1998: 734). They were compelled to sell land 
and become tenants. While it may have been true that the widespread distress 
sales of land in the 1930s came about as “a result of economic forces and not 
from a colonial conspiracy to deprive Koreans of their land,” the evidence 
suggests that landholdings became more concentrated, and many Japanese 
individuals and corporations acquired land from Korean cultivators (Gragert 
1994: 148–149). 
Ka argued that in Taiwan, where a system of perpetual tenancy had evolved 
that gave strong usufruct rights to the tenants, the Japanese did not try to 
implant another system but rather modifi ed the existing one to achieve their 
own aims of increasing rice and sugar exports (1995: 39). In the delta areas 
of Southeast Asia, where large amounts of new land were brought under cul-
tivation, tenancy evolved either as a direct consequence of government land 
policy (in Cochinchina and to a lesser extent in Thailand) or because the 
new settlers depended heavily on loans from private moneylenders, and when 
defaults occurred, the landowners were forced to surrender their land and 
became either tenants or laborers on land that they had formerly owned.
Even as rice exports were increasing rapidly from the two Japanese colo-
nies and the three deltas, other colonies in Southeast Asia were, by the early 
twentieth century, becoming rice importers, dependent on supplies from 
Cochinchina, Burma, and Thailand to make up the difference between domes-
tic demand and supply. In the Philippines, the switch from net rice exporter 
to rice importer appears to have begun after 1870 (Legarda 1999: 164–173). 
On the one hand, exports from Cochinchina were competing with those from 
the Philippines, especially in the China market, while, on the other hand, 
many Filipino cultivators found other crops, such as sugar and hemp, more 
profi table. Reliance on imports increased in the early years of the twentieth 
century, and in the six years from 1917 to 1922, imports amounted to more 
than 8 percent of home production (Mears et al. 1974: 355). 
Indonesia also became a major rice importer after the 1870s, and from 
1917 to 1922, imports to Java amounted to more than 9 percent of domestic 
production (Boomgaard and van Zanden 1990: 46). Imports to the islands 
outside Java also increased rapidly after 1900 and by 1925 exceeded imports to 
Java; we do not have production data for Sumatra before 1940, but it is prob-
able that the ratio of imports to local production was much higher than in 
Java. But from 1920 to 1940, the largest rice importer, both in absolute terms 
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and relative to local production, was British Malaya. Imports seldom dropped 
below 400,000 metric tons from 1923 to 1940 and in 1938–1940 were above 
600,000 tons. For much of the 1920s, imports were more than twice as high as 
domestic production (Grist 1941: table 32).
The high and growing reliance on imports of the key food staple worried 
both British and Dutch offi cials. In Malaya, from the late nineteenth cen-
tury onward, government policy supported the development of irrigation, 
although as Lim has pointed out, expansion of irrigated land was impeded by 
the insistence that irrigation works could only be carried out where the capital 
outlay could be recouped with interest (1977: 42). The Dutch in Java were less 
concerned with fi nancial rates of return, and in fact water charges were not 
levied in the schemes that were initiated or enlarged after 1900. The ethical 
policy, introduced in 1901 in order to increase the prosperity of the Indone-
sian, and especially the Javanese, population placed considerable emphasis 
on irrigation as a means of increasing agricultural productivity. This emphasis 
appears to have led to a rapid expansion of harvested area; one estimate sug-
gests that it more than doubled between 1880 and 1937 (van der Eng 1996: 
67). But still the reliance on imported rice continued, as population growth 
more than offset growth in area under rice production, and no breakthrough 
was achieved in yields. 
The Growth of Sugar as an Export Crop
By 1910, the three deltas had become virtually monocrop rice economies. But 
in other parts of the Asian region, new export crops emerged that in some 
cases competed with rice for land. The most prominent example of a com-
petitor crop was sugar, and sugar cultivation developed rapidly in the latter 
part of the nineteenth century in Java and the Philippines, and after 1900 in 
Taiwan. By the latter part of the 1920s, Java was exporting over 2 million tons, 
and Taiwan and the Philippines about 1.1 million tons between them (Table 
3.8). Elsewhere in Southeast Asia, sugar cultivation for export never took off, 
in spite of favorable agroclimatic conditions in several parts of the region. 
Ingram has pointed out that for some years after the Bowring Treaty, it was 
expected that sugar would become one of Thailand’s main export crops (1971: 
123–127), and in the 1860s a British fi rm obtained a grant of over one thou-
sand hectares of land from the Thai government at a very low rental. The plan 
was to grow cane and also develop sugar-processing facilities, but low world 
prices and an unfavorable domestic tax regime together prevented the growth 
of sugar exports; by the 1880s, they had practically ceased. 
Low prices and stiff international competition also prevented the devel-
opment of sugar cultivation in Vietnam, in spite of some government efforts 
to import new varieties from the Caribbean (Thompson 1937: 140 –141). The 
low world prices in the last decades of the nineteenth century were due to the 
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rapid growth of a subsidized beet industry in Europe and also the growth of 
exports from some parts of the tropics, including Java and Cuba. In addition, 
the American industry in both Hawai‘i and several southern states expanded 
after the end of the civil war and reduced the American reliance on imports, 
further depressing world market prices. These factors seem to have been cru-
cial in encouraging the mainly Chinese-owned sugar estates in Malaya to 
switch to other crops, such as rubber, which by the end of the nineteenth 
century were facing more buoyant world markets and also required less labor 
( Jackson 1968: 172–175). In addition, offi cial British policy was to encourage 
the growth of rice cultivation on irrigated land, rather than sugar or other 
crops that offi cials considered “speculative.” 
The industries in both Java and the Philippines were also affected by the 
diffi cult world market conditions in the last part of the nineteenth century, 
but by then they had become suffi ciently strongly established to weather the 
unfavorable international conditions. The Javanese industry had developed 
during the period of the cultivation system (cultuurstelsel), when smallholders 
were induced, or coerced, by various means to grow export crops for delivery 
to government agencies and sale in the Netherlands. By 1840, production 
amounted to 58,000 tons, and this fi gure almost trebled over the next three 
decades (Creutzberg 1975: 52). After the demise of the cultivation system and 
the introduction of the so-called liberal policy, the industry developed rapidly, 
although problems in the 1880s led to a thorough restructuring of the indus-
try, with some fi rms going out of business. Output had reached 744,000 tons 
by 1900. Large sugar factories using imported equipment were built, usually 
Table 3.8. Growth of Sugar Exports from Taiwan, the Philippines, and Java: 
1870 –1874 to 1935 –1939 (thousand metric tons)
 Taiwan Philippines Java
Exports
1870 –1874 n.a. 92.1 185.5
1900 –1904 30.3 78.6 848.2
1910 –1914 158.8 184.3 1,431.2
1920 –1924 340.0 292.4 1,661.0
1925 –1929 537.1 555.4 2,137.4
1930 –1934 738.9 949.0 1,503.5
1935 –1939 1,003.1 806.0 1,093.5
Yields
1928 –1932 29.3 20.4 56.4
Sources: Ka 1995: 68; Larkin 1993: 150, 202, appendix A; Java: Creutzberg 1975: 73–76. Yields data 
from Evenson and Kislev 1975: table 3.4.
Note: Yields are in short tons per acre; n.a. = not available. 
52 Chapter 3
with foreign capital, although the factories themselves owned little land and 
obtained most of their cane from land rented in from indigenous landown-
ers. By the early years of the twentieth century, Java had become one of the 
world’s leading producers, and also one of the most effi cient, with higher 
yields than any other producing region except Hawai‘i (Evenson and Kislev 
1975: table 3.4).
The industry in the Philippines also developed rapidly in the second part 
of the nineteenth century, with foreigners playing an important part in sup-
plying credit and technology (Larkin 1993: 46 – 53). British and American trad-
ing fi rms controlled the export trade, although the role of Philippine-Chinese 
merchants became more important in the fi nal decades of the century, partly 
because of Spanish attempts to lessen the stranglehold of other foreign fi rms. 
Spain was not an important customer for Philippine sugar; most of the exports 
went to Britain and to other Asian markets, including China and Japan, which 
took mainly lower quality output. The share of sugar in total Philippine 
exports between 1846 and 1895 fl uctuated considerably but seldom fell below 
one-third and was, with abaca, the most important export commodity. 
The third Asian colony to emerge as an important sugar exporter after 
1900 was Taiwan. Here there can be little doubt that the Japanese govern-
ment played a crucial role in the early development of the industry. Sugar had 
been grown in Taiwan for several centuries, but the Japanese considered the 
Taiwanese industry to be primitive. Although there were over one thousand 
mills on the island, “not a single mill had adopted the modern, mechanical 
method of manufacturing, and all of them used animal power” (Foreign Affairs 
Association 1944: 926). The Japanese colonial authorities were determined to 
increase production to supply the Japanese domestic market and thus lessen 
dependence on imports from other parts of Asia. Ho has argued that the Japa-
nese strategy was to cooperate with private Japanese capital and create a cor-
porate business structure that would then lead to the virtual elimination of 
Taiwanese capitalists from the industry, while at the same time encouraging 
Taiwanese farmers to grow more cane in order to supply large-scale mills with 
enough raw material to allow them to operate at full capacity for most of 
the year (1971: 320–321). Government investment in infrastructure, including 
roads, railways, and irrigation, was an important part of the policy package, 
but more direct assistance was also needed.
A regulation issued in 1902 clarifi ed the extent of the government subsi-
dies to both cultivators and factories. Any cultivator who grew more than fi ve 
acres of sugar could apply for fertilizer subsidies and “sugarcane shoot subsi-
dies.” In addition the government was prepared to subsidize up to 50 percent 
of the construction costs of irrigation and drainage projects that benefi ted 
sugar cultivation. Sugar manufacturers using approved government machin-
ery could claim up to 20 percent of its cost, and there were additional subsi-
dies for companies with grinding capacity above a certain limit. Lastly, gov-
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ernment lands could be cleared and used for cane cultivation without rent, 
and such lands could also be used without cost for irrigation construction. 
Other inducements provided by the colonial regime included tax concessions, 
reduced rail freight rates, and some legal privileges (Ho 1971: 321).
The Taiwanese sugar industry was granted further assistance through high 
tariffs imposed on imported sugar from outside the Japanese empire in the 
domestic Japanese market (Chang and Myers 1963: 445; Schneider 1998: 164). 
The colonial government encouraged Japanese fi rms operating in Taiwan to 
form a powerful cartel that regulated output price and exports. With such a 
favorable package of inducements, the industry expanded rapidly; between 
1905 and 1920, both land under sugar cultivation and output increased four-
fold (Grajdanzev 1942: 59). Between 1925 and 1940, the land controlled by 
sugar companies, through ownership and tenancies, grew by a further 44 per-
cent; by 1940 the land controlled by sugar companies amounted to 13.7 per-
cent of total arable land. By the 1930s, the sugar companies owned most of 
the land under sugar cultivation and either farmed it themselves or leased it to 
tenants. Less than 25 percent of land under sugar was owned by smallholders 
(Ka 1995: 99). But in spite of all the government assistance to the industry, it 
remained less productive than the world leaders in Java and Hawai‘i; in the 
1930s yields per hectare were only about half what was achieved in these two 
producing regions (Grajdanzev 1942: 46). Taiwanese producers also remained 
almost completely dependent on the protected Japanese market, and when 
that was withdrawn after 1945, production levels dropped markedly. 
Ka contrasted the development of the sugar industry in Taiwan with that 
in Java, where after 1870 the industry developed rapidly by renting in land 
from indigenous owners (1995: 98–101). The Javanese industry ran into severe 
problems in the mid-1880s, caused by disease and falling world prices, and 
many sugar companies were unable to meet their loan obligations and were 
taken over by banks. Smaller fi rms went under, and the larger ones became 
limited liability companies owned mainly by shareholders in the Netherlands 
(Boomgaard 1988: 160). It was at this time that the companies began to invest 
in the development of new varieties that greatly increased yields. Most writ-
ers have claimed that a strong element of compulsion was involved in the 
renting of land to the companies, who wanted large blocks of irrigated land 
of one thousand hectares or more delivered to them for use over at least fi f-
teen months on a recurring cycle (Geertz 1963: 86 – 89; Gordon 1979: 256). 
While many Dutch civil servants of an “ethical” cast of mind may have been 
unhappy with the consequences of this policy, the sugar companies usually 
got their land.
The effects of this policy on agricultural development in Java have been 
much debated. Most scholars agree that the rental paid to the landowner by 
the company did not fully compensate for the value of the farm production 
lost over fi fteen months, and sometimes the land was returned in poor condi-
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tion and needed work before it could be planted again with rice. But it has 
also been argued that, taking into account all the payments made by the sugar 
companies for labor and other services, the “direct social returns from sugar 
production were substantially higher than the shadow value of farm produc-
tion” (van der Eng 1996: 223). But if this argument is true, then why did the 
companies not encourage farmers to grow cane themselves and supply it to 
factories, using either rice land or other land? It was the element of coer-
cion that some Dutch offi cials and many subsequent scholars have criticized. 
Geertz argued that the effect of the sugar industry in Java was to make the 
Javanese cane worker a coolie while he also remained a peasant farmer (1963: 
89), although it is probable that many of the coolies employed by the sugar 
companies either as factory hands or fi eld workers did not themselves own 
irrigated land. 
The sugar industry on Java clearly created employment; it has been esti-
mated that at its height in the late 1920s, the factories employed up to 175,000 
workers, and the cultivation of cane needed 800,000 to 1 million seasonal 
work ers (Boomgaard 1988: 164). Another 250,000 were needed for cutting and 
carting the cane. When output began to contract after 1930, many of these 
jobs were lost. While the landowners no longer had to surrender their land, 
many poorer Javanese lost an important source of cash income. Between 1930 
and 1935, sugar output contracted from 3 million tons to little over 500,000 
tons (Creutzberg 1975: 53). This loss was almost entirely due to loss of mar-
kets, especially in the British empire after the policy of imperial preference 
was adopted. Unlike the Taiwanese and Philippine industries, there was no 
protected market into which Javanese producers could sell. The Netherlands 
itself was a small market, and the home government had to consider the inter-
ests of its own beet producers. 
By the latter part of the 1930s, exports from both Taiwan and the Philip-
pines had almost caught up with those from Indonesia (see Table 3.8). The 
Philippine story is particularly interesting, as the sugar industry seemed to be 
facing a bleak future in the early American period. Production and exports 
had plunged during the hostilities with America, as both refi ning facilities and 
ports were shut down. Competition from Java in Asian markets intensifi ed, 
and increased imports from Taiwan cut the Philippines out of the Japanese 
market. Several of the British and American trading companies that had pro-
vided credit to growers and arranged exports were virtually bankrupt by 1900 
(Larkin 1993: 53–54). In addition, American land policy appeared to favor 
smallholdings over large land grants, and powerful American cane and beet 
sugar producers supported politicians in Congress who opposed the establish-
ment of large agricultural estates in the new colony (Pelzer 1945: 105).
And yet, by 1916, the industry had recovered and sugar exports from the 
Philippines had more than regained the peak levels attained in the early 1890s 
(Larkin 1993: appendix A). One reason for the resurgence was that poten-
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tial investors in the sugar factories (centrals) were able to exploit loopholes 
in the 1902 Public Land Act, which placed ceilings of sixteen hectares on 
land grants to individuals and of 1,024 hectares on grants to corporations. 
An American syndicate was able to purchase 18,000 hectares in Mindoro in 
1909, and although this venture failed, other American-led ventures acquired 
land in Luzon. In addition, other sugar centrals negotiated long-term mill-
ing contracts with local growers that gave them guaranteed supplies of cane 
(ibid.: 58–59). With the establishment of the Philippine National Bank in 
1916, local investors were able to access credit to expand milling operations; 
they were further helped by government spending on transport infrastructure 
and higher world prices during the First World War. In addition, sugar from 
the Philippines was given favorable access to the American market, while the 
Panama canal reduced freight rates from Southeast Asia to the huge markets 
of the American eastern seaboard. By the 1920s, sugar planters from Luzon 
and Negros had formed a powerful lobby “capable of shaping national gov-
ernment policy on tariffs, investment policy, and relations with the United 
States” (McCoy 1992: 124). 
Thus three colonial regimes used rather different strategies to build up 
important sugar export industries in the early decades of the twentieth cen-
tury, while neighboring colonies with similar resource endowments failed to 
do so. The Javanese industry did not have a large protected home market 
to sell into; it grew through substantial investments in raising productiv-
ity, which allowed it to compete on world markets even in periods of falling 
prices. It is unlikely that the Taiwanese industry, which remained technically 
less developed than the Javanese one until 1940, would have developed if 
it had not had the protected Japanese market to sell into and if the colonial 
government had not provided a range of subsidies. The Philippine industry 
was also technically backward and benefi ted from a protected market in the 
United States. 
The industry in the Philippines was unique in that most of the assets, 
both in land and in processing plants and equipment, were owned not by for-
eign interests but by indigenous Filipinos who had by the 1920s become both 
very wealthy and politically powerful. Exports grew rapidly between 1921 and 
1934, with the American market becoming more and more important; after 
1930 almost all exports went to the United States (Larkin 1993: table 10). 
But the industry remained, like the Taiwanese one, technically backward, and 
growers had little incentive to increase yields or adopt more modern refi ning 
facilities, a fact that worried American offi cials, if not the growers themselves 
(Davis 1932: 24). The industry remained protected by favorable access to the 
American market after 1935 and indeed after full independence was granted in 
1946. The sugar barons remained politically powerful well after independence, 
with consequences for the country’s economic and political development that 
few could have predicted in the early years of the twentieth century. 
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Estates and Smallholders
The sugar companies that developed in Taiwan, the Philippines, and Java in 
the latter part of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, whether owned 
by locals or by foreigners, were capitalist enterprises in that the processing 
factories were large-scale and required heavy investment in plant and equip-
ment as well as substantial amounts of wage labor. The companies sold their 
output either to protected metropolitan markets or to third countries, and 
they were required by owners to return a profi t. But at the same time they were 
often reliant on indigenous smallholders for supplies of land; in some parts 
of the region they depended on independent growers or tenants to supply 
them with cane. In that sense they were different from the fully integrated 
estate enterprises that had evolved in Indonesia after the policy changes of 
the 1870s and in other parts of the region such as British Malaya later in the 
century, which were almost always foreign-owned. These enterprises acquired 
substantial amounts of land either in perpetuity or on long-term leases and 
grew crops largely if not entirely for export. Where processing was necessary 
before export, this was done on the estate; for both cultivation and process-
ing, the estate depended on wage labor.
The term “estate” is not infrequently used in the literature to refer to 
any large landholding (say over twenty hectares in size) that is too big to be 
operated by a normal farm household so must either be tenanted or operated 
by wage labor or some combination of both. As we have seen, tenancy was 
widespread in most of the rice-exporting regions of Asia by the 1930s, albeit 
for different reasons in different countries. It was also widespread in the Phil-
ippines. But were large holdings operated by tenants always owned by foreign 
interests? In the case of Korea and Taiwan, tenancy appears to have been at 
least partly associated with increased landownership by Japanese individuals 
and corporations, although there were some indigenous landlords as well. Lee 
estimated that, by 1930, Japanese owners accounted for 11 percent of taxable 
land area (1936: 147–148), and a substantial part of this was in large holdings 
of over 100 hectares that must have been cultivated by either paid labor or 
tenants. Ka showed that by 1939 Japanese interests owned substantial land-
holdings in Taiwan, mainly in the southern, sugar-growing areas, which in 
some cases were cultivated by tenants rather than directly by the companies 
(1995: 146 –147). 
In Burma, the growth in tenancy was at least partly the result of land 
being claimed by Indian moneylenders when loans were in default, although 
even as late as 1937, only about half the land occupied by nonagriculturalists 
was the property of the chettyars (Andrus 1948: 70). Adas argued that at least 
until the fi rst decade of the twentieth century, most landlords were success-
ful farmers who through luck or good management had been able to acquire 
more land than they were able to cultivate themselves (1974: 71), although 
the term “estate” does not seem to have been used to refer to their holdings, 
 Agricultural Expansion, Population Growth, and Access to Land 57
even when they amounted to hundreds of hectares. But increasingly landlords 
and others acquired land when owners could not pay back loans, whether to 
indigenous or Indian lenders. 
Brocheux has shown that in Cochinchina, where tenancy was widespread 
by 1930, European ownership accounted for only about 147,000 hectares, 
while “Asian settlement” accounted for almost 1.4 million hectares (1995: 
table 4). Henry reported that there were 6,300 holdings over fi fty hectares 
in Cochinchina (1932: 212), but it seems that the majority were owned by 
Vietnamese, in some cases with French nationality, rather than Europeans 
(Sansom 1970: 51). In Thailand, there was little alienation of land to foreign 
individuals or companies, and most of the land in large holdings was owned 
by members of the aristocracy, often funded by Chinese merchants. In the 
Philippines, tenancy appears to have been a means of sharing out the avail-
able land to all households willing and able to operate it, but there were also 
large holdings operated by managers and hired labor. The 1939 census showed 
that about 3.5 percent of all cultivated land was in such holdings, and the 
average size of these holdings was 88.3 hectares (Bureau of Census and Statis-
tics 1947: 137–140). But how many of these managed holdings were foreign-
owned or fully integrated estate enterprises is diffi cult to discern from the 
available data. 
It is easier to distinguish foreign-owned, fully integrated estate enterprises 
from other types of large holdings in the Indonesian and British Malayan 
fi gures. This is because colonial statistics made a sharper distinction between 
estates and smallholdings not just on grounds of size, but also on grounds of 
legal status. The statistics refl ected offi cial concern about alienation of indig-
enous land to “foreign interests,” including not just European companies, but 
also migrants from other parts of Asia, especially the Chinese. Such alienation 
was increasingly subject to legal controls after 1870 in Indonesia and after 
1913 in British Malaya (Lim 1977: chap. 4). By the early twentieth century, 
fairly accurate statistics were available on land controlled by estate companies 
in both Java and the Outer Islands and the conditions of tenure (Creutzberg 
1975: table 6). In 1900, around 920,000 hectares of land in Java and 850,000 
hectares of land outside Java were available to commercial estates through 
various concessions and leasing arrangements, including the letting of village 
land in Java to sugar companies. 
By the early 1920s, land controlled by estates outside Java was roughly 
equal to that in Java, but after that there was a contraction in Java and an 
increase elsewhere (Table 3.9). By the late 1930s, the amount available to 
estates in Java had dropped to slightly over 1 million hectares, or about 13 
percent of the land cultivated by indigenous Indonesians. But even in Java, 
only about 55 percent of the land controlled by estates was actually cultivated, 
while the proportion was lower elsewhere (Table 3.9). In Java, apart from the 
irrigated land rented to the sugar estates, most of the land controlled by estates 
was dry and often hilly, and used for the cultivation of tea, coffee, and rubber. 
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But by the 1930s many landless and near-landless indigenous cultivators were 
eager to cultivate even dry uplands with food crops such as corn and cassava. 
Disputes over access to land between the estates and local populations were to 
become more intense after 1942. 
Outside Java, the land controlled by estates was used for a variety of crops, 
although by the 1920s rubber had become the most important. Rubber cul-
tivation in Indonesia took off more slowly than in British Malaya; by 1910, 
planted area of rubber on estates was only about 60 percent of that in pen-
insular Malaya. But by 1940 planted area in Indonesia had almost caught up 
with Malaya. Particularly striking was the huge area estimated to be under 
smallholder cultivation outside Java by 1940 (Table 3.10). After 1920, there 
was also rapid growth in area under smallholder rubber in southern Thailand, 
although the total area remained less than in British Malaya or Indonesia up 
until 1940. 
The emergence of large, fully integrated estates producing crops such as 
tobacco or rubber for export was viewed by many colonial offi cials as inevi-
table. They were convinced that economies of scale existed in agricultural 
production as much as in industry and that the best way to “modernize” agri-
culture was to facilitate the emergence of the large-scale capitalist producer, 
who hired in labor and sold the output at a profi t on world markets. But these 
views were contradicted by the rapid growth of smallholder production of tree 
crops, which was one of the most remarkable aspects of agricultural devel-
opment in both British Malaya and Indonesia after 1900. In neither colony 
was government policy strongly supportive of smallholder production, and in 
British Malaya offi cial attitudes to smallholder rubber production remained 
overtly hostile until 1940. 
British offi cials were convinced that smallholdings were badly cultivated, 
and yields would decline progressively compared to the large estates managed 
on “scientifi c” principles (Drabble 1991: 138). They remained impervious to 
any evidence to the contrary, and increasingly the relationship between estates 
and smallholders became more competitive, not just over land but also over 
Table 3.9. Area Controlled by Estates in Java and the Outer Islands, 
1921–1940
  Planted Area as Planted Area of 
 Area Controlled a Percentage of Estates as a Percentage
 (million hectares) Controlled Area of Peasant Area
 Java Outer Islands Java Outer Islands Java
1921–1925 1.33 1.31 42 24 18
1926 –1930 1.23 1.56 54 29 16
1931–1935 1.10 1.55 55 35 14
1936 –1940 1.06 1.41 55 41 13
Sources: Department of Economic Affairs 1941: 70–73; van der Eng 1996: table A.4. 
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access to other support services such as improved seeds and credit. In Indo-
nesia, offi cial attitudes were probably more positive, especially on the part 
of offi cials anxious to encourage smallholders to diversify their output and 
incomes, although the growth in smallholder cultivation of rubber took place 
mainly outside the estate areas. Pelzer pointed out that only about 42,000 
of the estimated 715,000 hectares under smallholder rubber cultivation in 
1940 were in East Sumatra, where most of the large estates were located (1978: 
53). Most smallholders were in central and southern Sumatra and in western 
Kalimantan, where there were few barriers to smallholders taking more land 
under rubber cultivation. 
It is undoubtedly true that the smallholder rubber boom in Indonesia and 
Malaya would not have taken place if estates together with agency houses and 
banks had not pioneered the fi nancing, cultivation, and marketing of what 
was an exotic export crop about which indigenous Southeast Asian farmers 
knew nothing until the early years of the twentieth century. It is striking that 
rubber cultivation never took off at all in the southern Philippine island of 
Mindanao, where there was abundant land and a climate well suited to the 
crop. Pelzer suggested that the main reason was that American rubber capital 
was deterred by the 1,024-hectare limit on plantations and turned instead to 
Malaya and Sumatra (1945: 105), although immediately after the formation 
of the Federated Malay States, instructions to residents limited the amount 
of land that could be alienated to one individual to 640 acres (260 hectares) 
in Perak and a lower amount elsewhere (Drabble 1973: 23). These restrictions 
were lifted or circumvented when corporate capital became more involved in 
rubber cultivation, both in the FMS and in Johore.
In southern Vietnam, the amount of land under rubber cultivation was 
small relative to both Malaya and Indonesia and confi ned entirely to produc-
tion on large plantations, located mainly in the “gray” and “red” lands to the 
north of Saigon. There is little evidence that much smallholder production was 
undertaken; certainly it was never encouraged by the French colonial regime. 
The only region where smallholder cultivation was established before 1940 
Table 3.10. Planted Area of Rubber (Hevea), 1910–1940: British Malaya, Java, 
Outer Islands of Indonesia, and Thailand, 1910–1940 (thousand hectares)
 British Malaya Java Outer Islands Thailand
Year E S E S E S S
1910 172 53 64 n.a. 40 n.a. 0.4
1921 522 369 165 n.a. 204 n.a. 11.2
1930 754 476 229 n.a. 344 n.a. 60
1940 848 541 241 16 385 715 273
Sources: Drabble 2000: 53; Creutzberg 1975: table 10; Manarungsan 1989: 109.
Note: E = estate area, S = area under smallholdings; n.a. = not available. 
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outside Malaya and Indonesia was southern Thailand, where farmers managed 
to get access to seedlings from across the border. By 1940, planted area was 
around 273,000 hectares, although only about 120,000 hectares were tappable 
(Manarungsan 1989: 109). This area was much smaller than in either Malaya 
or Indonesia, but tappable hectarage was to expand rapidly after 1950. 
The main problem facing the large estates in Malaya, Vietnam, and Indo-
nesia after 1900 was recruiting and retaining suffi cient labor. Local populations 
who themselves had access to land were reluctant to work under what were 
seen as demeaning conditions for low wages, and companies had little alterna-
tive but to seek migrant workers. In Malaya, the recruitment was mainly from 
the huge labor pools in China and India, while in Indonesia and Vietnam, the 
colonial governments encouraged recruitment from the more densely settled 
areas within the colony where land was becoming scarce. The growth of large 
estates was thus an important factor in the development of a wage labor force 
in several parts of Southeast Asia in the early decades of the twentieth century, 
although by no means the only one.
The Emergence of a Wage Labor Force
By the 1920s, a skewed pattern of landholdings had emerged in many parts of 
East and Southeast Asia, where ownership was highly concentrated. In many 
regions, tenancy was used to distribute land to households who were willing 
and able to operate it, but tenants operating small plots of land were often 
in a very precarious position and probably little better off than those who 
depended mainly on wage labor for their incomes. In fact, it was frequently 
diffi cult to make a clear distinction between households owning very small 
plots, households who leased small amounts of land, and the wholly land-
less, as all three categories were dependent on wage labor and various types 
of self-employment to make ends meet. As we have seen, by the 1920s, it 
was estimated that around 60 percent of the population of Java was “land 
poor,” in the sense that they operated either no land at all, only very small 
plots, or house gardens. In Tonkin (northern Vietnam), almost 62 percent of 
households owned less than one mau (0.36 hectares), and a further 30 per-
cent owned less than fi ve mau (1.8 hectares). Gourou argues that a household 
cultivating three mau (1.1 hectares) and owning a buffalo was in “easy cir-
cumstances” by Tonkin standards, but the majority were below this threshold 
(1945a: 279).
For such households everywhere in Asia, the options were to try to acquire 
more land through purchase or rental /sharecropping arrangements, to earn 
some extra cash in various types of self-employment (food processing, weav-
ing, petty trade, and so on), or to seek wage employment either in agriculture 
on in other activities (mining, construction, manufacturing, transport, trade, 
and so on). A further option was to migrate to a place where land was in 
greater abundance and establish a new holding. Long-distance migration did 
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occur without government assistance, as in the case of the Irrawaddy delta. 
There were also attempts at government-sponsored land settlement schemes. 
In Indonesia, the Dutch colonial authorities viewed the movement of poor 
families from Java to Sumatra and Sulawesi as an integral part of the ethical 
policy. But movement of colonists to new settlements was costly and subject 
to a number of bureaucratic rules. In the early years of the twentieth century, 
the numbers moved were small, although they accelerated in the 1920s, espe-
cially to Lampung in southern Sumatra. As Pelzer pointed out, the govern-
ment settlement program had to compete with the recruiting agencies of the 
Sumatran plantations, which were by the early years of the twentieth century 
almost entirely dependent on Java for their labor supply (1945: 196–197).
The numbers of “coolies” working on the estates of East Sumatra increased 
over the fi rst three decades of the century to a peak of almost 303,000 in 
1929 (Lindblad 1999a: 72). Around 90 percent were Javanese, and most of 
the remainder were Chinese. Large numbers of Javanese also moved to other 
estate areas in Sumatra and southeastern Kalimantan; in 1929, the total num-
ber of coolies working on estates outside Java amounted to almost 535,000, 
of whom the great majority were Javanese ( Lindblad 1999b: 101). By 1930, 
people born in Java formed 31 percent of the total population of the region 
along the east coast of Sumatra where most large estates were located and 
about 10 percent of the entire population of Sumatra (Pelzer 1945: 260). Dur-
ing the 1930s, all the estates in Indonesia reduced their labor force, and by 
the end of the decade, the numbers of contract coolies had diminished to 
a few thousand. Recruitment in Java largely ceased, and most workers were 
“free,” that is, locally recruited. Over the same decade, the numbers of colo-
nists moved by the government increased, but even in 1940, the stock of Java-
nese transmigrants settled outside Java was lower than the numbers of estate 
workers (206,000 compared with 331,000). Taken together, offi cial land settle-
ment and the recruitment of estate workers from Java to the Outer Islands 
represented the largest movement of labor within a colonial territory in East or 
Southeast Asia in the early part of the twentieth century.
In addition, large numbers of workers were employed as wage laborers 
on sugar estates on Java. Life as a coolie worker on a large estate was hard for 
the Javanese, especially for those working many hundreds of miles away in 
Sumatra or Kalimantan. Workers were not infrequently recruited with false 
promises of wages and conditions, and mistreated after their arrival. In spite 
of the establishment of the Labor Inspectorate early in the twentieth century, 
conditions remained harsh for contract workers until the 1930s. Unpleasant 
and demeaning working conditions often resulted in attacks by coolies on 
their European supervisors (Houben 1999: 119). Rates of desertion peaked in 
the late 1920s, although they were never higher than around 3 percent of the 
total number of coolies (Lindblad 1999a: 76). But the lack of employment 
opportunities in most parts of Java ensured a steady supply of labor, both to 
the sugar estates in Java and to the plantations of Sumatra and Kalimantan. 
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This also appears to have been the case on the rubber estates in southern Viet-
nam, which by 1930 employed over 55,000 workers, of whom around 31,000 
were on contracts and the balance were free workers (Brocheux 1975: 63). 
During the early 1930s, the rubber estates employed more workers than the 
mining sector, which was the other large-scale employer of wage workers in 
Indochina. 
As in Sumatra, there was criticism of the conditions under which the 
laborers had to work; the harsh conditions and high incidence of malaria 
made it diffi cult for the estates to recruit in the Saigon area, where alterna-
tive work was increasingly available in the 1920s in the port and in industry. 
Murray states that in the buoyant years of the late 1920s, noncontract workers 
were paid around 60 cents a day, suffi cient to buy around four kilograms of 
rice (1980: 284). But they had to pay for food and lodgings. Unskilled workers 
in Saigon were paid at a slightly higher rate (between 65 and 79 cents) and 
would have been able to lodge with family or friends. The plantations were 
increasingly forced to look north to Tonkin and Annam for workers (ibid.: 
272). Labor recruiting was done through private agents, and as in Java, it 
appears that workers were often lured through false promises of high wages 
that did not eventuate. Workers were contracted for three years, and those 
who broke their contracts were subject to various penalties. Even so, there 
was a very high turnover of workers. In order to maintain an effective labor 
force of around 22,000 workers, estates found they had to recruit up to 75,000 
(Brocheux 1975: 63). This turnover was partly due to high mortality, although 
better medical care led to a decline in death rates during the 1930s. But many 
workers simply broke their contracts and either went home or joined the ranks 
of the wage labor force in other parts of the south.
It is not possible to estimate the size of the wage labor force in Southeast 
Asia or in Korea and Taiwan in the colonial period; labor force data are not 
available broken down by category of worker. There can be little doubt that 
several million workers in the region were largely if not entirely dependent 
on wage labor by 1930. The world depression in the early 1930s meant that 
many large enterprises, both estates and others, cut back on employment. In 
Indonesia, the total number of coolies working on estates outside Java more 
than halved between 1929 and 1934; there was also a sharp decline in num-
bers employed on rubber estates in British Malaya (Thoburn 1977: 285–286). 
In the case of Burma, many Indian workers returned home in the early 1930s 
as a result of the decline in wage labor opportunities. But by the latter part of 
the 1930s, as world economic conditions improved, recruitment of wage labor 
in the estates sector began to recover. By then other forms of wage employ-
ment had also become important. In Indonesia, by 1939 wage payments in 
industry exceeded those in estates, while earnings of Indonesians employed 
in government service had also risen in real terms over the 1930s (Polak 1943: 
tables 7.3, 8.2, and 10.3). 
A striking aspect of labor markets in several parts of Southeast Asia was the 
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apparently high degree of nominal wage rigidity; as employment declined in 
the early 1930s, money wages either stayed constant or declined quite slowly 
in Java, Sumatra, Thailand, and Vietnam. As prices of key staples such as rice 
were falling rapidly during these years, the real purchasing power of money 
wages often increased. Conversely, in the latter part of the 1930s, as exports 
and employment began to recover, money wages did not keep pace with 
increasing prices. Virtually everywhere in Asia, the amount of rice that daily 
wages could purchase declined in the latter part of the 1930s (Table 3.11). As 
would be expected, rice wages were lowest in the land-scarce areas of Java and 
Tonkin, although in neither case were they as low as in Korea. By the end of 
the 1930s, the highest wages were found in Manila and Bangkok, although in 
both cases government regulation of urban labor markets was increasing. In 
Manila, minimum wage legislation pushed urban wages well above rural ones 
and probably restricted employment growth as well. In Bangkok, the post-
1932 government began to restrict Chinese in-migration and impose quotas 
on Chinese employment in urban areas (Phongpaichit and Baker 1995: 179). 
By the late 1930s, many rural Thais were joining the urban wage labor force, 
which must have depressed real wages in sectors such as rice milling, formerly 
a Chinese preserve. 
A more complete discussion of the functioning of labor markets, wage 
trends, and their implications for living standards of both indigenous and 
migrant workers will be undertaken in Chapter 7. Here we can conclude by 
making three points about the interaction between land and labor markets in 
the context of export-oriented economies with rapid population growth. First, 
by the 1920s, land was becoming an increasingly scarce and contested asset 
in many parts of East and Southeast Asia. At the same time, labor was becom-
ing more abundant, partly because of natural increase and partly because of 
in-migration. It is thus probable that land rentals were increasing relative to 
wages, even in those parts of the region that in the mid-nineteenth century 
were land abundant. Data on this point are limited, but in Thailand Feeny’s 
estimates indicate that, between 1915 and 1940, land prices increased by more 
than 40 percent, while wage rates for unskilled labor grew by only about 6 
percent (Feeny 1982: tables 3-8 and 3-10). 
A second point concerns the role of migrant workers. In Southeast Asia, 
labor migration, by the early twentieth century, was increasingly important, 
although it varied over time and place. In Indonesia, French Indochina, and 
the Philippines, the policy of the Dutch, the French, and the Americans was 
to restrict in-migration, especially from China, while at the same time facili-
tating movement of workers and families from regions where land was scarce 
to regions where it appeared to be more abundant. These policies were also 
adopted after 1932 in Thailand. The Japanese in Korea and also the Dutch 
in Java began to encourage international migration. But everywhere in the 
region, the goal of a nation of prosperous homesteaders cultivating their own 
holdings remained elusive. More and more people worked for wages, even if 
Table 3.11. Daily Wages in Kilograms of Rice: Agricultural and Urban 
Workers, 1934 –1938
Colony / Country 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938
Korea 
Male agricultural 3.3 2.9 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Taiwan 
Farm wage 7.8 7.9 7.1 5.6 5.7
Straits Settlements
Rubber: male 11.4 6.1 6.3 6.9 7.1
Rubber: female 7.3 4.9 5.0 5.5 5.6
Peninsular Malaya
Rubber estates 7.7 5.7 6.2 6.6 5.9
Sumatra
Tobacco: male 10.8 10.0 10.4 8.8 8.7
Ditto with supplements 12.2 11.2 11.4 9.7 5.1
Tobacco: female 6.8 6.0 5.9 4.9 5.1
Ditto with supplements  8.1 7.2 7.0 5.9 6.2
Java
Sugar coolies: male 7.2 5.4 4.3 3.5 4.2
Ditto: female 5.9 4.5 3.9 3.1 3.6
Sugar: regular workers 12.0 8.4 6.6 5.2 5.6
Sugar: artisans 25.3 18.6 13.7 10.6 11.4
Saigon
Unskilled male 16.9 12.9 10.7 7.8 5.9
Unskilled female 13.2 9.5 7.6 5.3 4.0
Artisan male 36.5 27.4 22.1 14.9 12.0
Hanoi
Unskilled male 4.8 4.5 n.a. n.a. 2.1
Unskilled female 3.2 3.0 n.a. n.a. 1.3
Artisan male 10.3 9.7 n.a. n.a. 4.1
Bangkok
Coolies 14.7 11.5 11.0 11.3 12.0
Carpenters 26.6 20.9 20.0 20.5 21.7
Philippines
Manila: laborer n.a. n.a. n.a. 15.5 12.2
Sugar: laborer n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 5.1 (1939)
Sources: Taiwan: Rose 1985: 39. Korea: Rose 1985: 90. Singapore: Department of Statistics 1939: 
127–130. Malaya: Thoburn 1977: 286. Sumatra and Java: Department of Economic Affairs 
1941: 248; rice prices from Creutzberg 1978: table 3. Saigon and Hanoi: Giacometti 2000b: 189, 
204–205, with additional price data from Takada 2000: 136. Bangkok: Central Service of Statistics 
1940: 515, 522. Manila: Bureau of Census and Statistics 1947: 239; Runes 1939: 12. 
Note: n.a. = not available. 
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they had to move over long distances to do so. In Thailand and Burma, and 
in British Malaya, governments did not control in-migration but instead tried 
to regulate the land market, albeit with varying success. Migrant Chinese and 
Indians were largely confi ned to urban labor markets and to large estates in 
British Malaya. In Burma, the alienation of land to Indians occurred through 
the credit market, which was left largely unregulated until the late 1930s. 
The third point concerns the role of government in regulating markets 
for land, labor, and credit. There can be little doubt that during the fi rst four 
decades of the twentieth century, colonial governments in most parts of the 
region grasped the fact that in order to control, or at least infl uence, produc-
tion, they would have to be able to control factor markets. But the policies 
used differed over time and place, according to the priorities of the various 
governments and the instruments that were available. As we saw in the case 
of the sugar industry, the Dutch used coercion to control land rentals, while 
Japanese policy was to subsidize Japanese companies in order to establish pro-
cessing facilities, while at the same time making sure that they were able to 
access suffi cient land to produce the cane needed to supply the factories. In 
the Philippines, where the cultivation and processing of cane was largely in 
indigenous hands, the industry itself became a powerful lobby able to infl u-
ence government policy in its interests. 
A More Nuanced View of  Vent for Surplus?
Critics of the vent for surplus model as originally set out by Myint have stressed 
in particular the overly simplistic way in which he dealt with the precolonial 
economy (Smith 1976: 433). The assumption that the population was only 
involved in subsistence agricultural production was clearly unrealistic, both 
in Southeast Asia and in other regions such as West Africa. In addition, in the 
Southeast Asian context, the assumption that before the imposition of Euro-
pean colonialism much of the region was effectively closed to foreign trade 
is also questionable. Not only was there a signifi cant indigenous handicraft 
sector within the region, but there had also been quite extensive involvement 
in long-distance trade within Asia, which had given rise to large port cities 
where many people were employed in transport and commerce. Although this 
diversifi ed commercial economy had declined in the seventeenth and eigh-
teenth centuries even before the intrusion of European colonial institutions, 
that intrusion brought about a substantial restructuring of domestic economic 
activity.
It was pointed out in Chapter 2 that, in many parts of Southeast Asia in 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, there is evidence of a decline 
in handicraft production as cheaper imports not just from the metropolitan 
powers but also from Japan fl ooded in. The decline was by no means total, 
and the census evidence suggests that many handicraft producers survived 
and even fl ourished into the 1930s, partly because imported inputs of yarn 
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and cotton cloth actually helped activities such as weaving and batik manu-
facture. In addition, the growth of exports created employment in processing 
industries, and these workers together with the many millions of smallholder 
producers of crops such as rice and rubber were able to use their extra income 
to purchase a range of both home-produced and imported goods. But at the 
same time, the export boom inevitably made land a more valuable asset, and 
struggles over access to land became more intense in the fi rst four decades of 
the twentieth century. The casual assumption that underpins some discus-
sions of vent for surplus, that agricultural land was easily available to all those 
willing and able to cultivate it, was far from the truth in many parts of Asia 
after 1900. Even in the so-called frontier regions, scrambles for land intensi-
fi ed, and the victors were often those with the best connections to the colo-
nial establishment. 
Other factors also affected the extent to which export growth benefi ted 
indigenous populations. One of the most important was the role of govern-
ment. Implicit in much of the critical writing on the role of colonialism was 
the argument that governments were at best neutral in their impact on indig-
enous populations and at worst extremely negative. The next chapter tries to 
assess some of the main effects of government policy, paying particular atten-
tion to the evolution of taxation and expenditures. 
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Alternative Views of the Role of the Colonial State
One infl uential view of the role of government in colonial territories was put 
forward by Morris in the context of nineteenth century India: “Government 
policy during the nineteenth century, despite its authoritarian characteristics, 
was in its economic aspects essentially laissez faire. The British raj saw itself 
in the passive role of night watchman, providing security, rational adminis-
tration, and a modicum of social overhead on the basis of which economic 
progress was expected to occur. The Indian government obviously had no self-
conscious programme of active economic development” (1963: 615).
In a footnote, Morris pointed out that while the British certainly felt that 
the welfare of Indian society was an important objective, the prevailing ideol-
ogy in Britain at the time made a more assertive policy of economic develop-
ment impossible. It is important to note that Morris was only discussing nine-
teenth-century British policy, although there is little evidence to suggest that 
government revenues and expenditures in British India increased signifi cantly 
after 1900 or that economic policy became more “developmental” in other 
respects. Nor was Morris implying that colonial governments in other parts 
of Asia were pursuing similar policies to those in British India. Nevertheless 
the phrase “night watchman state” has gained a place in the literature on 
European and especially British colonialism in Southeast Asia; for example, 
Emerson argued in the case of the Straits Settlements that “until very recent 
times, the government has not interpreted its function more broadly than in 
terms of police power” (1937: 306). Huff argued that government in Singa-
pore “conceived of its role as primarily to enforce law and order and to secure 
property rights” (1994: 168), while Bayly and Harper thought that before the 
Pacifi c War, “large parts of the state across the whole region had been content 
to operate as the classic night watchman” (2004: 463– 464), although they did 
concede that there had been progress in the development of infrastructure. 
It was pointed out in Chapter 1 that the “night watchman” view of the 
colonial state has been challenged by writers who view the government’s role 
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in colonies as mainly concerned with encouraging the rapid exploitation of 
resources for export. Some writers have argued that, in most tropical colo-
nies, “there were few constraints on state power. . . . The colonial powers set 
up authoritarian and absolutist states with the purpose of solidifying their 
control and facilitating the extraction of resources” (Acemoglu, Johnson, and 
Robinson 2001: 1375). A third view on the economic role of the colonial state 
has been put forward by writers who support Japanese exceptionalism and 
who argue that the Japanese colonies were characterized by activist govern-
ments; in the case of Korea, Kohli claimed:
The colonial state in Korea was a busy state. While pursuing the imperial 
interests of Japan, it evolved a full policy agenda, including the goal of 
Korea’s economic transformation. The broad strategy of transformation 
was two-pronged: The state utilized its bureaucratic capacities to directly 
undertake numerous economic tasks, and, more important, the state 
involved propertied groups — both in the countryside and in the cities, 
and both Japanese and Koreans — in production-oriented alliances aimed 
at achieving sustained economic change. (2004: 40)
Was such a policy agenda unique to the Japanese colonies? The role of govern-
ment in colonial jurisdictions is a complex issue and must be addressed from 
several angles. This chapter attempts a comparison of government taxation 
and expenditure policies in colonial East and Southeast Asia; the involvement 
of the state in promoting production and controlling factor markets is dis-
cussed further in Chapter 6.
Tax and Expenditure Policies: An Overview
By the fi rst decade of the twentieth century, all the colonial powers in East 
and Southeast Asia were trying to establish effective administrative structures 
that prioritized the centralization and reform of fi scal systems (Elson 1992: 
149–154). Independent Thailand also carried out major reforms of govern-
ment revenue policy ( Ingram 1971: chaps. 8 and 9). On the revenue side, 
the metropolitan powers wanted tax systems under the direct control of the 
colonial administrations, which were suffi ciently buoyant to provide enough 
revenues to fund current expenditures while at the same time providing a sur-
plus for investment. Old practices of revenue farming were eliminated during 
the last decades of the nineteenth and the early twentieth century in favor 
of more “modern” revenue systems relying on trade taxes, domestic excises, 
and sales taxes, and in some cases on corporate and individual income taxes 
( Butcher 1993). 
In the Japanese colonies, considerable resources were devoted to drawing 
up land cadastres so that land taxes could be levied ( Ho 1984: 355; Grajdan-
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zev 1944: 54). Detailed cadastral surveys were also carried out in Burma and 
Java, and in some of the more settled regions outside Java, on the basis of 
which land taxes were levied as a fraction of the income that cultivators were 
assumed to be deriving from the land. Furnivall, who had extensive knowl-
edge of the Burmese system and studied the Dutch colonial land tax in Java 
in the 1930s, argued that the Javanese tax was simpler and in some respects 
more equitable than that in Burma ( Furnivall 1934a). Less progress was made 
in the frontier regions of Indonesia outside Java and in French Indochina, 
where cadastral surveys were far less accurate and the assessment of land taxes 
a hit-or-miss affair ( Thompson 1937: 193–194, 232–233). 
Revenue policy reform in Southeast Asia in the early twentieth century was 
in part directed to the abolition or at least the downsizing of politically embar-
rassing revenues such as those derived from the sale of opium. In the Philip-
pines, the American administration was committed to replacing the “repres-
sive” Spanish revenue system with one that would enhance economic and 
social uplift (Luton 1971: 133). Not surprisingly given these aims, the opium 
levy was seen as especially reprehensible, although it only accounted for about 
7 percent of total revenues in the fi nal phase of Spanish rule. The Americans 
fought hard for the prohibition of opium trading, except for medical pur-
poses, throughout Asia in the early part of the twentieth century, although 
other colonial powers, including the British, were reluctant to support more 
than its “gradual” withdrawal (Foster 2003: 112). Indeed Bayly and Harper 
have argued that British rule in both Burma and Malaya was “supported by 
narco-colonialism on a colossal scale” (2004: 33). 
By the early 1920s, this was probably an exaggeration. Certainly the gov-
ernments of the Straits Settlements and the Unfederated Malay States (UMS) 
were still dependent on the sale of opium products for a considerable share of 
total government revenues, although during the 1920s and 1930s the propor-
tion did fall, as other revenue sources became more important. In 1926, the 
governments of Kedah and Johore (which together accounted for 87 percent 
of total revenues raised in the Unfederated Malay States) derived about one-
third of their revenues from licenses, including those from the sale of opium. 
Revenues from other sources such as customs duties were larger and growing 
more rapidly (Colonial Reports 1929: appendix B). By 1938, the Straits Settle-
ments and the FMS were deriving less than 10 percent of total revenues from 
opium, although tax revenues accounted for less than half of the total ( Table 
4.1). In Indochina, the sale of opium became a state monopoly under the 
Doumer reforms implemented at the end of the nineteenth century; thereaf-
ter net receipts tended to stagnate (Descours-Gatin 1992: 226). But Vietnam 
remained reliant on a range of nontax revenues, including the opium, salt, 
and alcohol monopolies, for around 40 percent of revenues until the 1930s. 
In Thailand, Taiwan, and Korea, the proportion from nontax sources was even 
higher ( Table 4.1). 
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On the expenditure side, all the colonial governments had by 1900 begun 
to assume responsibility for a much broader range of activities than simply 
the maintenance of law and order and the collection of revenues. Increas-
ingly it was recognized that ambitious programs of infrastructural develop-
ment would have to be funded by government rather than the private sector, 
with government funds derived in part at least from loan fi nance. In Indone-
sia, where government expenditures had grown in real terms continuously 
after 1870, public works (including railways) accounted for 40 percent of total 
government expenditure in 1920 (Booth 1990: table 10.5). In Burma, civil 
public works accounted for almost 24 percent of government expenditures 
by 1901–1904, although the percentage fell somewhat thereafter (Aye Hlaing 
1965: table 22). In Indochina, especially the three provinces composing what 
is now Vietnam, public works already accounted for 20 percent of total gov-
ernment expenditures in 1901; by 1909, the share had risen to more than 40 
percent ( Booth 2007: table 2). The concept of mise en valeur, stressed by succes-
sive French administrators after 1900, meant in effect increased expenditures 
on public works in order to facilitate the exploitation of the colony’s natural 
resources ( Doumer 1902: 24; Simoni 1929).
To what extent was government spending biased in favor of infrastructure 
Table 4.1. Percentage Breakdown of Total Government Revenues, c. 1938
 Customs Revenues  Other  
 and Direct Taxes  Indirect Taxes  Other
 ( incl. land taxes) ( incl. excises) Revenues a Total
FMS (1938) 38.2 2.8 59.0 (8.2) 100
Straits Settlements (1938) 0 25.2 74.8 (9.2) 100
Thailand (1938/1939) 45.3 6.7 48.0 (8.7) 100
Vietnam (1938) 41.0 17.0 42.0 (17.6) 100
Philippines (1938) 28.1 35.9 36.0 100
Burma (1938/1939) 66.8 16.0 17.2 100
Indonesia (1938) 45.0 17.9 37.1 100
Taiwan b (1937) 25.8 20.2 54.0 (32.5) 100
Korea b (1938) 25.5 27.5 47.0 (16.2) 100
Sources: FMS and Straits Settlements: Department of Statistics 1939: chap. 33; Thailand: Central 
Service of Statistics 1940: 274–279; Vietnam: Bassino 2000b: table 2; Philippines: Bureau of Census 
and Statistics 1941: 164–166; Burma: Andrus 1948: table 37; Indonesia: Central Bureau of Statistics 
1947: 127–133; data on total revenues taken from Creutzberg 1976: table 4; Taiwan: Grajdanzev 
1942: 133–135; Korea: Grajdanzev 1944: 212–214. 
a Includes profi ts from government monopolies and government enterprises. Figures in parenthe-
ses show revenues from opium monopolies and, in the case of Vietnam, Taiwan, and Korea, all 
government monopolies. 
b To ensure better comparability with other data, revenues exclude government loans and carry-
overs from previous fi scal years. 
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in the export enclaves? French investment in land development in the south 
of the country was intended to boost rice production for export, although it 
was pointed out in the previous chapter that most of the benefi ciaries were 
Vietnamese, not French settlers. In other parts of Southeast Asia, several colo-
nial regimes (notably the Americans in the Philippines, but also the Dutch in 
Indonesia and the British in the Federated Malay States) were devoting a grow-
ing proportion of budgetary expenditures to increasing food-crop produc-
tion through improved rural infrastructure, especially irrigation, as well as to 
health and education. Offi cial rhetoric began to stress commitments to “uplift 
the natives” and gradually equip them for life in a modern economy. Ameri-
can policy in the Philippines was strongly infl uenced by such aims, and after 
1901, Dutch colonial policy shared many of the goals of the Americans. The 
ethical policy made the enhancement of the welfare of the indigenous popu-
lation of the huge Indonesian archipelago the key objective of colonial policy. 
Irrigation development, the expansion of health and education services, an 
ambitious land settlement program, and the development of rural credit facili-
ties all received signifi cant budgetary funding after 1900 (Boomgaard 1993; 
Cribb 1993). 
In Taiwan and Korea, there was also a strong emphasis on increased pro-
vision of rural infrastructure, although in both colonies the main concern of 
the Japanese was to increase rice, and in Taiwan also sugar, production for 
supply to the market in Japan. In the early years of the Japanese occupation of 
Taiwan, government expenditures were concentrated on the agricultural sec-
tor and on transport infrastructure. By 1920 these two heads of expenditure 
accounted for almost 60 percent of the total ( Table 4.2). Government capital 
formation (GCF) peaked at around 6 percent of GDP in 1912, although it 
fell thereafter ( Figure 4.1). In Korea, government expenditures were far more 
skewed toward public order and administration, although spending on trans-
port accounted for a growing share, especially after 1920 (Table 4.2). Govern-
ment capital formation was a lower percentage of GDP than in Taiwan until 
the latter part of the 1930s. 
The considerable differences in outcomes of revenue and expenditure 
policies in different parts of colonial Asia can be appreciated by examining 
revenues and expenditures per capita, converted into US dollars. Govern-
ment revenues per capita in 1910 varied between around one dollar per cap-
ita in Vietnam to fi fteen dollars in the Federated Malay States (FMS) (Table 
4.3). Although several of the colonies with low revenues per capita in 1910 
improved their revenue performance over the next two decades, none caught 
up with either the FMS or the Straits Settlements. By 1929, government rev-
enues in Indonesia, the Philippines, Korea, and Burma were around fi ve to six 
dollars per capita, more than in Thailand and Vietnam but still well below 
Taiwan and the three components of British Malaya. With the onset of the 
world depression, revenues fell in terms of dollars per capita in most colonies 
and had not recovered to 1929 levels by 1938.
Table 4.2. Government Expenditures Broken Down by Category: 
Taiwan and Korea, 1900 –1938 (percentage of total expenditures)
     Public Administration /
 Year Agriculture Education Transport Order Salaries
Taiwan
1900 7.7 4.3 35.1 13.4 19.1
1910 30.7 10.4 20.9 18.3 11.0
1920 29.9 4.1 29.3 5.6 24.1
1925 37.4 5.9 24.5 8.7 20.3
1930 28.2 8.2 28.4 10.9 20.0
1935 24.7 6.9 26.7 12.9 23.4
1938 21.6 6.2 26.4 22.3 17.1
Korea
1910 9.6 a 23.8 5.7 30.3 30.6
1920 5.0 10.1 23.3 35.4 20.8
1925 4.3 6.0 31.4 25.2 21.6
1930 4.8 5.9 29.5 26.2 18.2
1935 6.5 5.6 30.1 29.4 13.3
1938 4.0 4.2 40.0 28.8 9.6
Source: Mizoguchi and Umemura 1988: 288–293. 
Note: Excludes local government expenditures. Percentages do not always add to 100, as certain 
categories of expenditure are omitted.
a Includes expenditures on industry and commerce as well as agriculture. 
Figure 4.1. Government capital formation as a proportion of gross domestic expenditure, market 
price, Taiwan and Korea. (Source: Mizoguchi and Umemura 1988: part 3, tables 5, 7, 54, and 57)
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The striking differences in revenues per capita that were obvious by the 
1920s must have refl ected signifi cant differences in revenues as a ratio of GDP. 
We do not yet have complete national income data for all parts of the South-
east Asian region in the fi rst part of the twentieth century; the available evi-
dence indicates that by 1929 the highest per capita GDP was in British Malaya. 
It was not much higher than in the Philippines, but about 40 percent higher 
than in Indonesia (see Table 2.4). Thus revenues as a proportion of GDP must 
have been much higher in the Straits Settlements and the FMS than in the 
Dutch, American, or French colonies, or in independent Thailand. Whether 
they were higher than in the Japanese colonies is unclear. In Taiwan, govern-
ment revenues peaked at around 26 percent of GDP in 1912 and fell thereafter, 
although they seldom dropped below 17 percent of GDP. The ratio was much 
lower in Korea until the 1930s, when there was rapid convergence. The same 
is true for the ratio of government expenditures to GDP (Figures 4.2 and 4.3). 
Changes in revenues per capita in colonial Asia were broadly matched 
by changes in expenditures per capita (Table 4.4), although colonial budgets 
were not always balanced in every fi scal year. During the 1920s, several colo-
Table 4.3. Government Revenues Per Capita in Southeast Asia, Taiwan, and 
Korea, 1910 –1938 (US dollars)
Country 1910 1920 1929 1934 1938
Vietnam a 1  3 3 3 2 
Netherlands Indies 2 5 5 4 4
Philippines 3 6 6 4 5
Thailand 3 3 4 3 3
Burma 3 5 6 6 4
UMS b 5 6 11 10 10
Straits Settlements 8 21 29 17 15
FMS  15 24 28 19 18
Taiwan 8 16 16 8 12
Korea 1 4 6 4 7
Sources: Vietnam: Bassino 2000b and Banens 2000; Indonesia: Creutzberg 1976: table 4; van der 
Eng 2002: 171–172; Philippines: Birnberg and Resnick 1975: table A.38; Thailand: Ingram 1971: 
appendixes B and C; Burma: Shein, Thant, and Sein 1969: appendix 2; National Planning Com-
mission 1960a–b; Andrus 1948: tables 37 and 38; British Malaya (FMS, UMS, and Straits Colonies): 
Emerson 1937: chaps. 4, 5, and 6, with additional data from Lim 1967: appendix 9.2; Fraser 1939: 
appendix A for the Federated Malay States; exchange rates: van Laanen 1980: table 8; Direction des 
Services Économiques 1947: 288; Ingram 1971: 337; Emerson 1937: 522. Taiwan and Korea: Mizo-
guchi and Umemura 1988: 256, 288–293; exchange rates from Japan Statistical Association 1987. 
a Data refer to 1913, not 1910. Local and (after 1931) provincial revenues and expenditures are 
included. 
b Data refer to 1911 and 1921, not 1910 and 1920. The 1911 data refer to Johore and Kelantan 
only. 
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nies ran budget surpluses; as revenues fell in the early 1930s, some budgets 
swung into defi cit. This was the case in Indonesia, the Federated Malay States, 
the Philippines, and Vietnam in the early 1930s, although not in Burma and 
Thailand or in Taiwan and Korea (Table 4.5). These defi cits hardly refl ected a 
conversion to Keynesian economics on the part of colonial offi cials, but rather 
an inability to cut expenditures as rapidly as revenues fell with falling export 
Figure 4.2. Government revenues as a proportion of gross domestic expenditure, Taiwan and Korea. 
(Source: Mizoguchi and Umemura 1988: part 3, tables 5, 7, 53, and 56) 
Figure 4.3. Government expenditures as a proportion of gross domestic expenditure, Taiwan and 
Korea. (Source: Mizoguchi and Umemura 1988: part 3, tables 5, 7, 54, and 57) 
 What Were Colonial Governments Doing? 75
prices. In several colonies, such as the FMS and Indonesia, it proved diffi cult 
to cut back on expenditures on salaries and pensions. Independent Thailand 
found it easier to make cuts in spending. Virtually everywhere in the region, 
government expenditures on capital investments fell more rapidly than cur-
rent spending after 1930. The main exception was Korea, where there was a 
steep rise in government capital formation relative to GDP in the latter part of 
the 1930s, due in part to the increased expenditures on transport infrastruc-
ture (see Figure 4.1 and Table 4.2). 
Determinants of Revenue and Expenditure Growth
There is strong evidence that both revenue and expenditure growth in South-
east Asia in the fi rst four decades of the twentieth century were tightly linked 
to export growth. Long-run elasticities of both government revenues and 
expenditures with respect to exports were close to unity in most parts of the 
Table 4.4. Government Expenditures Per Capita in Southeast Asia, 
British India, Taiwan, and South Korea, 1910–1938 (US dollars)
Country 1910 1920 1929 1934 1938
Vietnam a 1 3  3 3 2
Indonesia 2 7 5 5 4
Philippines 3 6 6 4 5
Thailand 3 4 4 3 4
Burma 2 4 4 3 3
UMS b 5 8 11 7 10
Straits Settlements 6 20 19 15 17
FMS b 13 33 29 15 28
India 1 2 3 2 2
Taiwan 6 13 13 6 9
Korea 1 3 6 4 6
Sources:  Vietnam: Bassino 2000b and Banens 2000; Indonesia: Creutzberg 1976: table 4; van der 
Eng 2002: 171–172; Philippines: Birnberg and Resnick 1975: table A.38; Bureau of Census and 
Statistics 1941: 13; Thailand: Ingram 1971: appendixes B and C; Burma: Shein, Thant, and Sein 
1969: appendix 2; National Planning Commission 1960a–b; Andrus 1948: tables 37 and 38; Brit-
ish Malaya (FMS, UMS, and Straits Colonies): Emerson 1937: chaps. 4, 5, and 6, with additional 
data from Fraser 1939: appendix A for the Federated Malay States; Department of Statistics 1939: 
245–246; exchange rates: van Laanen 1980: table 8; Direction des Services Économiques 1947: 288; 
Ingram 1971: 337; Emerson 1937: 522. Taiwan and Korea: Mizoguchi and Umemura 1988: 256, 
288–293; exchange rates from Japan Statistical Association 1987. India: Reddy 1972. 
a Data refer to 1913, not 1910. Local and (after 1931) provincial revenues and expenditures are 
included. 
b Data refer to 1911 and 1921, not 1910 and 1920. The 1911 fi gure refers to Johore and Kelantan 
only. 
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region, which indicates that they increased in the same proportion as export 
revenues (Booth 2007: table 6). The reasons are not diffi cult to fi nd; by the 
early years of the twentieth century, the revenue base had become, at least 
in part, dependent on trade taxes that fl uctuated with the fortunes of the 
export sector. Income taxes were levied in most colonies, although not in Brit-
ish Malaya, and they were a minor source of revenue in the Philippines and 
Thailand. By contrast, they were important in Indonesia; by 1912–1916 they 
accounted for about 22 percent of total tax revenues and more than 30 per-
cent in 1936 –1940 (Booth 1990: table 10.4). But in an open and trade-depen-
dent economy, income taxes would also have depended on export earnings 
to a considerable extent, as would land taxes. Even consumption taxes whose 
incidence fell on the lower income groups (such as opium and alcohol excises) 
would have fl uctuated with export earnings, especially in British Malaya.
As already noted, expenditures did not always move in step with revenues, 
Table 4.5. Budgetary Revenues as a Percentage of Expenditures, 1900 –1939 
(fi ve-year averages centered on the year shown)
Year Vietnam Burma FMS Thailand Indonesia
1902 n.a. 153 122 100 95
1907 n.a. 146 121 94 100
1912 112 a 139 110 94 94
1917 104 142 134 100 84
1922 96 143 95 88 87
1927 89 146 108 97 104
1932 81 162 93 104 75
1937 104 108 b 107 c 97 88
 Philippines Straits Settlements Taiwan Korea
1902 96 d 97 107 n.a.
1907 104 103 126 n.a.
1912 101 129 125 117
1917 105 142 136 134
1922 97 118 124 112
1927 102 110 134 109
1932 97 97 123 107
1937 107 c 117 c 129 e 117 e
Sources: As for Tables 4.3 and 4.4.
Note: n.a. = not available. 
a Average for 1913/1914.
b Average for 1937/1938 and 1938/1939.
c Average for 1935–1938.
d Average for 1902–1904.
e Average for 1936–1938. 
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and in Vietnam, the Philippines, and Indonesia the elasticity of expenditures 
with respect to exports was slightly higher than revenues. This elasticity partly 
refl ected the tendency to run defi cits in years when revenues fell sharply; it 
could also have refl ected the fact that, in boom periods when exports were 
growing rapidly, it was easier for governments to access loan fi nance to fund 
increases in expenditures. It has been estimated that during the period 1900 –
1925 loans covered about 21 percent of the cost of all public works carried out 
by the central and local governments in French Indochina (Simoni 1929: 141). 
In Indonesia, the ethical policy led to a rapid increase in budgetary expendi-
tures and a widening defi cit by the end of the second decade of the twentieth 
century; by 1923 the public debt amounted to 21 percent of GDP and debt 
service charges around 6 percent of exports. Through the 1920s, the govern-
ment implemented a more austere spending policy, but by the early 1930s, 
the debt to GDP ratio had increased, not just because of heavier borrowing but 
also because of a contraction in nominal GDP (Booth 1998: 146).
Even in fi scally conservative Thailand, government debt and debt service 
charges grew in the early part of the twentieth century (Manarungsan 1989: 
176). In Taiwan, the early years of the Japanese occupation were diffi cult in 
that the domestic revenue base was far too weak to sustain the development 
expenditures that the new colonial power felt were essential to develop the 
island’s agricultural potential. Subsidies from the Japanese government and 
government debt issue covered more than half of all budgetary expenditures 
until 1897 and around one-third until 1903 (Chang and Myers 1963: 447). 
Direct subsidies ended in 1904, but as Ho has pointed out, other forms of 
budgetary assistance continued until 1914 (1971: 290). Thereafter, Taiwan 
was considered fi scally self-suffi cient, although the fi nancial crisis of 1927 led 
to another bond issue being fl oated to recapitalize troubled banks (Moulton 
1931: 176). By the late 1930s, the budget surplus in Taiwan was around 4 per-
cent of GDP (Mizoguchi and Umemura 1988: 289). In Korea, the goal of fi scal 
autonomy proved far more elusive. The budget continued to receive direct 
grants from the Japanese budget until the end of the 1930s; in addition, loan 
fi nance continued to be important until the end of the Japanese occupation 
(Moulton 1931: 176–177; Grajdanzev 1944: 212–213). 
Looking at the four decades from 1900 to 1940 as a whole, it seems clear 
that different factors were driving colonial revenue and expenditure policy 
from those that were determining such policies in the metropolitan powers. 
In most European states and in the United States and Japan, the fi rst three 
decades of the twentieth century saw an increase in government revenues 
and expenditures in per capita terms. This change was due to the increase 
in military expenditures associated with the war against Russia in Japan and 
the 1914–1918 war in the European metropolitan powers and in the United 
States. There were also growing demands on governments for provision of 
infrastructure, education, and social security. Relative to GDP, social trans-
fers (government spending on welfare, unemployment, pensions, health, and 
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housing subsidies) increased between 1890 and 1930 in France, the Nether-
lands, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Japan, although they were 
much lower in Japan than in the other countries (Lindert 2004: table 1.2). 
These pressures toward increasing government spending were not felt to 
the same extent in the colonial territories; in every colony in Southeast Asia, 
government revenues and expenditures fell relative to those in the metropoli-
tan power after 1910 (Booth 2007: table 7). In the FMS, where government 
expenditures per capita were almost two-thirds of those in the United King-
dom in 1910, the ratio had fallen to only 17 percent by 1934. In Vietnam, 
where both revenues and expenditures per capita were low in comparison 
with other colonies, they fell relative to those in metropolitan France after 
1920. In Taiwan, government revenues per capita in 1900 were higher than 
in Japan, and government expenditures only slightly lower, although they 
fell relative to Japan thereafter. Only in Korea did revenues and expenditures 
increase relative to the metropolitan power from 1910 to 1934, although they 
fell between 1934 and 1938 (Table 4.6). 
Changing Expenditure Priorities 
By the third decade of the twentieth century, public works dominated govern-
ment expenditures in many parts of Southeast Asia, although in Indonesia 
expenditures on capital works were cut sharply after 1920 in order to eliminate 
the budget defi cit (Booth 1998: 145). In the Federated Malay States, where by 
1920 government expenditures per capita were much higher than elsewhere 
in the region, expenditures on capital works accounted for almost 40 percent 
of total government expenditures in the early 1920s. Railways accounted for 
around half of capital expenditures, while public buildings and roads took 
up much of the rest (Maxwell 1922: 7). In Vietnam, expenditures on public 
Table 4.6. Per Capita Government Revenues and Expenditures in Taiwan 
and Korea as a Percentage of Japan, 1900 –1938
 Taiwan Korea
Year Revenues Expenditures Revenues Expenditures
1900 110.3 89.3 n.a. n.a.
1910 95.4 87.1 8.2 8.2
1920 66.9 59.5 17.6 16.3
1929 69.4 55.6 25.4 23.3
1934 52.0 42.5 26.6 24.5
1938 32.8 28.3 20.8 19.5
Sources: Japan: Ohkawa and Shinohara 1979: 370–377, 392–393; Taiwan and Korea:  Mizoguchi and 
Umemura 1988: 256, 288–293.
Note: n.a. = not available. 
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works accounted for at least 25 percent of budgetary expenditures through the 
decade (Booth 2007: table 2). 
The comparative study produced by Schwulst showed that in 1931, when 
the effects of the world depression were only just beginning to affect govern-
ment budgets in most parts of Southeast Asia, public works still accounted for 
around 30 percent of government expenditures in French Indochina and 20 
percent in the Federated Malay States (Schwulst 1932: 57; Booth 2007: table 
8). The Philippines stood out as the colony where a high proportion of bud-
getary expenditures were devoted to education and health. In both Indonesia 
and Siam, defense expenditures accounted for more than 20 percent of total 
expenditures. Elsewhere the proportion was much lower. Nowhere in South-
east Asia did defense expenditures account for as high a proportion of budget-
ary expenditures as in British India, where they fl uctuated between 40 and 65 
percent of all outlays (Lal 1988: table 8.11A).
As the impact of the world slump increasingly affected government rev-
enues in most parts of Southeast Asia in the early 1930s, spending priorities 
changed in most colonies. By 1935, expenditures on public works had fallen 
to around 13 percent of total expenditures in the Straits Settlements and less 
than 10 percent in the Federated Malay States. In the FMS, debt charges and 
pension payments accounted for almost 30 percent of the total (Department 
of Statistics 1936: 229–232). Military expenditures also increased in most parts 
of the region in the latter part of the 1930s. This was especially the case in 
Indonesia and Thailand, where by the latter part of the 1930s, the govern-
ments were devoting more than 25 percent of budgetary expenditures to 
defense-related expenditures (Central Bureau of Statistics 1947: table 193; 
Central Service of Statistics 1940: 388–389). In the Philippines, by contrast, 
national defense only accounted for around 10 percent of budgetary outlays 
in 1939 –1940 (Bureau of Census and Statistics 1941: 165). In Vietnam, cen-
tral government expenditures on the military were even smaller, at around 5 
percent of the total in 1939 and 1940 (Bassino 2000b: 287). These differences 
refl ected different perceptions of external (especially Japanese) threats by the 
various colonial powers, although in the event military preparedness proved 
inadequate everywhere in the region.
In Korea and Taiwan, expenditures on public order and defense accounted 
for 29 and 22 percent of total budgetary outlays respectively in 1938. In Tai-
wan, there had been an increase in the share over the 1930s, while in Korea 
there had been little change in the share since 1910 (see Table 4.2). After 
1925, there had been a continual decline in the share of budgetary outlays on 
agriculture in Taiwan, although agriculture always commanded a higher share 
than in Korea. It was noted in Chapter 2 that the two Japanese colonies both 
experienced faster growth during the 1930s than the Southeast Asian colo-
nies; in the case of Korea in particular, revenues and expenditures grew faster 
than GDP, so that by 1940, the ratios of expenditure and revenues to GDP had 
caught up with Taiwan (see Figures 4.2 and 4.3). Between 1910 and 1938, gov-
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ernment revenues per capita, in terms of nominal US dollars, increased seven-
fold in Korea, which was faster than in any other part of Asia (see Table 4.3). 
The rapid growth in total revenues relative to national income meant that the 
Japanese authorities in Korea could increase expenditure in priority areas such 
as transport infrastructure without incurring increasing defi cits. The impact 
of this increased expenditure on the welfare of the Korean population will be 
assessed in the next section.
The emphasis on spending on transport infrastructure in both Korea and 
Taiwan meant that, by the end of the 1930s, length of both road and rail 
per unit of area was higher in the two Japanese colonies than in most other 
Southeast Asian colonies. The main exception was Java, where dense road and 
rail networks had been developed by the early 1930s. As in Taiwan, part of 
this infrastructure was intended to serve the sugar industry, although it served 
other sectors of the economy as well and facilitated the mobility of people. 
Electricity generation capacity was also higher in Taiwan and Korea than in 
Southeast Asia, with the exception of British Malaya (Table 4.7). 
The Incidence of  Taxation and Expenditures
Most scholars in the postcolonial era who have examined government rev-
enue and expenditure policies in colonial Asia in the decades from 1900 to 
Table 4.7. Infrastructure Endowments, Late 1930s
 Roads  Railways
 ( km. per thousand ( km. per thousand Electricity a
Country / Year square kilometers) square kilometers) ( installed capacity)
Philippines (1939) 70.5 4.5 4.76
Indonesia (1940) 27.7 3.9 2.97
 Java 171.9 40.5 3.01
 Outer Islands 17.0 1.1 2.86
Indochina (1936) 38.8 3.9 3.82
British Malaya (1938) 100.1 12.5 36.06
Burma (1938) 45.2 3.4 3.69
Taiwan (1937) 94.4 43.3 b 38.32
Korea (1938) 107.2 25.7 28.48
Sources: Philippines: Bureau of Census and Statistics 1947: 279, 304–307; Indonesia: Department 
of Economic Affairs 1947: 56, 97; Indochina: Robequain 1944: 94–97, 285; British Malaya: Depart-
ment of Statistics 1939; Burma: Andrus 1948: 226, 237; Korea: Grajdanzev 1944: 72–74, 135, 
185–192; Taiwan: Grajdanzev 1942: 118–119; Barclay 1954: 42.
a Data refer to installed capacity in kilowatts per thousand population for the following years: 1938 
(Philippines), 1937 (British Malaya), and 1940 (Indonesia and Taiwan). For Burma, the data refer to 
the capacity of the large plants with an estimate for smaller plants. 
b Data exclude 2,098 kilometers of special track for the transport of sugar. 
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1940 have been critical of at least three aspects of those policies: fi rst, the 
regressive nature of colonial taxation systems; second, the failure to allocate 
expenditures to programs that enhanced the welfare of the indigenous popu-
lations; and third, the adverse macroeconomic effects of fi scal policy. 
The regressive nature of colonial revenue policy has attracted consider-
able attention, especially in the context of British Malaya, including both the 
FMS and the Straits Settlements, where government revenues were relatively 
high in per capita terms. Critics have stressed the dependence on “vice” taxes, 
especially revenues raised from opium, liquor, and tobacco. It has already 
been pointed out that in the Straits Settlements, the opium monopoly alone 
accounted for almost half of the government revenues between 1900 and 
1920, although its importance declined thereafter, and by 1938 it accounted 
for around 9 percent of total revenues (see Table 4.1). In the FMS, reliance on 
the opium levy also fell after 1920, but even as late as 1938, excises on the sale 
of opium and other items together with import duties on tobacco and spirits 
still accounted for around 20 percent of all government revenues (Department 
of Statistics 1939: 241). Given that low-income Chinese and Tamil workers 
together accounted for a high proportion of the opium, alcohol, and tobacco 
purchases, it is probable that these revenue sources were regressive in their 
impact. 
In contrast, highly paid government offi cials and private sector employ-
ees paid no income tax, and there was (excepting a brief period during the 
First World War) no tax on corporate profi ts. Colonial offi cials in the FMS 
claimed that large estates were taxed through the export tax, but export tax 
rates were low, and revenues were not large. The export tax rate on rubber 
varied between 2.5 and 3 percent of the export value and fell on all exports 
whether produced by estates or by smallholders (Barlow and Drabble 1990: 
206). Given the domestic supply and foreign demand elasticities, the inci-
dence of the export tax must have fallen on the domestic producer rather than 
the foreign buyer, and increasingly the domestic producer was a smallholder 
(see Table 2.8). But total revenues remained quite small; at no time between 
1912 and 1929 did revenues from the rubber export tax equal revenues from 
the opium levy, and they were also well below the tin export tax (Li 1982: 103; 
Lim 1967: appendix 9.1). 
Elsewhere in Southeast Asia after 1900, governments did try to widen 
the tax net and reduce the burden on poorer groups by taxing wage and sal-
ary earners and corporate incomes, by increasing import duties on imported 
luxuries and removing duties on imported necessities such as rice, by assess-
ing higher land taxes on those cultivators in possession of well-irrigated land, 
and by charging fees for government-provided services such as electricity, rail-
ways, and telecommunications, which were mainly used by the better-off. 
In Vietnam, where opium and other government monopolies accounted for 
almost half of government revenues in the early 1920s, the proportion did fall 
thereafter as the government tried, albeit with only limited success, to diver-
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sify the revenue by introducing new excises and charges for public services. 
Thompson argued that the attempt by Varenne to introduce an income tax 
in 1927 was “the fi rst approach to real justice” (1937: 194), but the initiative 
failed, although in 1935 a tax on very high incomes was introduced. It did 
not bring in much revenue, but it did establish a principle; nonetheless the 
regressive head tax was not rescinded. Opinion differs about the incidence of 
the monopolies; Bassino suggested that the opium levy was less regressive in 
Vietnam than in British Malaya because the Chinese community was better 
off in relation to the indigenous population and the habit of opium smoking 
spread to wealthy Vietnamese and Europeans as well (2000b: 281). The same 
argument applied to the alcohol monopoly. In contrast, the salt monopoly 
was certainly regressive, as indeed were similar levies elsewhere in Asia (Mur-
ray 1980: 77). 
In the Philippines, where opium revenues had been phased out by 1914, 
American policy was to diversify the revenue base by introducing a wider range 
of taxes and improving administration. But Luton argued that “the Americans 
showed a surprising lack of real commitment to equity in taxation” (1971: 
136), in spite of their professed aim of reforming and modernizing what they 
saw as the ineffi cient, outdated, and unfair Spanish fi scal system. In order to 
encourage export agriculture, the government did not levy any export taxes, 
while the land tax (which accrued to provincial and municipal governments) 
was assessed on the capital value of the land and buildings. This system had 
the potential to be strongly progressive, but because of resistance on the part 
of large landowners, it was never properly implemented (ibid.: 137). 
Pressure from lobbies representing both business and agricultural interests 
prevented the inclusion of either a tax on corporate income or an inheritance 
tax in the Revenue Law of 1904. The cedula, which was a roughly graduated 
head tax and accounted for over half of all revenues in the late Spanish period, 
was converted into a fl at capitation tax, not a step in the direction of greater 
equity (Luton 1971: 14). In 1907, a law was passed that permitted provincial 
authorities to double the cedula in order to raise money for roads and bridges. 
While this did lead to considerable improvements in the road network, the 
funds were inadequate to cover other sectors where the American administra-
tion had ambitious plans, such as education (May 1980: 145). Only very mod-
est progress was made in widening the tax base over the next thirty years; by 
the late 1930s, direct taxes and customs revenues accounted for a lower pro-
portion of government revenues in the Philippines than in most other parts 
of the region (see Table 4.1). May concluded that lack of revenues was “one of 
the greatest obstacles to social engineering in the Philippines. Policy-makers 
could advance in one area only if they were willing to accept a regression in 
another” (ibid.: 146).
High dependence on direct taxes, including land taxes, did not mean 
that the taxation system was equitable in its impact, across regions or income 
classes. In Burma, two-thirds of government revenues were derived from cus-
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toms revenues, land taxes, and income taxes in 1938–1939; the land tax alone 
accounted for one-third of total revenues in that year (Andrus 1948: table 
37). The offi cial view was that the assessment standard in Burma should be 
half the net profi ts from the land, but as Furnivall pointed out, it was in prac-
tice “impossible for any government to take so large a share of the proceeds 
of cultivation” (1957: 216). So in Lower Burma the formula was changed to 
one-quarter of net produce, although in Upper Burma one-half remained the 
standard. In practice neither formula was effectively applied; the result was 
an assessment procedure that varied both by region and by sector. Incomes 
in the urban sector, both personal and corporate, were not taxed at anything 
like the same rate as those in rural areas. The issue of intersectoral inequities 
in the burden of taxation was to become a major problem for governments in 
the postindependence era. 
In his comparison of the implementation of land taxes in Burma and 
Java, Furnivall (1934a) argued that the Javanese system was less burdensome 
on the cultivator with rates varying between 8 and 20 percent of taxable yield, 
which was estimated with more generous deductions for costs of cultivation 
than was the case in Burma. In addition, by the 1930s, land taxes were a 
much lower proportion of total revenues in Indonesia than in Burma. By the 
late 1930s, taxes on wages and other forms of personal and corporate income 
brought in more than four times as much as the land tax. Revenues from 
import duties and excises on petroleum products were also far more important 
than land taxes (Central Bureau of Statistics 1947: 133). As the incidence of all 
these taxes would have weighed more heavily on the upper income groups, it 
is probable that tax incidence in Indonesia in the last years of the Dutch era 
was less inequitable than in other parts of colonial Asia. Certainly the Dutch 
were sensitive to the problem of tax burdens on the indigenous population; 
several reports were published in the 1920s that argued that, given the pov-
erty of the natives, there was little scope for further tax increases (Booth 1998: 
147). Apart from the land tax, the other tax that fell directly on cultivators was 
the export tax; in the mid-1930s, a special tax was levied on smallholder rub-
ber producers that was highly inequitable, but it was rescinded after protests. 
It was replaced by quotas that attempted, with varying success, to achieve the 
same goal of restricting smallholder output (Bauer 1948: 142 –153).
In Korea, revenues from the land tax also accounted for a diminishing 
proportion of total government revenues during the 1930s, while taxes on 
personal and corporate income increased. Kimura has argued that the land tax 
in Korea was in theory a proportional tax but in practice regressive (1989: 303), 
so its declining importance relative to income taxes could indicate greater pro-
gressivity in the system. But Korea in the late 1930s was less dependent on tax 
revenues than Indonesia; monopolies alone accounted for more than 16 per-
cent of all revenues, excluding borrowings. Grajdanzev argued that taxes and 
other revenues that fell on the better-off sections of the population accounted 
for only around 30 percent of the total, while the remainder fell on the rest of 
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the population, many of whom were very poor (1944: 214). “We must there-
fore conclude that those who drew large incomes were treated with greater 
consideration than the poorer sections of the population” (ibid.: 215). His 
analysis of the revenue system in Taiwan found that an even lower proportion 
of total revenues (10 to 20 percent) in the latter part of the 1930s fell on the 
wealthiest, many of whom were Japanese. He pointed out that the govern-
ment, under pressure to increase revenues further, preferred to borrow from 
the rich rather than to tax them more (Grajdanzev 1942: 135). 
Revenue policy is only half of the fi scal equation, and colonial govern-
ments did have the opportunity to effect some redistribution through govern-
ment expenditures designed to improve incomes of the indigenous popula-
tions. This was most obviously the case in British Malaya, where expenditures 
per capita were high by the 1920s in comparison not just with other parts of 
Southeast Asia, but also with the Japanese colonies of Korea and Taiwan (see 
Table 4.4). We have seen that expenditures on public works grew rapidly from 
the 1890s onward. Even critics of British colonialism conceded that the heavy 
expenditures on transport infrastructure in the three decades up to 1925 
brought about a transformation in production possibilities that benefi ted 
indige nous populations as well as large foreign companies (Li 1982: 26 –27). 
In addition, increased government expenditures on health led to a grad-
ual improvement in modern medical facilities, and death rates declined. Edu-
cational enrollments also increased over the early part of the century. The 
evidence on mortality rates, together with other social indicators, will be 
reviewed further in Chapter 7. The expansion in public expenditures meant 
that public sector employment grew rapidly in both the Straits Settlements 
and the FMS, and with it spending on salaries, wages, and pensions. Debt 
servicing charges also increased. Although in 1931 the FMS was still devot-
ing a higher proportion of total expenditures to “developmental” activities 
than any other colony except the Philippines (Schwulst 1932: 57), there was 
growing unease in some quarters after 1930 about the “cost of swollen depart-
ments, at a time of revenue ebb” ( Khor 1983: 62). Retrenchment followed, but 
growing expenditures on defense during the 1930s meant that public works 
never regained their pre-1925 share of total expenditures. 
Elsewhere, colonial governments had fewer budgetary resources in per 
capita terms than in British Malaya, and there was considerable variation, both 
across the region and over time, in the allocation of expenditures. It has been 
noted that the main pillars of the ethical policy in Indonesia were the develop-
ment of improved irrigation facilities, increased access for the indigenous pop-
ulation to health and education facilities, and land settlement schemes outside 
Java. There can be no doubt that, at least until the 1920s, more budgetary 
resources were allocated to these purposes, and they did lead to some increase 
in incomes for sections of the indigenous population, although most of the 
irrigation expansion would have benefi ted the better-off households in rural 
areas of Java. This was also true of the expenditures on irrigation and drainage 
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in southern Vietnam. In Burma, where expenditures per capita were compara-
tively low, expenditures on education, medical services, civil works, and agri-
culture accounted for less than one-fi fth of total budgetary expenditures from 
1937–1938 onward, as military outlays increased (Andrus 1948: 322). 
Grajdanzev’s analysis of government expenditures in Taiwan and Korea 
during the 1930s concluded that most budgetary outlays were devoted to 
maintaining the bureaucracy, pensions, police, prisons, and the army. In both 
colonies, according to his argument, these expenditures were largely on Japa-
nese staff and for the benefi t of the Japanese population. In the case of Taiwan, 
expenditures on research were not insignifi cant, but they were much less than 
what was devoted to prisons and the police (Grajdanzev 1942: 137–138). The 
judgment of Grajdanzev on Korea was that, while the government was “gen-
erous to its bureaucrats, police, prison, and army, it is miserly with respect to 
social services for the native population” (1944: 220). While this may well 
have been true, a more positive case regarding the impact of budgetary expen-
ditures on the welfare of the Korean population has been made by Cha (1998). 
He argues that the public health measures introduced by the Japanese led 
to rapid population growth, and while the government did intensify the tax 
burden on the Korean population, it also increased public investment. This 
led to improvements in land productivity and also during the 1930s to rapid 
growth of manufacturing output, which offset, to some extent at least, the 
“Malthusian” consequences of sustained population growth. These arguments 
are examined further in Chapter 7.
Budgetary Surpluses and Colonial “ Drains”
Critics of colonial fi scal policies in Southeast Asia have also emphasized the 
large surpluses of revenues over expenditures and the “drain” abroad of public 
funds that these surpluses allegedly permitted (Golay 1976). In the nineteenth 
century, the remittance abroad of budgetary surpluses was most pronounced 
in Indonesia, where under the culture system unrequited transfers on gov-
ernment account to the home budget were substantial. These transfers were 
brought to an end in the 1870s, and from 1881 onward the fi scal balance 
in Indonesia was negative for all decades until 1940 (Booth 1998: 137–141). 
Elsewhere, budget outturns were rather different. In both the Straits Settle-
ments and the FMS, government budgets were in surplus for most quinquen-
nia between 1902 and 1937 (see Table 4.5). Because of the currency board 
arrangement, it was considered essential to hold large balances in the metro-
politan power, usually earning very low interest rates. In effect the colony was 
extending soft loans to the metropolitan power (Khor 1983: 44–49). The fi scal 
surpluses were even larger in Burma, where the gap between revenues appro-
priated by the government in New Delhi and the expenditures paid by that 
government amounted to between 3.6 and 8.4 percent of net national product 
between 1901–1902 and 1931–1932 (Booth 2007: table 9). The surpluses came 
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to an end only with the granting of complete fi nancial autonomy to Burma 
in 1937. Postcolonial scholars have attributed the large export surpluses in 
Burma from 1900 onward to this fi scal drain to Delhi, although remittances 
on the part of Indian migrants also contributed (Shein, Myint, and Tin: 1969; 
Andrus 1948: 182). 
The situation in Vietnam was very different from both British Malaya and 
Burma. The balance of payments estimates prepared by Bassino indicate that 
Indochina as a whole ran large current account defi cits from 1899 to 1914, 
which refl ected the heavy expenditures by both government and the private 
sector on imported capital goods (2000b: table 2). The budget was in surplus 
during the second decade of the twentieth century but swung into defi cit 
again in the 1920s and early 1930s (see Table 4.5). In Indonesia, where the 
budget was in defi cit for most years from 1900 through to 1940, the balance 
of payments surplus must have been due to a surplus of private savings over 
investment. Just why these private surpluses were so large and sustained over 
such a long period is still a matter of some controversy; the debates are exam-
ined further in the next chapter. In the Philippines, budgets were more or less 
in balance with the exception of the early 1920s and the early 1930s. As has 
already been noted, the early 1930s saw a tendency toward budget defi cits 
in many parts of Southeast Asia as government revenues fell with declining 
export earnings; the exceptions were Burma and Thailand.
The evidence from the budget data for the various colonies in Southeast 
Asia over the fi rst four decades of the twentieth century shows considerable 
differences between them in taxation and expenditure policies and in the size 
of budget surpluses and defi cits. Generalizations about “fi scal exploitation” 
should thus be treated with caution. In the case of Indochina, it was argued by 
one foreign scholar that Indochina was “one of the most intensively exploited 
colonial areas” in the world (Mitchell 1942: 151). But the evidence from the 
government accounts and the balance of payments hardly bears this out. 
While the overall incidence of the fi scal system may have been regressive, it 
is not clear that it was any more regressive than those in several other colo-
nies, including Korea. In Burma, where remittances on government account 
were much larger and more sustained than in other parts of the region, the 
benefi ciary was the budget in New Delhi, rather than that in London. While 
there can be little doubt that colonial offi cials were always under pressure 
from home governments to balance the budget and curb foreign borrowing, 
in practice achieving balanced budgets was far from simple, especially in times 
of falling export revenues.
In both Taiwan and Korea, budgets were in surplus for most years from 
1900 (1910 in the Korean case) to 1938 (see Table 4.5). In the case of Korea, it 
should be noted that part of the reason for these surpluses was that revenues 
were boosted by subventions from the Japanese budget, in effect a type of 
aid. In Taiwan, the large and sustained surpluses fi nanced outward fl ows of 
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capital; the balance of payments was consistently in surplus for most years 
from 1900 onward. We examine the links between the budget and the balance 
of payments for Taiwan and other Asian colonies in more detail in the next 
chapter. By the 1930s, the Japanese government was using Taiwan as a base 
for its penetration into Southeast Asia, and Taiwan was making considerable 
contributions to the Japanese budget for this purpose. 
88
The Open Dualistic Model and Its Implications
As we saw in Chapter 1, the open dualistic model developed by Paauw and 
Fei and others stressed that earning profi ts in and remitting them from the 
export enclave was an integral part of the operation of colonial economies 
in Asia and indeed elsewhere. One consequence was that large commodity 
export surpluses were sustained, often over long periods of time, that were 
only partly offset by defi cits in services. Thus the current account of the bal-
ance of payments was expected to be in surplus. A further consequence of 
the model was that the colonial export enclaves were tightly tethered to the 
metropolitan economies, in that most exports were sent to markets either in 
the metropolitan economy or in other parts of the empire controlled by the 
metropolitan economy, and most imports originated from the same sources. 
These biases in trade fl ows were mirrored in investment fl ows; most invest-
ment, whether direct investment in productive enterprises such as plantations 
or mines, or portfolio investment, originated from the metropolitan power. 
Thus bilateralism was alleged to be a crucial feature of colonial trade 
and investment fl ows in Asia. It was often argued that such bilateralism was 
enforced by a variety of controls, sometimes explicit and sometimes more sub-
tle, on both trade fl ows and capital fl ows. By the beginning of the twentieth 
century there was evidence that such controls were being used to insulate colo-
nial markets from imports and investment fl ows from more powerful econo-
mies. Both the Dutch and the French as well as the Japanese were concerned 
about British and American economic penetration in their colonies and took 
steps to limit it. By the 1920s, all the European colonial powers and the Ameri-
cans were becoming more nervous about growing imports into their territories 
from Japan. These concerns grew as the impact of the world depression of the 
early 1930s on the Asian economies became more severe, although responses 
to the “Japanese threat” varied considerably across the region. 
The 1930s also posed challenges for all the trading economies of Asia, 
whether they were independent states or colonial territories, regarding appro-
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priate exchange rate policy. In 1930, when the Indochina piastre was given an 
exact value in gold equal to ten times that of the French franc, all the curren-
cies in Southeast Asia together with that of Japan and the Japanese colonies 
were briefl y on the gold standard. During the early part of the 1930s, the vari-
ous Southeast Asian colonies followed their metropolitan masters in decid-
ing whether to abandon or stay with the gold standard; the British colonies 
left with sterling in September 1931, while Indonesia stayed on gold with 
the Netherlands until 1936. Thailand stayed on the gold standard for several 
months after sterling was devalued while an intense policy debate raged about 
appropriate policy responses to the deepening world crisis (Batson 1984: chap. 
7; see also Vichitvong 1978). Finally, in May 1932, the Thai cabinet agreed 
to relink the baht to sterling at the rate that prevailed before sterling went 
off gold, and this link was maintained until 1942. The Philippines had been 
pegged to the US dollar since the Philippine Gold Standard Act of 1903. The 
system broke down in 1918, and in 1922 a separate Gold Standard Fund and 
Treasury Certifi cate Fund were established. Thereafter, the overwhelming pri-
ority of successive Philippine administrations was to maintain the peg to the 
US dollar rather than to maintain a fi xed parity with gold, and the peso went 
off the gold standard with the dollar in 1933. Japan, having pegged its cur-
rency to gold in 1929, left the gold standard in December 1931, with impor-
tant consequences for its own traded goods industries and those of its colo-
nies, which will be reviewed in more detail below.
Exchange rate policy was important for all the colonies in East and South-
east Asia because, by the third decade of the twentieth century, they had all 
developed considerable export sectors, and in several cases the main export 
industries were becoming more dependent on markets outside those con-
trolled by the metropolitan power. Every colonial territory had experienced 
some growth in exports per capita between 1905 and 1920; in Taiwan and 
Korea as well as in Burma and British Malaya, this growth was sustained until 
1929 (Table 5.1). By the late 1920s, exports had reached around 40 percent of 
GDP in Taiwan, and about 20 percent in Korea (Figure 5.1). They comprised 
between 35 and 40 percent of GDP in Burma for most years from 1906 to 1931 
(Aye Hlaing 1964: 111). By 1926, exports comprised around 25 percent of GDP 
in both Indonesia and Vietnam and probably a higher ratio in the Philippines 
(Booth 2003c: table 2). In British Malaya, the estimates prepared by Benham 
(1951) for 1947 found that exports were 31 percent of GNP. Given that world 
trade had only begun to recover from the ravages of war in that year, it is prob-
able that the ratio for the late 1920s was much higher. 
The Evolution of Commodity Trade Flows: 1900 –1940
The British Malayan case is important not just because exports per capita were 
so high (among the highest in the world at the time), but also because there 
had been, during the 1920s and 1930s, substantial diversifi cation of markets 
Table 5.1. Exports Per Capita, 1905 –1938 (US dollars)
Colony 1905 1913 1920 1929 1934 1938
Taiwan 4 8 31 32 19 25
Korea 1 1 6 9 7 12
Indochina 1 3 7 4 2 3
Thailand 4 5 4 8 6 6
Burma 7 11 16 18 13 11
FMS 44 76 93 126 74 48
British Malaya n.a. n.a. n.a. 126 58 63
Philippines 4 5 14 13 8 9
Indonesia 3 6 14 10 6 6
Sources: Taiwan and Korea: Mizoguchi and Umemura 1988: 247–248, 256; Philippines: Bureau of 
Census and Statistics 1947: 347; Indonesia: Korthals Altes 1991: tables 1B, 2B, 3B, 4B; van der Eng 
2002: 171; Indochina: Doumer 1902: 296 –297; French Indochina: Service de la Statistique Gén-
érale 1947: 290; Banens 2000; FMS: Fraser 1939: appendix A; British Malaya: Kratoska 2000: table 
13.1; Department of Statistics 1939: 120; Burma: Saito and Lee 1999: 7, 177; Thailand: Ingram 
1971: appendixes C and D; Manarungsan 1989: 32. Population data from sources given in Table 
2.1; exchange rates taken from van Laanen 1980: table 8; Service de la Statistique Générale 1947: 
288.
Note: n.a. = not available. 
Figure 5.1. Exports as a proportion of gross domestic expenditure, Taiwan and Korea. (Source: Mizo-
guchi and Umemura 1988: part 3, tables 5, 14, 7, and 15)
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away from Britain and the British empire. By the late 1930s, only about 14 
percent of exports from British Malaya were going to the United Kingdom, 
and about 18 percent of total imports were sourced from there; 36 percent 
were sourced from the United Kingdom and all other British colonies and 
dominions (Table 5.2). On the export side, the demand in the British mar-
ket for Malaya’s main exports, rubber and tin, was limited compared with 
that in the United States, where the automobile and canned foods industries 
were growing rapidly. Only a small proportion of Burma’s exports went to 
the United Kingdom, although the great majority went to British territories, 
mainly in British India. The share of Indonesian trade with the Netherlands 
also declined after 1900, and by 1939 only 14 percent of exports went there. As 
in British Malaya, Indonesia’s main exports (rubber, tin, petroleum products) 
were in greater demand in the United States and in other parts of Asia than 
in the metropolitan economy. This was also the case with French Indochina, 
where only one-third of all exports were taken by France in 1939, although 
this was a higher ratio than earlier in the century.
While trading links between the European colonies and their metropo-
les had in most cases weakened by the 1930s, trade fl ows to and from Tai-
wan and Korea, and the Philippines were tightly tied to Japan and the United 
States respectively. In the case of Taiwan and the Philippines, the percentage 
of exports and imports sent to and sourced from Japan and the United States 
rose sharply after 1900; by 1939, more than 80 percent of exports from both 
colonies went to metropolitan markets. In Taiwan, trade with both Britain and 
America was larger than trade with Japan before 1895, and British banks, ship-
Table 5.2. Percentage of Exports and Imports to/from Metropolitan Power
 Early Twentieth Century C. 1939 a
Country / Years Exports Imports Exports Imports
Korea (1904 –1906) 84.6 73.3 73.2 88.5
Taiwan (1896 –1900) 19.6 27.0 86.0 87.6
Philippines (1902–1904) 40.1 13.5 82.0 68.3
Indochina (1897–1901) 20.6 44.6 32.3 55.4
Indonesia (1900 –1904) 35.4 31.4 14.4 18.7
British Malaya (1938) n.a. n.a. 14.1 (31.6) 18.2 (36.1)
Burma (1904 –1907, 1938 –1939) 9.2 26.7 12.7 (67.0) 18.2 (72.1)
Sources: Korea: Bank of Chosen 1920: 166–168; Grajdanzev 1944: 227; Philippines: Bureau of 
Census and Statistics 1947: 347; Indonesia: Korthals Altes 1991: tables 1B, 2B, 3B, 4B; Indochina: 
Doumer 1902: 296–297; Bassino and Huong 2000: 305–323; Taiwan: Grajdanzev 1942: 144; British 
Malaya: Department of Statistics 1939: 114; Burma: Offi ce of the Prime Minister 1958; Andrus 
1948: 167–176. 
a Figures in parentheses refer to all exports and imports from both the United Kingdom and British 
dominions and colonies.  
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ping, and trading companies based in Hong Kong dominated trade and com-
merce. But all foreign companies were gradually ousted after 1900 in favor of 
those from Japan (Grajdanzev 1942: 146–147). In Korea, exports per capita 
were still very low in 1905, and such trade as there was took place largely 
with Japan, although around one-quarter of imports came from elsewhere. 
Exports from Korea grew rapidly after 1913, and most of the growth was with 
Japan and other parts of the Japanese empire, especially Manchuria. By 1939, 
Korean exports to non–yen bloc countries amounted to only 3 percent of the 
total (Grajdanzev 1944: 228). 
A frequent argument made by critics of colonial trade policies, especially 
those associated with nationalist movements in Asia, was that metropolitan 
governments protected the markets of their colonial territories from foreign 
competition in order to provide home producers of goods such as textiles 
and other manufactures with captive consumers. A study of colonial trade 
patterns of the main European imperial powers at the end of the nineteenth 
century found that one-third of total British exports in 1892–1896 went to 
colonial possessions, about 24 percent of Spanish exports, almost 10 percent 
of French exports, and 5 percent of exports from the Netherlands (Flux 1899: 
491). While to some extent this pattern refl ected the fact that the British 
empire was considerably larger than any of the others, it is also true that Brit-
ish colonial policy stressed the importance of colonial markets as outlets for 
British manufactures to create employment at home. This emphasis contin-
ued into the twentieth century (Meredith 1996: 38–39). And yet by the 1930s, 
the British share of both Burmese and British Malayan imports was under 20 
percent. In France, where Jules Ferry pronounced his well-known dictum that 
“la politique coloniale est fi lle de la politique industrielle” (colonial policy is 
the daughter of industrial policy) in the early twentieth century, exports to 
the colonies, while not a large share of total exports, were important in some 
industries, especially cotton textiles, and this importance grew rapidly after 
1900 (Marseille 1984: 54). 
In spite of the rapid growth of trade of both Taiwan and Korea with Japan 
after 1900, colonial trade represented only a minor part, at most around 20 
percent, of total Japanese trade until the late 1920s (Moulton 1931: 211). But 
during the 1930s, the share of total Japanese exports going to markets outside 
the Japanese empire fell sharply (Figure 5.2). Imports sourced from foreign 
countries also fell as a percentage of all imports. On the export side, this fall 
was due to the sharp increase in exports to both Taiwan and Korea as well as to 
Kwantung province in southern Manchuria. The increased exports to colonial 
territories in the 1930s were dominated by producer goods and were the result 
of the rapid development of industry and infrastructure. Increased imports 
of consumer products such as cotton textiles, which were fl ooding into other 
Asian markets from Japan in the 1930s, only accounted for a minor part of the 
growth in Japan’s trade with its own colonies. 
The obvious lesson from even a cursory examination of the evidence on 
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trade fl ows between colonies and metropole in East and Southeast Asia after 
1900 is that generalizations are impossible. While the two Japanese colonies 
and the Philippines appear to conform to the open dualistic model in that 
both exports and imports became more tightly linked to the metropolitan 
power after 1900, that was much less the case in the other Southeast Asian 
colonies. In order to explain these divergent outcomes, we need to examine 
both trade and exchange rate policy in more detail.
Evolving Trade Regimes and Structures of Protection 
Already by the early 1900s, there were considerable differences across South-
east Asia in trade regimes and structures of protection, and these differences 
became more pronounced during the next four decades. In order to explain 
the differences in outcomes shown in Table 5.2, I begin with an analysis of 
trade policy in the Philippines and French Indochina, which were the two 
colonies of Southeast Asia most tightly tied to their metropoles by the 1930s, 
before examining policies in Indonesia, British Malaya, and Burma, which, 
while not very closely linked to the metropole, had very close ties to British 
India. I then look at trade policies in the two Japanese colonies. 
Acts passed by the US Congress in 1909 established free trade between 
the United States and the Philippines, although some quantitative restrictions 
remained on Philippine exports to the United States (Espino 1933: 8). These 
were largely removed by the Underwood Tariff Act of 1913, which permit-
ted all Philippine products containing no more than 20 percent by value of 
Figure 5.2. Japanese trade outside the Japanese empire as a proportion of total Japanese trade. (Source: 
Mizoguchi and Umemura 1988: part 3, tables 13 and 17)
94 Chapter 5
foreign materials to enter the United States duty free. Essentially the Under-
wood Act remained in force until the mid-1930s, when the Philippines was 
granted self-government. Owen has argued that in fact the Underwood Act 
removed many tariffs on all imports into the United States, so those from 
the Philippines received no special treatment (1972: 53). Important exports 
such as coconut oil and cordage remained on the free list until the 1930s. The 
main product to enjoy preferential tariffs was sugar, together with some minor 
exports such as tobacco and embroideries, even though these were the prod-
ucts that competed in the American market with home production. 
Whether because of preferential treatment or because the United States 
was a natural market for Philippine exports, as it increasingly was for exports 
from other parts of Southeast Asia, there was a rapid shift in trade fl ows toward 
the United States after 1910. By the end of the First World War, almost two-
thirds of Philippine imports originated from the United States. In 1929–1933, 
the American share of Philippine imports was four times its share of world 
exports (Table 5.3). An even higher proportion of Philippine exports went 
to the United States. This reliance led some Filipinos to argue for political 
independence on the grounds that they must regain tariff autonomy in order 
to foster their own industries (Espino 1933; see also Owen 1972: 52). But 
agri cultural interests, especially the sugar growers, were far from enthusias-
tic about independence, as they realized they would lose preferential access 
to the American market (Friend 1963; Friend 1965: 116–121; Corpuz 1997: 
251–262).
French attitudes were rather different. As we have seen, after 1900 French 
policy became more consciously directed toward securing colonial markets 
for French products, which was never an important concern in the United 
States. Until 1928, trade between metropolitan France and the French colo-
nies was governed by tariff laws that provided extensive protection for French 
products in colonial markets, and leading French politicians made little secret 
of the fact that a key role of colonies was to provide protected markets for 
French industries. But the tariff provisions were not reciprocal in that colonial 
products did not automatically enjoy duty-free entry into France. This ineq-
uity gave rise to great resentment in Indochina and was fi nally removed in 
1928, when a regime of reciprocal free trade was established within the French 
empire. As a result of this protectionism, Indochina conducted little of its 
trade with neighboring countries, while the share of metropolitan France in 
Indochina’s imports was nine times France’s share of world exports in 1929–
1933 (see Table 5.3). 
The discriminatory trade regimes imposed by both the United States and 
France on their Southeast Asian colonies was sometimes contrasted with the 
more liberal approach of the Dutch. Not only was there virtually no tariff or 
nontariff discrimination against imports from any source after the reforms of 
the 1860s and 1870s, but there was also an open capital account facilitating 
the infl ow of capital and the repatriation of profi ts. Although both specifi c 
 International Trade, Balance of Payments, and Exchange Rate Policies 95
and ad valorem import taxes were levied, Dutch and foreign commentators 
emphasized that tariffs were purely for revenue purposes, and the idea of pro-
tection was totally foreign (Paulus 1909: 124; Fowler 1923: 399; Kuitenbrou-
wer 1991: 67). But in spite of the apparently nondiscriminatory trade regime, 
the Netherlands continued to account for a much greater share of imports 
into Indonesia than its share of total world trade would have justifi ed. Import 
enforcement ratios fell between 1880 and 1900, but by 1929–1933, the Dutch 
share of imports into Indonesia was still almost eight times its share of world 
exports (see Table 5.3). It is likely that various forms of subtle discrimination 
against British and other importers persisted after 1870 through the domi-
nance of Dutch trading houses in the export-import sector and through a 
Dutch commercial and legal system that would have advantaged Dutch mer-
chants.
It has already been noted that the share of imports sourced from the 
Table 5.3. Metropolitan Shares of World Export Trade and Colonial Import 
Trade, 1929–1933
 Metropolitan Share of Imports (%) Metropolitan Share of World Exports (%) Ratio
Taiwan 74.7 2.9 26.1
Korea 76.7 2.9 26.8
Indochina 55.3 6.2 9.0
Thailand a 15.5 10.3 1.5
Burma b 22.7 (45.4) 10.3 (3.3) 2.2
British Malaya c 14.8 (32.9) 10.3 1.4
Philippines 63.8 13.8 4.6
Indonesia 17.0 2.6 7.8
 Japanese Share of Imports (%) Japanese Share of World Exports (%) Ratio
Indochina 2.8 2.9 1.0
Thailand 11.4 2.9 4.0
Burma 9.3 2.9 3.3
British Malaya 3.9 2.9 1.4
Philippines 9.2 2.9 3.2
Indonesia 14.3 2.9 5.0
Source: Thailand: Swan 1988: 76; French Indochina: Service de la Statistique Générale 1947; 
 Philippines: Bureau of Census and Statistics 1941; Indonesia: Korthals Altes 1991; Burma: National 
Planning Commission 1960b: Statistical Appendix; British Malaya: Annual Departmental Reports 
of the Straits Settlements (Singapore: Government Printing Offi ce, 1930–1934); Taiwan and Korea: 
Mizoguchi and Umemura 1988: 246–251. Data on metropolitan countries’ share of world exports 
from Clark 1936: 62–63. 
a Metropolitan power is the United Kingdom.
b Figures in parentheses are for the rest of British India.
c Figures in parentheses include all countries in the British Empire. 
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United Kingdom in British Malaya was quite low by the 1930s; the share was 
little more than would be expected given the British share of world exports 
(see Table 5.3). It would appear that British exporters did not see the Malayan 
market as having the same strategic importance as that of British India. In 
addition, there were vested interests in Singapore in particular that supported 
the free port policy, although as will be seen below, this was tested by the 
rise of Japanese imports after 1930. The situation in Burma was complicated 
by the fact that Burma was just a small part of Britain’s vast colonial posses-
sions in the Indian subcontinent and until the latter part of the 1930s had no 
autonomy in economic or indeed other matters. The constitutional reforms of 
the early 1920s gave India considerable autonomy in setting tariffs, and during 
the 1920s some tariff protection was accorded Indian producers of iron and 
steel products and textiles (National Planning Commission 1960b: 84 –90). 
But these tariffs had no protective function in Burma, which did not pos-
sess such industries; their only effect was to increase prices of imported textile 
and steel products. After the Ottawa Agreement of 1932, India shifted to a 
system of tariff preferences for products from other parts of the British empire, 
and during the next two years very high tariffs were levied on imports from 
countries outside the imperial system, most notably textile products from 
Japan (Chaudhuri 1983: 869). The impact of these policies on Burma will be 
examined in more detail in the next section. In the early 1930s, almost 45 
percent of Burmese imports came from India and a further 22 percent from 
Britain (see Table 5.3). The very high reliance on imports from India did not 
change much after the formal separation of Burma from India in 1937 (Andrus 
1948: 187–192).
Although Thailand was not a colony, the infl uence of British fi nancial 
advisers in the kingdom was considerable up to 1932, and as late as 1929–
1933, the proportion of total imports from Britain was higher than the British 
share of world exports (see Table 5.3). The Bowring Treaty and similar treaties 
signed with other powers in the latter part of the nineteenth century had 
deprived Thailand of any capacity to use tariffs for protective purposes, but 
by 1926 these treaties had been revoked and tariff autonomy was substan-
tially restored (Ingram 1971: 147). Thereafter, only very limited use was made 
of tariffs as a means of fostering domestic industry. As will be shown below, 
Thailand’s liberal trade regime and reasonably buoyant agricultural economy 
through the 1930s led to considerable growth in imports from various sources, 
especially Japan. 
It is clear from Table 5.3 that, by the early 1930s, the two Japanese colonies 
were more tightly tied to Japan than was the case with any of the Southeast 
Asian colonies, even the Philippines. Japanese exports to Taiwan and Korea 
comprised around 75 percent of all imports; this ratio increased further in the 
latter part of the 1930s as Japanese export trade became more concentrated on 
its colonial possessions rather than on the wider world (see Figure 5.2). Some 
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foreign scholars supported the Japanese view that the high degree of reliance 
of both colonies on Japanese imports was due to geographical proximity and 
comparative advantage. Given their different factor endowments and levels of 
development, it was inevitable that Taiwan and Korea would supply agricul-
tural products and other raw materials to the Japanese economy and receive 
manufactured goods back in return (Vinacke 1928: 366). Critics such as Graj-
danzev viewed the Japanese domination of Korean trade in a rather different 
light:
The infl uence of Japanese political control on Korean trade was exercised 
not only through the tariff wall which guarded Korea against the intrusion 
of non-Japanese goods (goods from Japan entered duty-free), but through 
the control of the country’s entire economic life. Industry, banks, commu-
nications and the government machinery were in Japanese hands. Under 
these conditions it was inevitable that the decisions as to what to import 
or what and where to export were taken by Japanese import and export 
fi rms, and that these decisions were infl uenced by offi cial Japanese policy. 
(Grajdanzev 1944: 229) 
In the context of Taiwan, it was argued by Japanese scholars that it was 
inevitable that Japanese merchants would displace traditional trade with 
China, as they possessed a far stronger capital base and were supported by Japa-
nese subsidies and the powerful presence of Japanese trading fi rms, shipping 
fi rms, and banks. But as Grajdanzev pointed out, there was little evidence that 
much of the capital invested in Taiwan was brought from Japan; most was 
generated within Taiwan itself (1942: 147). It does seem clear that, increas-
ingly during the 1930s, Japanese fi rms in Taiwan played an important role in 
the Japanese government’s strategic aims of extending commercial penetra-
tion into both southern China and Southeast Asia (Schneider 1998; Howe 
1996: 359–360). Government assistance to fi rms to achieve these aims took a 
variety of forms, including the granting of monopoly rights, subsidies, tariff 
protection, and tax benefi ts. 
As a result of these policies, the export industries that Japan established 
in both Taiwan and Korea were high-cost and uncompetitive in regional 
markets. Rice prices in Korea were well above those in Southeast Asian mar-
kets from 1915 onward (Figure 5.3). This imposed a considerable burden on 
Korean consumers, who might, under freer trade, have preferred to consume 
cheaper Indica varieties of rice rather than the barley and pearl millet that 
many were forced to substitute for rice. In Taiwan also, consumers might have 
preferred to eat more rice rather than sweet potatoes had relative prices been 
different (Anderson and Tyers 1992: 119). Taiwanese sugar could not compete 
on international markets with low-cost sugar from Java or from Hawai‘i and 
Cuba (Howe 1996: 359). It could only be sold in mainland Japan because of 
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high tariffs on imports from outside the empire. Japanese consumers were 
thus subsidizing not just producers in Taiwan and Korea, but also the long-run 
strategic aims of their government in other parts of Asia. 
Responses to Growing World Protectionism and the Japanese “ Threat ” 
One of the most striking aspects of the development of intra-Asian trade in 
the interwar years was the growth of Japanese exports. After 1920, Japan, as a 
“newly industrializing nation,” embarked on the kind of export strategy that 
the erstwhile Japanese colonies, South Korea and Taiwan, were to adopt in 
the 1960s and many other Asian countries after 1980. Labor-intensive indus-
tries in such goods as textiles and garments, footwear, bicycles, and house-
hold utensils that had been produced largely for the domestic market began 
to penetrate export markets in other parts of Asia. Because industrial labor 
was much cheaper in Japan than in the more mature industrial economies of 
Western Europe and North America, Japanese products could be priced very 
competitively, and they found a ready market among millions of consum-
ers who were more concerned about price than about quality. In 1920, over 
half of total Japanese exports were going to Asia, and this percentage did not 
change greatly until the latter part of the 1930s. A growing proportion of the 
Asian share of Japanese exports went to parts of Asia that were under the con-
trol of the British, Dutch, and Americans; by 1935, British India, the Straits 
Figure 5.3. Rice prices in Korea and Southeast Asia (Indonesia guilders [fl .] per quintal). Rice variet-
ies: Bangkok: Straits quality; Saigon: No. 1 quality; Java: Saigon quality. (Sources: Korea: Rose 1985: 90; 
Bangkok: Central Service of Statistics 1940: 515; Saigon: Direction des Services Économiques 1947: 
299; Java: Department of Economic Affairs 1938: 5)
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Settlements, and Indonesia accounted for about 40 percent of exports to Asia 
outside the Japanese empire (Booth 2000: table 14.3). 
That it suited the interests of powerful lobbies in British Malaya, Indone-
sia, and the Philippines to have cheap Japanese wage goods fl ooding into these 
colonies in the early 1930s cannot be doubted. Large estate companies were 
desperate to hold down labor costs as prices for primary products slumped 
after 1930 and world markets contracted. In addition, there was resentment, 
especially in the British colonies, that quotas on Japanese textile products 
would amount to a tax on “poor peasants” in order to assist high-cost Lan-
cashire producers. Meredith quotes an article from The Economist in May 1934 
pointing out that “the cheapness of Japanese cotton exports has been doing 
the world a considerable service by helping the consumer in tropical countries 
to maintain his purchases” (1996: 43). In Singapore, the Chamber of Com-
merce appeared to agree with this; its members voiced considerable opposi-
tion to the decision of the British government in 1934 to impose quotas on 
imports from Japan of cotton and rayon piece goods on the grounds that 
the Malay peasant would suffer, and it was far from clear that the Lancashire 
producers would derive much benefi t anyway (Brown 1994: 116 –123). The 
quotas were nonetheless imposed, and the Japanese share of total imports to 
British Malaya fell after 1934 (Table 5.4).
In Indonesia, the competitive position of key export industries such as 
rubber and sugar was eroded relative to those in other parts of the tropical 
world by the Dutch decision to stay on the gold standard after 1931. Because 
Indonesia was a more open and less protected economy than the Philippines 
Table 5.4. Percentage of Total Imports from Japan
Year Thailand Philippines French Indochina Indonesia Burma British Malaya
1928 2.8 9.6 2.1 9.1 6.5 2.0
1929 8.1 8.1 1.8 10.4 8.4 2.6
1930 11.2 10.5 1.1 10.9 8.9 3.5
1931 8.4 11.1 1.6 15.2 8.9 3.9
1932 14.4 7.8 1.1 19.1 11.6 4.5
1933 19.2 8.4 2.2 29.8 9.4 7.4
1934 25.3 12.4 2.2 31.9 9.3 8.0
1935 29.1 14.2 3.3 29.5 10.9 6.4
1936 28.3 13.1 3.1 26.2 10.6 6.3
1937 21.5 14.8 3.2 24.2 8.3 5.8
1938 15.6 9.6 3.1 14.5 6.6 n.a.
1939 9.6 6.2 1.7 16.1 7.1 n.a.
Sources: Thailand: Swan 1988: 76; French Indochina: Service de la Statistique Générale 1947; 
 Philippines: Bureau of Census and Statistics 1941; Indonesia: Korthals Altes 1991; Burma: National 
Planning Commission 1960a – b: statistical appendixes; British Malaya: Annual Departmental Reports 
of the Straits Settlements (Singapore: Government Printing Offi ce, 1930 –1938). 
Note: n.a. = not available. 
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or French Indochina as well as being a much larger market, it is not surpris-
ing that Japanese exports were much larger in absolute terms than those to 
the other colonies (Booth 2003c: table 9). They also comprised a greater share 
of total imports, especially after 1930 (see Table 5.4). Given the increasing 
power of the militarist factions in the Japanese government during the 1930s, 
it was inevitable that the Dutch colonial authorities began to worry about the 
political and strategic motives behind the rapid growth of Japanese exports. 
Japanese government agencies were deeply involved in the export expansion 
into Southeast Asia, and the huge Indonesian archipelago was, in the eyes of 
the Dutch colonial establishment, especially vulnerable to Japanese “subver-
sion by trade” (van Gelderen 1939: 21).
The fi rst years of the world slump were especially damaging to Indonesia 
not just because of falling prices for key export staples, but also because of 
contracting markets. As both the British and French empires retreated into 
greater protectionism, it became increasingly diffi cult to sell products such 
as sugar into either British or French territory. Given that the metropolitan 
market in the Netherlands for tropical products was small and the Dutch pos-
sessed few other colonial territories, there was little option but to cut back 
production. In 1929–1930, when Java sugar production was at its peak, it was 
more than three times that of the Philippines. By 1935–1936, Javanese pro-
duction had fallen to only about 20 percent of the 1929–1930 level, while that 
in the Philippines had surpassed Javanese production by almost 50 percent 
(Booth 2000: table 14.4). 
Facing such problems in leading export industries, it was hardly surpris-
ing that Dutch free-trade principles were tested beyond their limits, and “the 
idea rapidly spread that the unlimited free trade and open-door policy, which 
governed the whole foreign trade of the Netherlands, including its inter-impe-
rial relations, had to be reconsidered in the light of post-crisis conditions” 
(van Gelderen 1939: 30). The new policies took two main forms. First, trading 
links between the metropolitan economy and Indonesia were strengthened 
by policies designed to reserve a large share of the Dutch metropolitan market 
for colonial imports of sugar, corn, and vegetable oils. In the case of sugar, the 
Netherlands guaranteed a quota in the home market of 85,000 tons annually, 
in spite of protests from Dutch sugar beet producers. But this was only about 
16 percent of the very reduced level to which production had fallen by 1935. 
The rest still had to be sold into those markets that were unregulated for what-
ever price could be negotiated. 
Van Gelderen pointed out that these quota allocations were granted in 
part as a compensation for the implementation of the second class of poli-
cies, which involved imposing quotas on imports into Indonesia for a range 
of imports. Some goods were subject to general quotas, which enabled colo-
nial importers to purchase from the cheapest source (usually Japan), but other 
goods were subject to specifi c country quotas. Typically cheap cotton goods 
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and some household utensils were subject to general quotas, while superior 
textile products, paper products, rubber tires, chemical manures, light bulbs, 
and so forth, were subject to country quotas. The purpose of this system was 
to reserve a share of the colonial market for Dutch and to a lesser extent other 
European producers. It led to a marked downturn in the percentage share of 
Japanese imports in total imports from the peak reached in 1934, although 
in absolute terms Japanese exports reached a peak in 1937 and fell thereafter. 
In spite of the quota restrictions, Indonesia remained a very large market for 
Japanese cotton textile exports; in 1937, the value of these exports to Indone-
sia was higher than anywhere else in Asia (Sugiyama 1994: table 2.5). 
In the Philippines, commercial interests in the United States were also put-
ting the colonial administration under strong pressure to place tariffs or quan-
titative restrictions on Japanese imports, especially of cotton textiles. Mindful 
of the approach of self-government and also concerned about the impact of 
trade restrictions on prices of important consumer goods, the Bureau of Insu-
lar Affairs, the main agency responsible for economic policy, took a cautious 
approach to the imposition of import controls in 1934 –1935. The Japanese 
for their part were pointing out to Filipinos the benefi ts that would accrue 
after independence from diversifying markets for their exports and imports, 
and establishing closer economic and technical links with neighboring coun-
tries. Japan fi nanced lobbyists to stress the importance of cheap wage goods to 
low-income workers (Goodman 1983: 48 – 50). 
But American congressional pressure grew, and senators such as Millard 
Tydings began to suggest that if restrictions on Japanese imports were not 
imposed, the United States would take a much tougher approach to the grant-
ing of duty-free access into the US market for Philippine agricultural imports. 
Negotiations dragged on through 1935 between the American and Japanese 
governments; the upshot was that, in October 1935, Japanese yarn and textile 
producers agreed to a system of voluntary export restrictions to the Philippine 
market (Goodman 1983: 53; Guerrero 1994: 175–179). Japanese exports to the 
Philippines were never especially large in relation to total Japanese exports, 
and the Japanese government no doubt reasoned that it was more prudent to 
appease the US Congress than to increase commercial penetration of the Phil-
ippine market. After 1937, the absolute value of Japanese exports fell, as did 
the share of Japan in total Philippine imports (see Table 5.4). As in other parts 
of Southeast Asia, this decline refl ected, in part at least, the increasing reluc-
tance of Chinese shopkeepers and traders to handle Japanese goods, given the 
violent behavior of the Japanese army in China. 
In French Indochina, by contrast, Japan was never able to get more than 
a tiny share of the total import market, and the absolute value of Japanese 
exports into Indochina was minuscule. Indeed the balance of trade between 
Japan and Indochina ran in favor of Indochina throughout the 1930s (Rahm 
1952: table 17). What explains this outcome? Exchange rate policy is unlikely 
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to have accounted for the persistent trade surpluses, as the piastre appreci-
ated against the yen in real terms for much of the decade. We must seek the 
explanation in terms of trade policy. Norlund presents a clear analysis of the 
tangle of vested interests, both in the colony and in metropolitan France, 
which affected trade policy decisions in French Indochina as the world crisis 
deepened:
Agricultural interests in France wanted the French market to be protected 
from colonial imports; French industrialists wanted protection for their 
goods in the colonial market; colonial agricultural interests wanted the 
abolition of restrictions on the import of their production into France and 
opposed the protection of French goods in the colonial market. The Comite 
de l’Indochine lobbied effectively for protection for Indochinese crops. Its 
greatest achievement was to secure a free loan of 100 million francs in 
1932 for French rubber plantations. (Norlund 2000: 216) 
Faced with this barrage of contradictory demands, the French colonial admin-
istration decided to restrict imports from other parts of Asia and especially 
from Japan and China. As far as the Japanese were concerned, there is some 
evidence that they viewed the Indochina market in a rather different light 
than markets in other parts of colonial Asia, such as British India or Indonesia. 
No doubt French tariff policies accounted for much of the Japanese hesitation. 
Touzet quoted a former Japanese consul general in Hanoi as stating in 1930 
that “Japan has much to ask of Indochina but nothing to offer her” (1934: 
151). This was certainly not the Japanese view regarding Dutch and British 
colonies. It appears that the robust nature of the French response to any sign 
of interest in the Indochina market on the part of Japanese exporters after 
1930 served as a potent deterrent or at least persuaded Japanese textile export-
ers, to take one example, to target other parts of Asia where colonial govern-
ments were more laissez-faire in their trade regimes. 
After the tariff changes of 1928 –1929, French textile interests lobbied 
hard to prevent any imports into Indochina from Japan, and in 1932 (at least 
two years before either the Dutch or the Americans were stirred into action), 
the Japanese and French governments signed a trade accord that regulated 
trade between Japan and Indochina. A list of products that the Japanese could 
export to Indochina with an agreed reduction in the general tariff was drawn 
up; in Touzet’s words, the list was “sans doute un peu limité” (1934: 153), but 
that was all that the French were prepared to offer. It appears that the main 
lobby groups acting on behalf of the French estates were less concerned about 
the availability of cheap wage goods than in other parts of Southeast Asia. 
Their main concern was to persuade the government to increase tariff pro-
tection for colonial products in France and give interest-free loans to rubber 
producers (Schweitzer 1971: 238 –239).
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Even a senior colonial offi cial like Touzet was somewhat ambivalent about 
the impact of this aggressive protectionism; he acknowledged that the level 
of trade between Indochina and Japan was “derisory” and expressed the view 
that it could and should expand. But he also pointed out that Japan engaged in 
trade practices that were potentially dangerous to Indochina; these included 
not only “currency dumping” through the depreciation of the yen, but also 
dumping of manufactures at prices made possible by “salaries derisoires, longues 
heures de travail” (Touzet 1934: 156). Touzet noted the export offensive that the 
Japanese mounted against both British India and Indonesia, and pointed out 
that Indochina had been spared most probably because of the relatively small 
size of its market. But the nature of French protectionism was almost certainly 
the most important explanation, and Japanese exports to Indochina were to 
expand rapidly after 1941, when the disruption of trade links with France 
made it a far more open and attractive market for Japanese manufactures. 
The robust nature of the French protectionist response in Indochina can 
be contrasted with the situation in Burma, where a form of “double colonial-
ism” prevailed. Given that Burma in the early 1930s was simply a province of 
British India with no autonomy in economic policy, trade policy was deter-
mined in New Delhi and London. Japanese exports to British India as a whole 
almost trebled in terms of nominal yen between 1931 and 1937 in spite of the 
imposition of imperial preference in 1932 and high tariffs on Japanese textile 
imports in 1933. Japanese imports into Burma reached 11.6 percent of total 
imports in 1932, and although the percentage declined slightly during the 
next two years, Japanese imports still comprised almost 11 percent of total 
exports in 1935–1936, suggesting that the effect of the protectionist measures 
adopted in 1932–1933 was at best transitory (see Table 5.4). There was no large-
scale domestic textile industry in Burma to protect from foreign competition, 
either from the rest of India, Britain, or Japan. The desire to keep the price of 
wage goods cheap must have been an important factor weighing on the minds 
of British administrators in Burma, and as Brown (2000) argued, there is little 
evidence that textile imports declined on a per capita basis after 1931. 
In Thailand, where the government was not under the same pressure 
from metropolitan vested interests in determining tariff policies, the share 
of Japan in total imports increased sharply after 1931 and by 1935 was as 
high as in Indonesia (see Table 5.4). The Thai government that had come to 
power after the 1932 coup against the absolute monarchy did not share the 
fears of the Dutch or the British about Japanese intentions in Southeast Asia. 
The decline in imports from Japan as a percentage of total Thai imports after 
1936–1937 was mainly due to Chinese merchants boycotting Japanese goods 
and replacing them with goods from other countries (Swan 1988: 95–96). But 
the boycott eventually crumbled, and after the European war made it increas-
ingly diffi cult to obtain imports from the United Kingdom and elsewhere, the 
Japanese share increased again. 
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Exchange Rate Policies 
It is impossible fully to understand changing trade relationships between Japan 
and other parts of Asia without considering exchange rate policies. In relation 
to one another and to other important currencies such as the yen and (except 
in the Philippines) the dollar, nominal exchange rates in the colonies followed 
the movements of the metropolitan currencies during the 1930s. Relative to 
the dollar, the piastre fi rst appreciated, along with the franc, and then depreci-
ated after 1936 (Bassino 1998: fi g. 1). This was also the path followed by the 
sterling-based currencies, the straits dollar, the baht, and the rupee. The Indo-
nesian guilder underwent a sharp appreciation against the dollar until 1936, 
when the Netherlands fi nally decided to go off the gold standard. The yen by 
contrast left the gold standard in December 1931, after the Japanese had lost 
675 million yen in gold in a vain attempt to defeat speculators, and thereafter 
depreciated rapidly against both the dollar and sterling, and the other curren-
cies pegged to them (Kindleberger 1987: 163–164). By 1935, the yen had lost 
more than half its value against the various Southeast Asian currencies; the 
nominal devaluation was especially steep against the Indies guilder. 
In Indonesia, there was a sharp defl ation during the years from 1929 
to 1936; by 1936, the cost of living for low-income indigenous families in 
Batavia ( Jakarta) was only half what it had been in 1929 (Booth 2000: table 
14.5). But given the magnitude of the nominal appreciation, the defl ation 
was insuffi cient to restore the real value of the guilder against the yen (Booth 
1994: table 6.8). In Indochina, where the rate of defl ation was far more mod-
est, the piastre appreciated sharply against the yen between 1931 and 1935; 
indeed the real exchange rate of the piastre against the yen only returned to 
its 1931 value in 1937 (Booth 2000: table 14.6). Given the extent of the appre-
ciation against the yen, why did Japanese imports not fl ood into Indochina? 
The answer lay in the ever more stringent controls applied by the French 
against all imports originating from outside the French empire. It has already 
been pointed out that the French administration faced a complicated set of 
demands from diverse vested interests in both the colony and metropolitan 
France as the crisis deepened. But ultimately, considerations of imperial pref-
erence weighed more heavily in the minds of the French than those of con-
sumer welfare in the colony. 
The departure from gold made Thai rice exports more competitive, 
although the price advantage was offset in several key markets by the import 
controls that many rice-importing countries in Asia and elsewhere imposed 
after 1932 (Manarungsan 2000: 192). In addition, Thai rice exports were of 
higher quality than those from Vietnam and Burma, and consumers in impor-
tant markets such as neighboring Malaya switched to less expensive rice as 
their incomes fell. But in spite of these problems, Thai rice exports recovered in 
volume terms quite rapidly from the low point reached in 1930, and the aver-
age annual tonnage exported in 1936–1938 was some 13 percent higher than 
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the average for 1928–1930. The Thai government was sensitive to the problems 
of rural producers and realized that exchange rate policy alone was insuffi cient 
to boost rural incomes. After 1932, both the tax on rice fi elds and the poll tax 
were reduced, and many agricultural debts were written off (ibid.: 194 –195). 
Balance of Payments Surpluses, Investment Flows, and the 
Colonial “Drain”
The open dualistic model assumed that the main economic goal of colonial-
ism was to create an export surplus, which was then used to fi nance remit-
tances abroad on both government and (more often by the early twentieth 
century) private account. In other words, the commodity trade surpluses were 
not balanced by defi cits on services, so that the current account was usually 
in surplus even in years of slow or negative economic growth. These surpluses 
were frequently cited by nationalists in various parts of Asia, both during the 
colonial era and more recently, as evidence of colonial exploitation. In fact, 
when we examine the data on export surpluses in Korea, Taiwan, and South-
east Asia in the fi rst four decades of the twentieth century, we see very differ-
ent outcomes in different colonies. These outcomes were in turn the result of 
different macroeconomic and sectoral policies pursued by the different colo-
nial regimes. 
In one colony, Korea, commodity exports were always below imports 
(Table 5.5). The current account was always in defi cit (Figure 5.4), and by the 
late 1930s, these defi cits amounted to around 10 percent of gross domestic 
expenditure (GDE). The situation in Taiwan was very different; in the early 
Table 5.5. Export Earnings as a Percentage of Import Earnings, 1897–1938, 
in Taiwan, Korea, the Philippines, and French Indochina (averages for 
years shown)
Year Taiwan Korea Philippines French Indochina
1896 –1900 80.6 93.7 85.9 a 107.5
1901–1905 94.7 62.7 94.4 69.4
1906 –1910 107.8 54.8 104.2 95.8
1911–1915 105.0 49.4 95.8 114.0
1916 –1920 133.4 82.3 118.2 148.0
1921–1925 150.3 97.3 115.1 122.7
1926 –1930 134.9 86.8 116.4 114.0
1931–1935 140.1 90.1 128.4 111.3
1936 –1938 130.9 80.5 134.7 160.4
Sources: Taiwan and Korea: Mizoguchi 1974: table 3; additional data for Korea from 1896 to 1910 
from Bank of Chosen 1920: 166 –167; Philippines: Bureau of Census and Statistics 1947: 347; 
French Indochina: Bassino and Huong 2000: table 1. 
a 1899–1900 only. 
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phase of the Japanese occupation, commodity exports were below imports, 
and until 1915 the current account balance was mostly in defi cit (Table 5.5 
and Figure 5.5). But after 1915, exports exceeded imports by a margin of at 
least 30 percent; although there was a defi cit on service transactions, it was 
much less than the commodity surplus (Mizoguchi and Umemura 1988: 295). 
Figure 5.4. Korea: budget and current account balances. (Source: Mizoguchi and Umemura 1988: part 
3, tables 57 and 63) 
Figure 5.5. Taiwan: budget and current account balances. (Source: Mizoguchi and Umemura 1988: part 
3, tables 54 and 60) 
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The current account surpluses increased steadily until the late 1930s, when 
they amounted to 9 percent of GDE. 
If the balance of payments outcomes in the two Japanese colonies were 
very different by the 1930s, that was also the case in the two British colonies 
in Southeast Asia. In Burma, export earnings were already more than 30 per-
cent above imports by 1900, and the margin widened rapidly thereafter (Table 
5.6). There are no balance of payments fi gures for colonial Burma, but there 
can be little doubt that the current account surplus was substantial and that 
it fi nanced outward remittances of Indian workers and subventions by Burma 
to the British Indian government in Delhi. It was pointed out in the previous 
chapter that the fi scal surpluses in Burma were large and amounted to as much 
as 8 percent of NDP by the 1930s. Even after the system was terminated in the 
mid-1930s, the export surplus remained very large and must have refl ected 
outward remittances on private account by individuals and companies. In 
the Federated Malay States, large export surpluses were also recorded for most 
years after 1900, but they were to a considerable extent offset by defi cits in 
other parts of British Malaya. When consolidated export and import data for 
all of British Malaya were published in the 1920s, they showed a much lower 
export surplus (Table 5.6). It is probable that the current balance was in defi cit 
in the decade from 1926 to 1935, given that the commodity trade was almost 
balanced and that there would have been a defi cit on services. 
In the Philippines and French Indochina until 1915, the trade balance 
was frequently in defi cit or showed only a small surplus (see Table 5.5). In 
Indochina, there were large infl ows of capital in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries on both government and private account, mainly to 
develop infrastructure and to support the growing French bureaucratic pres-
Table 5.6. Export Earnings as a Percentage of Import Earnings, 1897–1938, 
in Indonesia, Burma, Thailand, and the Federated Malay States
Year Indonesia Burma Thailand Federated Malay States a
1896–1900 124.1 134.8 126.1 144.4
1901–1905 134.0 130.1 136.5 161.5
1906–1910 149.1 144.6 139.7 161.8
1911–1915 151.0 148.7 124.3 195.1
1916–1920 186.7 156.0 115.2 252.9
1921–1925 167.3 181.5 127.1 217.1 (123.5)
1926–1930 153.3 180.3 121.1 178.6 (106.5)
1931–1935 155.6 246.5 154.8 171.6 (101.5)
1936–1938 171.8 228.3 158.8 221.8 (120.6)
Sources: Indonesia: Korthals Altes 1991; Burma: Saito and Lee 1999: 177–178; Thailand: Ingram 
1971: appendix C; Federated Malay States: Fraser 1939: appendix A: British Malaya: Kratoska 2000: 
table 13.1 and Department of Statistics 1939.
a Figures in parentheses refer to the consolidated data for British Malaya from 1924 onward. 
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ence (Bassino 2000a: tables 2 and 3a). Bassino’s estimates show that current 
account surpluses were consistently positive and large only for the years from 
1936 to 1944. It is probable that during these years outward remittances by 
the Chinese were an important factor driving the large surpluses (ibid.: 335). 
The surpluses on the trade account recorded in the Philippines after 1915 were 
not as large as in Taiwan and were probably largely offset by negative balances 
on services. Balance of payments estimates prepared by the American govern-
ment for the decade from 1925 to 1934 indicate that for most years the defi cit 
on services together with interest and dividend movements offset the positive 
balance of trade to a considerable extent, although there was still a positive 
outfl ow over the decade (United States Tariff Commission 1937: table 8; Golay 
1976: 375–376). 
In Indonesia, for most years from the late 1890s to 1940, exports earn-
ings exceeded imports by a large margin; Golay estimated that in the 1920s 
the Indonesian surplus accounted for more than half that of Southeast Asia 
as a whole (1976: 375). The large trade surplus was not offset by a defi cit on 
services, and the current account balance was positive for much of the period 
from 1901 to 1939 (Korthals Altes 1987: table 1; Booth 1998: table 5.5). In 
Thailand, the commodity surplus was also substantial, especially during the 
1930s (see Table 5.6). We do not have balance of payments estimates for this 
period, but it is probable that there was a positive current account balance for 
much of the period from 1900 to 1940.
It seems clear that there is no single explanation that fi ts all these out-
comes. Arguments in terms of “colonial drains” and “exploitation through 
trade” seem inadequate, given the divergent empirical evidence. Rather we 
must seek reasons for the very different outcomes in each colony. Let us start 
with Korea, where imports often exceeded exports by 15 percent or more. 
Given that the balance of trade in services was also negative, Korea was run-
ning current account defi cits for most years from 1911 to 1938 (see Figure 5.4). 
These defi cits were funded by transfers from the Japanese government and 
after 1927 by increasing long-term capital infl ows (Mizoguchi and Umemura 
1988: 298). Given that the Korean budget was usually balanced or showed 
a slight surplus, the trade and current account defi cits had their origins in 
private sector transactions. The large investments by Japanese corporations, 
especially in the 1930s, were undoubtedly an important factor; in addition, 
there were large numbers of Koreans living in Japan and Manchuria, and they 
were remitting more than 100 million yen annually back to Korea (Grajdan-
zev 1944: 237). At least part of these remittances would have been spent on 
imported goods. Imports from Japan by Japanese residents, many of them 
earning higher salaries than their counterparts in Japan, and the wealthiest 
groups among the Korean population would also have been substantial. 
In Taiwan and in most parts of Southeast Asia, explanations must be 
sought for persistent and in several cases high trade and current account sur-
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pluses. A number of reasons have been put forward. Golay argues that an 
understanding of the colonial drain 
is to be found in the processes of capitalist development which fl ourished 
in the colonial world. There, the savings of a rentier class of foreign inves-
tors and the capital and enterprise of aliens resident in Southeast Asia who 
participated actively in colonial economic development—predominantly 
Western, Chinese and Indian—were combined with indigenous labor 
and readily exploitable natural resources to produce tropical foodstuffs 
and industrial raw materials in strong demand outside the area. Rela-
tively modest initial injections of alien/foreign-owned capital and alien 
entrepreneurship initiated a process of economic growth which became 
self-sustaining and increasingly independent of further geographic infl ows 
of capital and entrepreneurial resources from the outside world. (1976: 
371–372) 
Golay stresses the importance of reinvested profi ts in the development of 
large-scale enterprises in Southeast Asia, as did Drake (1972: 953–954), who 
pointed out that many forms of export expansion are relatively “undemand-
ing of capital goods, particularly imported capital equipment.” It was pos-
sible for many estate and mining companies to get started in Southeast Asia 
with only modest amounts of investment from abroad; sometimes loans from 
local trading houses, usually located in the port cities, were suffi cient. Once 
they began to make profi ts, the tendency was to plow back profi ts into fur-
ther expansion, especially if the world price for the particular commodity was 
buoyant. Even where the crops were grown not by large-scale estates but by 
smallholder producers, Drake suggested that large profi ts were reaped by trad-
ers who exploited imperfections in the marketing system. Ultimately profi ts 
made by foreign traders, whether Asian or European, were remitted abroad, 
and it was these remittances, which were not offset by inward investment 
fl ows, that accounted for the balance of payments surpluses. 
The idea that the profi ts accruing to foreign enterprises in Southeast Asia 
were attributable to monopolistic and monopsonistic exploitation of indig-
enous consumers and producers was widespread in the colonial and postcolo-
nial literature. Even some commentators from the metropolitan powers sup-
ported it (see, for example, Gonggrijp 1931). Investors from the metropolitan 
power were undoubtedly dominant in their own colonies, whether British, 
French, Dutch, or American, even if they had only a minor share of global 
investment fl ows (Lindblad 1998: 14). In this sense, the skewed distribution of 
investment fl ows mirrored the trade data (Svedberg 1981). In the British con-
text, there is some evidence that the discrimination in favor of British fi rms in 
British colonies led to larger profi ts being earned in colonial territories than in 
other parts of the world (Svedberg 1982). Marseille has suggested that French 
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fi rms operating in French colonies in the early part of the twentieth century, 
including Indochina, also made large profi ts in comparison with fi rms oper-
ating at home and in other parts of the world (1984: 109–115). Lindblad has 
argued that Dutch fi rms in Indonesia also paid out high dividends to overseas 
shareholders, in comparison with local and Chinese fi rms (1998: 80–81). Oil 
and mining companies and some estate companies (cinchona and tobacco) 
were particularly profi table.
But profi t remittances were only one factor in the outfl ow of funds on 
the capital account of the balance of payments. In the Indonesian context, 
outward fl ows of life insurance premiums and pensions were also signifi cant 
by the 1920s, as were “increases in private fl oating balances abroad” (Korthals 
Altes 1987: table 1). These would have included remittances of Chinese as 
well as European expatriates. In addition, there were outfl ows on government 
account to redeem both short- and long-term government debt. As the Indo-
nesian budget was either balanced or in defi cit for much of the period from 
1915 to 1940, most of the outfl ow over these twenty-fi ve years were on private 
account. 
In Taiwan, imports exceeded exports in the fi rst phase of the Japanese 
colonial era, and the current account balance was almost always in defi cit 
until 1915 (see Figure 5.5). These defi cits were funded by transfers from the 
Japanese budget and also by private fl ows of portfolio capital and direct invest-
ment (Mizoguchi and Yamamoto 1984: 408). After 1915, the balance of pay-
ments was always in surplus, and there were considerable capital fl ows back to 
Japan. These consisted of loans from the Taiwanese central bank, the Bank of 
Taiwan, to fi rms in Japan and also a substantial buildup in reserve funds held 
in Japan. Thus, in contrast to Korea, Taiwan by the 1930s was a net creditor 
to Japan (ibid.: 411).
Other colonies with currency board arrangements that pegged their cur-
rencies to the metropolitan currency, including British Malaya and the Philip-
pines, also built up substantial reserves in the United Kingdom and the United 
States respectively. These reserves have been much criticized by postindepen-
dence economic analysts, who claim that the funds should have been used for 
investment in the colony itself (Khor 1983: 49–64). The traditional colonial 
defense of currency boards was that they guaranteed a stable exchange rate 
and thus reduced risk for foreign investors. While there may have been some 
truth in this, it has also been argued that the fi xed exchange rates were often 
overvalued, and this overvaluation made investment in traded goods indus-
tries (producing both exports and imports) increasingly unattractive, espe-
cially after 1920, when the terms of trade turned against most of the Southeast 
Asian colonies. 
Hooley has argued in the context of the Philippines that the two peso to 
the dollar exchange rate was overvalued even in 1904, when it was originally 
fi xed (1996: 296); after 1920, the consequences of the dollar peg were increas-
ingly serious for all traded goods producers. But the response was to seek pref-
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erential access to the American market via quotas rather than to devalue the 
currency. If internal prices were fl exible, then a real depreciation could have 
been achieved in the Philippines and elsewhere through a fall in the internal 
price of nontraded goods and services relative to traded goods. But the evi-
dence suggests that this did not happen in the main Southeast Asian econo-
mies. In both Indonesia and British Malaya, the evidence indicates that prices 
of nontraded goods and also wages remained suffi ciently high relative to the 
price of manufactures to deter investment in industry (Huff 2002: 1102–1107). 
In Malaya, even the imposition of quotas on Japanese textile imports did not 
attract investment into the domestic manufacture of textiles, although, as was 
argued in Chapter 2, in Indonesia and Vietnam there was some growth in 
domestic production during the 1930s. 
112
C H A P T E R  6
Growth and Diversifi cation 
of the Market Economy
The Precolonial Economy of Southeast Asia
Since the 1960s, many observers have pointed to the apparent ease with 
which a successful indigenous entrepreneurial class emerged in both Taiwan 
and South Korea, which was, in only a few decades, able to build up successful 
fi rms that rapidly made inroads into world markets for a range of manufac-
tured products. This success has been contrasted with the apparent failure of 
indigenous entrepreneurship in Southeast Asia, where it has been argued that 
much of the industrial growth since the 1960s has been the result of foreign 
investment. Where local industrialists have emerged in Thailand, Malaysia, 
Indonesia, and the Philippines, they have almost all been of Chinese descent. 
Surely this striking contrast must have been been the result of different colo-
nial policies?
The argument that colonial policies stifl ed indigenous entrepreneurs in 
Southeast Asia receives some support from the work of historians, who have 
found that, in the fi fteenth and sixteenth centuries, there was a considerable 
increase in trade between Southeast Asia and other parts of Asia, and also with 
the developing economies of Europe. Reid (1993) has called the years from 
1450 to 1680 the “age of commerce” in Southeast Asia, a period characterized 
not just by increased international trading links, but also by the growth of cit-
ies throughout both mainland and insular Southeast Asia and a considerable 
expansion of domestic entrepreneurial and trading activity. By the middle of 
the sixteenth century, Reid argues, there were at least six trading cities with 
populations in excess of 20,000 people; several almost certainly had popula-
tions of well over one hundred thousand (ibid.: 69). 
By the middle decades of the seventeenth century, that number had 
expanded. These cities were not just trading centers, but also the conduits 
through which both religious and secular ideas from many countries fi ltered 
into domestic societies. Populations were mixed, with indigenous people 
associating freely with traders from the Middle East, South Asia, and China. 
Several of these cities, including Aceh, Banten, and Brunei, contained at least 
one-fi fth of the total population under the control of the states where they 
were located. In Southeast Asia as a whole, at least 5 percent of the population 
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was living in large urban trading centers. This was a larger proportion than in 
contemporary northern Europe, although probably not larger than in Mughal 
India or China at that time (Reid 1993: 75).
In spite of the relatively high level of urban development in Southeast 
Asia in the seventeenth century, there were several areas where the region 
was still well behind other parts of Asia as well as Europe. Banking in its mod-
ern form, as distinct from traditional moneylending, was unknown; in addi-
tion, the impersonal institutions to safeguard capital and property that were 
developing in Europe were “totally absent in Southeast Asia” (Reid 1993: 129). 
Reid goes on to argue that the close links between rulers and the marketplace 
that characterized much of precolonial Southeast Asia made the evolution of 
individual property rights diffi cult throughout the region, in contrast to late 
medieval Europe and Tokugawa Japan. On the one hand, many members of 
the political elite were involved in trade and commerce, which made them 
more sympathetic to such activities than their counterparts in other parts 
of Asia or indeed in parts of Europe might have been (ibid.: 270). But on the 
other hand, a robust independent class of indigenous traders and entrepre-
neurs, protected by an impartial legal system, was unable to emerge. By the 
eighteenth century, European observers in many parts of Asia were blaming 
the rapacity of native rulers for this failure, but the activities of the Europeans 
themselves were hardly helpful.
To blame the collapse of most of the powerful Southeast Asian trading and 
maritime cities on the increasing power of European, especially Dutch, com-
mercial penetration alone is clearly an oversimplifi cation. The Dutch would 
not have been able to destroy centers such as Banten and Makassar if there 
had been more trust and greater willingness to form durable alliances between 
the various indigenous kingdoms in different parts of the Indonesian archi-
pelago. Aceh and several trading cities in mainland Southeast Asia did not fall 
under Dutch control, but they disengaged from the regional and global trad-
ing system because they no longer found such activities profi table or because 
their rulers wanted their populations to concentrate on food-crop cultivation 
(Reid 1993: 299–301). This was even more the case for the increasingly power-
ful inland states that were hostile to the coastal trading states. Other factors 
such as climate change may also have contributed toward the demise of the 
age of commerce in the region by the end of the seventeenth century. By 1700 
the main Asian-ruled trading cities had “lost their place both in world trade 
and within their societies” (ibid.: 328). Not only did regional and global trad-
ing links become attenuated, but the outward-looking, cosmopolitan, urban 
centers underwent a steady decline. 
The Emergence of the Plural Economy
The eighteenth century saw the growth of several port cities, such as Bata-
via (now Jakarta) and Manila, that were under the control of European pow-
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ers and from which the tentacles of foreign domination stretched out to the 
hinterlands. But the total urban population almost certainly declined, and 
this century saw a retreat from the market into the subsistence agricultural 
economy in many parts of Southeast Asia. In addition, it also witnessed the 
beginnings of what was, by the early twentieth century, characterized as the 
plural economy, where ethnicity and economic role were tightly linked. In 
most parts of Southeast Asia, the emergence of the plural economy was inex-
tricably linked to the growth of resident Chinese populations. During the “age 
of commerce,” the Chinese were just one of several trading minorities active 
in the larger port cities, and they mixed with both indigenous and other trad-
ing groups without appearing to dominate. But by the eighteenth century 
their numbers had grown, mainly because economic and demographic pres-
sures in China itself were pushing more Chinese into trading and commer-
cial ventures in Southeast Asia (Reid 2001: 50). The European-controlled port 
cities held several attractions for Chinese traders in the eighteenth century. 
They were important sources of valuable commodities and precious metals, 
especially silver, which were much in demand in China, and they provided a 
“stable environment in which Chinese could grow wealthy and even infl uen-
tial without ceasing to be Chinese” (Reid 1993: 317). 
Reid argued that the single most important development that led to the 
sharp functional separation of economic activity by ethnic group was the 
introduction of tax farming, which was initiated by the Dutch in Batavia in 
the seventeenth century and spread to various native states in Java, Thailand, 
and Cambodia over the next century (1993: 318–319). These developments 
on the one hand permitted rulers to withdraw from commercial concerns, 
while on the other, they gave the Chinese considerable economic power and 
social prestige without threatening the position of the rulers. Reid suggests 
that it was perhaps no accident that those ethnic groups in Southeast Asia 
where the entrepreneurial spirit best survived into the twentieth century were 
located in remote regions where Chinese tax farming did not penetrate or 
where religious and cultural hostility to the practice made local rulers reluc-
tant to adopt it.
The nineteenth century saw further growth of European-controlled port 
cities, and by the 1890s, there were a number of port cities in mainland and 
island Southeast Asia with populations in excess of 50,000 including Rangoon 
and Moulmein, Bangkok, Singapore, Batavia, Semarang, Surabaya, Palembang, 
Saigon-Cholon, and Manila. In addition, some inland cities, including Manda-
lay, Yogyakarta, Surakarta, and Hanoi had become important centers of admin-
istration and trade by the turn of the twentieth century. But the nineteenth 
century was a period of rapid population growth in much of Southeast Asia, 
and several scholars have pointed out that it is probable that urban populations 
actually declined relative to total populations in some parts of the region. 
The European colonial powers were not in favor of rapid in-migration of 
indigenous populations to urban areas, and neither was the governing elite 
 Growth and Diversifi cation of the Market Economy 115
in Thailand, where it has been claimed that the “court helped to develop 
urban Siam as a Chinese preserve” (Phongpaichit and Baker 1995: 174). As 
was pointed out in Chapter 2, it would be an exaggeration to claim that urban 
populations were always overwhelmingly European and Chinese or Indian. 
In the Javanese cities, indigenous Indonesians were in the majority by 1890, 
and this continued to be the case until 1942 (Boomgaard and Gooszen 1991: 
220 –221). But in Bangkok, it has been estimated that, by the 1850s, Chinese 
outnumbered indigenous Thai by two to one, and Chinese in-migration accel-
erated from the 1860s onward, as the demand for urban labor increased. The 
government was also an important source of employment for Chinese work-
ers, especially on railway construction, while the port of Bangkok became 
“virtually a Chinese preserve” (Phongpaichit and Baker 1995: 174 –175). In 
Rangoon, where Indian in-migration accelerated between the late nineteenth 
century and 1930, the 1931 census found that Indians comprised 53 percent 
of the population. They were almost 11 percent of the population in Lower 
Burma as a whole. Only 32 percent of the population of Rangoon comprised 
indigenous Burmans (Baxter 1941: 9–21). 
After the turn of the century, the division between the newly arrived Chi-
nese and the established families became more pronounced, not just in Java 
but in other parts of Southeast Asia as well. Many children from the “old 
migrant” families began to assimilate; they ceased speaking Chinese dialects, 
learned Dutch, English, or French, and wherever possible gravitated toward 
salaried jobs. As educational opportunities increased for Chinese, especially 
in Indonesia and British Malaya, they were, as Rush (1991: 24) and Mackie 
(1991: 89) have pointed out, attracted to the genteel professions rather than 
the hurly-burly of commerce. It was the new arrivals from China, mainly sin-
gle men, who became coolie laborers, itinerant peddlers and moneylenders, 
and artisans. By the 1930s, the Chinese in Indonesia, the Straits Settlements, 
the Federated Malay States, and Thailand were spread across a variety of occu-
pations; in all these territories, the majority were in nonagricultural occupa-
tions, although more than 40 percent were in agriculture in the Outer Islands 
of Indonesia and in the FMS, mainly as plantation laborers (Table 6.1).
The lack of interest in commercial careers on the part of the assimilated, 
Dutch-speaking Chinese (known as peranakan) in late colonial Indonesia led 
Williams to argue that “the Chinese in Indonesia did not achieve entrepre-
neurship” (1952: 34). His thorough survey of the evidence from the interwar 
years led him to the conclusion that the Indonesian Chinese were unable 
or at least unwilling to extend their commercial and industrial enterprises 
beyond the “limits imposed largely by tradition” (ibid.: 55). There were excep-
tions, the most famous of whom was the “sugar king” Oei Tiong Ham, who 
built up a large conglomerate based mainly on plantations in the early part 
of the twentieth century (Panglaykim and Palmer 1970; Yoshihara 1989). In 
an offi cial handbook listing all fi rms operating in the colony in 1940, the 
Oei Tiong Ham concern, including both sugar and banking interests, was the 
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only Indonesian Chinese business with assets in excess of 40 million guilders 
(Twang 1998: 32). 
Based on offi cial data and interviews, Twang has assembled a list of the 
large Chinese fi rms operating in Java and Sumatra in 1940 (1998: table 2.3). 
Most were either in agrobusiness or in trade and banking. Few were in manu-
facturing, apart from agricultural processing. Several large Chinese companies 
were still exploiting the so-called private lands (particuliere landerijen), mainly 
in West Java, that had been in Chinese hands for many decades in spite of 
Dutch attempts to expropriate the Chinese owners in the early twentieth cen-
tury (ibid.: 33). There were many medium- and small-scale enterprises, some 
of which were in manufacturing and by no means all of which were Chinese-
owned. In the 1920s, a government survey showed that there were almost 
1,700 Chinese-owned industrial fi rms employing more than fi ve people, com-
pared with 2,800 European fi rms and 870 owned by indigenous Indonesians 
(Fernando and Bulbeck 1992: 254–259). But all these numbers pale into insig-
nifi cance when compared with developments in other parts of Asia (especially 
Japan) at the same time. Prominent though the Chinese might have appeared 
in the commercial life of Indonesia and other Southeast Asian cities in the 
1920s and 1930s, they were hardly laying the foundations for an industrial 
take-off. 
Nonetheless, by the 1920s, the contours of the “plural society” were plain 
to see:
The western superstructure is only one aspect of a distinctive character, 
common to all tropical dependencies, that cannot fail to impress even 
Table 6.1. Percentage Distribution of the Chinese in the Labor Force 
by Sector, 1930s
 Java Outer Islands Straits Settlements FMS Thailand Philippines
Sector 1930 1930 1931 1931 1937 1939
Agriculture 9.1 44.7 17.2 41.5 25.4 1.8
Manufacture 20.8 19.5 17.6 27.3 20.3 14.3
Transport 2.8 2.6 12.5 3.4 3.9 1.3
Commerce 57.7 23.2 23.3 12.2 34.9 53.7
Public service 0.5 0.7 0.2 0.1 1.2 0.2
Professions a 2.1 1.2 2.3 1.2 1.2 3.6
Other services 6.9 8.2 26.8 14.4 14.2 25.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Sources: Indonesia: Department of Economic Affairs 1936: vol. 8, table 18; Thailand: Central 
Service of Statistics c. 1946: 75; Straits Settlements and FMS: Vlieland 1932: tables 126, 134; 
 Philippines: Commonwealth of the Philippines 1941: 505–521.
a Includes clerical workers. 
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the most casual observer; the many coloured pattern of the population. 
In Burma, as in Java, probably the fi rst thing that strikes the visitor is the 
medley of peoples—European, Chinese, Indian and native. It is in the 
strictest sense a medley, for they mix but do not combine. Each group 
holds by its own religion, its own culture and language, its own ideas and 
ways. As individuals they meet, but only in the market place, in buying 
and selling. There is a plural society, with different sections of the com-
munity living side by side, but separately, within the same political unit. 
Even in the economic sphere there is a division of labor along racial lines. 
Natives, Chinese, Indians and Europeans all have different functions, and 
within each major group subsections have particular occupations. (Furni-
vall 1948: 304 –305) 
Furnivall admitted that traces of a plural society were evident in several 
societies outside the tropical world, including Canada, the United States, and 
South Africa. He pointed out that, in these countries and in Australia and 
New Zealand, “when the infl ux of alien elements threatened national life,” 
restrictions were placed on in-migration (1948: 305). By the second decade 
of the twentieth century, some colonial regimes in Southeast Asia, especially 
the Dutch, were also seeking to control in-migration from China in particular, 
although British policy in both Malaya and Burma was more laissez-faire with 
respect to both Chinese and Indians. By the 1930s, when the severe economic 
downturn reduced in-migration in many parts of Southeast Asia, the plural 
society and economy were well entrenched. Especially in Indonesia, offi cial 
concern about its consequences intensifi ed in the last phase of Dutch colonial 
rule. 
The “Problem” of Indigenous Entrepreneurship
Like many other colonial administrators in different parts of Asia, Furnivall 
recognized that the “development of native enterprise must be a chief object 
of policy in any dependency which is valued as a market for the products of 
the colonial power” (1948: 293). He argued that subsistence producers should 
be brought into the market economy, if necessary by imposing taxes that had 
to be paid in money, and was in favor of inducements to encourage indigenous 
cultivators to grow export crops and of expanded credit to native producers, 
even where this meant borrowing on the security of crops. Again like the 
views of other colonial administrators, Furnivall’s views were at least partly 
motivated by a desire to create larger and more dynamic markets for metro-
politan manufactures in the colonies. But at the same time, he was well aware 
of the debates in the various colonial regimes in Southeast Asia concerning 
the desirability of exposing indigenous producers to the full blasts of global 
capitalism. The great majority of colonial offi cials would have been unaware 
of the precolonial economic history of the regions they were controlling, and 
118 Chapter 6
even if they had realized that there had been an “age of commerce” several 
centuries earlier, they would no doubt have argued that the world economy in 
the early twentieth century was very different from that four centuries earlier, 
and while the rewards of involvement in international commerce were great, 
so were the dangers.
The Dutch in particular debated endlessly the extent to which indigenous 
Indonesians were being incorporated into the “Western sphere” of economic 
infl uence, the factors that promoted or inhibited such incorporation, and its 
effects on the economic and social welfare of the population The views of 
Boeke on these issues were well known in the English speaking world and 
were much criticized in the postindependence period by writers such as 
Hig gins (1956) and Sadli (1971). But Boeke’s views underwent considerable 
change in the course of his long career and cannot be considered typical of 
the Dutch colonial establishment as a whole, as de Vries, among others, has 
pointed out (van der Eng 1991: 42 – 43). Indeed it is far from clear whether, 
by the early twentieth century, there was an “offi cial view” on the part of the 
Dutch regarding the entrepreneurial capacities of the indigenous population, 
although a number of Dutch offi cials working in Indonesia had strong views 
on the subject.
In his study of the formation of occidental stereotypes of the “Malay char-
acter,” Alatas pointed out that “the general negative image was not the result 
of scholarship” (1977: 112). Most of those who proclaimed the indigenous 
peoples of Southeast Asia to be indolent, dull, treacherous, childish, and lack-
ing any talent for or interest in trade and commerce were either colonial offi -
cials, planters, military people, or casual tourists. And yet, as Alatas concedes, 
even at the high noon of Western imperialism, there were some who were 
prepared to admit that these alleged features of the “Malay character” were 
by no means universal and where they were widely found had quite rational 
economic foundations. By the early twentieth century, most colonial schol-
ars and policy makers in Indonesia, and in other parts of the region as well, 
would doubtless have concurred with van Gelderen that “the inhabitant of 
the tropics is further removed from the classical homo oeconomicus than the 
Westerner” (1927: 144), but at the same time the reasons for the apparent lack 
of “rational economic behavior” on the part of the indigenous population in 
Indonesia were much disputed. 
Some colonial offi cials were content to ascribe this perceived lack to cul-
ture, religion, and the climate, but others thought differently. In 1941, van der 
Kolff published a remarkable paper that argued that, to the extent that Indo-
nesians, especially Javanese, adopted short time horizons and were unwilling 
to invest in risky operations that would yield results only in the longer term, 
this was because they were ignorant, poor, and insecure. It was, according to 
van der Kolff, poverty and insecurity that led to practices such as ijon (selling 
the crop while still immature), and such behavior was perfectly rational given 
the constraints within which many Javanese had to make decisions on con-
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sumption, saving, and investment (1941: 247). Other writers also stressed the 
economic rationality of farmer behavior in the more land-abundant parts of 
the region, such as British Malaya. It was argued that the Malay reluctance to 
work for wages did not refl ect an aversion to effort or a lack of desire for a cash 
income, but rather that with relatively abundant supplies of land they could 
earn more in agriculture than as unskilled workers in the city. As Richard Win-
stedt pointed out, “because he is an independent farmer with no need to work 
for hire, the Malay has got an undeserved reputation for idleness, which his 
Asiatic competitors take care to foster” (Alatas 1977: 50). 
Such views would not have been universally held, although there would 
have been greater agreement on a further assertion of van Gelderen’s that the 
indigenous cultivator was likely to be exploited in his or her dealings with 
the market economy because of the “great difference in bargaining power 
between the buyer on the one hand and the seller on the other” (1927: 147). 
The buyer usually has both superior knowledge of the market situation 
and greater possibilities to reach and make use of more than one local 
market. This preponderance is even greater if the buyer is the only one, 
or one of a very small group of competitors, as against a larger number of 
persons offering the commodity for sale. In such a case it is very easy for a 
monopoly or semi-monopoly situation to develop, so that the local price 
of a commodity is forced downwards. Another factor producing the same 
effect is the vast difference in the value of the same unit of money for the 
two parties to the transaction. . . . In many cases, in fact, the normal situa-
tion is one in which the necessity to sell is so urgent that what takes place 
is actually a forced sale. (van Gelderen 1927: 147) 
The underlying implication was that the monopsonistic middlemen were 
almost always Chinese, and it was their superior knowledge and bargaining 
power that led to the exploitation of the indigenous producer. Regardless of 
whether these assertions were true, they were held by many Dutch colonial 
administrators as well as many indigenous Indonesians. Indeed Kahin argued 
that the rapid growth of the Sarekat Dagang Islam, formed by Raden Mas Tir-
toadisoerjo in 1909, into a political-nationalist movement was in large part 
due to “sharp Chinese trading practices” on the part of “aggressively com-
petitive Chinese entrepreneurs” whose commercial power had increased as a 
result of the lifting of travel restrictions on Chinese between 1904 and 1911 
(1952: 67). The Sarekat Islam attracted “an avalanche of members” and galva-
nized anti-Chinese feelings to the point where, in 1912, there were anti-Chi-
nese riots in both Surakarta and Surabaya. 
Outside Java, although the Chinese presence was larger relative to the 
indigenous population, some indigenous business groups did emerge in the 
last phase of the Dutch colonial era. Post has described the rise of a group of 
Sumatran traders who were able to establish themselves in Java and built up 
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quite extensive trading links with other parts of Asia, especially Japan (1997: 
93–103). Several had close ties to leaders of the independence struggle, par-
ticularly Hatta, and accompanied him on a trip to Japan in 1933. The Japanese 
were keen to build up a network of indigenous traders in Indonesia for prod-
ucts such as textiles, especially as Japanese products were increasingly subject 
to boycotts by Chinese merchants. These links were strengthened during the 
Japanese occupation, and some of the Sumatran traders survived to play an 
important role in the early postindependence era. 
Paradoxically, in spite of the Dutch concern about the ability of the Java-
nese to participate in the “modern economy,” native Javanese accounted for a 
higher proportion of the nonagricultural labor force than was the case in most 
other parts of the region (Table 6.2). Although it may have been true that many 
jobs in the nonagricultural labor force occupied by Javanese in the 1930s were 
in petty trade and cottage industry, they also outnumbered both Chinese and 
Europeans in professional occupations and in the civil service. Even in trade, 
where the Chinese were certainly important, their numbers were only around 
12 percent of indigenous workers in Java and 37 percent in the Outer Islands 
(Table 6.3). By the 1930s, it would appear that many indigenous Indonesians 
were availing themselves of a greater range of economic opportunities than 
were other Southeast Asians or indeed the indigenous populations of Taiwan 
and Korea. It is arguable that many were forced into nonagricultural occupa-
Table 6.2. Indigenous Labor Force as a Percentage of the Total Labor Force, 
c. 1930
 Indigenous Workers as Percentage of
 Total Labor Force Agricultural Workers Nonagricultural Workers
Java (1930) 98.2 99.7 95.5
Outer Islands of Indonesia  94.7 97.1 85.2
(1930)
Straits Settlements (1931) 16.9 38.8 7.8
FMS (1931) 19.9 27.5 7.4
Burma (1931) 87.9 94.7 72.4
Philippines (1939) 98.6 99.7 97.9
Thailand (1937) 94.5 98.1 66.7
Korea (1930) 96.9 99.6 87.2
Taiwan (1930) a 92.3 99.5 80.1
Sources: Indonesia: Department of Economic Affairs 1936: vol. 8, table 18; Thailand: Central 
Service of Statistics c. 1946: 75; Straits Settlements and FMS: Vlieland 1932: tables 121–141; 
Burma: Baxter 1941: 25; Philippines: Commonwealth of the Philippines 1941: 505–521; Korea: 
Chang 1966: table 2; Taiwan: Barclay 1954: 71. 
a Refers to male labor force only. 
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tions by the growing scarcity of agricultural land. But whether out of choice or 
through desperation, indigenous Indonesians were moving into new occupa-
tions and accepting new challenges, both as employees and as self-employed 
businesspeople. 
It is instructive to compare developments in Indonesia with those in the 
Philippines. Although the Chinese were not in fact a much smaller propor-
tion of the total population in the Philippines than in Java (see Table 2.2), the 
American administration did not seem to be nearly as anxious about their eco-
nomic role as were the Dutch. The Americans were keen to build up a robust 
indigenous entrepreneurial class in the Philippines and viewed education as 
a key policy in achieving this goal. As will be shown in the following chap-
ter, they facilitated the development of both secondary and tertiary educa-
tion to a much greater extent than administrators in any other Asian colony. 
But other aspects of American policy were less conducive to the development 
of indigenous entrepreneurs. Owen pointed out that when the Americans 
arrived, there was very little large-scale Filipino manufacturing (1972: 52). The 
advent of a free trade regime with the United States together with an overval-
ued peso made investment in Philippine industry unprofi table except in a few 
export-processing sectors. Because several of the key politicians who emerged 
in the period immediately preceding self-government were connected to and 
dependent on the sugar sector, there were few advocates for rapid industrial-
ization. Much of the large-scale manufacturing industry that did emerge was 
controlled by foreign interests, either American, Chinese, or Spanish. This was 
also true of commercial banking. 
Table 6.3. Indigenous and Chinese Labor Force by Sector, Indonesia 1930
 Indigenous Indigenous as Chinese as
 Labor Force Percentage of Percentage of
 by Sector Total Labor Force  Indigenous Labor Force
Sector J OI J OI J OI
Agriculture 65.3 81.6 99.7 97.1 0.2 2.7
Industry 11.5 7.7 97.4 88.2 2.3 12.4
Transport 1.4 1.4 93.2 89.0 2.5 9.1
Trade 6.3 3.1 87.9 70.1 11.6 36.6
Professions 0.7 0.7 89.1 87.4 3.6 7.9
Government 2.6 2.0 95.5 94.6 0.3 1.8
Other 12.1 3.5 98.9 89.0 0.7 11.5
Total 100.0 100.0 98.2 94.7 1.3 4.9
Sources: Department of Economic Affairs 1936: vol. 8, table 18. 
Note: Agriculture includes hunting, fi shing, forestry, mining, and salt manufacture. Government 
service includes police, army, and navy. J = Java, OI = Outer Islands. 
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The Chinese dominated internal trade, especially retailing, and also par-
ticipated in wholesaling and importing, as indeed was the case in other parts 
of Southeast Asia. Foreign observers such as Kurihara emphasized the lack of 
involvement of indigenous Filipinos in large-scale manufacturing and argued 
that the “Philippine experience was no different from that in European depen-
dencies or in independent countries which, economically, occupy a semi-colo-
nial status” (1945: 11). His analysis of the 1939 census data on employment 
showed that most workers engaged in manufacturing were employed in tra-
ditional labor-intensive industries such as embroidery, dress-making and tai-
loring, hat making, carpentry, native textiles, shoe and slipper manufacture, 
mat making, and cigarette manufacture (ibid.: 16 –17). Many women were 
employed as home workers on a subcontracting basis. Few workers were learn-
ing new skills in factories using modern technologies, and even fewer were 
learning how to manage large-scale enterprises, whether in manufacturing or 
in other sectors of industry and commerce. 
While Kurihara’s criticisms were broadly correct, there is evidence that 
Filipinos were, by the late 1930s, controlling a higher proportion of nonagri-
cultural assets in the economy than the populations of other Asian colonies. 
Golay used the 1939 census data to estimate that Philippine citizens owned 45 
percent of all nonagricultural assets; in manufacturing industry the fi gure was 
higher (55 percent) (1969b: table 1). Chinese controlled around 14 percent of 
assets and Americans 25 percent. It is probable that many Filipinos of mixed 
Chinese or Spanish descent were classifi ed as indigenous Filippinos in the cen-
sus data, but even allowing for this, Golay’s fi gures do suggest that, on the eve 
of the Pacifi c War, Philippine citizens already exercised considerable control 
over the nonagricultural sectors of the economy. The consequences of this for 
postindependence development are explored in subsequent chapters. 
Thailand, although never a colony, also had to face the problem of con-
siderable foreign control over important sectors of the economy. Ayal pointed 
out that the leaders of the 1932 coup “were imbued with Western ideas of 
exclusive nationalism and were therefore more sensitive to the presence and 
activities of unassimilated aliens in their country” (1969: 338). The notion of 
“Thaifi cation” gained support, and from 1935 onward, laws were passed to 
reserve certain urban occupations for Thais and to give preference to fi rms 
owned by indigenous Thais in allocating government contracts (Phongpaichit 
and Baker 1995: 179; Yoshihara 1994: 32–35). The Business Registration Act 
of 1936 was designed to facilitate the compilation of information on busi-
ness ownership, and in 1938 a government-controlled Thai Rice Company 
was formed by the purchase of ten Chinese rice mills. The Liquid Fuel Act of 
1939 attempted to establish government control over oil imports and distri-
bution (Ayal 1969: 300 – 301). Some of these policies were reversed later, but 
the measures of the 1930s set a precedent for “persistent, if erratic” policies to 
indigenize the economy that continued after 1945 (ibid.: 338). 
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The Development of Markets for Land, Labor, and Capital: 
Indonesia and British Malaya Compared
It would be wrong to assume that the attitude of all colonial offi cials in South-
east Asia was one of purely paternalistic concern that the commercially incom-
petent indigenous population be protected from the rapacity of the clever 
Chinese. By the beginning of the twentieth century, it was becoming clear to 
at least some Dutch and French administrators, concerned about what was 
perceived as overpopulation in Java and Tonkin, that the living standards of 
the indigenous populations would only improve to the extent that they could 
participate more fully in the modern, nonagricultural economy. In Java, two 
facts were widely acknowledged by most scholars and administrators who had 
studied the empirical evidence: the proportion of agricultural output, includ-
ing foodstuffs, that was sold on the market had increased to almost 50 percent 
in many parts of the island, and most rural households were diversifying their 
sources of income away from purely agricultural pursuits to manufacturing, 
transport, trade, and wage labor (van Laanen 1990: 265; Boomgaard 1991: 
34 –36). More broadly, Burger, who discussed the “government’s native eco-
nomic policy” in a thesis defended in 1939, quoted several offi cials including 
van Gelderen, Meijer Ranneft, and Boeke to support his argument that the 
indigenous economy was becoming ever more monetized and commercial-
ized, and as a result a native business class was slowly emerging (p. 329).
The slow speed of development of this business class was a source of frus-
tration to many Dutch observers as well as to Indonesians themselves. Burger 
was no doubt correct when he argued that “if a vigorous group of native entre-
preneurs had arisen, the authorities would almost certainly not have gone so 
far with their welfare policies as they have done” (1939: 329). Boeke (1927), 
in a lecture delivered in the late 1920s, in fact called for a different type of 
government policy that put less emphasis on improving the general level of 
welfare and more on encouraging the emergence of outstanding individuals 
with genuine entrepreneurial ability, a policy later characterized by Wertheim 
as “betting on the strong” (1964: 264 –265). Only the emergence of such indi-
viduals could, according to Boeke, pose an effective challenge to European 
and Chinese domination of the economy. But the 1930s were hardly a propi-
tious time for such a new breed of entrepreneurs to emerge and consolidate 
their position within the colonial economy. By the late 1940s, when Boeke’s 
best-known works were published, “the gradualistic approach to rural society, 
via well-to-do advanced farmers” no longer occupied a central place in his 
thinking (ibid.: 266). 
While the debate was continuing about the entrepreneurial capacities 
of indigenous populations, their involvement with market institutions was 
steadily increasing. By the dawn of the twentieth century, thousands of Java-
nese were moving to Sumatra to work as wage laborers, and many more were 
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seeking opportunities as wage laborers at home. These numbers increased 
steadily until the onset of the depression of the 1930s. The increased willing-
ness of the Javanese to move in search of better economic prospects contra-
dicted the stereotype of the indolent native who was unwilling to seek oppor-
tunities for economic self-improvement. And the involvement with market 
institutions was not limited to the labor market. As was argued in Chapter 
3, land also was becoming a marketed commodity, both in Java and in other 
parts of the archipelago. In addition, the colonial authorities were experi-
menting with several credit programs, which attracted attention and admira-
tion from both English and French colonial offi cials (Henry 1926; Angoulvant 
1926: 282–283; Furnivall 1934b, 1934c). 
Furnivall was at pains to emphasize that even in the depths of the depres-
sion, the entire credit system was solvent and required no state subsidies 
(1934b: 26). He argued strongly against the assertion that the government-
operated institutions simply displaced private ones, especially those run by 
the Chinese. It appears that the government pawnshop service was operated 
more effi ciently than the nineteenth-century Chinese pawnshops, and while 
the relaxation of the laws on Chinese residence might have led to greater 
Chinese activity in rural areas in the twentieth century, it cannot be argued 
that taxpayers’ money was used to subsidize fi nancial institutions that the 
private sector would have provided more effi ciently. The private system did 
continue to expand alongside the state one, although in the absence of data, 
it is impossible to tell how important privately supplied credit was compared 
with state provision. 
Given that the people’s credit system did develop so rapidly in the inter-
war years, what was its impact on the indigenous economy in Java? Scholars 
seem very divided in their opinions. Alexander and Alexander have argued 
that there is little evidence that the various rural credit institutions served to 
stimulate economic diversifi cation, and the main effect of the government-
sponsored initiatives was to institutionalize the two-tier credit market in the 
rural economy (1991: 386 –387). The relatively wealthy could get access to 
credit at lower rates of interest, which they could then lend at higher rates 
to the relatively poor, making large profi ts in the process. While no doubt 
correct, this argument ignores the basic economic point that credit markets 
always refl ect a degree of dualism in the sense that some people will always be 
seen as more creditworthy than others. 
If the government initiatives did greatly increase the supply of loanable 
funds to rural areas in Java, were these funds used for productive investment 
or for consumption purposes? Alexander and Alexander argue that most went 
toward consumption, ceremonial expenditures, and for tiding people over in 
emergencies such as ill health, unusually long dry seasons, and so on. Other 
authors have argued that the credit available from both pawnshops and other 
credit institutions was at least partly used for productive purposes; Furnivall 
pointed out that “a man may pawn his wife’s bangles and use the proceeds as 
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the fi rst installment towards buying a motor bus on the hire purchase system” 
(1934c: 11). Both Furnivall and van Laanen (1990) have suggested that the 
pawnshops were not the last resort of the desperate (as they tended to be in 
Europe) but rather a convenient source of credit to many people who were far 
from destitute but who kept their savings in commodities rather than in cash 
or bank deposits. The fact that the real value of credit advanced through gov-
ernment institutions dropped so sharply after 1930 indicates that borrowings 
were related to investment opportunities rather than to fi nancial pressures, 
and when the investment climate deteriorated as a result of the depression, 
the demand for loans fell.
In comparison with developments in Indonesia, the indigenous popula-
tion of the Malayan peninsula was drawn more slowly into the cash economy 
in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Indeed Indonesian migrants 
began arriving in British Malaya in large numbers from the 1870s to take 
advantage of trading opportunities and the growing demand for wage labor, 
which the indigenous Malays were reluctant to avail themselves of (Roff 1974: 
37). According to Roff, the greater part of the Malay merchant community 
in Kuala Lumpur in the 1890s was said to originate from the Minangkabau 
region of West Sumatra, while Javanese began to arrive in considerable num-
bers in the Straits Settlements to work as laborers. Most Malays preferred to 
stay in their traditional occupations as farmers and fi shermen, and the Brit-
ish did not encourage them to move out of these roles. By the end of the 
nineteenth century, seeds were sown that were to develop into ever more 
bitter ethnic hostilities over the next century. Roff has quoted articles that 
appeared in a Straits Chinese newspaper in 1894, which drew attention to 
Malay educational and economic backwardness and attributed it to “their 
slavish adherence to outmoded custom, the dissoluteness of their traditional 
leaders . . . their lack of industry and ambition, their hostility toward anyone 
who showed exceptional talents, and their inability to practice mutual self-
help” (ibid.: 54). Roff comments that, however unfair these accusations were, 
“they came for many Malays uncomfortably near the truth.” 
In the second decade of the twentieth century, the British colonial 
authorities became more obsessed with rice self-suffi ciency and more frus-
trated that production was not growing fast enough to keep up with rising 
domestic demand. The 1913 Malay Reservations Enactment gave Residents in 
the Federated Malay States the power to set aside land (mainly but not only 
rice land) for exclusive Malay ownership. The land could not be mortgaged, 
leased, or sold to non-Malays. Although in passing this legislation the British 
claimed to have been infl uenced by the earlier land legislation in Indonesia, 
in fact, the Malay enactment was more stringent in that it prevented even the 
leasing of land to non-Malay parties. In 1917, following mounting anxiety 
about food shortages, more legislation was passed that empowered Residents 
to regulate cropping patterns on Malay land, in effect preventing the cultiva-
tion of nonrice crops (Roff 1974: 123; Lim 1977: 121). 
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These draconian interventions in markets for both land and crops went 
well beyond Dutch measures in Indonesia and indeed beyond what the British 
did in other parts of Asia under their direct control. While one motivation was 
a genuine concern on the part of the colonial establishment that the growth 
of foreign estates could lead the Malay cultivator to become landless in his 
own country, it was clear that it was the offi cial intention to keep the Malay 
away from the cultivation of crops other than rice. In particular, colonial offi -
cials showed themselves to be increasingly hostile to the idea that Malays 
should be involved in the cultivation of rubber (Lim 1977: 116). After 1917, 
Malay smallholders were not permitted to obtain non-Malay land for rubber 
cultivation, and indeed land already alienated to Malays that was found to be 
used for growing rubber was withdrawn. 
Colonial offi cials appeared impervious to the fact that growing rubber 
afforded a better return on land and labor than growing rice, even at the 
increased rice prices prevailing in 1918–1920. The Stevenson Scheme, imple-
mented in both Malaya and Ceylon in the 1920s to restrict the growth of 
rubber output and maintain its price, affected smallholder cultivation more 
severely than that of the estates (Sundaram 1988: 69). The main benefi ciaries 
of this scheme were in fact smallholders in Indonesia, whose production really 
took off at this time. Although the Dutch colonial establishment gave the 
Indonesian smallholder little positive encouragement, they were not discrimi-
nated against, and their ready access to land meant that they could increase 
output with little offi cial harassment. 
Paddy cultivation was to remain, in the words of one economic historian, 
“the least profi table of all major occupations in Malaya” right up to the 1950s 
(Lim 1967: 176; see also Sundaram 1988: table 3.1). This did not prevent the 
British from continuing to deter the rural Malays from doing anything else. 
Their zeal to keep the Malays in traditional occupations also affected educa-
tional policy. Winstedt, an infl uential offi cial, argued that the provision of 
English-language schools should be restricted lest it make rural Malays restless 
and eager to leave the kampong for the wider world (Lim 1967: 176). Roff 
quotes a director of agriculture in 1934 who warned against the dangers of 
inducing the rural Malay to “forsake the life of their fathers for the glamour 
of new ways which put money in their pockets today but leave them empty 
tomorrow, and to abandon their rice-fi elds for new crops which they can-
not themselves utilize and the market for which depends on outside world 
conditions beyond their orbit” (1974: 125). The result was that the Malay ver-
nacular schools had quite a different aim from the English-medium schools. 
They were not intended to train clerks and offi ce workers (Wyndham 1933: 
210). But many Malay parents could not see the point of education that did 
not lead to social mobility (Snodgrass 1980: 237–243; Rudner 1994: 289–290). 
Although enrollments in Malay vernacular schools increased rapidly, by the 
late 1930s only about 20 percent of eligible children were attending school. 
It is probable that many Dutch administrators in Indonesia in the inter-
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war years had similar feelings to those of British offi cials about the dangers of 
exposing indigenous cultivators to the full blast of national and world market 
forces. But Dutch colonial thinking had, by the 1920s, been forced to recog-
nize reality. As we have seen, the great majority of the population in Java and 
other parts of the archipelago were involved in the cash economy not just as 
producers of cash crops, but also as suppliers of wage labor. Given the increas-
ing density of population on restricted supplies of land, they had little option 
but to avail themselves of whatever nonagricultural opportunities for earning 
money were available. The purpose of the ethical policy and the interventions 
adopted in the 1930s was not so much to protect peasants from capitalism as 
to facilitate their gradual absorption into the market economy. In Malaysia, by 
contrast, the aim of colonial policy appeared to be to build ever higher fences 
between the kampong Malay and the market economy. 
According to the 1931 census, Malays comprised less than 10 percent of 
the nonagricultural labor force in both the Straits Settlements and the FMS 
(see Table 6.2). This was a much lower percentage than in Java or the Outer 
Islands of Indonesia, or in Burma, the Philippines, and Thailand, although 
the Thai census data used a “nationality” criterion that probably underes-
timated the actual number of ethnic Chinese in the labor force. It was also 
much lower than in Taiwan and Korea. Indigenous Malays were a very low 
proportion of both manufacturing workers and those engaged in trade and 
commerce compared with Burma, the Philippines, and Indonesia, as well as 
Taiwan and Korea (Table 6.4). In the FMS, they comprised only 3 percent of 
the manufacturing labor force and less than 3 percent of those engaged in 
commerce and trade. To some extent, the very low proportion of indigenous 
Table 6.4. Indigenous Workers as a Percentage of the Labor Force in 
Manufacturing, Commerce, Professions, and Government Service
 Manufacturing Commerce / Trade Government and Professions
Indonesia (1930) 95.3 84.3 93.6
Straits Settlements (1931) 7.2 3.9 20.5
FMS (1931) 3.0 2.4 32.9
Burma (1931) 80.8 73.3 86.7
Philippines (1939) 97.6 82.7 96.5
Thailand (1937) 55.2 60.6 95.2
Korea (1930) 89.7 85.1 59.8
Taiwan (1930) a 78.5 86.9 49.2
Sources: Indonesia: Department of Economic Affairs 1936: vol. 8, table 18; Thailand: Central 
Service of Statistics c. 1946: 75; Straits Settlements and FMS: Vlieland 1932: tables 121–141; 
Burma: Baxter 1941: 25; Philippines: Commonwealth of the Philippines 1941: 505–514; Korea: 
Chang 1966: table 2; Taiwan: Barclay 1954: 71. 
a Male workers only. 
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Malays in the nonagricultural labor force refl ected the fact that Malays were 
a much lower proportion of the total labor force than the indigenous popula-
tion in other parts of East and Southeast Asia. But there can be little doubt that 
the large infl ux of migrant workers into British Malaya together with British 
policy aimed at keeping the indigenous population in rural areas created a 
more extreme example of the plural economy than in other colonies in East 
and Southeast Asia. It was a legacy that postcolonial governments struggled 
with for the last four decades of the twentieth century. 
Indigenous Entrepreneurship and Economic Opportunity in 
Colonial Korea and Taiwan
The plural economy that attracted such attention throughout Southeast Asia 
in the last phase of European colonial rule did not exist in the Japanese colo-
nies. There was very little in-migration from China or any other Asian coun-
try, except Japan, into either Taiwan or Korea, although the percentage of the 
population from the mainland in Taiwan was estimated at around 1 percent, 
which was higher than the percentage of Chinese nationals in the Philippines 
and only slightly lower than the percentage in Burma and Java (see Table 2.2). 
What did stand out in both Korea and Taiwan by the 1930s was the Japanese 
presence; Japanese citizens comprised over 5 percent of the total population 
in Taiwan and just under 3 percent in Korea (see Table 2.2). 
The vast majority of Japanese workers in both colonies were in nonag-
ricultural occupations; in Taiwan, the largest number of employed males in 
1930 were in the professions and government, followed by commerce and 
manufacturing (Barclay 1954: table 16). Many indigenous Taiwanese were in 
these occupations as well; in 1930, indigenous Taiwanese comprised slightly 
less than half of male workers employed in government and the professions. 
In Korea, the proportion was around 60 percent. These were higher propor-
tions than in British Malaya, although much lower than in Burma and Indo-
nesia, where indigenous races accounted for the great majority of employed 
workers in the professions and government service by 1930. In Indonesia, 
indigenous workers accounted for a higher proportion of the manufacturing 
labor force than in either Taiwan or Korea and a roughly similar proportion of 
the labor force in trade and commerce (see Table 6.4). 
There is little evidence that the Japanese colonial regimes in either Tai-
wan or Korea were much concerned with the development of entrepreneurial 
capacity among the indigenous populations. In the context of Taiwan, Ho 
argued:
During the colonial period, the government relied primarily on its own 
savings and the savings of the Japanese corporate business structures it 
helped create to provide the capital for industry. It never encouraged the 
emergence of an indigenous industrialist class; in fact, its whole policy 
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was directed toward preventing the emergence of such as class. Until 
1924 Taiwanese were not allowed to organize or operate corporations 
unless there was Japanese participation. Thus the modern sector became 
a monopoly of the Japanese capitalists. Even after this restrictive rule 
against Taiwanese participation was rescinded, Taiwanese were reluctant 
to seek entry to the modern sector because of its domination by Japanese 
capitalists. Through its power to regulate, and license, and by granting 
exclusive privileges to Japanese capitalists, the government successfully 
kept the Taiwanese from acquiring any economic power. (1971: 323)
Ho’s argument is that Japanese policy in Taiwan was trapped in an image of 
its own creation. Taiwan was to be developed as an agricultural appendage of 
Japan, and it was only in the 1930s, when the Japanese government became 
more preoccupied with war preparations, that these views changed. In Korea 
in the 1930s, Juhn pointed out, when the Japanese authorities were trying to 
attract the zaibatsu to invest in Korean industry, some offi cials did argue for a 
strategy that also encouraged Koreans to establish small and medium enter-
prises (1977: 48). But few policies were implemented, and Korean businesses 
received little assistance, compared with that granted to Japanese fi rms, who 
remained in a dominant position in virtually all sectors of industry and trade. 
Juhn argued that the activities of the industrial cooperatives that were estab-
lished in Korea after 1910 were “insignifi cant and ineffective” compared with 
small producers’ cooperatives in Japan (1973: 128). 
A fi gure frequently quoted for Korea is that Japanese investors accounted 
for around 90 percent of all paid-up capital in industry by the late 1930s (Kim 
1973: 110–111; Haggard, Kang, and Moon 1997: 871; Chung 2006: 123). These 
authors have emphasized that Japanese investors dominated light as well as 
heavy manufacturing and that most skilled workers and almost all managers 
were Japanese. The fi gure of 90 percent has been challenged by Eckert, who 
claimed that it ignores joint Japanese-Korean companies that “may well have 
garnered the lion’s share of Korean capital” (1991: 54). Eckert also argued that 
such statistics did not capture the full extent of the transition, although often 
incomplete, by Korean merchants and landlords into the ranks of the indus-
trial bourgeoisie (ibid.: 55). He cites the examples of the men who would go 
on to found the chaebol that became famous in the post-1960 era, including 
Samsung, LG, and Hyundai. Most were sons of landlords who became small-
scale businessmen in the 1930s and 1940s in sectors such as brewing, rice 
milling, textiles, and vehicle repair. 
A few Koreans did rise to control substantial business empires during the 
Japanese era. The outstanding example of an indigenous Korean industrial 
family that rose to wealth and power in the Japanese era were the Kim broth-
ers, who founded the Kyongsong Spinning Company. They came from a fam-
ily that had accumulated substantial holdings of rice land in the southern part 
of the country, and after education in Japan, the two sons moved into indus-
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try in the 1920s. The move was fraught with diffi culties, not the least being 
the stiff competition from better-funded Japanese fi rms (McNamara 1988: 
174–175). But by the 1930s they had managed to consolidate their position in 
Korea and move into southern Manchuria, where they established a spinning 
plant in 1937. The textile venture survived the war and liberation, and pros-
pered under the First Republic (McNamara 1990: 117; Juhn 1977: 49–50). 
The Kim success story was exceptional, although other large-scale Korean 
businesses were able to emerge and compete with Japanese fi rms in banking 
and trade. Examples of successful entrepreneurs that are often cited include 
Pak Hung-sik, who established a substantial wholesale and retail business, and 
the aristocratic Min clan, who moved into banking during the Japanese era 
( Juhn 1973: 126; McNamara 1990: chaps. 5 and 6; Chung 2006: 263–264). 
After the establishment of formal Japanese rule, there were few positions avail-
able to Koreans in the upper ranks of the civil service or the military, so bank-
ing and fi nance became a socially acceptable occupation for men from families 
that had previously occupied senior bureaucratic posts. Chung has estimated 
that there were some sectors of light industry, such as brewing and pharma-
ceuticals, where Korean capital comprised at least 40 percent of the total by 
1938 (2006: table 5.1). But as McNamara argued, all Korean business people 
“had to carefully align their investments to fi nd a niche in the development 
plans of the colonial administration” (1990: 49). Few were able to exploit such 
niches and build up substantial enterprises, and most businesses remained 
small-scale, as indeed was the case in other parts of colonial Asia.
However limited the development of an indigenous entrepreneurial and 
managerial class in Korea before 1945, it is arguable that more was achieved 
there than in most other colonies in Asia, outside India and possibly the Phil-
ippines. One would search in vain for successful industrial ventures similar in 
size to the Kyongsong Textile Company owned and managed by indigenous 
families in Thailand, British Malaya, or Indonesia before 1942. And as  Eckert 
has pointed out, some indigenous Koreans did own stock in both Korean and 
Japanese companies (1991: 55). This hardly ever happened in Indonesia, Thai-
land, or British Malaya. Here the combination of foreign capital and local 
Chinese and Indian domination made it almost impossible for indigenous 
entrepreneurs to move beyond small-scale trading and manufacturing. Lack 
of access to credit was one factor; in addition, very few indigenous Thais, 
Indo nesians, or Malays received the sort of education, either at home, in the 
colonial motherland, or elsewhere, that gave the Kim brothers the knowledge 
and confi dence to establish new industrial ventures. The small number who 
did receive such education usually went into the civil service or the military. 
This tradition was to continue after the advent of political independence. 
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Economic Growth and Living Standards
It is widely recognized by economic historians that trends in per capita GDP 
are not by themselves reliable guides to changes in living standards. It is 
indeed possible for economies to grow in per capita terms over a period of 
years or even decades with very little evidence of an improvement in living 
standards on the part of the majority of the population, especially those in 
the lower income groups. There are several reasons for this. First, economic 
growth often confers much greater benefi ts on some groups in society com-
pared with others; in particular in the early stages of capitalism, profi ts are 
likely to increase more rapidly than wages, and thus there will be a widening 
gap in income and wealth between those who earn profi ts and those who 
earn wages. Second, and related to the fi rst point, it is possible that much of 
the increase in income accruing to capitalists will not be consumed at all but 
saved and invested in expansion of productive capacity. In some economies, 
governments may appropriate a large share of the increase in taxes and invest 
these revenues in infrastructure and public services, including defense, which 
may not benefi t a large part of the population. 
A third reason is that in open economies a large part of the profi ts accru-
ing to capitalists may be repatriated to other parts of the world; thus a rapid 
growth in gross domestic product may be accompanied by a sharp increase 
in surpluses in the balance of payments. This is a key feature of the open 
dualistic model of Paauw and Fei, among others, and, as argued in Chapter 5, 
several colonies in Asia did indeed experience sustained export surpluses in 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In addition, a rapid growth 
in exports could show up as a rapid growth in gross domestic product, mea-
sured in constant prices, but if the terms of trade are declining, the impact on 
domestic consumption and investment expenditures may be much reduced. 
Recent work on the impact of economic growth on living standards in 
Asia has tried to explore these issues. Williamson (1998, 2000) has examined 
trends in real wages in various parts of Asia and drawn from them conclu-
sions regarding trends in living standards and inequality. His work is reviewed 
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below. But fi rst it will be useful to look at the evidence on several indicators 
of living standards in various parts of colonial East and Southeast Asia in the 
early part of the twentieth century, including consumption of food staples, 
food shares in household budgets, education, and mortality rates. Such evi-
dence is not diffi cult to assemble because, during the fi rst part of the twentieth 
century, colonial governments were themselves increasingly concerned with 
the problem of “native welfare” and indeed were under pressure from various 
forces, both in the colony and at home, to justify their regimes in terms of 
broadly based improvements in living standards and purchasing power. Thus 
offi cial data-gathering exercises became more oriented to compiling evidence 
on indigenous living standards and how they were changing over time.
Debates and Evidence about Trends in Living Standards in Colonial Asia
In the postcolonial literature, a frequent criticism made of many colonial 
economic systems in Asia and elsewhere is that the economic growth that 
occurred did not benefi t the great majority of the population. While exports 
may have boomed and government revenues expanded, nutritional intakes 
for the mass of the population did not improve, access to health care and sec-
ular education was severely limited, and as a result mortality rates were high 
and many adults were illiterate. Wage labor opportunities were limited, and 
wage rates were low. In Korea, where criticism of the impact of colonial poli-
cies on popular welfare by postcolonial scholars has been especially strong, it 
has been argued that by the 1930s, “pauperization among Korean farmers was 
becoming increasingly a pressing problem even for the colonial policy mak-
ers” (Chang 1971: 176). 
There is considerable evidence to support the critics’ case. In spite of some 
progress in the adoption of new production technologies, rice consumption 
per capita in Korea fell steadily from 1912 to 1930, forcing the great majority 
of the population to eat more inferior foods such as millet (Lee 1936: 275). 
Although there was some improvement in rice availability toward the end of 
the 1930s, total grain availability per capita was still, in 1937–1941, below 
the average for 1912–1916 ( Johnston 1953: 55). Per capita rice availability 
in the late 1930s was also below the level of 1915–1919 (Table 7.1). The fall 
in domestic rice availability in Korea after 1910 has been explained by the 
increase in the proportion of arable land controlled by large-scale commercial 
owners, many of them Japanese. Rents were often paid in kind, so that a high 
percentage of the rice crop passed to landlords and then into the export mar-
ket (ibid.: 55; Chang 1977: 58–59). By 1938, more than half of all farmers in 
Korea were tenants who did not own any land (Grajdanzev 1944: 109: Myers 
and Yamada 1984: 451–452). By the 1940s, even semi-offi cial Japanese publi-
cations acknowledged that the majority of Korean farmers formed a “poverty-
stricken community” controlling very small plots of land and earning very 
low incomes (Foreign Affairs Association 1944: 909).
 Changing Living Standards and Human Development 133
Myers and Yamada have argued that the “dysfunctions” in Korean agricul-
ture (especially regarding access to land) were much greater than in Taiwan, 
where rural living standards appear to have been higher by the late 1930s 
than in Korea (1984: 451). Certainly rice availability per capita was higher (see 
Table 2.6). Ka argues that rural living standards in the 1930s in Taiwan under-
went “substantive growth” (1995: 144); he cites the estimates of Mizoguchi 
on rising real wages (1972: table 3) in both manufacturing and agriculture. Yet 
Chang’s analysis of farm household surveys during the 1930s indicates some 
decline in rice consumption per capita between 1931 and 1937, although 
there was a sharp increase in intake of sweet potatoes (Chang 1969: table 
14). He explains this switch in terms of movements in relative prices; real 
per capita expenditures of farm families between 1931 and 1937 increased by 
around 12 percent.
Several authors have used anthropometric evidence to examine trends 
in living standards in both Korea and Taiwan during the colonial period. 
In Korea, Gill found that the Korean population became shorter beginning 
with the birth cohorts of the late 1920s, and a secular growth in height only 
began with birth cohorts from the early 1950s (1998: 124 –126). He argues 
that reduced grain consumption explained at least part of the decline in the 
colonial period. In Taiwan, by contrast, Morgan and Liu (2005) argue that 
rural food intake and per capita incomes improved from the 1910s to the 
1940s, and this in turn led to an increase in male heights. This supports the 
Table 7.1. Index of Rice Consumption Per Capita, 1915–1919 to 1935–1939 
(1925–1929 = 100)
 Korea Taiwan Java British Malaya
1915–1919 138 98 n.a. 93
1920–1924 123 100 99 91
1925–1929 100 100 100 100
1930–1934 87 88 96 94
1935–1939 125 70 94 99
 Philippines French Indochina Burma
1915–1919 87 91 139
1920–1924 99 99 105
1925–1929 100 100 100
1930–1934 84 107 91
1935–1939 80 109 100
Sources: Korea: Chang 1977: 58; Taiwan: Ho 1978: table 6.2; Java: Mears 1961: 248; British Malaya: 
Grist 1941: table 32; Philippines: Mears et al. 1974: appendix 4.1; French Indochina: Rose 1985: 
110; population data from Banens 2000; Burma: Saito and Lee 1999: 80–81; conversion ratios as 
given in Richter 1976: table 3. 
Note: n.a. = not available. 
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argument made by Ka that living standards did improve in Taiwan during the 
fi rst decade of the twentieth century; as will be argued below, demographic 
evidence also confi rms this view. 
Turning to Southeast Asia, debates about living standards became increas-
ingly prominent in several parts of the region after 1900. In Indonesia, the 
perception that living standards in Java had been falling during the nine-
teenth century led to the introduction of the ethical policy, with its emphasis 
on agricultural improvement, improved rural infrastructure, better access to 
education, and accelerated migration of poor people in the densely settled 
inner islands to less densely settled regions of the archipelago. The concern 
about declining welfare also led to a series of government investigations on 
indigenous living standards, access to land, tax burdens, and other economic 
and social issues that continued until the end of the 1930s, culminating in the 
so-called coolie budget surveys carried out in Batavia and among estate work-
ers in Java. How much impact all this data collection actually had on policy 
is questionable. Husken has suggested that it was all “too little, and too late” 
(1994: 222). For budgetary reasons, expenditures on infrastructure and trans-
migration were cut back from the early 1920s, even before the full impact of 
the depression of the 1930s was felt in Indonesia. After 1929, expenditures on 
capital works were cut more severely than those on salaries and other perqui-
sites of the civil service (Booth 1998: 145).
In British Malaya, there was also growing concern about indigenous wel-
fare in the 1920s, although this concern was more clearly articulated by Malay 
writers than by the colonial establishment. It is perhaps ironic that, although 
rural Malays in fact enjoyed one of the highest living standards in rural South-
east Asia in the interwar years and certainly higher than in most parts of Indo-
nesia, the small Malay intelligentsia became increasingly obsessed with what 
they saw as “Malay poverty.” In 1923 the Malay writer and translator Zainul 
Abidin wrote that “the Malays, as a whole, are a particularly poor people. 
Poverty is their most outstanding characteristic and their greatest handicap 
in the race of progress. Poor in money, poor in education, poor in intellectual 
equipment and moral qualities, they cannot be otherwise but left behind in 
the march of nations” (quoted in Roff 1974: 151). Roff pointed out that this 
gloomy picture had its counterpart in many other articles appearing at the 
same time, but the debate showed “a real confusion about underlying causes 
and ultimate remedies” (1974: 151–152). Much of the discussion was fatalistic 
in tone, with participants apparently accepting the fact that little could be 
done to promote the economic advancement of the Malay in an economy 
where foreigners—European, Indian, and Chinese—were in effective control 
and dominated most types of nonagricultural employment. It was only in the 
1950s, with political independence almost achieved, that a new generation of 
Malay intellectuals began to ask what government could do to increase the 
participation of ethnic Malays in the market economy. Aziz (1964) saw the 
poverty of the rural Malay as being due to governmental neglect in colonial 
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times (he was especially critical of Winstedt’s education policies), low agricul-
tural productivity, and exploitation of rural Malays by monopsonistic middle-
men. These ideas gained widespread support in the latter part of the 1960s 
and were very infl uential in the Second Malaysia Plan (1971–1975). 
In other parts of Southeast Asia, debates about rural poverty were, as in 
Malaya, conducted less at the offi cial level and more within higher educa-
tion circles and in parts of the press controlled or infl uenced by indigenous 
nationalists. Trade unions were suppressed by the British, Dutch, and French 
authorities; in British Malaya, a wave of strikes in mines and estates in the late 
1930s provoked a harsh response, and many hundreds of workers were forcibly 
repatriated to China (Bayly and Harper 2004: 42). In the Philippines, the freer 
political climate permitted more open militancy, which led to hundreds of 
incidents of agrarian unrest in the latter part of the 1930s (Larkin 1993: 218–
236). There was mounting evidence that the growth that had occurred during 
the period of American control had not benefi ted all parts of the population, 
although the worst unrest was not in the poorest parts of the country. From 
1929 onward, several studies of living conditions among different groups of 
the population were carried out; probably the most comprehensive was the 
survey in the Tondo district of Manila in 1933, sponsored by the local chapter 
of the American Red Cross. Although there was disagreement on what consti-
tuted a minimum income, in one estimate 44 percent of families lived below 
the income threshold necessary for a “decent standard” (Lava 1938: 19).
A study of living standards in the Ilocos region of northern Luzon by Lava 
found that families of fi ve (three adults and two children) were subsisting on 
5,700 calories per day (1938: 24). This was considerably below the calorifi c 
intake of prisoners, who also had regular supplies of drinks such as tea, cof-
fee, and ginger root, which the Ilocano peasant regarded as a luxury. Most 
of the families surveyed ate meat only once or twice a month. More than 
62 percent of the average household budget went toward food (Table 7.2). 
Another study by Runes of living standards among sugar workers found that 
the food share of household budgets was over 80 percent and that the typical 
family “spends almost the entire income for food and clothing of the lowest 
quality and quantity” (1939: 30; see also Larkin 1993: 220–221). Although 
Lava conceded that “actual stark starvation does not exist in the Philippines 
except in isolated cases” and that living standards in the Philippines might 
have been higher than in parts of Japan (1938: 81), both his study and that 
of Runes caution against any casual assumption that the population of the 
Philippines shared equally in the fruits of the economic growth that occurred 
in the American era. Indeed Kurihara quoted several authors who argued that, 
for many Filipinos, living standards in the late 1930s were little better than in 
the last phase of Spanish rule (1945: 40). 
Other household budget studies carried out in the 1930s in both Vietnam 
and Java found that the food share of household budgets was high, especially 
for poorer groups in rural areas. Gourou reported survey results that showed 
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that the majority of the population in rural Cochinchina was spending 60 
percent or more of budgets on food (1945a: 531), about the same share Lava 
reported from Ilocos (see Table 7.2). Poor peasants in Tonkin, who comprised 
the majority of the rural population, were spending almost 80 percent on 
food. In Java, the survey of coolie laborers in Batavia carried out in 1938 found 
that most were spending around 60 percent of the household budget on food, 
while in rural areas, the proportion among estate laborers varied from 58 to 
75 percent. For plantation and factory laborers and the sample of farmers in 
Java surveyed at the same time, food shares were above 70 percent, which was 
about the same as for landless coolies in Cochinchina (see Table 7.2)
The comparison of household budgets can be supplemented with data 
on per capita rice availability, which was a widely used indicator of living 
standards in a region where rice has always been the preferred food staple 
Table 7.2. Budget Studies in Vietnam, the Philippines, and Java, 1930s
 Percentage of Household Expenditures on
 Rice Food
Cochinchina: 1937
Landless coolies 49 71
Small tenants 43 60
Middle tenants 39 60
Large tenants 29 43
Landowners 22 36
Tonkin delta: 1938
Poor peasants c. 55 79
Small proprietors n.a. 63
Luzon
Cavite / Tarlac (1929/1930) n.a. 54
Ilocos (1937) n.a. 62
Sugar workers (1938) n.a. 82
Java: Batavia
Poor coolies 44 61
Better-off coolies 26 52
Java: plantations
Field workers n.a. 73
Factory workers n.a. 73
Senior workers n.a. 58
Java: Farmers n.a. 71
Sources: Vietnam: Gourou 1945a: 531–540; Philippines: Lava 1938: 13–21; Runes 1939: 93; Java 
(Batavia): Central Bureau of Statistics 1939: tables 39–41; Java (plantations): van Niel 1956: 77. 
Note: n.a. = not available. 
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(see Table 2.6). In Java, per capita availability of rice was only 85 kilograms 
by 1937–1939 and in the Philippines 97 kilograms, which was slightly higher 
than in Korea. This contrasts with around 140 kilograms in Thailand in the 
1930s (Manarungsan 1989: 44–45). Gourou states that rice consumption per 
capita in Tonkin was 400 grams per day, or 146 kilograms per annum, which 
was about the same as in Thailand; he argues that it would have been rather 
higher in the south (1945a: 548). Everywhere in East and Southeast Asia, 
calorie intake was augmented by other foods including corn, cassava, and 
sweet potatoes; this was especially the case in the Philippines and Java. The 
time series produced by Mears on rice availability in Java shows some fl uctua-
tion between 1921 and 1941 but no discernible upward trend (1961: 248); by 
the latter part of the 1930s, average per capita availability was still below the 
1925–1929 level (see Table 7.1). Nor was there any upward trend in estimates 
of total calorie supply per capita after 1920 (van der Eng 1993: fi gure 4). 
In the Philippines, the series on rice and corn availability produced by 
Mears et al. showed increases in both rice and corn availability in per cap-
ita terms until the mid-1920s, and then some decline, especially during the 
1930s (Table 7.3) (Mears et al. 1974: 355–357). By the latter part of the 1930s, 
annual per capita availability of both rice and corn was well below that of 
a decade earlier, although still higher than in 1910–1914. In British Malaya 
and in Burma, there was a fall in per capita rice availability in the early part 
of the 1930s, although in both these colonies consumption had recovered to 
1925–1929 levels by the late 1930s (see Table 7.1). This would suggest that 
household budgets did come under pressure in the depression years virtually 
everywhere in Southeast Asia, although there was some recovery in the later 
1930s in parts of the region. The main exception appears to have been Indo-
china, where per capita availability increased slightly during the 1930s.
Demographic Indicators and Access to Education
In addition to data on food availability and food shares of household budgets, 
changes in demographic indicators are used by many scholars as a guide to 
Table 7.3. Rice and Corn Consumption Per Capita in the Philippines 
(annual average)
 Rice Consumption ( kg.) Corn Consumption ( kg.)
1910–1914 67.3 18.3
1915–1919 100.1 21.7
1920–1924 113.5 22.6
1925–1929 114.9 20.0
1930–1934 96.4 15.4
1935–1939 92.2 17.4
Source: Mears et al. 1974: appendix 4.1. 
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changes in living standards; they are sometimes more accurate than indicators 
derived from household income and expenditure surveys. During the 1990s, 
both monetary and other indicators have been used by United Nations stat-
isticians to compute a composite index of human development (UNDP 2003: 
340–342). We do not have longtime series on, for example, infant mortality 
rates for all parts of East and Southeast Asia from 1900 onward, but we do 
have some estimates for most countries by the 1930s. It seems clear that infant 
mortality rates were lower in Taiwan, the Philippines, and British Malaya than 
in Indonesia, Indochina, and Burma (Table 7.4). The data on crude death 
rates (which are probably less reliable) tell a similar story. A comparison of life 
expectancies for Taiwan and Korea in the late 1930s indicates that they were 
very similar, which suggests that infant mortality in Korea was also about the 
same as in Taiwan (Chang 1966: table 7.3; Barclay 1954: table 37). 
Figures on trends over time are more diffi cult to assemble. It is clear that 
infant mortality rates and crude death rates fell in Taiwan during the Japanese 
period (Barclay 1954: tables 36 and 39). Kimura has argued that there was also 
a decline in death rates in Korea after 1920 (1993: 643); this is supported by 
Chang’s estimates (1966: 268). In the Philippines, there was also some decline 
in both indicators over the American period (Zablan 1978: tables 79 and 90). 
Banens’s estimates found a decline in infant mortality rates among the Viet-
Table 7.4. Development Indicators: East and Southeast Asia, Late 1930s
 Per Capita GDP, 1938   Educational Enrollments
 (1990 international Infant Mortality Crude Death as Percentage of
Country dollars) Rates Rates Total Population
Philippines 1,522 139 23 11.5
Korea 1,459 n.a. 23 5.8
British Malaya a 1,361 147 21 7.8
Taiwan 1,302 142 21 11.4
Indonesia 1,175 225–250 28 4.0
Thailand 826 n.a. 22 10.7
Burma 749 232 30 5.4
Indochina n.a. 190 24 2.5
Sources: GDP data: Maddison 2003: 182–183. Educational enrollments: Furnivall 1943: 111, with 
additional data on Korea from Grajdanzev 1944: 264. Data on infant mortality rates and crude 
death rates for Indonesia: Nitisastro 1970: 113, table 39, and refer to Java only; Korea: Chang 1966: 
268; Philippines: Zablan 1978: 100–105; Taiwan: Barclay 1954: 146, 161; Thailand: Manarungsan 
1989: 35; Vietnam: Banens 2000: 36–37; crude death rates refer to Cochinchina; infant mortal-
ity rates refer to Hanoi only. Burma: Sundrum 1957: 20, 52. British Malaya: Evans 1939: table 15; 
crude death rates: Palmore, Chander, and Fernandez 1975: table 4.1. 
Note: n.a. = not available.
a GDP and crude death rate data refer to the area covered by the modern state of Malaysia and 
exclude Singapore. Infant mortality rates refer to the Federated Malay States only. Educational 
enrollments refer to British Malaya including Singapore. 
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namese population in Hanoi between 1925 and 1938, admittedly from a very 
high level of over four hundred per thousand (2000: table 7). In the Straits 
Settlements, there was a steady fall in infant mortality rates between 1914 and 
1934, although the decline was much less for Malays than for the other ethnic 
groups (Manderson 1996: table 2.11). 
In all these cases, no doubt, colonial governments would have attributed 
the declines to better access to modern health facilities and greater profes-
sional supervision of deliveries and provision of postnatal care. Especially in 
urban areas, improved provision of sanitation and clean drinking water would 
also have been important. But it was not true that infant mortality was always 
lower in urban areas; estimates for the Philippines in the early 1920s found 
that they were higher in Manila than in the provinces (Wood 1926: 48). The 
1931 census data for British Malaya showed that infant mortality rates in the 
Federated Malay States were lower than in urban Singapore (Vlieland 1932: 
110). These differences would have refl ected the greater overcrowding in slum 
housing in Singapore and Manila compared with the rural areas. 
A further set of indicators relate to education. Both literacy and years of 
schooling are used in the Human Development Index, published annually by 
the United Nations in their Human Development Report. But literacy can be a 
misleading indicator in the Asian context. In Indonesia, for example, where a 
question on literacy was included in the 1920 population census, only those 
who could read in the Roman script were deemed literate, although many 
thousands had learned to read Malay written in the Arabic script, and newspa-
pers and books appeared in this format. Such people were not considered liter-
ate by the colonial statisticians. In the Japanese colonies, literacy was often 
equated with an ability to read and write Japanese. Comparisons of census 
and other offi cial data on literacy are thus unreliable, and it is safer to look at 
the evidence on school enrollments.
Here the differences between colonies were quite stark by the 1930s. In 
spite of the assertions of authors such as Maddison that the Japanese were 
more successful in increasing access to education than the other colonial pow-
ers (1990: 365), the evidence indicates that neither in Taiwan nor in Korea did 
the Japanese achieve what the Americans accomplished in the Philippines. By 
1940–1941, it was estimated that just over two million students were enrolled 
in public schools in the Philippines and a further 180,000 in private schools. 
Of these a remarkable 40,000 were in tertiary institutions, a much larger fi gure 
than in Korea, Taiwan, or any European colony (Bureau of Census and Statis-
tics 1960: 21–29). Some of these institutions were Catholic foundations estab-
lished in the Spanish period, but the government also became more involved 
in tertiary education during the American era. The University of the Philip-
pines was established early in the American era on the model of the state 
university systems in America and by the 1930s was enrolling thousands of 
students across a number of faculties and campuses.
The American achievement was hardly an unqualifi ed success; in spite 
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of the rapid growth in school attendance, many children either did not enter 
school at all or dropped out before fi nishing sixth grade (Hunt 1988: 363). 
Lava found that, among the rural Ilocano families he surveyed, many par-
ents had ambitions of higher education for their children (1938: 53–54). But 
fi nancial pressures forced the great majority to drop out before completing 
fourth grade. The Monroe Commission of 1925 (named after Paul Monroe 
of Columbia Teachers College, who chaired it) found that many classes were 
badly taught by teachers with little command of English (May 1980: 124). 
Those who did manage to fi nish high school had not, on average, reached 
the same standard as their counterparts in the United States. Nevertheless, 
compared with other parts of the region, the results at all levels were substan-
tial, and many bright young people from relatively humble backgrounds were 
able to get a college education and move into professional and administrative 
occupations. 
In Korea by 1943, fewer than 10,000 students were in higher education 
(both government and private); in the government institutions, around 70 
percent of the students were Japanese (Kim 1985: 168). The basic attitude of 
the Japanese authorities to higher education in Korea was that it was both 
unnecessary and potentially dangerous in that it would foster nationalist 
dreams of independence. In Taiwan, the Taihoku Imperial University was 
established largely for research purposes, and few Taiwanese students were 
accepted. The ten specialized middle schools, which were located in the cit-
ies and in the larger towns, were open to all Japanese boys but only a small 
number of carefully selected Taiwanese (Kerr 1942: 53; Barclay 1954: 68). In 
1931, Japanese students were in the majority in the middle schools and also in 
the high schools for girls (Wyndham 1933: 154). Some children from wealthy 
homes in both Taiwan and Korea were sent to Japan for higher education, 
but they faced considerable discrimination in employment if they returned 
home. 
In both Taiwan and Korea, the government did much more in developing 
primary education, especially in the 1930s. In Korea, an attempt was made 
to enroll children in remote rural areas by establishing “short course elemen-
tary schools” with a two-year teaching cycle (Foreign Affairs Association 1944: 
914). But even with these initiatives, many Korean children had either no 
education at all or at most very brief schooling in poorly equipped rural facili-
ties. More success was achieved in Taiwan, where by 1943 it was claimed that 
70 percent of all children of legal school age were attending some sort of 
school (Barclay 1954: 68). But even in Taiwan, it was never the intention to 
achieve parity with Japan in educational standards. Tsurumi claimed that the 
goal of the Japanese educational system was only to “fashion the lower track 
of the two-track Meiji education system” (1984: 308).
Apart from the Philippines, educational access in most parts of Southeast 
Asia was even more restricted than in Korea, especially at the secondary and 
tertiary levels. Many children in Burma and Thailand learned basic literacy in 
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monastic schools, but beyond that there were few facilities outside the large 
towns. In Indonesia and Indochina, offi cial policy on education was to limit 
it to at most a very basic curriculum of short duration, although in Indonesia 
the Islamic schools also provided some instruction, especially in rural areas. In 
addition, a system of Chinese schools was established in the early part of the 
twentieth century that gave Chinese children tuition in Dutch (Suryadinata 
1972). In British Malaya, Chinese children also had better access to schools, 
especially in urban areas, and by the interwar years, a considerable gap had 
opened up between Malays and other races in access to education and espe-
cially education in English. 
The comparative data assembled by Furnivall showed that Taiwan and 
the Philippines were well ahead of most other parts of East and Southeast 
Asia in terms of the ratio of educational enrollments to total population by 
the end of the 1930s (see Table 7.3) (1943: 111). At the other end of the scale 
was Indochina. In British Malaya, the ratio was above that of Korea, although 
a disproportionate number of students were Chinese and Indian rather than 
Malay. The “plural society” that had been created by large-scale in-migration 
from China and India to Malaya, Burma, and Indonesia had led to a skewed 
access to education by race. Correcting this bias proved to be a major chal-
lenge for postindependence governments. 
What Do Trends in Wages Tell Us about Living Standards?
In recent years, a number of scholars have constructed long-term series on 
wages for various parts of the world and used these series to draw conclu-
sions about trends in living standards. In a paper purporting to examine living 
standards in various parts of Asia before 1940, Williamson has claimed that 
“living standards of ordinary workers as captured by real wages are a better 
indicator of the economic well-being of the vast majority in any society” than 
per capita GDP (2000: 19). While this may be true for some economies, there 
are several reasons why the use of real wages may produce misleading results 
regarding trends in living standards in many parts of Asia before 1940 and 
indeed in more recent times. 
First, in most parts of East and Southeast Asia in the early part of the 
twentieth century, only a small part of the labor force was in full-time wage 
employment. Even in the 1970s, census data for most parts of the region 
showed that wage and salary earners were less than a quarter of all employed 
workers, and the fi gure would probably have been lower in the early decades 
of the twentieth century. Only a minority of families would have been deriv-
ing all, or even as much as half, of the household income from wages in most 
parts of Asia. In the more land-abundant parts of the region, most households 
made their living from cultivation, with some additional income from raising 
livestock and poultry, and handicrafts. Young males in particular may have 
taken up wage work if it was available for a few weeks or months, but this 
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would not have composed the main part of the household’s income. Even in 
the more land-scarce regions, it is unlikely that wage earnings made up a large 
share of household earnings for the majority, although they may have been 
important for households controlling little or no land. Thus wage trends are 
by themselves not a good indicator of trends in household incomes. 
A second point relates to the way labor markets functioned. Williamson 
and others who have argued that trends in real wages can be a good proxy 
for trends in living standards appear to assume that most labor markets in 
Asia functioned according to the simple supply-demand model, with wages 
quickly adjusting to changes in either demand or supply. But in fact a num-
ber of distortions led to segmentation by region and to considerable nomi-
nal wage rigidity, especially in times of economic depression. Although trade 
unions were weak and minimum wage legislation not widely imposed, there 
were exceptions, such as the Philippines in the 1930s. Here a minimum wage 
was introduced for workers in government employment, although it was not 
universally implemented (Kurihara 1945: 42–43). It is probable that such leg-
islation aggravated the gap between urban and rural wages, which was already 
signifi cant in earlier decades (Doeppers 1984: 39–41). 
A more important problem was that of nominal wage rigidity, which 
seems to have been a feature of some labor markets in Asia by the early twen-
tieth century. Several authors have pointed out that in labor markets in Java 
and Vietnam, nominal wages did not decline in the early 1930s as rapidly 
as prices declined so that the real wage actually increased even though wage 
employment opportunities were declining. By 1934, when the full impact 
of the world depression was transmitted to markets in Southeast Asia, real 
wages in Java, Sumatra, Hanoi, Saigon, and Bangkok were all above 1929 lev-
els (Table 7.5). The data for workers in the Java sugar industry illustrate the 
problem very clearly; by 1935, numbers employed as factory and fi eld workers 
had fallen to less than 20 percent of the 1929 level, but average daily wages 
in 1929 prices for both male and female workers were still well above those 
prevailing in the late 1920s (Table 7.6).
Several explanations have been suggested for these apparently paradoxical 
trends. First, as usually happens in periods of business downturns, it is likely 
that many employers dismissed the most junior and least experienced workers 
fi rst. Thus the average wage might appear to rise, because those receiving the 
lowest wages had been dismissed, although those more experienced workers 
remaining in employment could well have been getting a lower nominal wage 
(Goudal 1938: 145). Second, employers would have been uncertain as to how 
long the bad conditions were going to last and thus continued to pay their 
best workers enough to retain their loyalty because they would be needed 
again when conditions improved. Third, conditions of work probably deterio-
rated for many workers who remained in employment; they might have been 
expected to work longer hours per day and could have lost some fringe ben-
efi ts (Ingleson 1988: 309). Fourth, for many workers hired on a daily or weekly 
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basis, fewer days or weeks of employment were available, so total earnings on 
a monthly or annual basis probably dropped sharply. Even if they were lucky 
enough to keep some wage employment, many millions of workers across the 
region had lower annual incomes and lower purchasing power, which in turn 
affected many small enterprises in manufacturing, trade, and transport.
For all these reasons, it would be unwise to interpret apparent increases 
in real wages as indicative of broad-based improvements in living standards. 
Williamson argued that living standards in the Philippines doubled under the 
American occupation because a series on real wages that he compiled showed 
Table 7.5. Index of Real Wages: Java, Sumatra, Hanoi, Saigon, and Bangkok, 
(1925 = 100)
Year Java (a) Java (b) Sumatra  Hanoi Saigon Bangkok
1921 98.7 94.7 n.a. 80.9 n.a. 107.1
1922 109.4 108.4 n.a. 95.5 n.a. 121.4
1923 105.7 106.7 n.a. 93.3 n.a. 107.1
1924 99.1 99.4 97.2 94.9 n.a. 114.3
1925 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1926 96.3 94.8 105.6 107.7 102.6 92.9
1927 105.0 104.4 116.1 104.6 103.2 100.0
1928 111.6 111.5 126.7 105.9 100.2 100.0
1929 105.5 105.1 118.7 99.0 103.7 100.0
1930 109.9 108.6 121.5 97.0 102.0 121.4
1931 148.5 158.2 167.9 95.6 110.1 164.3
1932 157.1 174.6 195.4 92.0 115.5 171.4
1933 159.8 179.3 218.8 101.7 114.0 192.9
1934 145.7 158.8 229.1 104.6 110.2 200.0
1935 133.3 140.1 231.2 108.5 108.2 157.1
1936 128.7 137.5 247.4 106.4 104.8 157.1
1937 119.7 126.6 227.1 89.0 101.4 142.9
1938 131.8 138.4 222.3 79.2 92.0 150.0
1939 139.2 146.7 n.a. 87.0 95.2 n.a.
1940 140.2 147.7 n.a. 81.5 86.7 n.a.
Sources: Java: Statistisch Jaaroverzicht van Nederlandsch-Indie ( Batavia: Department of Economic 
Affairs, annual publication, 1922–1940); defl ators from Polak 1943: 80 and Central Bureau of 
 Statistics 1947; 125. Sumatra: Dros 1992: 116; defl ators from Polak 1943: 80. Hanoi and Sai-
gon: Giacometti 2000b: 204–205; defl ators from Direction des Services Économiques 1947: 301. 
 Bangkok: Ingram 1964: 115.  
Note: Java (a) refers to wages of male factory coolies on the Java sugar estates defl ated by the price 
index given in Polak 1943: 80; Java (b) refers to the same wage data defl ated by the Java food 
price index given in Department of Economic Affairs 1947: 125. Data for Sumatra refer to wages 
of tobacco estate workers excluding supplements, defl ated by the Polak index. Data for Hanoi and 
 Saigon refer to wages of unskilled male workers. Bangkok data refer to unskilled rice-mill workers. 
n.a. = not available.
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that real wages more than doubled between 1895–1899 and 1935–1939 (Wil-
liamson 2000: 23, table 1.2). He found that real wages in the Philippines were 
80 percent higher than those in Japan in 1920–1924 and more or less the same 
as in Japan by 1935–1939, although he cautioned that the defl ators he used 
might not be reliable. After 1910, he argued, real wages in the Philippines were 
higher than in either Korea or Taiwan, or in Thailand and Indonesia. But other 
data from the Philippines throw some doubt on these assertions. 
It was true that wages for laborers in Manila in the late 1930s were high 
in comparison with most other parts of Asia (see Table 3.11). But this was a 
market where minimum wage laws would have been applied, albeit weakly, by 
the late 1930s. The data from Runes’ survey shows that wages for sugar work-
ers in rural areas were much lower than the urban unskilled wage and indeed 
lower than the wage for estate workers in Sumatra (see Table 3.11). As we have 
Table 7.6. Trends in Total Wage Bill, Numbers of Workers, and Real Wages, 
Java Sugar Industry, 1921–1940
 Total Wage Bill Total Workers Daily Wages
Year (fl . millions: 1929 prices) (thousands) (cents: 1929 prices)
 Male Female
1921 77 98 41 34
1922 90 101 47 37
1923 90 109 46 36
1924 87 114 43 34
1925 88 115 47 34
1926 86 116 41 32
1927 97 120 45 36
1928 112 129 49 39
1929 102 132 46 37
1930 101 130 48 38
1931 128 119 68 55
1932 109 97 79 62
1933 56 55 84 63
1934 26 29 72 57
1935 17 25 64 52
1936 24 28 60 55
1937 48 54 55 48
1938 54 56 61 52
1939 64 59 64 55
1940 n.a. 62 62 53
Sources: Daily wages of factory coolies: Statistisch Jaaroverzicht van Nederlandsch-Indie (Batavia: 
Department of Economic Affairs, annual publication, 1922–1940). Java food price defl ator from 
Central Bureau of Statistics 1947: 125. Total wage bill from Polak 1943: 46. 
Note: n.a. = not available. 
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already seen, data from the surveys conducted by Runes, Lava, and others 
indicate that many Filipinos in rural areas were living at a very low level in 
the late 1930s. While there was an improvement in per capita food availability 
between 1910–1914 and 1925–1929, by the latter part of the 1930s, rice avail-
ability was quite low in comparison with many other parts of the region. This 
would suggest that living standards were not as high, relative to other parts of 
the region, as the urban wage data alone might indicate. 
Who Did Have the Highest Living Standards?
One obvious conclusion suggests itself from the preceding discussion. It is very 
unwise to draw conclusions from a single indicator about differences in living 
standards across countries or regions at a point in time or about trends over 
time. While there is now widespread agreement that per capita gross domes-
tic product or per capita national income are not always reliable indicators, 
either for cross-country comparisons or for trends over time, other indicators 
can also be misleading. This strengthens the case for composite indicators, 
such as the Human Development Index, although even these do not yield 
unambiguous results. In the context of East and Southeast Asia, the data in 
Table 7.4 would suggest that Taiwan and the Philippines enjoyed the highest 
standards of human development in the latter part of the 1930s, especially if 
we allow for the probable underestimation of Taiwan’s GDP in the Maddison 
fi gures. There can be no doubt that these two colonies were well ahead of the 
others in terms of educational enrollments, although Taiwan was behind the 
Philippines in the development of tertiary facilities.
Computing a Human Development Index for most countries before 1940 
is very diffi cult, as data are usually lacking for one or more of the compo-
nents. The attempt by Metzer ranked thirty-six countries in the late 1930s 
and placed the Philippines at 22, which was above Thailand (at 26) and India 
(bottom at 36) (1998: 57). No other Asian country was included in Metzer’s 
sample, but the Philippines was ranked above all the Latin American countries 
except Chile. The Human Development Index can be criticized for ignoring 
consumption indicators (such as intakes of calories and proteins), for neglect-
ing infrastructure endowments, and for failing to include any indicator of 
inequality in the distribution of income or assets. As we have seen, rice con-
sumption in the Philippines was relatively low by Asian standards in the late 
1930s, although calorie intake was boosted by consumption of corn, as it was 
boosted by millet in Korea. Taiwan did rather better, at least in part because of 
Japanese efforts to raise productivity, although the focus of the “agricultural 
revolution” in colonial Taiwan was very much toward producing more rice 
and sugar for export to Japan. The highest rice consumption per capita in Asia 
in the 1930s was in the surplus regions of Thailand and southern Vietnam, 
although they ranked lower in terms of educational indicators.
The Philippines had a poorer infrastructure endowment than Taiwan by 
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the 1930s, whether one looks at roads, railways, irrigation, or power genera-
tion facilities. Yet infrastructure was highly developed in regions such as Java, 
which scored lower in terms of both per capita GDP and indicators such as 
infant mortality rates and educational enrollments. Indicators of inequality 
are more diffi cult to compile, as large-scale income and expenditure surveys, 
which could be used to estimate income or expenditure inequalities, are not 
available. Even data on land distribution are scarce for many parts of the 
region before 1940 and often of doubtful accuracy. Williamson has estimated 
ratios of real wages to real per capita GDP for a number of Asian economies 
in the latter part of the nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries (2000: 
table 1.7). He argued that this gives at least a rough guide to trends in factor 
shares; if real wages are stagnating while per capita GDP is rising, this suggests 
that most of the additional income is accruing to owners of land and capital, 
who are assumed to be richer than most wage workers. Thus trends in the ratio 
should “approximate changes in the economic distance between the work-
ing poor near the bottom of the distribution, and the average citizen in the 
middle of the distribution” (ibid.: 35).
Williamson’s series tend to show a V-shaped result for most of South-
east Asia; the wage to per capita GDP ratio fell through the latter part of the 
nineteenth century and rose again after 1920. He suggested that these trends 
could represent an improvement in the incomes of the poor relative to others, 
although the estimates seem vulnerable to the same criticisms as those already 
made of the real wage series. Unsurprisingly, given the evidence of consider-
able nominal wage rigidity on the one hand and falling per capita GDP on 
the other, the wage per capita GDP ratio rose sharply in the early 1930s in 
Indonesia, compared with the previous decade. A similar trend occurred in 
Thailand and to a lesser extent in the Philippines. But does this really indicate 
that the poor as a group were doing better than the rich in Indonesia in the 
early 1930s? Or simply that a small number of privileged workers had enjoyed 
an increase in real wages while the great majority were losing what meager 
wage-earning opportunities they may have possessed before the crisis hit? The 
Java sugar data would suggest the latter was the case.
Williamson also found that the wage to per capita GDP ratio fell in Taiwan 
between 1900 –1904 and 1915 –1919, although it rose thereafter. The Korean 
series was shorter but showed the same trend. Perhaps more revealing is the 
series on wage / land rental ratios for both Taiwan and Korea, both of which 
showed a consistent increase over the early decades of the twentieth century, 
almost doubling in both cases (Williamson 2000: table 1.8). This would seem 
to cast some doubt on the argument that Japanese landlords consistently 
gained relative to native workers in both Japanese colonies, although once 
again one must exercise some caution over the wage data. Many wage earners 
in both economies, especially outside agriculture, were Japanese, not native 
Koreans or Taiwanese. And most of the very poor in Korea and probably in 
Taiwan as well were tenant farmers rather than wage workers. This was prob-
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ably the case in the Philippines and parts of Vietnam, Indonesia, Thailand, 
and Burma as well. How they fared relative to both landlords and wage earners 
during the colonial era is far from clear.
Taken together, the evidence on inequality is too fragmentary to allow any 
defi nite conclusions to be drawn, either from Southeast Asia or for Korea and 
Taiwan. On balance, taking all the available indicators together, it is probably 
true that Taiwan enjoyed the highest living standards in colonial Asia by the 
late 1930s, followed by the Philippines. It is quite possible that the majority 
of the population in both colonies enjoyed living standards that were higher 
than the poorest decile in Japan. Populations in land-abundant Thailand and 
Malaya also seem to have enjoyed relatively high living standards; per capita 
availability of rice was high, death rates were lower than in other parts of the 
region, and most boys had some access to schooling, even if it was in poorly 
equipped rural facilities. Living conditions in both countries were probably 
better for the majority than they were for indigenous Koreans. Life was grim-
mest for the landless and near landless in the densely settled parts of Tonkin 
and Java. Here many families faced a constant struggle even to get enough 
food; decent housing, education, and medical treatment were unattainable 
luxuries.
Refl ecting on the problems of the Tonkinese peasant in 1945, Gourou 
argued that one remedy was accelerated out-migration, while another was 
industrialization (1945b: 15 –17). But he thought that both these options had 
limited potential; he also emphasized that there would have to be greater 
efforts to improve agricultural yields through better irrigation, more use of fer-
tilizers, and improved fl ood control systems. He also advocated tenure reform, 
gradual abolition of the great estates, and better rural credit facilities. These 
were all policy measures that, with the exception of land reform, had been 
implemented by the Dutch in Java four decades earlier. Their impact on living 
standards had been, to many Dutch and Indonesians, disappointing. By the 
1930s, nationalists in many parts of Southeast Asia had more radical ideas for 
improving living standards, which involved the end of colonialism and the 
creation of independent states. Left-wing nationalists envisaged the imple-
mentation of sweeping programs of asset redistribution and expropriation of 
all foreign-controlled enterprises. Debates over these policies were to continue 
after 1945, sometimes with violent consequences. 
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C H A P T E R  8
The Greater Asian 
Co-Prosperity Sphere: 
1942 –1945
Emergence of the Greater Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere
During the 1930s, both Korea and Taiwan experienced faster economic growth 
than the Southeast Asian colonies, whose economies were subject to the full 
force of the world slump of the early 1930s. But even allowing for the growth 
slowdown in much of Southeast Asia, the evidence does not support the argu-
ment that living standards in either Taiwan or Korea were markedly higher 
than in the Philippines, British Malaya, or even Thailand in the latter part 
of the 1930s. By then, the economies of both Taiwan and Korea were tightly 
integrated into the Japanese military-industrial complex, and after Pearl Har-
bor and the beginning of the Pacifi c War, this integration intensifi ed. In 1942, 
Korea ceased to be regarded as a colony and became an integral part of Japan, 
governed through the Home Ministry (Brudnoy 1970: 189). Northern Korea, 
like Manchuria, underwent rapid industrial development based on exploita-
tion of its mineral resources and hydroelectric potential, but these changes 
were “externally induced and served Japanese, not Korean, interests” (Cum-
ings 1997: 175). 
In 1936, the Japanese navy had already initiated plans for a “southern 
advance,” which involved, among other initiatives, the seizure of oil fi elds in 
Sumatra and Borneo (Tsunoda 1980: 241). The outbreak of the war in Europe 
in 1939 and the rapid capitulation of both the Netherlands and France to the 
German army together with what seemed to be the imminent collapse of Brit-
ain gave Japan its chance to intensify demands on the European colonial terri-
tories in Southeast Asia. Beasley argued that Japanese military planners viewed 
the advance to the south as part of the broader strategy of national defense 
(1987: 224), but the economic role allotted to Southeast Asia was quite differ-
ent from that given to China, Korea, and Manchuria. In Northeast Asia, Japan 
planned to build an integrated industrial complex; the role of territories in 
the south was to supply raw materials and also provide a market for Japanese 
exports.
This role was in fact not very different from what had happened in the 
1930s, except that under the new order controlled by Japan, the European 
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and American colonial governments would no longer be in a position to frus-
trate Japanese demands for greater market access, as they had done during the 
1930s. As we have seen in Chapter 5, by the early 1930s, Japanese consumer 
goods were fl ooding into markets in Indonesia, British Malaya, Thailand, the 
Philippines, and Burma. But in the mid-1930s, all the colonial governments 
had imposed restrictions on Japanese imports and in some cases on exports 
to Japan as well. Even with these controls, Japan still relied on imports of 
strategic raw materials such as iron ore, rubber, tin, coal, and above all petro-
leum from British Malaya, the Philippines, French Indochina, and Indonesia. 
Indonesia supplied around 25 percent of Japan’s oil imports in 1936, making 
it the second largest supplier after the United States (Beasley 1987: 223). By 
1941, the United States no longer appeared a reliable trading partner. It was 
essential for the Japanese war economy to secure supplies from elsewhere in 
Asia, preferably from a territory fi rmly under Japanese control. 
The Japanese took advantage of the German occupation of the Nether-
lands in 1940 to demand guaranteed supplies of oil, bauxite, nickel, and rub-
ber from the government in what was still the Netherlands Indies (Beasley 
1987: 228–229). Negotiations dragged on into 1941, but the Dutch were not 
cooperative, especially on the vital issue of oil supplies. The leader of the Neth-
erlands Indies delegation, van Mook, was given credit for standing up to Japa-
nese demands (Kemperman 2002: 30). But this intransigence strengthened 
the hawks in Japan who argued that nothing short of military force would 
suffi ce to secure supplies of vital raw materials from the south. In Indochina, 
the pro-Vichy regime was more cooperative with Japanese demands. An eco-
nomic settlement negotiated in 1941 gave Japan the kind of privileges it had 
failed to get from the Dutch; supplies of rice, rubber, coal, and other metals 
were guaranteed, and Japanese manufactures were given unrestricted access to 
the markets of Indochina. In addition, Japanese citizens were free to establish 
businesses and undertake mining operations (Beasley 1987: 231). Japan also 
secured the right to station troops in Indochina and to make use of existing 
naval bases and airfi elds (Kemperman 2002: 30–31). 
By December 1941, the Japanese government had come to the conclusion 
that diplomacy would not achieve its aims in Southeast Asia. It was essential 
to secure direct control over the region and also ensure that no power was in 
a position to threaten shipping links between Japan and Southeast Asia. The 
American navy posed the greatest threat, and on December 7, a surprise raid 
on Pearl Harbor in Hawai‘i destroyed most of the American Pacifi c fl eet. This 
immediately provoked a declaration of war by the United States, Great Brit-
ain, and its allies. A strategy document adopted by the Liaison Conference on 
December 12, 1941, stated clearly that, in the short run, the primary objective 
of the Japanese in the south must be to “fulfi ll the demand for resources vital 
to the prosecution of the present war” (Lebra 1975: 116). A few weeks earlier, 
the principles for administration of the southern areas had stated that in order 
to secure vital raw materials, economic hardships would have to be endured 
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by the indigenous populations. The armed forces would have to be locally 
provisioned, even if that meant depriving indigenous populations of part of 
their food supplies. The minister of fi nance went so far as to state that “it will 
not be possible for us to be concerned with the livelihood of the peoples in 
these areas” (Lebra 1975: 115; Tarling 2001: 219).
In December 1941 and early 1942, the Japanese armed forces swept down 
through Hong Kong, the Philippines, Malaya, Burma, Indonesia, the Solomon 
Islands, New Guinea, and other parts of the southwest Pacifi c. By the end of 
April 1942, the colonial regimes had all been forced into humiliating sur-
renders, and large numbers of prisoners were taken. The Japanese themselves 
seem to have been surprised by the speed and success of their blitzkrieg and by 
the abject failure of the colonial powers to put up any effective resistance. By 
mid-1942, Japanese military and economic control stretched from the south-
west Pacifi c to the eastern borders of British India and from Manchuria to the 
Indonesian archipelago. Northern Australia was under threat. The power of 
imperial Japan seemed unstoppable. But the Japanese administrative machin-
ery was ill prepared to deal with the problems of governing the vast areas that 
their armed forces had conquered in Southeast Asia.
To many indigenous people in Southeast Asia, the Japanese army appeared 
to be liberators rather than occupiers. In Indonesia, nationalists formed “free-
dom committees” in many towns in Java and Sumatra and offered their assis-
tance to the Japanese armed forces in maintaining law and order (Kemperman 
2002: 42). The Chinese were more fearful, mindful of the atrocities that had 
already taken place in China. The worst fears of the Chinese population in 
Singapore were soon realized when, in February 1942, thousands of young 
men were rounded up and executed on suspicion of being sympathetic to the 
Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) or to the communists. It was estimated after 
the war that between 50,000 and 100,000 were executed during the so-called 
sook ching (Lee 1998: 58). 
The policy of the Japanese army, which was in control in the densely 
settled parts of Southeast Asia, was to govern through local leaders where 
possible. The Japanese redrew the colonial boundaries and established new 
regions of control; Sumatra, the Federated Malay States, Johore, and the Straits 
Settlements were all governed from Singapore. The northern Malay states were 
handed back to the Thai government, whose leadership was pro-Japanese. 
Thailand and French Indochina, by then controlled by a pro-Vichy group of 
offi cers, were placed in “Area B” and given greater administrative autonomy. 
Elsewhere, cooperating native offi cials were selected to run local government 
and essential services. In the Philippines, a largely compliant native bureau-
cracy, already in place, continued with most of its routine administrative tasks 
(Goodman 1988: 101). In many parts of Indonesia, low-ranking Indonesian 
offi cials were promoted into senior posts after their Dutch bosses left or were 
imprisoned. 
Benda has pointed out that the aim of the Japanese occupiers was “to 
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erase Western legacies” and impose a new system of values on all the former 
colonies and a new orientation, cultural as well as economic, toward Japan 
(1967: 69–71). The over-arching goals of the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity 
Sphere were economic autarchy and tight political control from Japan. The 
policies already imposed on Taiwan and Korea, and on Manchuria were to be 
extended to Southeast Asia, the South Pacifi c, and eventually to India, Austra-
lia, and New Zealand. The goal of the Japanese government was to create “an 
economic and strategic organism centered on Japan with each part having a 
defi ned place and function” (Swan 1996: 145). Although lip service was paid 
to national liberation and to preserving the “honor of Thailand as an indepen-
dent state,” the Japanese regimes in Southeast Asia were hardly anticolonial. 
Rather, the government wished to replace European and American colonial-
ism with a much more tightly regulated version that served the strategic aims 
of imperial Japan. 
On the cultural front, few in Southeast Asia understood the Japanese lan-
guage, so one important consequence of the new policies was a much greater 
emphasis on indigenous languages. Dutch and English were offi cially forbid-
den, although used in practice for some government programs. Burmese, 
Malay, and Tagalog were all given offi cial status in education and govern-
ment. The Japanese deliberately encouraged the formation of youth groups; 
school and college students were organized into a number of different associa-
tions, some of which were in effect paramilitary combat forces. As Mortimer 
put it in the context of Indonesia, “the Japanese for the fi rst time provided 
Indonesian youth with a political role and an organizational identity” (1974: 
31–32). The members of Japanese-sponsored groups were not always uncriti-
cal admirers of their sponsors, but they imbibed the same fi erce nationalism 
the Japanese themselves exhibited, albeit directed to their own situations. It 
was these groups that constituted the “potentially most revolutionary legacy 
that Japanese rule was to bequeath to the de-colonization process in many 
parts of Southeast Asia” (Benda 1967: 780).
The Economic Consequences of Japanese Control: 
Falling Production and Rising Prices
If the immediate goals of Japanese economic policies in Southeast Asia were 
to secure supplies of key raw materials and to use local markets as outlets 
for their own manufactures, it rapidly became clear that neither aim would 
be easily achieved. The American navy recovered far more quickly from the 
devastation of Pearl Harbor than the Japanese had expected. From early 1942, 
the entire American economy was placed on a war footing, and the building 
of new warships and fi ghter planes was accorded top priority. In mid-1942, 
the Americans infl icted a heavy defeat on the Japanese navy at the Battle of 
Midway, viewed by most historians as the key turning point in the Pacifi c 
arena. From then on, American and Allied forces fought their way from island 
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to island; once strategic islands were liberated, they could be used as air and 
naval bases to support the next stage of the war. 
Johnston argued that the Japanese government had been, from the begin-
ning of the Pacifi c War, too optimistic about the country’s shipping capacity, 
and destruction of merchant shipping by Allied forces was far greater than the 
war planners had allowed for (1953: 140–141). Between December 1941 and 
mid-1943, over one million tons of shipping was lost; this fi gure more than 
doubled in 1943–1944, and in 1944–1945 it was estimated that over 3 million 
tons were destroyed, the majority by American submarines. By mid-1944, the 
Allies were within bombing range of the Japanese mainland, and shipping 
services within Japan and between Japan and Taiwan, Korea, and Manchuria 
were badly disrupted. Supplies of rice and other foods from Taiwan and Korea 
fell sharply, and the food situation in Japan itself became grave. 
But before Japanese shipping losses had removed any possibility of effec-
tively integrating Southeast Asia into the Co-Prosperity Sphere based on Japan, 
the occupying forces made it clear that the economies throughout the region 
would have to be drastically restructured. The Japanese had little interest in 
encouraging the production of traditional export staples such as sugar, coffee, 
tea, and spices. Japan was already supplied with sugar from Taiwan, and pre-
cious shipping space could not be wasted on transporting luxury foodstuffs 
that the metropolitan economy did not need. In both Java and the Philip-
pines, sugar factories, on the one hand, were either closed or converted (almost 
always unsuccessfully) into plants that produced alcohol from molasses, which 
could then be used for fuel (Larkin 1993: 237; de Jong 2002: 254). On the other 
hand, the Japanese armed forces in Indonesia did establish or expand factories 
for the production of explosives and other military supplies as well as cement, 
medicines, shipping parts, and textiles (Siaahan 1996: 115). Such factories 
were probably constructed in other parts of Southeast Asia as well. 
Throughout Southeast Asia, Japanese offi cials insisted that large tracts of 
agricultural land be switched to growing crops that were in short supply in the 
region or in Japan. Of particular concern was the shortage of food, vegetable 
oils, and fi bers such as cotton and jute. In Java, some land used for sugar 
cultivation reverted to food crops, and some to cotton. Tea and coffee estates 
were either neglected or used for food-crop cultivation; it was estimated that, 
by 1945, over half the tea plantations on Java and 28 percent of the coffee gar-
dens had been dug up (de Jong 2002: 253). In South Vietnam, rubber estates 
were switched to cotton cultivation, although most land under rice in the 
south was not converted to other crops. In Tonkin, however, the Japanese 
insisted that agricultural land under rice and maize be used for cultivation of 
jute, cotton, and hemp, as well as peanuts and castor oil plants (Dung 1995: 
table 1; Anh 1998: table 9.4). This enforced conversion of food-crop land was 
to have grave consequences for food supplies in the fi nal stages of the war. 
Rubber was needed by Japanese industry, but as transport became more 
diffi cult, some rubber plantations in Sumatra and Java were dug up and con-
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verted to other uses. Instructions on land use were often countermanded 
when new priorities emerged or simply because of bureaucratic bungling. In 
Malaya, the military authorities announced in 1942 that rubber acreage was to 
be reduced in favor of food crops but reversed this ruling in the following year. 
By 1943, production was less than one-quarter of the average for 1935–1941, 
and there was only a modest recovery the following year (Kratoska 1998: 227). 
Tin output also fell sharply in both Malaya and Indonesia. Petroleum output, 
which was crucial to the Japanese war machine, also declined. The departing 
Dutch had infl icted considerable damage on the Indonesian installations in 
early 1942, and output in 1942 was less than half that of 1938. Japanese engi-
neers were successful in repairing the damage, and in 1943 output was 90 per-
cent of the 1938 level. De Jong estimated that between April 1942 and March 
1943 around 40 percent of oil production reached Japan (2002: 236). The 
proportion fell the following year, as shipping became scarcer. Output fell rap-
idly in 1944 and 1945 (Hunter 1966: 257). In 1945, the Sumatran installations 
were subject to heavy Allied bombardment, but by then the transport of oil to 
Japan, and even within Southeast Asia, had become virtually impossible.
But it was food supplies even more than strategic raw materials that pre-
occupied the Japanese from 1942 onward. By the 1930s, Indonesia, the Phil-
ippines, and British Malaya were all net importers of rice. British Malaya 
depended on imports for around 60 percent of domestic consumption during 
the 1930s (Grist 1941: table 32). The estate regions of eastern Sumatra were 
also very dependent on imports, as were large parts of the Philippines and 
northern and central Vietnam. After 1942, there was a sizable Japanese mili-
tary population to feed and also growing numbers of Southeast Asian work-
ers who had been forcibly conscripted into various public works projects and 
had to be supplied with food and other basic necessities. Furthermore, all this 
had to be done in the context of disintegrating transport facilities. Shipping 
even in coastal waters was becoming vulnerable to Allied air attacks, and road 
transport was made more diffi cult because of gasoline shortages and lack of 
spare parts for lorries. It is far from clear whether the Japanese administrators 
realized the extent of the integration of regional rice markets within Southeast 
Asia before 1942, but even if they had done so, there was little they could do to 
preserve the prewar trading networks as hostilities continued. All they could 
do was encourage regional self-suffi ciency in food and other basic needs. 
It had been expected by wartime planners that Japan would supply a range 
of consumer goods, including textiles, clothing, household utensils, bicycles, 
and so forth, to Southeast Asia, as indeed it had done in the 1930s. But as the 
Japanese economy moved to a total war footing, production of “non essential” 
goods was curtailed, and there was little to spare for export (Pluvier 1974: 
274). The Japanese shipped a large number of idle spindles to various parts 
of Southeast Asia, and it was expected that the cotton and other fi bers pro-
duced locally would be used to produce yarn and cloth, gunny bags, and other 
products (Kratoska 1998: 195). The success of this policy was modest, and the 
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shortage of textiles grew more acute through 1944 and 1945. Many people 
resorted to old rice sacks or even tree bark to make clothing. Women in par-
ticular displayed great ingenuity in producing a range of household products, 
including textiles, soap, vegetable oils, and mats, both for their own use and 
for sale or barter. 
The increasing shortages inevitably led to smuggling and black marke-
teering. Offi cially such activities were strongly discouraged, and penalties 
were severe. In practice, lower-ranking Japanese soldiers took bribes in order 
to turn a blind eye or became actively involved themselves (Kratoska 1998: 
171; de Jong 2002: 470 – 472). The shortages of food and other basic needs 
added to infl ationary pressures, which were fueled by the increased supply of 
currency under the Japanese. The Singapore cost of living index, which stood 
at 100 in December 1941, had reached 10,980 in May 1945 (Kratoska 1998: 
203), and by late 1944, prices were also spiraling out of control in Indonesia, 
the Philip pines, Vietnam, and Burma. In Manila, the open market price of rice 
(per sack) was between eight and twelve pesos in early 1942. By December 
1944, it had reached 11,000 pesos ( Jose 1998: table 4.6). In Hanoi, the cost of 
living index for workers increased more than fi vefold between 1940 and 1944, 
and increased almost four times more in the fi rst nine months of 1945 (Direc-
tion des Services Économiques 1947: 301). These massive increases in prices 
were to lead to enormous suffering for many millions in the closing phase of 
the Pacifi c War.
While shortages contributed to the accelerating infl ation, the fundamen-
tal reason was the rapid growth in money supply engineered by the Japa-
nese authorities. Throughout the Japanese occupation of Southeast Asia, the 
Japanese continued to issue their own “scrip” or campaign money. Although 
the stated intention of the Japanese government was to use local currency as 
much as possible in the occupied areas, it was conceded that existing stocks 
of coin and banknotes would have to be supplemented with Japanese scrip in 
order to obtain essential war materials (Lebra 1975: 115). As Swan has pointed 
out, it was not the law that gave military scrip its legitimacy “but rather the 
ability of the military to maintain its authority over a territory and the large 
amount of business transacted between the military and the local population” 
(1989: 315). As more and more Japanese money, denominated in local curren-
cies, fl ooded the Southeast Asian economies (often with no serial numbers so 
that it was easy to forge), many people hoarded the old colonial money, which 
by 1945 could often be exchanged for more than twice as much Japanese scrip 
with the same face value.
In April 1942, a Southern Region Development Treasury was established 
in order to exercise some control over the release of scrip into the economies 
of Southeast Asia. But it lacked the power to veto the military, who contin-
ued to issue paper money in order to secure resources. In Indonesia, it was 
estimated that, by the end of the occupation, the amount of paper money 
in circulation had increased almost sevenfold compared with March 1942 
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(de Jong 2002: 235). In British Malaya, the Japanese used various methods to 
reduce the money in circulation, including enforced “gifts” from wealthy Chi-
nese and lotteries. But these ploys were rendered ineffective by the continued 
printing of more banknotes by the Japanese until the fi nal months of the war 
(Kratoska 1998: 213). Only in Thailand, where economic relations with Japan 
were conducted on a government-to-government basis, did the administra-
tion manage to keep some control over economic policy and currency issues 
(Swan 1989: 346). 
The Welfare Consequences of Japanese Control: 
Forced Labor, Starvation, and Premature Death
As is always the case, the impact of rapid infl ation was especially severe on 
those with fi xed money incomes and little or no ability to earn extra, either in 
cash or in kind. The plight of many pensioners was exacerbated by the refusal 
of the Japanese to honor colonial pension payments; many retired civil ser-
vants found they had nothing to live on. By 1945, poverty was so widespread 
in Malaya that the charitable institutions could not cope (Kratoska 1998: 205). 
The Japanese were alarmed at the increasing number of vagrants and destitute 
people, but there was little they could do. If the situation was bad in Malaya, 
which had been comparatively affl uent in the interwar years, it was much 
worse in other parts of the region. In Java, many small farmers were forced to 
sell whatever meager amounts of land they owned, and it was these people 
who were vulnerable to the infl ation and shortages of the fi nal phase of the 
Japanese occupation (Sato 1994: 230).
The plight of those forced to survive on fi xed incomes in a time of grow-
ing infl ation or to sell their assets, although severe, was probably not as bad as 
that of the conscripted workers. The exact number of those forced to work on 
Japanese construction projects (romusha) has almost certainly been underes-
timated by many historians, who have tended to count only those who were 
forced to move from one part of Southeast Asia to another. In the Indonesian 
context, Sato has pointed out that labor mobilization to repair damaged infra-
structure was initiated by the Japanese in 1942 as a way of alleviating unem-
ployment, especially among those who were no longer needed as workers on 
sugar, tea, and coffee estates (1994: 156–157). But as the Pacifi c War went 
badly for the Japanese, the military began to plan a massive defense buildup 
in the occupied areas. Sato quotes Japanese estimates that, by November 1944, 
2.62 million workers had been conscripted to work on a range of projects, 
including many that were intended to increase agricultural production. 
De Jong has put forward a higher fi gure of 4.1 million for the entire occu-
pation period (2002: 243). Only a small proportion of these would have been 
sent overseas; most stayed on the island where they had been recruited and 
often worked only for brief periods. The majority were in Java. Some volun-
teered in order to earn a wage and receive food. Workers were supposed to get 
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a daily ration of rice of four hundred grams if they were judged to be involved 
in hard labor, which was probably more than many other Javanese were get-
ting by 1944 and was indeed the same as the household ration given to Japa-
nese males engaged in heavy work ( Johnston 1953: 203). But conditions of 
work were often harsh, and the daily ration actually received may well have 
been much less than the mandated minimum. Mortality was certainly higher 
among laborers sent to other parts of Indonesia far from home who received 
little or no support from local populations. 
Mortality was highest for those hapless workers sent out of their own 
countries to work on projects often thousands of miles from home. Most atten-
tion has been concentrated on those who were sent to the notorious “death 
railway” that was built from Thailand into Burma. Nakahara quotes fi gures 
from Allied sources indicating that around 182,500 workers from Southeast 
Asia worked on this project, in addition to the Allied prisoners of war, mainly 
from Britain and Australia (1999: 233). Around 73,500 workers from Malaya 
were transported to the Thai-Burma and Kra railway projects; at least 30 per-
cent died (Kratoska 1998: 184; Bayly and Harper 2004: 405– 409). Many of the 
rest were from Burma, where death rates were also high. In addition, forced 
labor was used for projects within Malaya. In spite of mounting unemploy-
ment and the harsh economic climate, the Japanese in Malaya found few 
takers for employment even on local public works projects; by early 1945, 
the majority of the rural labor force was engaged in growing their own food 
(Kratoska 1998: 186–189). 
Conscription and enforced migration were also widespread in Korea, 
where many rural people were either dragooned into factories as unskilled 
workers or sent abroad. By 1944, it was estimated that 11.6 percent of the 
population was residing abroad; the percentage of adults would have been 
much higher (Cumings 1997: 175). Most of these workers came from rural 
areas in the south, where high population growth and increasing concentra-
tion of landownership was producing a large surplus of labor, which could not 
be absorbed in agriculture. Large numbers of women from Korea and other 
occupied territories were forced to become “comfort workers” in military 
brothels (Hicks 1995). In Taiwan, there was far less movement of labor; there 
was also less emphasis on heavy industrialization than in Korea, and while 
indigenous Taiwanese did serve in the Japanese army, numbers were smaller 
than in Korea. 
By 1944, the food situation had become very precarious in many parts 
of East and Southeast Asia, and hunger was widespread. In Malaya, rice avail-
ability fell sharply, but in a relatively land-abundant region it was at least 
possible to grow other foods; tapioca became an important staple even for 
the more affl uent families (Bayly and Harper 2004: 327–330). Root crops were 
also widely consumed in Indonesia and the Philippines, but it is probable that 
their availability did not prevent many premature deaths from hunger and 
malnutrition. In Java, Japanese procurements amounted to nearly 1.5 million 
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tons in 1943, which was 17 percent of prewar production. This amount fell 
only slightly in 1944, when a severe drought curtailed production of both rice 
and other food staples (Sato 1994: 122–123). It was estimated that death rates 
increased by more than 20 percent in many parts of Java between 1939 and 
1944; in some areas in Central and East Java they almost doubled (de Vries 
1946; see also Kurosawa-Inomata 1997: 126). Nitisastro cast doubt on the reli-
ability of these estimates, which he considered to be of “only very limited 
value” but agreed that mortality rates in Java and to a lesser extent other parts 
of Indonesia increased between 1944 and 1946 (1970: 119). De Jong has cited 
several eye-witness accounts of starvation in Bandung and Semarang that are 
similar to those from the contemporaneous Bengal famine (2002: 279–280). 
Apart from the serious decline in food availability, the drastic decline in medi-
cal supplies would also have led to increased death rates. 
By 1944, a very severe food situation also prevailed in northern Vietnam. 
In that year, drought and insects reduced the spring rice crop, and typhoons 
damaged the main autumn crop (Marr 1995: 96–99). In addition, almost 
170,000 hectares of food-crop land had been converted to production of jute, 
cotton, hemp, and vegetable oils. Dung has quoted estimates that these lands 
could have yielded 64,000 tons of paddy as well as tens of thousands of tons 
of maize and sweet potatoes (1995: 592). Both French and Japanese offi cials 
were aware of the food supply problem but were slow to act. Northern Viet-
nam usually depended on food imports from southern Vietnam, and while 
these were greatly reduced because of Allied air raids on both coastal shipping 
and overland transport, French and Japanese offi cials did manage to stockpile 
rice from the south for their own use. Many landlords and larger farmers also 
began to stockpile rice in anticipation of further rises in prices. By early 1945, 
a major famine had taken hold; prices of both rice and other foods including 
corn and root crops increased far more rapidly than money wages, and many 
employees in jobs that did not include food rations found themselves starv-
ing. Poorer rural families were also in a terrible position. Deaths reached their 
peak in March–May 1945 and continued up to the Japanese surrender. 
The famine in Vietnam is thought to have killed between 600,000 and 
2 million people (Pluvier 1974: 280 –281). The fi gure of 2 million was widely 
used in propaganda by the communist forces after 1945, although Marr has 
argued that the true fi gure was lower, probably around the 1 million mark 
(1995: 104). Dung has suggested that this is too low (1995: 576). A fi gure of 
at least 1.5 million is probably more realistic. In Java, de Vries estimated that 
the years 1943 –1945 cost 2.45 million lives, including the deaths of the forced 
laborers who died outside Java. This fi gure might also be too high, but it is 
likely that there were at least two million premature deaths in all Indonesia. 
American and Philippine authorities estimated that the full death toll during 
the Japanese occupation was 1.1 million people. Of these, 131,000 had been 
murdered or tortured to death by the Japanese (Pluvier 1974: 358). If it is 
assumed that excess deaths in British Malaya, Thailand, and Burma amounted 
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to at least 1 million, then the years of the Japanese occupation led to the pre-
mature deaths of more than 5 million people in Southeast Asia. These fi gures 
are only rough estimates, and the true fi gure could have been much higher. 
What is certain is that the cost of the Japanese occupation, both in lives and 
in physical destruction, was extremely high. 
August 1945 saw the dropping of two devastating nuclear bombs on Japa-
nese cities. The subsequent loss of life and destruction of property fi nally 
forced the Japanese government into the humiliation of an unconditional 
surrender. But in spite of the hardships of the occupation, the Allied troops 
who returned to Southeast Asia were not greeted as liberators by local popula-
tions. Even among those who had not supported the nationalist movements 
before 1942, the returning armies were seen as simply attempting to restore 
the colonial status quo of the pre-1942 era. There was little confi dence that, 
if the old colonial governments were reinstated, they would govern Southeast 
Asia in the interests of the indigenous populations. Many millions, especially 
the young, wanted a new political and economic order in which Southeast 
Asians would have much greater power to determine their own destinies. The 
returning colonial regimes reacted to these demands in very different ways.
The Transition to Independence in Southeast Asia, Korea, and Taiwan
The Allied armies that returned to Burma, Malaya, Indonesia, Indochina, and 
the Philippines in 1945 found not just mass poverty and starvation, but also 
considerable economic devastation. The extent of the destruction of infra-
structure, factories, and mines varied considerably by region. In Burma, where 
the retreating British had carried out a scorched earth policy in 1942 and 
Allied forces had bombed cities and other installations during the reconquest, 
the economic devastation was long-lasting “and was to impoverish more than 
one generation” (Bayly and Harper 2004: 180). In the Philippines, the Japa-
nese armed forces put up a savage resistance to the returning American forces 
led by General MacArthur. Fighting in Manila was especially fi erce, and the 
Japanese, realizing that they were encircled, embarked on a series of atrocities 
against the civilian population reminiscent of the pillage of Nanking in 1937 
(Karnow 1989: 320–321). When the Japanese were fi nally subdued, much of 
the city was reduced to rubble. 
The Americans had granted the Philippines home rule with the inaugura-
tion of the commonwealth in November 1935. It was expected that full inde-
pendence would follow within ten years. But many observers, after witnessing 
the devastation brought about by the war and by the American recapture of 
the islands, doubted that the country could cope with the enormous chal-
lenges, both political and economic, that full independence would bring. The 
American high commissioner, Paul McNutt, was known to be opposed to rapid 
granting of independence, although some Philippine politicians thought that 
if the chance was not seized promptly, the Americans might refuse to honor 
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their pledge in the future (Karnow 1989: 334). This argument won the day, 
and full independence arrived on July 4, 1946. But it was clear that the new 
republic would have to continue to depend on American economic assistance 
for reconstruction and also in dealing with internal rebellions, especially in 
parts of Luzon. 
The situation in Indonesia was very different. Key nationalist leaders, 
such as Sukarno and Hatta, had been released from prison by the Japanese 
and had cooperated with them in setting up youth groups that, although 
offi cially pro-Japan, were in fact fronts for nationalist movements whose aim 
was full political independence. When Japan surrendered unconditionally in 
August 1945, there were few Allied troops on Indonesian soil. The older gen-
eration of nationalists was uncertain how to act in the political hiatus that 
followed; their minds were made up for them by youth groups who pressed 
for an immediate declaration of independence. On August 17, two days after 
the Japanese surrender, Sukarno stood outside his house in Jakarta and read 
the Indonesian declaration of independence to a small group of onlookers 
(Ricklefs 1993: 210). 
British forces, most of them Indian, arrived in the latter part of Septem-
ber 1945 and saw their main task as disarming and repatriating the Japanese 
military before handing back power to the Dutch. By early 1946, it was clear 
that the Dutch had little interest in negotiating anything but very limited self-
government for some parts of the country. Many in the Netherlands, newly 
liberated after almost fi ve years of German occupation, saw no reason why 
the Dutch should not continue to govern Indonesia much as they had done 
before 1942. The nationalist movement was itself split on how to deal with 
Dutch intransigence. Outside Java some traditional leaders sided openly with 
the returning Dutch, fearful of their privileges in an Indonesian republic. The 
scene was set for a bitter and destructive war of attrition between Dutch and 
republican forces, which was only fi nally resolved at the end of 1949.
The situation in British Malaya was different again. Even before 1942, it 
was clear to at least some in Whitehall and in the British business community 
that the “administrative hotch potch of British territories in Malaya” would 
at some stage have to be reformed. The Japanese occupation was seen as a 
chance to work out a new system of governance that would better serve the 
interests of all the races in the peninsula (Stockwell 1974: 333–335). The new 
plan that emerged from a Colonial Offi ce planning unit was for a Malayan 
Union, embracing both the federated and the unfederated states as well as Sin-
gapore, Malacca, and Penang. The most radical aspects of the plan involved 
stripping the Malay sultans of much of their power and granting full citizen-
ship and other constitutional rights to the Chinese and the Indians. The Brit-
ish, on returning to Malaya, tried to implement the plan but ran into fi erce 
opposition, mainly from the Malays and also from elements within the British 
expatriate business and planter community. It was subsequently argued that, 
in failing to implement the plan, the British lost an opportunity to create a 
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genuinely multiracial state in Malaya (Stockwell 1984: 69). While a federal 
constitution was promulgated in 1948, it left the Malays with several impor-
tant political privileges; the Attlee government made a broad commitment to 
Malay independence but set no date, even for limited self-government.
There were several reasons why, in contrast to the situation in Indonesia, 
the Philippines, or Burma, the British both wanted and could afford to stall 
in Malaya. First, no strong independence movement had emerged during the 
war that commanded the allegiance of all ethnic groups. The communist-led 
insurgency, which became known as the “emergency,” was led by Chinese but 
was not supported by the Chinese business community or by the great major-
ity of Malays. Second, at least some British offi cials, notably the governor-gen-
eral in Southeast Asia, Malcolm MacDonald, were sympathetic to “moderate” 
Asian nationalists and anxious to avoid any impression that the British were 
ganging up with the Dutch and the French to stifl e all expressions of Asian 
nationalism (Stockwell 1984: 74 –76). And third, the British realized that, 
unlike India and Burma, Malaya could play a crucial role in earning dollars for 
what was then called the sterling area. Export production recovered quickly 
from wartime problems, and by 1952, export earnings per capita in Malaya 
were among the highest in the world (Woytinsky and Woytinsky 1955: 63). 
As Smith has pointed out, the British could afford to let Burma go along with 
India; in terms of the harsh economic realities of the post-1945 world, it had 
little value to Britain (1988: 48). But Malaya certainly did. Indeed, Britain’s 
slow decolonization of Malaya has been viewed as “inexplicable without refer-
ence to its dollar-earning capacity” (White 2000: 560).
The result was that Burma, devastated by war and plagued by unrest 
among ethnic minorities, gained independence in October 1947. Aung San, 
the only leader able to command broad support among the population, had 
already been assassinated by political rivals, and the new nation was vulner-
able to attack both from within and from without. In Malaya, the British 
adopted a policy of slow progress toward self-government that ultimately paid 
off; self-government was granted in Malaya in 1957, while two years later, 
after a sweeping victory in elections, the People’s Action Party gained power in 
Singapore. In 1963, the British granted full independence to the Federation of 
Malaysia, which included all the British territories in both peninsular Malaya 
and Borneo, except Brunei. Although Singapore left the federation two years 
later, federal Malaysia has survived and prospered.
The most prolonged and violent transition to independence was in French 
Indochina. The French, like the Dutch in Indonesia, were antagonistic to the 
nationalist leaders who had emerged during the Japanese occupation. The 
Dutch reluctance to grant independence or even a measure of autonomy to 
the nationalists was mainly based on the fear that the loss of Indonesia would 
spell the ruination of the already war-damaged Dutch economy. French reluc-
tance to compromise on sovereignty in Indochina was due more to concerns 
that any attempt to negotiate with the nationalists there would set a danger-
 The Greater Asian Co - Prosperity Sphere 161
ous precedent regarding French territories in North Africa and elsewhere in 
Africa and the Pacifi c. Ho Chi Minh pointed out in 1947 that if the French 
were prepared to do what Britain had done in India or the United States in the 
Philippines, there was no reason why the relationship with France should not 
be friendly and cooperative. But many French politicians and military offi -
cers were staunch imperialists who could not contemplate any concession to 
nationalist forces. In addition, by the end of the 1940s, they had gained more 
support from the United States, now fearful of the spread of communism in 
Asia.
The American position by the latter part of the 1940s was changing from 
one of broad anticolonialism and sympathy for Asian independence struggles 
to a more bellicose anticommunism. National liberation struggles were sup-
ported if they were clearly anticommunist but not if they were led by people 
with communist or left-wing links. It was the effective suppression of the com-
munist uprising in Madiun in East Java by nationalist forces in 1948 that tilted 
American support toward Sukarno and his government in Indonesia and away 
from the Dutch (Ricklefs 1993: 230). The French, by contrast, exploited grow-
ing American fears about the spread of communism in Asia, especially after 
the communist triumph in China, by stressing the communist sympathies of 
the Viet Minh leadership. Thus the United States supported the French cre-
ation of a unifi ed state of Vietnam within the French Union with Bao Dai as 
head of state, in spite of his obvious lack of support among the Vietnamese 
people. By convincing the United States that their military struggle against 
the Viet Minh was part of a broader Asian anticommunist struggle, the French 
gained crucial American military aid (Pluvier 1974: 446 – 451). Even after their 
military defeat in 1954, the French were able to prevent the emergence of a 
unifi ed Vietnam at the Geneva Conference of 1954. It was only in 1975, after 
another two decades of savage and destructive fi ghting, that a unifi ed Viet-
namese state fi nally emerged. 
Independence in Korea and Taiwan came far more precipitately than in 
Southeast Asia. The era of Japanese colonialism came to an abrupt end with 
the surrender of Japan in August 1945. An agreement that Soviet and American 
troops would both occupy Korea was reached at the Yalta conference; subse-
quently the Americans and the Russians decided to divide the country into two 
jurisdictions along the thirty-eighth parallel (Cumings 1997: 186–192). Taiwan, 
under the terms of the Cairo declaration of December 1943, was handed back 
to the KMT government on the mainland. Although the Taiwanese were not 
consulted about this, there is evidence that many on the island at fi rst greeted 
the decision with euphoria (Lai, Myers, and Wei 1991: 47– 48). Even Taiwan-
ese who had benefi ted from and cooperated with the Japanese regime, to the 
extent of adopting Japanese names and speaking the Japanese language, felt 
some relief that they were again joining the mainland, which was the home 
of their remote ancestors and the source of their culture. But their enthusiasm 
rapidly turned to bitter disillusion with tragic consequences. 
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There are several parallels between the situation in both Taiwan and Korea 
in 1945 and that in the Southeast Asian colonies three years earlier. Just as the 
Dutch, the British, and the French all lost face as a result of their craven capitu-
lation to or cooperation with the Japanese in 1942, so did the defeated Japa-
nese rapidly lose whatever respect they had hitherto been given by the popu-
lations in their erstwhile colonies. The economic consequences of the rupture 
with Japan for both Taiwan and Korea was even more devastating than the 
consequences of the break with Europe and the United States had been for 
the Southeast Asian colonies. Almost all their trade had been conducted with 
Japan or with its other colonies, and during the 1930s, their economies were 
developed to serve the needs of the Japanese war machine. Suddenly all these 
links were severed, Japan itself was an economic ruin, and the two former 
colonies faced an uncertain economic and political future.
In Taiwan, the KMT government was ill-prepared to tackle the challenge 
of integrating the island back into the mainland administrative and economic 
system, which was itself in a chaotic state by 1945. The impact of the Pacifi c 
War on the Taiwan economy had begun to be felt by 1943, with farm labor 
in short supply, irrigation systems neglected, and fertilizer shipments from 
Japan disrupted (Hsing 1971: 149). Taiwan suffered considerable damage from 
Allied bombings in early 1945 that destroyed ports, railways, and industrial 
complexes (Lai, Myers, and Wei 1991: 80 – 81). Large numbers of people who 
had worked for the Japanese as offi cials or members of the police and local 
militias were unemployed. Taiwan had been dependent on Japan not just for 
chemical fertilizers, but also for textile materials and machinery; supplies of 
all these dwindled to nothing by late 1945. One result was a sharp decline in 
rice output and output of other agricultural staples. 
It was estimated that in August 1945, when Taiwan was formally retro-
ceded to China, around three-quarters of the industrial capacity on the island 
and two-thirds of the power-generating capacity had been destroyed. At least 
half the railway rolling stock, track, and stations were also out of action (Hsing 
1971: 149). In Taiwan as in the Southeast Asian territories under Japanese con-
trol, the issue of banknotes expanded rapidly through 1944 and into 1945, 
with an inevitable acceleration in infl ation. Rising prices and shortages of food 
led to hoarding on the part of many producers. Those on wage incomes in 
urban areas and many small farmers in rural areas were, like their counterparts 
to the south, in a desperate situation. The unstable economic situation pre-
cipitated unrest, which exploded in antigovernment riots in 1947. These were 
suppressed with considerable loss of life; the bad relations between Taiwanese 
and mainlanders persisted after the KMT government was evicted from the 
mainland in 1949 and moved to Taiwan. Economic instability persisted into 
1950; by February of that year, the Taipei wholesale price index had reached 
554, compared with 100 in the fi rst half of 1937, and the difference between 
the offi cial and the market rate of exchange continued to widen (Lin 1973: 
34).
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The situation on the Korean peninsula over the war years was little bet-
ter. Ban has estimated that agricultural output in South Korea, which had 
grown almost 3 percent per annum through the 1930s, fell almost 3.5 percent 
per annum between 1939 and 1945 (1979: 93). The main reason appears to 
have been the sharp decline in use of purchased inputs; in 1945, the value 
of inputs, including fertilizers, other chemical inputs, seeds, and tools, had 
fallen to less than half their value (in constant 1965 prices) of 1938 (ibid.: 
table K- 4b). Conscription of rural labor, especially from the south, probably 
also contributed to the output declines. But in spite of output declines, Korean 
shipments of rice to the Japanese mainland continued until 1945, although in 
that year they were much reduced, mainly as a result of transport problems. 
After 1945, both land and labor productivities in South Korean agriculture 
experienced sustained growth. 
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C H A P T E R  9
The Transition to 
Independent States
Growth and Structural Change after 1945
Few observers surveying the economic plight of the former colonies of East 
and Southeast Asia in 1945, or indeed in 1950, could have been very optimis-
tic about their futures. Apart from the devastation of infrastructure brought 
about by Allied bombing, accelerating infl ation, and severe shortages of food 
and other basic needs, the populations of both the European and Japanese 
colonies were alienated from their former colonial masters, and, especially 
among the young, there was a growing desire to acquire more control over 
their own destinies. But how was this to be done in a world that was rap-
idly becoming polarized into rigid blocs, controlled by the United States and 
the Soviet Union? In 1946, only one country appeared to have emerged rela-
tively unscathed from the carnage, and that country, Thailand, had not been 
directly colonized. Nor had it experienced much economic growth or struc-
tural change away from smallholder agriculture in the pre-1940 era. Per capita 
GDP in 1938 was little changed from that in 1913 and only about 12 percent 
higher than in 1890 (Manarungsan 1989: 251). 
Infrastructure in Thailand was undeveloped compared to most of the 
colonies in East and Southeast Asia. While there had been some development 
of railways before 1940, road development was very limited, and the ratio of 
highway miles to area was very low compared to most other parts of East and 
Southeast Asia (Andrews 1935: 390). The expansion of rice production was 
achieved mainly through area expansion; yields remained low by Asian stan-
dards. There was little modern industry apart from rice milling. But the pro-
Japanese government that was in place during most of the war had managed 
to avoid at least some of the catastrophes that befell the European and Ameri-
can colonies. Toward the end of the Pacifi c War, it was replaced by the left-
leaning Seri Thai group led by Pridi Bhanomyong, but this government was 
unable to cope with the shortages, labor unrest, and infl ation of the immedi-
ate postwar years. It was overthrown by a group of military offi cers in 1947 
(Phongpaichit and Baker 1995: 182–186). Partly because of the subsistence 
orientation of many farmers and their minimal reliance on purchased inputs 
and partly because wartime damage to infrastructure was limited, Thailand 
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was the only country in the region where, by 1949, rice production was well 
above prewar peaks, although the Philippines had just managed to return to 
prewar output levels in that year (Table 9.1). 
Paauw has argued that, by 1950, both the Philippines, with the help of 
American assistance, and Thailand had returned to prewar output levels in 
terms of per capita GDP (1963: table 6). The estimates made by Manarungsan 
confi rm that, by 1950, real gross domestic product was around one-third 
higher than in 1938 (1989: 251); in per capita terms it was roughly the same. 
In the Philippines, total national product was estimated by Goodstein to have 
been around 11 percent higher in 1948 than in 1938, although per capita 
national product was signifi cantly lower (1962: table 1-1). But the Philippines 
experienced rapid growth of per capita gross national product after 1946; in 
the decade from 1946 to 1956, it more than doubled, which was almost cer-
tainly a faster rate of recovery than in any other part of Asia. Per capita con-
sumption expenditures also doubled, indicating a signifi cant improvement in 
living standards (National Economic and Development Authority 1978: table 
4.1.1). By 1956, total national product was thought to have been around 84 
percent higher than in 1938; per capita output was also much higher than in 
1938 in spite of rapid population growth after 1945 (Goodstein 1962). 
Elsewhere in Southeast Asia, the process of postwar rehabilitation was 
much slower; indeed, the evidence indicates that by 1959 neither Burma nor 
Indonesia, nor South Vietnam, nor British Malaya had returned to prewar 
levels of per capita GDP (van der Eng 2002: 172; Booth 2003a: table 2; Bassino 
unpublished). In the case of Burma, per capita GDP growth was quite rapid 
during the 1950s; the slow return to prewar levels was a consequence of the 
devastation of the 1940s. In Indonesia and South Vietnam, slow growth in 
per capita GDP in the 1950s, especially the latter part of the decade, also con-
tributed to the slow recovery to prewar output levels (Table 9.2). Maddison’s 
Table 9.1. Rice Production as a Percentage of the Prewar Peak, 1946 –1960
Colony a 1946 1949 1955 1960
Cochinchina (1939/1940) 35.4 40.3 60.7 107.9
Burma (1939) 48.4 57.7 75.9 89.2
Taiwan (1938) 63.8 86.7 115.2 136.4
Java (1941) 75.0 86.6 98.0 108.1
British Malaya (1938) 75.9 90.7 102.0 141.3
Philippines (1940/1941) 85.5 106.8 134.1 151.7
Thailand (1941) 86.8 129.3 141.8 152.1
Sources: Taiwan: Executive Yuan 1962: 27; Cochinchina: Wiegersma 1988: 177; Ministry of National 
Economy 1962: 173; Java: van der Eng 1994: table A1; Central Bureau of Statistics 1968: 93; Burma: 
Saito and Lee 1999: 81; Thailand: Central Statistical Offi ce 1955: 154; British Malaya: Rose 1985: 
208, 216; Philippines: Mears et al. 1974: 355–356. 
a Figures in parentheses indicate the peak year before 1942. 
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estimates for Malaysia (i.e., British Malaya excluding Singapore and including 
Sarawak and North Borneo) indicate that the 1939 level of per capita GDP was 
not reached again until 1962. Per capita GDP growth in Singapore during the 
1950s was also slow (Maddison 2003: 183–185).
Taiwan, having experienced considerable destruction through bombing 
in the fi nal phase of the Pacifi c War, also struggled to regain pre-1942 levels 
of output after the end of the Japanese colonial era. By April 1946, the last 
Japanese soldier had left Taiwan, and the American Liaison Group also with-
drew. The reins of government were handed over to the mainland Chinese 
KMT regime, who installed General Chen Yi as high commissioner. The result 
was three years of administrative misrule that severely hindered economic 
recovery (Kerr 1966: 97–142; Lin 1973: 27–33). Infl ation had already taken 
hold in the fi nal phase of the Japanese era and was fueled after 1946 by large 
government defi cits. According to Kerr, word quickly spread on the mainland 
that substantial Japanese assets were available for the taking, and thousands 
of carpetbaggers streamed in, mainly from Shanghai (1966: 97–98). The new-
comers had money or could arrange to get it from mainland banks, and work-
ing together with the new government, they rapidly acquired many Japanese 
and joint Japanese-Taiwanese enterprises. 
The takeover of Japanese property was done in the name of “Necessary 
State Socialism,” but the corruption and mismanagement was so blatant that 
it caused immense resentment among many Taiwanese. The presence of thou-
sands of poorly paid and equipped mainland troops also contributed to the 
looting of property owned by indigenous Taiwanese as well as by the depart-
ing Japanese. Food stockpiled by the Japanese army was immediately confi s-
cated, but in addition, many Taiwanese farmers had to give rice and other 
produce to the government, precipitating food shortages in what had always 
Table 9.2. Index of Per Capita GDP, 1950 –1970 (1960 = 100)
 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970
Singapore n.a. n.a. 100 120.5 196.2
Taiwan 62.3 87.4 100 139.1 183.0
Korea (South) 77.3 96.5 100 119.5 182.5
Thailand 77.2 90.7 100 121.6 159.6
Malaysia 92.7 99.4 100 119.1 133.2
Philippines 72.8 93.1 100 110.7 125.5
Indonesia 85.2 101.1 100 100.0 120.8
Laos 104.7 102.6 100 96.0 115.9
Burma 64.5 83.2 100 111.6 108.9
Vietnam (South) 84.6 96.9 100 112.3 105.2
Cambodia 84.8 86.7 100 104.1 97.6
Source: World Bank 1976.
Note: n.a. = not available. 
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been a food-surplus island. Mounting infl ation also contributed to the woes 
of urban people who could no longer afford to buy food and other necessities. 
By 1947, popular resentment had boiled over into armed revolt, which was 
brutally suppressed. Many educated Taiwanese, who had been the most vocal 
critics of Chen Yi’s misrule, lost their lives. 
The fi nal defeat of the KMT on the mainland and the advent of around 1.5 
million mainlanders in 1949 did bring some benefi ts to Taiwan. Many skilled 
professionals, managers, and administrators arrived who were able to fi ll at 
least some of the gaps left by the departing Japanese. Some brought both capi-
tal and technical expertise in manufacturing industry. The KMT government 
was able to impose a monetary reform, which did fi nally bring down the rate 
of infl ation. Massive American aid permitted the imports of key commodities 
including soybean, cotton, and fertilizers (Lin 1973: 33–38). Aid and improve-
ments in tax collection reduced the government defi cit. Steps were also taken 
to improve the lot of rural Taiwanese. The Chinese-American Joint Commis-
sion on Rural Reconstruction was set up and began to tackle the problems in 
the rural economy, although the terms of trade facing farmers continued to 
deteriorate until 1954 (ibid.: 206). Greater availability of fertilizer boosted rice 
production, although prewar production levels were not regained until the 
early 1950s (see Table 9.1). Sugar production had not regained prewar levels 
by 1960; the loss of protected markets in Japan was a blow from which the 
industry never fully recovered. 
By 1953, real per capita income in Taiwan had returned to the prewar 
peak, in spite of the 60 percent increase in population (Hsing 1971: 152). From 
1953 onward, growth in Taiwan was new, rather than simply catching up to 
prewar levels. Aid infl ows played an important role in the rapid recovery and 
continued growth of the Taiwanese economy between 1946 and 1961; during 
these years per capita US aid fl ows were higher than in any other country in 
the region (Table 9.3). According to Hsing, the Americans, in disbursing proj-
ect aid, favored infrastructure projects such as electric power and transport 
Table 9.3. American Aid Per Capita, 1946–1948, 1949–1952, and 1953–1961 
(US dollars, annual averages over the years shown)
 1946 –1948 1949 –1952 1953 –1961
Taiwan 30.92 23.99 35.16
Korea (South) 3.44 6.50 21.19
Vietnam (South) n.a. n.a. 18.92
Thailand 0.11 1.29 2.59
Philippines 5.84 8.65 2.21
British Malaya n.a. n.a. 0.35
Indonesia 0.31 0.36 0.33
Source: Kang 2002: 43. Population data from World Bank 1976.
Note: n.a. = not available.
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(1971: 192–198); in the fi rst part of the 1950s, aid funds covered half of total 
gross capital formation. But some part of the aid did go to the agricultural sec-
tor and especially to the implementation of the land reform program, which 
is examined more fully below. 
In Korea, the post-1945 problems were more serious than in Taiwan and 
took longer to resolve. The end of Japanese rule and the division of the country 
“created extreme disorganization in every aspect of Korean society” (Kim and 
Roemer 1979: 25). The departure of almost all Japanese managers and techni-
cians led to a sharp fall in manufacturing output; many plants had to suspend 
production completely because of a lack of raw materials and managerial staff. 
Kim and Roemer have estimated that industrial output in the south in 1948 
was only about 15 percent of the 1939 level (ibid.: 27). The southern sector 
experienced a surge in population, due to refugees from the north and also 
to the repatriation of migrant workers from Japan and other parts of the for-
mer Japanese empire. Food availability per capita declined sharply, and South 
Korea became dependent on food aid from the United States.
The division of the Korean peninsula together with the communist vic-
tories in China created a highly unstable political situation. In 1950, troops 
from the north crossed the line of partition and tried to set up a unifi ed state. 
Seoul, the capital of the southern zone, fell to the invading army. The bitter 
war that followed involved large numbers of foreign troops from the United 
States and its allies and from China and the Soviet Union. The fi ghting was 
brought to an end after three years with an armistice agreement in 1953 that 
effectively returned the country to the pre-1950 status quo. The war caused 
massive devastation of private dwellings, industrial plants, and infrastructure. 
In addition, many people were forced to move from their ancestral homes, 
and at least 2 million Koreans from both north and south, many of them 
civilians, perished. It was estimated that real output of agriculture, forestry, 
mining, and manufacturing in South Korea was only 73 percent of 1940 lev-
els in 1953; in per capita terms, commodity output had fallen by almost half 
(Kim and Roemer 1979: 35). Such was the fall in productive capacity that “the 
Korean economy in 1953 could be managed only with a massive infl ow of 
foreign relief and aid” (ibid.: 39).
By the late 1950s, it was clear that, within Southeast Asia, Thailand and 
the Philippines were undergoing structural change away from agriculture and 
toward industry (Paauw 1963: 575–577). In Taiwan also, the share of agricul-
ture in GDP was falling and that of industry increasing (Hsing 1971: 274). By 
1960, the percentage of GDP accruing from agriculture in the former colonies 
varied considerably; it was still more than 50 percent in Indonesia and Cam-
bodia but below 30 percent in Burma, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Singapore 
(Table 9.4). But a fall in the percentage accruing from agriculture did not nec-
essarily mean that there was an increase in the share of manufacturing indus-
try. In a number of countries, the share of the tertiary sector, including gov-
ernment services, had increased rapidly after 1950. In many former colonies, 
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agriculture and manufacturing industry together accounted for only around 
half of total GDP (Table 9.4). 
In 1960, in spite of a sluggish growth performance since 1945, Singapore 
and the Federation of Malaya had the highest per capita GDP among the for-
mer colonial territories, with Taiwan, the Philippines, Thailand, and South 
Korea behind them (Table 9.5). Indonesia and Burma were well behind South 
Korea. These two economies remained behind throughout the 1960s. Several 
observers attributed their poor performance to a failure to relink effectively 
to the world economy; this argument is examined further below. There was 
Table 9.5. Per Capita GDP (1985 US dollars), 1955, 1960, 1965, 1970
 1955 1960 1965 1970
Japan 2,108 3,052 4,663 7,676
Singapore n.a. 1,649 1,866 2,994
Malaysia 1,352 1,497 1,687 2,106
Korea (South) 876 899 1,047 1,694
Thailand 728 969 1,184 1,573
Philippines 1,043 1,165 1,248 1,433
Indonesia n.a. 589 545 640
Burma 252 315 415 418
Source: Penn World Tables, version 5.6 (from http://datacentre.chass.utoronto.ca)
Note: Although the Federation of Malaysia included Singapore until 1965, the data given here refer 
to Malaysia excluding Singapore in 1955, 1960, and 1970. Data are adjusted for changes in the 
terms of trade.
n.a. = not available. 
Table 9.4. Agricultural and Manufacturing Shares of GDP: 1960 and 1970
 Agriculture / GDP Manufacturing / GDP
 1960 1970 1960 1970
Indonesia 53.9 47.2 8.4 9.3
Cambodia 51.0 38.3 10.1 11.7
Thailand 39.6 28.3 10.4 12.2
Korea (South) 36.9 28.1 11.2 17.2
Malaysia 33.4 26.5 7.3 11.5
Vietnam (South) 30.4 31.5 9.6 5.6
Philippines 27.8 29.7 16.2 15.6
Burma 27.1 38.0 8.6 10.4
Taiwan 26.4 15.0 13.6 18.7
Singapore 5.7 2.8 8.7 19.1
Source: World Bank 1976.
Note: Although the Federation of Malaysia included Singapore until 1965, the data given here refer 
to Malaysia excluding Singapore in both 1960 and 1970. 
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still, in 1960, little evidence pointing to the very different performance of the 
former colonies in coming decades; few would have predicted the stellar post-
1960 performance of South Korea or Taiwan from their growth performance 
in the 1950s, and few would have forecast the disappointing post-1960 perfor-
mance of the Philippines. By 1970, this was changing; Taiwan, South Korea, 
and Singapore all experienced growth in per capita GDP of 80 percent or more 
during the 1960s, and the share of manufacturing industry in total output had 
undergone a considerable increase (see Tables 9.2 and 9.4). The Philippines, by 
contrast, experienced much more modest per capita growth during the 1960s, 
and the share of manufacturing industry in total output fell slightly.
A further aspect of structural change in Southeast Asia that might help to 
explain the divergent outcomes after 1960 concerns the role of government. 
Most of the newly independent countries in Southeast Asia, even the more 
pro-Western ones, such as the Philippines and Thailand, were inclined toward 
a more activist view of the state than the colonial powers had been. This 
involved not just higher levels of public expenditures relative to GDP, but also 
direct government involvement in production through state-owned enter-
prises. Planning offi ces were established throughout the region, and a variety 
of development plans were produced. To quote a United Nations publication: 
“The actual extent of planning has varied from country to country. Mainland 
China and other centrally planned economies of the region have attempted 
to implement plans affecting their entire economies. In other countries the 
plans deal only or mainly with the major programmes to be implemented in 
the public sector and, in several of them, lay down production and invest-
ment targets for the private sector” (United Nations ECAFE 1961: 54). 
If one of the purposes of the increased emphasis on the role of govern-
ment in the economy was to bring about an increase in the share of govern-
ment domestic revenues and expenditures, and especially government invest-
ment expenditures, relative to GDP, outcomes by the latter part of the 1950s 
in different parts of Asia were very mixed. Comparing government revenues 
and expenditures per capita in the 1950s with those in the 1930s is diffi -
cult because exchange rates were overvalued in many parts of Asia after 1950, 
which makes conversion into dollars problematic. But there is ample evidence 
that, compared with the colonial regimes, several newly independent coun-
tries found domestic revenue mobilization diffi cult. The rapid increase in 
world prices for a range of agricultural and mineral products that occurred in 
the early 1950s as a result of the Korean War led to a windfall increase in gov-
ernment revenues in primary exporting countries, as taxes on foreign trade 
still accounted for a large proportion of all taxes. But the war boom collapsed 
rapidly, and in most parts of Southeast Asia, government revenues were less 
than 15 percent of GDP by 1957 (Table 9.6). 
Government expenditures were higher than domestic revenues in most 
of the former colonies, which refl ected the important role of foreign aid, espe-
cially in the case of Taiwan and South Korea. It was in these two economies 
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together with Burma that government investment accounted for around 9 
percent of GDP in 1957. Elsewhere government investment was below 5 per-
cent of GDP (see Table 9.6). Much of this investment went toward the repair 
and rebuilding of war-damaged infrastructure; very few of the former colo-
nies in East and Southeast Asia had been able, by the end of the 1950s, to 
add substantially to the stock of infrastructure that had been in place by the 
late 1930s. The evidence on installed capacity of electric power illustrates this 
point. By 1959, there was wide variation in installed capacity per capita, with 
Singapore and Taiwan at the top of the rankings (Table 9.7). In Taiwan, the fi g-
ure was about 50 percent higher than the prewar fi gure, and there was an even 
more rapid increase in the Philippines, albeit from a lower base. But elsewhere 
there was little change (see Table 4.7). In South Korea, installed capacity was, 
in 1959, well below the fi gure for the whole of Korea in the late 1930s, refl ect-
ing both the damage infl icted during the Korean War and the fact that much 
of the capacity installed in the Japanese era was in the north of the country.
It would be simplistic to argue that the relatively high ratios of govern-
ment investment to GDP in the latter part of the 1950s were in themselves 
a crucial determinant of future economic growth. Taiwan, South Korea, and 
Burma all managed quite high ratios in spite of the fact that around 30 percent 
of government expenditures in all these economies was devoted to defense. 
But after 1960, Taiwan and South Korea forged ahead in terms of economic 
growth, while Burma fell behind. To seek the explanation for this, we have 
to look in more detail at the way in which these economies responded to the 
changing opportunities for international trade in the post-1950 world econ-
Table 9.6. Government Expenditures and Revenues as a Percentage of 
GDP, and Investment and Defense Expenditures as a Percentage of Total 
Expenditures, 1957
 Percentage of GDP Percentage of Government Expenditures
 Government Government Government
 Expenditures Revenues Investment Investment Defense
Taiwan 30 20 10 32 34
Burma 25 20 10 39 28
Korea (South) 22 11 9 40 30
Federation of Malaya  19 17 3 25 16
Thailand 16 12 5 29 22
Indonesia 15 12 2 11 15
Cambodia 14 12 n.a. n.a. 28
Philippines 12 11 3 22 14
Source: United Nations ECAFE 1961: tables 22, 24, 25, 32, 33.
Note: Federation of Malaya excludes Singapore and includes the former federated and unfederated 
states. 
n.a. = not available. 
172 Chapter 9
omy. We also have to take into account the changes in political leadership 
that occurred during the 1960s.
Inward- and Outward-Looking Economic Policies
In a well-known paper written in the mid-1960s, the Burmese economist Hla 
Myint drew a distinction between what he termed the “inward-” and “out-
ward-” looking economies of Southeast Asia. He argued that, by the early 
1960s, two discernible patterns of economic development had emerged in 
South east Asia, typifi ed by Burma and Indonesia, on the one hand, and Malay-
sia, Thailand, and the Philippines, on the other. (He did not explicitly consider 
the countries of former Indochina, and he did not examine Taiwan and South 
Korea). Myint pointed out that while all the countries of Southeast Asia shared 
a common reaction after independence to what might be termed the “colo-
nial economic pattern,” the nature of the reaction differed between these two 
groups. Governments in the Philippines, Thailand, and (British) Malaya
seemed to have sensed early that it would be easier and quicker to change 
the economic structure and the pattern of distribution of incomes and 
economic activities if the total volume of national output were expand-
ing rapidly than in a situation of economic stagnation or slow growth. 
They also seemed to have realised that, given the basic conditions of their 
economies, the key to expanding their total national product was to be 
found in expanding the volume of their exports. Since a large share of 
these exports was produced by the foreign-owned mines and plantations, 
Table 9.7. Electric Power Generation: Installed Capacity, Total and 
Per Capita, 1959
 Installed Capacity, 1959 Per Capita
Country (megawatts) (megawatts per million people)
Singapore 152.0 (4.1) 97.3
Taiwan 632.8 (2.1) 61.8
Malayan Federation 307.0 (2.2) 39.0
Philippines 434.7 (2.6) 16.4
South Korea 374.8 (1.4) 15.5
South Vietnam 97.6 (1.5) 7.2
Thailand 160.3 (3.8) 6.2
Burma 105.2 (3.5) 4.8
Cambodia 21.4 (3.2) 4.1
Indonesia 277.0 (1.6) 3.0
Laos 3.6 (1.8) 1.6
Sources: United Nations ECAFE 1962: 28; World Bank 1976.
Note: Figures in parentheses show 1959 installed capacity as a ratio of that in 1951. 
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the governments of these countries took care to guarantee the security 
of foreign property and freedom to remit profi ts, and generally created 
a favorable economic environment which encouraged the foreign enter-
prises not only to continue their existing production but also to undertake 
new investments, to strike out into new lines of exports and to introduce 
new methods of production and organization. (Myint 1967: 2–3)
In contrast, Myint continued, the political leaderships of Burma and Indo-
nesia at that time “were obsessed by the fear” that once foreign enterprises 
were allowed to reestablish themselves or expand their operations, they would 
resume their old stranglehold over the economy and reimpose the colonial 
economic pattern whereby most profi ts were remitted abroad, and the local 
populations gained little benefi t from the exploitation of the economy’s abun-
dant natural resources. Myint argued that both countries did little to attract 
new investment and indeed nationalized many foreign-owned fi rms. In the 
latter part of the 1950s, after the failure in the United Nations of a resolu-
tion on Indonesian sovereignty over West New Guinea, the Indonesian gov-
ernment proceeded to nationalize all remaining Dutch-owned enterprises in 
Indonesia and expel almost all their staff (Anspach 1969: 191–192). The Dutch 
enterprises were, for the most part, converted into state-owned enterprises 
and have remained in government hands down to the present day. Lacking 
skilled administrators to run such a wide diversity of companies, including 
estates, banks, trading houses, and industrial enterprises, many were turned 
over to the military or to nominees of political parties, often with unfortunate 
consequences for their management.
Both the Indonesian and Burmese governments also adopted policies hos-
tile to their Chinese and Indian minorities, so that many left either for their 
ancestral homelands or to settle in third countries. But in spite of much rheto-
ric supporting “indigenism,” policies toward indigenous producers, especially 
of exports, were also often hostile. In both countries, smallholder producers 
of export crops were taxed through export taxes and marketing boards, and 
there was little investment in infrastructure or new cultivation technologies 
that would directly benefi t smallholder producers. The increasingly overval-
ued exchange rates led to greatly increased smuggling of traded goods in the 
border regions of Burma, while in Indonesia, many of the export-producing 
regions outside Java virtually seceded from the national economy and were 
conducting their own export and import trade with neighboring Malaysia and 
with the Philippines.
Even among the countries that Myint considered were pursuing “open-
type” policies after 1950s, there were considerable differences in both policies 
and outcomes in the two decades from 1950 to 1970. In their study of the 
transition in the open dualistic economies of East and Southeast Asia, Paauw 
and Fei distinguished between those countries characterized by neocolonial-
ism (Malaya and Thailand) and those characterized by economic national-
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ism (Taiwan and the Philippines) (1973: 77–89). The neocolonial countries 
continue to rely on free market systems to facilitate the growth of traditional 
export staples, while the nationalists use controls to facilitate import substitu-
tion, leading to the rapid growth of domestic industrial capacity to replace 
imported goods. Broadly, the neocolonial path was adopted by both Thai-
land and Malaya because both countries were still, after 1950, characterized by 
favorable natural resource endowments. In addition, a lack of entrepreneur-
ship and capital among the indigenous population coupled with distrust of 
the migrant minorities on the part of the political elite militated against the 
adoption of policies favoring rapid domestic industrialization. In Thailand, 
state enterprises were the favored vehicle for industrialization until the Sarit 
regime assumed power in 1957. Thereafter, the government embarked on an 
import-substitution strategy, with substantial foreign participation, usually 
through joint ventures with Sino-Thai business groups. 
In both the Philippines and Taiwan, alien minorities played a much 
smaller role in the nonagricultural sectors of the economy, and industrial 
interests had more political power from the early 1950s onward. But the tran-
sition process in these two countries, although broadly within the economic 
nationalist mold, differed in important respects. In Taiwan, the import-sub-
stituting phase was remarkably short; already by the early 1960s agricultural 
exports accounted for less than 50 percent of all exports (Paauw and Fei 1973: 
273). The speed of the transition was in large part due to the supply of entre-
preneurs, many of whom had come from the mainland. To begin with, manu-
factured exports from Taiwan were concentrated in labor-intensive products 
such as textiles, garments, and footwear. Increasingly after 1960, more tech-
nologically sophisticated industrial processes were mastered, and manufac-
tured exports became far more diversifi ed into products that Taiwan had not 
produced at all, or only in very small quantities, during the import-substitu-
tion phase (Nelson and Pack 1999: 418–419).
Apart from the supply of entrepreneurial talent and capital, Paauw and Fei 
also stressed the crucial role of agricultural modernization in the transition to 
export-oriented growth (1973: 114–115). They argued that government poli-
cies, including land reform, agricultural cooperatives, extension services, and 
infrastructure investment played an important role in modernizing Taiwanese 
agriculture, in addition to private initiatives. During the 1950s, Taiwan was 
able to build on the Japanese legacy in the agricultural sector, and the rapid 
gains in agricultural productivity facilitated the release of labor into nonag-
ricultural employment. To the extent that this was rural-based, industrializa-
tion took place without rapid urbanization, and many rural households were 
able to diversify their incomes away from total reliance on agriculture without 
physically relocating to the towns. There is considerable evidence that, since 
the 1950s, farm households in Taiwan earned their income increasingly from 
off-farm and nonagricultural sources (Ho 1986: table 4.2).
The transition to export-oriented growth in Taiwan was accompanied by 
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a change in the balance of trade; whereas in the colonial era there had been a 
large export surplus, throughout the 1950s, imports exceeded exports, often 
by a large margin (Table 9.8). In the Philippines as well, the balance of trade 
was negative for most years from 1949 onward (Power and Sicat 1971: 37). Per-
haps paradoxically, it was in Burma and Indonesia, the two Southeast Asian 
economies that had run large current account surpluses in the prewar era, that 
the balance of trade remained in surplus throughout much of the 1950s (Table 
9.8). Although there were large defi cits in services in both economies, espe-
cially Indonesia, during most of the 1950s, the current account was in surplus 
(Rosendale 1978: 146). The reasons for these surpluses are not entirely clear; 
in the early 1950s, they were the result of the rapid surge in export prices as 
a result of the Korean War boom. Later in the decade, slow overall economic 
growth together with import controls and a complex multiple exchange rate 
system appear to have depressed import demand. 
In most of the former colonies in East and Southeast Asia, the share of 
the former metropolitan powers in total exports and imports fell after 1950 
(Table 9.9). This refl ected a trend toward diversifi cation of trade fl ows that 
was common to almost all former colonies in the postindependence period 
(Kleiman 1976: 478). In those colonies where trade fl ows before 1940 had 
been very tightly tethered to the metropolitan power, the decline was quite 
Table 9.8. Commodity Export Earnings as a Percentage of Commodity 
Import Earnings, 1950–1965
 Burma Indonesia Taiwan
1950 153 176 n.a.
1951 144 139 n.a.
1952 134 92 58
1953 134 110 68
1954 123 138 48
1955 126 159 70
1956 126 102 57
1957 77 123 67
1958 95 154 71
1959 100 153 66
1960 87 118 69
1961 103 77 67
1962 121 97 75
1963 115 122 108
1964 87 132 114
1965 91 148 89
Sources: Burma: Saito and Lee 1999: 185; Indonesia: Rosendale 1978: 146; Taiwan: Hsing 1971: 
279–280.
Note: n.a. = not available. 
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marked; in Taiwan, for example, Japan’s share of total exports fell from more 
than 90 percent in 1938 to less than 40 percent by 1960. There was a similar 
fall in the share of imports coming from Japan. By 1960, Taiwan was sourcing 
more imports from the United States, which was in part at least a refl ection 
of the large American aid fl ows (Table 9.9). In the Philippines, the share of 
the United States in total exports fell, while that of Japan rose, although the 
United States remained the country’s most important trading partner. In Indo-
nesia, where the Netherlands only accounted for around 20 percent of export 
and import trade in 1938, the proportion had fallen to virtually nothing by 
1960, refl ecting the hostile nature of the bilateral relationship after the expro-
priation of Dutch assets in 1958–1959. 
The transition to rapid export-oriented growth in Taiwan in the 1960s has 
often been compared with that in South Korea. Certainly the experience of 
both these economies had become an important model for other developing 
countries, in Asia and elsewhere, by the 1980s, although there were important 
differences in the policies they adopted (Wade 1990: 320–325). In the 1950s, 
South Korea followed a “one-sided policy of import substitution” with export 
growth playing a minimal role in overall economic growth. In the 1960s, 
trade and exchange rate policies were reformed, and there was a rapid switch 
to export-oriented growth, leading some commentators to talk of an “unbal-
anced export-oriented industrialization strategy” (Kim and Roemer 1979: 
136–137). By 1970, manufacturing output was a slightly lower proportion of 
GDP in South Korea than in Taiwan, although higher than in any Southeast 
Asian country except Singapore, where per capita GDP was much higher and 
the agricultural sector tiny (see Table 9.4). Like Taiwan, South Korea after 1960 
was extremely successful in increasing exports in sectors that had not devel-
oped at all during the colonial and immediate postcolonial years. 
Reforming Land Tenure and Promoting Agricultural Growth
In the aftermath of depression, war, and foreign occupations, the problem 
of land tenure was of paramount importance in the minds of many of the 
nationalists who came to power in the decade after the Japanese defeat. Even 
more than in the late 1930s, all the colonial territories in East and Southeast 
Asia were still basically agricultural economies in 1945, with the majority of 
their labor forces relying on agriculture for most of their income. Yet there 
was a widespread conviction that many of those employed in agriculture were 
somehow being cheated of their just rewards, and in some parts of Asia, this 
conviction was already spilling over into armed insurrections. The grievances 
centered on three key issues: tenancy, large estates, and growing landlessness. 
It was already obvious by the late 1930s that tenancy was widespread in both 
Taiwan and Korea as well as in Lower Burma and the Philippines (see Table 
3.5). But the causes were very different in different colonies. In Burma, ten-
ancy was the result of dispossession of indigenous cultivators by Indian mon-
eylenders, while in Korea it was due to widespread ownership of land by both 
Table 9.9. Percentage Breakdown of Exports and Imports by Main Trading 
Partners, 1938 and 1960
 Percentage of Exports Percentage of Imports
 1938 1960 1938 1960
Burma
United Kingdom 16.9 9.8 20.2 14.3
India a 51.0 34.8 49.2 13.0
United States 0.2 0.4 4.4 3.8
Japan 2.3 5.1 8.7 22.5
British Malaya
United Kingdom 14.1 12.5 18.2 15.0
Other British 17.5 16.2 17.9 17.6
United States n.a. 11.3 n.a. 4.0
Western Europe n.a. 20.4 n.a. 9.3
Indonesia
Netherlands 20.0 0.3 22.2 3.1
United States 14.2 23.0 12.6 15.7
Japan 3.1 4.1 15.0 16.0
Singapore 17.0 23.1 7.6 2.2
French Indochina b
France 47.2 35.8 52.3 21.3
United States 8.6 4.4 5.1 25.5
Japan 3.1 2.8 3.1 21.9
Hong Kong 9.7 8.6 7.2 0.3
Philippines
United States 83.0 50.9 69.6 44.6
Japan 5.1 23.5 9.6 26.4
Taiwan
Japan 92.0 37.4 89.4 34.6
United States 0.9 12.5 0.7 40.8
Hong Kong 0.2 11.5 0.0 2.0
Korea c
Japan 73.2 47.4 88.5 21.9
United States 0.4 16.7 1.7 45.4
China d 23.7 19.4 6.5 2.0
Sources: Burma: Andrus 1948: 167–176; Central Statistical and Economics Department 1963: 
tables 110, 115; British Malaya: Department of Statistics 1939: 114; Department of Statistics 1961; 
Indonesia: Central Bureau of Statistics 1959: 108–109; Central Bureau of Statistics 1968: 206–207; 
French Indochina: Direction des Services Économiques 1947: 290–292; South Vietnam: Ministry 
of National Economy 1962: 328–330. Philippines: Bureau of Census and Statistics 1941: table 120; 
National Economic and Development Authority 1975: table 12.3. Taiwan: Grajdanzev 1942: 144; 
Hsing 1971: 284–285; Korea: Grajdanzev 1944: 227; Economic Planning Board 1967: 210–211. 
Note: n.a. = not available.
a 1960 data refer to Pakistan, India, and Sri Lanka.
b 1960 data refer to South Vietnam only.
c Data refer to 1939 and 1961. The 1961 data refer to South Korea only.
d In 1938, China includes Manchuria. In 1960, China refers to Hong Kong and Taiwan only. 
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indigenous and Japanese landlords. In Taiwan and the Philippines as well as 
in southern Vietnam, indigenous landlords predominated.
Large estates run along capitalist lines, employing substantial numbers 
of wage workers and often owned by foreign interests, were important in the 
development of export crops in British Malaya, Indonesia, South Vietnam, 
and the Philippines. Increasingly after 1945, they were the focus of intense 
resentment from various nationalist and radical forces, for whom they exem-
plifi ed exploitation on the part of either foreign corporations or domestic 
“comprador capitalists.” But should these estates be nationalized and run 
by domestic corporations, either state-owned or private? Or should they be 
divided up among smallholder farmers? The case for converting estates into 
smallholdings was especially strong in regions where population growth was 
outstripping available supplies of arable land and where landlessness and near 
landlessness was an increasing problem. They included Java, parts of Suma-
tra and Sulawesi, and parts of the Philippines and Vietnam. Even in those 
regions considered land abundant in the pre-1940 era, landlessness was grow-
ing, and confl icts over land were increasingly violent after 1945. In North 
Sumatra, where the postwar migration of Bataks from their traditional home-
lands added to existing population pressures, demands for the redistribution 
of estate lands were becoming more pressing, while in the central plains of 
Thailand, both tenancy and the numbers of landless were increasing (Feith 
1962: 293–297; Phongpaichit and Baker 1995: 38–39). 
Newly independent or about to become independent governments in East 
and Southeast Asia reacted to these demands for agrarian reform in different 
ways. Perhaps the most successful, and certainly the most quoted, example 
of agrarian reform was that carried out in Taiwan between 1949 and 1953. In 
1949, the KMT government enacted a rent reduction program that aimed to 
reduce rents and increase the security of tenants. This program was followed 
by the sale of part of the public lands owned by the Japanese state until 1945 
to Taiwanese cultivators who had been leasing the land. Then in 1953, the 
“Land to the Tiller” program was implemented; this consisted of the compul-
sory purchase of tenanted farm land and its resale to those who were actually 
cultivating the land (Apthorpe 1979: 521–522). The result of these policies 
was that, by 1955, more than 80 percent of farmers in Taiwan were either full 
or part owner-operators, while only 17 percent were pure tenants, compared 
with 41 percent in 1945 (Mao 1982: table 1).
A number of extravagant claims have been made about the impact of the 
Taiwanese reform program; a not untypical claim is that it “created the foun-
dation for both economic growth and an equitable distribution of income and 
wealth” (Orme 1995: 41). In fact, the reform did not have a dramatic impact 
on the size distribution of operated holdings, which was already quite equal 
in the Japanese era (Apthorpe 1979: 529). Nor is it clear what the contribution 
of the reform policies was to subsequent agricultural growth in Taiwan, as a 
number of other important development programs in the agricultural sector 
 The Transition to Independent States 179
were also being implemented at the same time. Thus it is probably wrong 
to argue that agrarian reform by itself had a dramatic impact on output per 
hectare or per worker, both of which increased steadily during the 1950s and 
1960s (Lee and Chen 1979: table T-1a). However, the granting of secure title 
to cultivators undoubtedly did, at the margin, encourage greater use of inputs 
such as fertilizer and improved seeds and increased the net wealth of many 
rural families.
In Korea after 1945, the implementation of land reform proceeded rather 
differently than in either Japan or Taiwan. In the north, a fi ve-hectare limit was 
placed on holding size, which “did away with perennially high rates of ten-
ancy” (Cumings 1997: 428). It would not have made much difference to oper-
ated holding sizes, as by the late 1930s very few operated holdings exceeded 
fi ve hectares (see Table 3.4). But the cultivators received secure title to land 
that they could pass on to their children, although the land was “socialized” 
in the sense that it could not be sold on the market. In the south, the gov-
ernment of President Rhee was not supportive of radical reform, and Rhee 
vetoed the Land Reform Act of 1949, although this veto was subsequently 
voted down by the legislative assembly. After the act was passed, implementa-
tion was slow, and it was only after the reoccupation of the south by Allied 
troops that the reform was concluded. Around 970,000 tenant farmers and 
farm laborers became landowners, and only about 7 percent of farmers were 
still tenants. The old landlord class was wiped out; although they were com-
pensated with government bonds, for most the value was too low for them 
to make productive investments in nonagricultural ventures (Boyer and Ahn 
1991: 31; Putzel 1992: 81–82). 
The Korean reform was a tenancy reform rather than a redistributive land 
reform (Lee 1979: 494). It had little impact on the size distribution of oper-
ated holdings, although as in Taiwan, by conferring much greater security of 
tenure on cultivators, the reform would have had a positive impact on invest-
ment decisions. Efforts by the government in the south to modernize agricul-
ture during the 1950s and 1960s do not appear to have been as successful as 
in Taiwan, and urban-rural income differentials remained large. These had the 
effect of encouraging out-migration, and many farm households rented out 
land that they could not cultivate themselves because the young adults in the 
household were working outside agriculture. By the end of the 1970s, tenancy 
was again increasing, although it was still illegal under the terms of the land 
reform legislation (Boyer and Ahn 1991: 77–79). 
There are obvious parallels between the situation in Vietnam and that 
in Korea after 1950; both countries were divided between communist and 
noncommunist regimes, and in both the noncommunist governments were 
dependent on American assistance and advice. In North Vietnam, a land 
reform program began in 1953 but rapidly led to “major upheavals in rural 
society,” substantial opposition in many areas, and in 1956 the resignation 
of the fi rst secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam (Fforde 1989: 11). 
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Pre-1953 land reform efforts in the north carried out by Vietminh cadres had 
often been quite successful, as they were based on traditional views of the 
commune’s obligation to redistribute land to those in need. But after 1954 the 
party’s approach to land reform became more doctrinaire and coercive, and 
less popular with rural people. After 1959, rural cooperatives were formed, 
and by the early 1960s, more than 90 percent of the rural population in the 
north had joined cooperatives comprising around 70 percent of the cultivated 
area (ibid.: 12). How well or badly these functioned is still a matter of some 
controversy, but with the escalation of the war in the mid-1960s and heavy 
American bombing, the conditions for implementing sustained rural develop-
ment policies were hardly propitious. 
Matters were rather different in the south. As we have seen, population 
densities in Cochinchina were much lower than in Tonkin in the late 1930s, 
although tenancy was widespread (see Table 3.1). After the installation of Pres-
ident Diem in 1956, the Americans pressed him to implement some tenure 
reforms, and Edward Lansdale, the American who had advised President Mag-
saysay on land reforms in the Philippines, was brought in to encourage Diem 
to take a more activist approach (Putzel 1992: 100). An ordinance enacted 
in 1955 was mainly concerned with confi rming the titles of absentee land-
lords, although it did provide for a maximum rental and for rent reductions 
in times of crop failure. Many farmers in those parts of the south effectively 
under Viet Cong control had been paying no rent to absentee landlords at all 
and were not impressed with the provisions of the ordinance. After further 
pressure from the Americans, another ordinance was issued that did allow 
for some redistribution from landlords to tenants, although the ceilings were 
about thirty times higher than the American advisers wanted (Wiegersma 
1988: 181–184). The main problem was that Diem relied on the landlord class 
and landowning offi cials for his support. Gradually, those in his government 
who were genuinely committed to rural reform were marginalized, and by the 
early 1960s, what little commitment there had been to effective reform had 
vanished.
In the Philippines, the average holding size was larger than in either Tai-
wan or Korea in the late 1930s, and around half the land was in holdings 
under full or partial tenancy (see Table 3.5). Given the continuing infl uence 
of the Americans in the country after 1945, it might have been expected that 
they would push for land reform there as they were doing in both occupied 
Japan and the former Japanese colonies. But General MacArthur, after his 
reconquest of the Philippines in 1944, was determined to restore the pre-1942 
status quo and did not want to threaten the landlord class that underpinned it 
(Putzel 1992: 83). The Bell Trade Act, signed in 1945, provided for the resump-
tion of free trade with the United States, thus restoring the power and privi-
leges of the large sugar growers. The fi rst two post-1946 presidents, Roxas and 
Quirino, were conservatives who thought that the radical peasant movements 
that had arisen before and during the Japanese occupation could, and should, 
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be destroyed by armed force. They had little time for arguments that land 
issues were at the heart of the rural unrest and must be addressed directly.
Land reform was placed on the policy agenda in 1950, with the publi-
cation of the report of the Bell Mission’s survey of the Philippine economy 
(Putzel 1992: 85). This report recommended substantial land redistribution 
as a means of ending the agrarian unrest. Experts who had worked on the 
Japanese land reform were dispatched to Manila; they argued for the abolition 
of absentee ownership, capping of rentals at 25 percent of the crop value, low 
ceilings on land retained by former landlords, and government purchase of 
land for resale to tenants and the landless. As in Japan, Taiwan, and Korea, it 
was proposed that landlords be compensated with government bonds. Ten-
ants would pay for land they acquired over a period of twenty-fi ve years, at an 
interest rate of 4 percent. The American advisers argued that implementation 
of these proposals would give cultivators the incentive to adopt new tech-
nologies, while at the same time encouraging former landlords to invest their 
capital in nonagricultural enterprises.
Putzel has argued that the American advisers “underestimated the degree 
to which the state was controlled by the landed oligarchy in the Philip-
pines, and the extent of animosity toward reform among policy-makers and 
US corporate lobbyists in Washington” (1992: 87). When Ramon Magsaysay 
was elected to the presidency in 1953, it was hoped that he would be more 
supportive of agrarian reform; he did not come himself from a landowning 
background, and his political style was more populist than that of his prede-
cessors. But he was both unwilling and unable to overcome the hostility of 
landowning interests; the agrarian legislation passed in 1954 and 1955 was 
modest in its aims, being mainly concerned with regulating tenancy agree-
ments. The Land Reform Act of 1955 was more ambitious and created a Land 
Tenure Administration that would acquire large tenanted rice and corn estates 
and resell them to tenants. But the provisions of the act were watered down in 
the congress, with some legislators stating that any redistribution was “com-
munist-inspired” and land reform should be limited to resettlement on virgin 
lands (ibid.: 92). With the death of Magsaysay in a plane crash in 1957, land 
reform slipped off the policy agenda until the Marcos era.
In other parts of Southeast Asia, problems of land tenure were also of 
pressing concern to postcolonial governments. In Burma, not surprisingly 
given the extent of tenancy in the late 1930s, the government was concerned 
with eliminating Indian ownership and restoring national ownership of land. 
This was done not through a Taiwan-style reform but by nationalizing all 
agricultural land in 1948. However, implementation was slow and the con-
sequences not always benefi cial to tenants; some tenants were evicted as a 
result of land nationalization and became landless laborers (Steinberg 1981: 
126). In addition, although nationalization made the state the landlord, it did 
not always eliminate insecurity of tenure on the part of small cultivators. The 
Revolutionary Council that came to power in 1962 was committed to improv-
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ing the conditions of peasant cultivators and in 1965 passed a tenancy law 
that in effect abolished all tenancy. Although this legislation seemed radical, 
its main thrust was “to break up the landowner-tenant relationship in order 
to create a new government-owner-cultivator relationship and, at the same 
time, to strengthen government control over farmers” (Than and Nishizawa 
1990: 90–91). 
In Thailand, there was little overt government concern with land tenure 
issues in the 1950s and 1960s, in spite of the evidence that “the balance of 
advantage shifted in favor of the landlord” in many rice-growing areas in the 
delta, and exploitative tenancy agreements were often a step toward complete 
landlessness (Phongpaichit and Baker 1995: 38). In British Malaya, by contrast, 
offi cials became more concerned about land tenure issues in the preparation 
for self-government. Harper has argued that the debates over political and 
constitutional reform in the immediate post-1945 years took place “against a 
backdrop of agrarian crisis and terror” (1999: 94). According to his analysis, 
the communist rebellion, called an “emergency” by the British, drew its sup-
port and sustenance from an array of rural problems. During the Japanese 
occupation, many of the forest reserves created by the British had been felled 
for food-crop, especially tapioca, cultivation. Japanese food-crop policies were 
aggravated by spontaneous migration of people into the interiors of the pen-
insula; this process had begun during the depression and continued through 
the war years. Many of these squatters were Chinese. By the late 1940s, the 
squatter problem was acute in several areas and prevented rubber plantations 
from expanding the area under higher-yielding varieties (ibid.: 99–100).
To the problems of squatters and illegal deforestation were added prob-
lems of widespread tenancy. The survey reported by Wilson found that ten-
ancy was widespread in the rice-growing regions in the northern part of the 
peninsula and that “less than one half of the padi land of North Malaya is 
owned by the farmers who cultivate it” (1958: 63). Wilson also found evi-
dence of very uneven distribution of land in the areas where detailed surveys 
were carried out. Wilson’s fi ndings were confi rmed by the 1960 Agricultural 
Census, which found that only about one-third of all wet paddy land in pen-
insular Malaya was owner-cultivated (Hill 1967: 101). A much higher pro-
portion of land under rubber and coconut cultivation was owner-operated, 
although Hill has queried the accuracy of these fi ndings. He argued that the 
high degree of tenancy, especially in the paddy areas, was the result of his-
torical forces dating from the nineteenth century, when Malay entrepreneurs 
had secured land grants from the sultans and brought in many families from 
Java, Sumatra, and southern Borneo to cultivate them. Their descendants con-
tinued as tenant cultivators, while the descendants of the original landlords, 
often minor members of the royal households or hajis, continued as landlords 
and often extended their landholdings. Hill stressed that the colonial land leg-
islation, and especially the Malay Reservation Acts, would not have affected 
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Malay landlords, as the legislation was only intended to prevent non-Malays 
from acquiring agricultural land (ibid.: 106). 
Probably nowhere in Asia in the years after the Japanese occupation were 
land problems more complex and politically fraught than in Indonesia. At 
least in British Malaya, arable land was still in abundant supply relative to 
the numbers wishing to cultivate it, even if access to land was inequitable, 
and land legislation often favored expatriate corporations over locals, whether 
Malay or Chinese. The situation was very different in many parts of Indone-
sia. The Dutch had bequeathed to independent Indonesia two distinct legal 
systems, one based on Dutch law and one on traditional or adat law, as it had 
been interpreted by colonial legal scholars. Although Dutch colonial offi cials 
tried to preserve traditional legal systems, especially as they related to land 
matters, they also realized that, with growing commercialization of the indig-
enous economy, land was increasingly becoming a marketable commodity. 
By the 1920s, the offi cial records showed that there were over 400,000 land 
transactions per year in Java and Bali (Booth 1998: 300). Perhaps surprisingly, 
writers such as Boeke did not accept this as evidence of the existence of a 
land market (1953: 131), although quite a high proportion of these transac-
tions were sales rather than legacies or gifts. The Dutch agrarian legislation of 
1870 permitted the leasing of land to Dutch and other foreign corporations, 
although foreigners were not able to purchase agricultural land outright.
By 1940, large estates in Indonesia controlled about 2.9 million hectares 
of land in Indonesia, of which only about 1.2 million hectares were actually 
under cultivation. Outside Java, only about 40 percent of land controlled by 
estates was planted (see Table 3.9). By contrast, many families in Java, Bali, 
and other parts of the country either possessed no land at all or cultivated 
only very small parcels, from which they could not make an adequate living. 
Some colonial agricultural experts, aware of the growing landlessness in Java 
and the widespread indigenous resentment about land issues, advocated the 
conversion of land under both annual and perennial crops to food-crop agri-
culture. This happened to some extent during the Japanese occupation and 
the ensuing struggle against the Dutch, with squatters occupying land that 
had been under both annual crops (tobacco and sugar) and tree crops (tea, 
coffee, and rubber). 
In 1950, the government faced a very diffi cult problem regarding estate 
land. Under the terms of the Round Table Conference Agreements of 1949, the 
Indonesian negotiators had pledged to honor existing legal titles to land; in 
addition, the pressing need to earn foreign exchange and attract more foreign 
investment encouraged the new government to accommodate the demands 
of Dutch and other foreign-owned estate and mining companies (Feith 1962: 
293). But that meant expelling many thousands of squatters, most of whom 
had few other means of making a living. The scene was set for bitter and 
protracted struggles, which lasted throughout the period of parliamentary 
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democracy. Perhaps surprisingly, given the populist inclinations of most of 
the post-1950 cabinets, government policy tended to protect the large estates. 
When in the late 1950s the government took over most Dutch-owned com-
panies, including estates, they continued to be operated as estates, often man-
aged by the military. The option of dividing up the land, amounting to well 
over 1 million hectares, among smallholder cultivators does not seem to have 
been seriously considered. 
This failure is all the more surprising when we consider the position of 
the smallholder cultivator of cash crops in postindependence Indonesia. By 
the 1950s, smallholders were producing 88 percent of output of tobacco, 77 
percent of coffee, and 65 percent of rubber (Booth 1988: table 6.5). Of the 
main export crops, only sugar and tea were still largely produced by estates, 
although output of both crops remained well below pre-1940 levels through-
out the 1950s. While the failure to break up large estates in the Philippines or 
South Vietnam can be explained by the dominant position of large landowners 
in the government and the legislature, this was far less the case in Indonesia. 
The failure to redistribute estate land was in large part due to the urban bias of 
the principal decision makers; they simply did not appreciate that smallholder 
producers were potentially far more effi cient than the large estates. In addi-
tion, both military and civilian offi cials saw the estates as important sources 
of patronage in an increasingly diffi cult economic environment. As they were 
largely ignorant of the problems, both technical and socioeconomic, facing 
the estate sector, it is hardly surprising that most of the new managers had at 
best patchy success in reviving its fortunes. 
In January 1960, the Supreme Advisory Council of President Sukarno held 
a special session devoted to land reform; after this the government moved 
quickly to introduce new agrarian legislation. Its intention was to unify the 
dualistic legacy from the Dutch colonial era and convert all land rights into a 
single system based on adat law but modifi ed by principles introduced in the 
new law (Gautama and Harsono 1973: 24). The new legislation introduced 
both land ceilings (depending on the density of population) and minimum 
holding sizes (of two hectares). As Mortimer has pointed out, it was an arith-
metical impossibility to provide two hectares to every rural family in Java, 
even if vacant estate land was redistributed, lower land ceilings than fi ve hect-
ares imposed, and land grants to village offi cials abolished (1974: 287). The 
Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) did in fact advocate these more radical 
reforms, although it did not advocate the formation of agricultural collectives. 
“If the PKI leaders shared the Leninist view that land reform was no more than 
a necessary concession to the proprietary instincts of the peasantry along the 
way to collectivization, they did not show it” (ibid.: 288). Instead they sup-
ported a “land to the tiller” policy and supported the demands of squatters 
on former estate and forest land, small landowners who had lost their land 
through pawning, and landless laborers. Partly as a result of PKI agitation, 
some 1 million hectares of agricultural land had been redistributed to around 
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1 million people by 1968, although some of this might have been reoccupied 
subsequently by former owners (Utrecht 1969: 84).
The modest achievements of land reform policies in most parts of South-
east Asia in the critical two decades following 1945 were thus the result of 
powerful vested interests in governments and legislatures who opposed radi-
cal redistribution, on the one hand, and an inability on the part of many 
urban-based nationalists, including those from left-wing parties, to appreciate 
the nature and extent of the problems in rural areas, on the other. A surpris-
ing number maintained the colonial belief that estates were a more effi cient 
form of agricultural production, in spite of the evidence to the contrary. In 
addition, in Indonesia, Malaya, and the Philippines, there was a tendency on 
the part of well-intentioned reformers to believe that problems of landlessness 
in densely settled regions could be solved by moving people to those parts 
of the country deemed to have abundant supplies of empty land. These atti-
tudes can be contrasted with the situation in Taiwan, where land reform was 
implemented quickly and effi ciently by the KMT government, whose mem-
bers had few vested interests to protect or few illusions that land settlement 
was a viable option. 
The failure to implement land reform in the Philippines did not have 
an adverse impact on agricultural growth, which was in fact quite rapid in 
the 1950s and 1960s. Total output growth was 4 percent per annum during 
these two decades, which was slower than in South Korea and Taiwan but 
faster than in many other parts of Asia (David and Barker 1979: table 5.2). But 
growth in both output per hectare and output per worker in the agricultural 
sector was much slower in the Philippines than in the two former Japanese 
colonies (Table 9.10). Much of the agricultural growth in the Philippines dur-
ing these two decades was due to increases in land and labor rather than to 
growth in factor productivity. The slow growth in agricultural productivity 
combined with the skewed access to land and the large number of landless 
rural families, estimated by Bautista to be 20 percent of all rural households 
in 1965 (1994: 99), meant that by the early 1960s poverty levels were still 
Table 9.10. Post-1946 Growth of Agricultural Output, Arable Land per 
Worker, Yields per Hectare, and Output per Worker: Taiwan, South Korea, 
and the Philippines
 Annual Average Growth of
  Arable Land Yields per 
 Total Output per Worker Hectare  Output per Worker
Taiwan (1946–1970) 5.6 – 0.6 5.2 4.6
South Korea (1953–1969) 4.4 – 0.7 3.3 2.5
Philippines (1950–1969) 4.0 0.2 1.3 1.5
Sources: Lee and Chen 1979: tables 3.1, 3.5, 3.7, 3.8a); Ban 1979: tables 4.1, 4.6, 4.7; David and 
Barker 1979: tables 5.4, 5.5a, 5.6. 
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high in rural areas of the Philippines. The proportion of the population under 
the poverty line was estimated to be 64 percent in 1961; this had fallen only 
slightly to 57 percent by 1971 (Balisacan 1993: 297). 
By the early 1970s, there were clear differences between the size distribu-
tion of landholdings in Taiwan and in most parts of Southeast Asia. In 1975, 
only 4 percent of land was in holdings over fi ve hectares in Taiwan compared 
with 34 percent in the Philippines, 23 percent in Indonesia, and 24 percent 
in Thailand (Booth 2002: table 2). Agricultural growth in Taiwan was accom-
panied by considerable diversifi cation of farm household income away from 
dependence on agricultural incomes. While this was also happening in other 
parts of Asia, the “linkage ratio” between growth in agricultural incomes and 
growth in other sources of income for agricultural households appeared to 
be considerably lower than in Taiwan (ibid.: table 4). The land reform pro-
gram appeared to have brought about an egalitarian distribution of owner-
ship of agricultural land, while the rapid growth of employment opportunities 
in nonagricultural activities meant that most rural households experienced 
growth in nonagricultural incomes at the same time that agricultural incomes 
were increasing. This benign outcome did not occur to anything like the same 
extent in other parts of Asia. 
Eradicating the Legacy of the Plural Economy
It was stressed in the previous chapter that the Japanese occupation facilitated 
the rise of an aggressive form of indigenism in several parts of Southeast Asia. 
This was due in part to the expropriation of almost all enterprises owned by 
European and American interests and in part to the harsh treatment of many 
ethnic Chinese businesspeople. In addition, the Japanese approach to eco-
nomic policy making in the occupied territories was dirigiste in the extreme 
and relied on a range of economic controls embracing most aspects of produc-
tion and distribution. Even if this controlled economy proved incapable of 
supplying basic needs to the great majority of the population across Southeast 
Asia, it still presented nationalists across the region with an alternative model 
to the apparently more laissez-faire approach of the colonial powers (Golay, 
Anspach, Pfanner, and Ayal 1969: 455 – 456). In spite of the increasing eco-
nomic dislocation in the last phase of the Japanese period, some shrewd and 
determined indigenous businesspeople in various parts of Southeast Asia were 
able to turn a chaotic situation to their own advantage and establish viable 
enterprises. 
On the political front, the fi erce devotion to emperor, armed forces, and 
nation, which inspired the Japanese military, made a deep impression on 
many young people in Southeast Asia, and this intense nationalism inevitably 
affected the way they viewed economic problems. After 1945, the relationship 
between indigenous business groups, the Chinese, and foreign businesses, 
especially those originating from the colonial power, could never be the same 
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as it was before 1942. The forces of indigenism were probably strongest in 
Indonesia, where grievances against both the Dutch and the Chinese were 
intense, and in Burma, where not just Indians and Chinese, but also some 
minority ethnic groups such as the Karens, were considered to have been 
accorded favorable treatment in the colonial era. But they were not entirely 
absent elsewhere in the former colonies or in Thailand, the only Southeast 
Asian country to have escaped direct colonial control. 
In most of the former colonies in Southeast Asia, the independent gov-
ernments wanted to eradicate what they saw as the pernicious legacy of the 
plural economy, with its apparent tight relationship between ethnicity and 
economic role. It has been suggested that the drive toward rapid indigenism 
was essentially an elite phenomenon, “originating with and promoted by pol-
iticians seeking power for other ends and by members of a narrow indigenous 
entrepreneurial element who are motivated by avarice to expropriate alien 
wealth” (Golay, Anspach, Pfanner, and Ayal 1969: 447). While this was prob-
ably true, especially in Indonesia and Burma, it could hardly be denied that in 
both countries there was considerable grassroots antagonism against the role 
of the Chinese and the Indians respectively. In Burma, this antagonism was in 
large part due to the Indian expropriation of indigenous cultivators. In Indo-
nesia, it resulted from the role of the Chinese in rural areas as traders and mon-
eylenders together with the widespread perception among many nationalists 
that Chinese businesses had received preferential treatment under the Dutch. 
In 1956, the former minister of the interior in the Natsir cabinet, Assaat, made 
a direct attack on the role of the Chinese in Indonesia, which triggered a 
number of violent demonstrations against Chinese businesses; these attacks 
continued well into the 1960s (Feith 1962: 481–487; Mackie 1976). 
In both Burma and Indonesia, the decade after independence witnessed 
much political rhetoric about socialism and popular control over the means 
of production. In Burma, there was a strong government push during the 
1950s, even before the military regime assumed power, to take over both Brit-
ish and Indian fi rms, and to establish new state enterprises in manufacturing. 
By 1960, it was estimated that more than 90 percent of industry was Burmese-
owned. But it was clear that many private businesses and state enterprises 
were poorly managed and that government industrial policy suffered from a 
lack of coordination. The Revolutionary Government that assumed control 
in the early 1960s, after a brief period of apparent openness to both domes-
tic and foreign private enterprise, abruptly reversed its policy and after 1963 
prevented the establishment of any new private enterprise in manufacturing 
industry (Pfanner 1969: 231–232). 
The main problem facing governments in Burma and elsewhere who 
wished to promote both indigenous private enterprises and state enterprises 
was the acute shortage of managerial expertise. Few indigenous Indonesians, 
Thais, Burmese, Malays, Vietnamese, or even Filipinos had had much experi-
ence running large-scale productive enterprises, and many of the state corpo-
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rations created throughout Southeast Asia between 1945 and 1960 were fi nan-
cial failures. In Thailand, Burma, and Indonesia, many managers were former 
army offi cers and treated the enterprises they were supposed to be running 
as sources of personal enrichment and patronage. Ayal has pointed out that, 
even before 1940, the Thai experience confi rmed the basic correlation between 
premature indigenism and corruption, a correlation that was to become more 
obvious in other parts of the region after 1950 (1969: 338 –339). 
In Indonesia, the 1945 constitution had enshrined the “family principle” 
of economic organization, and some nationalist leaders regarded coopera-
tives as an “excellent expression of Indonesian social ideals” even though the 
peasant economy in Indonesia had, during the latter part of the colonial era, 
been increasingly based on private ownership of land and production for the 
market, whether domestic or foreign (Mackie 1964: 44 – 45). Perhaps because 
the spirit of private enterprise was so strong in rural areas, little was achieved 
with agricultural cooperatives during the 1950s, and, as we have seen, there 
was little pressure for the establishment of collective farms, even on the part 
of the Indonesian Communist Party. Instead in the early 1950s, government 
policy was directed more to the fostering of indigenous entrepreneurs in the 
nonagricultural economy. The so-called Benteng program, established imme-
diately after independence, was at fi rst directed mainly toward getting more 
indigenous Indonesians involved in the lucrative import and export trade, 
which had been dominated in colonial times by the big Dutch trading houses 
and to a lesser extent by the Chinese. 
Anspach has discussed the failings of the program in detail. As he pointed 
out, there was concern, even among some nationalist politicians, at the blatant 
racial bias of the Benteng measures and the unwillingness to encourage Chinese 
businesses even when their owners had adopted Indonesian nationality (1969: 
168–179). In addition, the lingering support for cooperatives, especially strong 
with Vice President Hatta, meant that some key politicians tended to oppose 
any plan to encourage private enterprise, whatever the ownership. The distaste 
of the Hatta camp for hothouse development of indige nous entrepreneurs was 
no doubt strengthened by the growing evidence that many of the so-called 
indigenous businesses that got access to import licenses were simply fronts for 
more experienced Chinese companies. In fact, close cooperation between Chi-
nese businessmen and Indonesian powerholders began during the latter part 
of the 1940s, when nationalists leaders established links with totok traders in 
order to secure food and other essential materials for the struggle against the 
Dutch (Twang 1998: 324 –327). It was the less culturally integrated totok, rather 
than the older, established, Dutch-speaking peranakan business groups, who 
adjusted more quickly to the often hostile political climate of the 1950s. 
President Sukarno exploited the growing public frustration at the perceived 
failure of indigenist policies after he brought the period of constitutional 
democracy to an end in 1958 and ushered in the Guided Economy. From 
then on, indigenist goals became intertwined with the aim of implement-
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ing Indonesian socialism, although as Anspach has pointed out, for most of 
the Indonesian political elite, socialism meant little more than “an emotional 
predilection, a vestigial sentiment from the revolutionary struggle against the 
capitalistic Dutch” (1969: 126). In fact, the decades of the 1950s and the 1960s 
almost certainly witnessed an attenuation of the role of government in the 
Indonesian economy. Government expenditures relative to GDP were already 
low in Indonesia in comparison with several other former colonies in the 
late 1950s (see Table 9.6). After 1960, in spite of the increased rhetoric about 
Indonesian socialism, revenues and expenditures fell further relative to GDP. 
In 1960, output from government enterprises, including those expropriated 
from the Dutch, amounted to only about 20 percent of total output (Booth 
1998: fi gure 4.1, table 4.9). 
In several respects, British Malaya in the late 1950s offered a stark con-
trast to the situation in both Burma and Indonesia as well as that in Thailand. 
The Chinese and to a lesser extent the Indian presence was much larger than 
elsewhere in Southeast Asia, and indigenous Malays comprised a much lower 
proportion of the nonagricultural labor force than in other colonies in the 
1930s (see Tables 6.2 and 6.4). It might have been expected that indigenist 
policies would have been stronger there than in other parts of Southeast Asia. 
But according to Golay, Anspach, Pfanner, and Ayal, the forces of indigen-
ism were comparatively weak, and there was little or no socialist content to 
such indigenist policies as were implemented (1969: 454). Pressures on foreign 
and especially British enterprises were hardly draconian. Indeed White argued 
that, by 1957, the British had achieved something approximating neocolo-
nialism or “informal empire” (1996: 269). 
The Alliance government maintained open economic policies, a competi-
tive exchange rate, and a friendly attitude to foreign investment. In 1962, 
Malaya was the sixth largest recipient of direct foreign investment from Britain. 
Estate companies that had been established in the colonial era, far from being 
threatened with takeovers by the government, were encouraged to undertake 
replanting and expansion of their activities. Although Malaya’s share of world 
rubber production, both natural and synthetic, was only 18.2 percent in 1960 
compared with 44.5 percent during the 1930s, the Alliance government rec-
ognized that both rubber and tin would continue to be important earners of 
foreign exchange in the 1960s and that investment in both industries should 
be encouraged, whatever its provenance. These attitudes were unacceptable 
to more radical nationalists in the wider Malay world, especially President 
Sukarno, whose policy of confronting the new Malaysian Federation when 
it was formed in 1963 was based on a fear that it was simply a front for the 
neocolonial ambitions of Britain and the other former colonial powers in the 
region. 
In the 1950s, the government of what was still British Malaya had to be 
urged by international development agencies to assume more responsibility 
for encouraging manufacturing industry. The report by the International Bank 
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for Reconstruction and Development (as the World Bank was then known), 
published in 1955, recommended a two-pronged approach. On the one hand, 
the government should provide infrastructure including water, electric power, 
roads, and so on, while, on the other hand, it should “foster individual enter-
prise” through measures such as provision of technical and market research 
for secondary industry, investment in appropriate education and training pro-
grams, support for foreign investors in sectors where their technical know-
how could be crucial, and also the judicious use of tariff protection. On this 
last point, the report stressed that the tariff should be used as a means of 
encouraging development and not as a way of supporting “hopelessly high-
cost industries” (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
1955: 123). Here the bank seemed to be echoing the belief, strongly held by 
many British colonial offi cials, that most infant industries never grew up and 
that most colonies should remain primary producers (Meredith 1975: 497).
Tariff protection was an especially diffi cult issue because those parts of 
British Malaya that had developed as free ports, especially Singapore and 
Penang, were fearful that with independence their free port status would be 
removed and their consumers forced to pay high tariffs on imported goods or 
buy high-cost manufactures from other parts of Malaya. These fears were part 
of the reason for Singapore’s departure from the Federation of Malaysia in 
1965. But the Malay political elites who dominated policy making just before 
independence were themselves ambivalent about encouraging rapid indus-
trialization because they knew that it would be the Chinese who would seize 
the opportunities provided by tariff protection. Some were also concerned 
about the impact of industrial protection on the urban-rural terms of trade 
and about the welfare effects on small rural producers, the great majority of 
whom were Malay. As Golay has argued, the insecurity felt by the Malay lead-
ership also caused them to accept and even encourage the continuing large 
Western stake in the economy (1969a: 346). 
The situation in the Philippines was different again. By the late 1930s, 
almost 45 percent of the assets of nonagricultural enterprises in the Philip-
pines were owned by Filipino citizens (Golay 1969b: table 1). This was a far 
higher proportion than in any other colonial territory in East or Southeast 
Asia. Certainly many of the large owners of both agricultural estates and 
nonagricultural enterprises were of mixed Filipino and Chinese or Spanish 
descent, but the ethnicity issue was less politically fraught in the Philippines 
after 1945 than in many other parts of the region. This was mainly because 
ethnic Chinese were fewer in number than in many other parts of Southeast 
Asia and not really perceived as a major threat by postindependence govern-
ments. The most overtly anti-Chinese legislation was the Retail Trade Nation-
alization Law, enacted in 1954, which restricted retail trade to Filipino busi-
nesses after 1964. But many noncitizen Chinese who owned medium- and 
large-scale fi rms got around the legislation, usually by seeking naturalization 
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(Yoshihara 1994: 28–32). By the late 1960s, younger members of Chinese fam-
ilies were integrating reasonably well into the broader Philippine society. 
A shared religion and a similar educational background helped in assimi-
lating the Chinese in the Philippines; in addition, many in the governing 
elite had some Chinese and Spanish ancestry and harbored little resentment 
toward those of mixed or foreign blood if they were prepared to take citizen-
ship and embrace Philippine cultural values. This lack of xenophobia was also 
refl ected in the attitudes of the government and business elites toward for-
eign and especially American companies. Most of the politicians who attained 
power after 1946 in the Philippines harbored little overt hostility to these 
enterprises. In addition, they had virtually no sympathy for socialist policies 
or even for government taking an activist role in the economy. As we have 
seen, land reform policies made little progress in the period from the late 
1940s to the late 1960s. In the late 1950s, government expenditure relative 
to GDP was the lowest in the region (see Table 9.6). By and large the politi-
cal forces that had come to power in the last phase of the American period 
remained in control after 1946 and became over time an entrenched barrier 
to further structural transformation of the economy. In this sense, American 
colonialism was, as Kang has argued, “pervasive and yet, ultimately, nontrans-
formative” (2002: 27). 
In the two decades after 1946, it could be argued, the lack of aggressive 
economic nationalism in the Philippines served the country well. There was 
substantial economic growth during this period. After the implementation of 
high levels of protection through extensive import and foreign exchange con-
trols after 1949, the manufacturing sector grew rapidly, and by 1960 manu-
facturing accounted for a higher proportion of GDP than in any other former 
colonial territory in Asia (Golay 1969b: 33; see also Table 9.4). Export growth 
slowed as a result of the overvaluation of the peso, and gradually the export 
sector was taken over by Philippine interests. It was these interests that ulti-
mately pushed through the removal of exchange and import controls in 1962 
and the substantial devaluation of the peso. It was much easier for the govern-
ment of the day to undertake such measures once the export sector was seen 
to be in Philippine hands. At this point it might have appeared that pressures 
of indigenism, such as they were, were driving the Philippines in the direc-
tion of a more open and competitive economy. But in spite of these policy 
changes, it proved impossible for the Philippines to move into the kind of 
high-speed industrial growth achieved by Taiwan and South Korea after 1960. 
The benefi ts of the devaluation of 1962 were rapidly eroded by high infl ation 
(Power and Sicat 1971: 52), thus providing only a transitory boost to both 
existing and new export industries.
In both Taiwan and South Korea, forces of indigenism were weaker than 
in much of Southeast Asia, mainly because the dominant Japanese presence 
had left virtually no room for any other foreign participation in either econ-
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omy. There was no equivalent of the large migrant Indian or Chinese pres-
ence, and there was no foreign investment apart from that of the Japanese. 
Thus the abrupt departure of the colonial power in 1945 left large holes in 
both economies, which were fi lled in different ways in the two former colo-
nies. In Taiwan, the Chen Yi administration that took over from the depart-
ing Japanese was imbued by the “statist economic ideas” used in KMT circles 
to interpret Sun Yat-sen’s doctrine of fostering the people’s livelihood (Lai, 
Myers, and Wei 1991: 84). Offi cials were concerned with building up a patron-
age network for migrants from the mainland but were also imbued with an 
ideological bias in favor of a planned economy. Publicly owned fi rms soon 
controlled more than 70 percent of all industrial and agricultural enterprises. 
In addition, a new Monopoly Bureau controlled the supply and marketing 
of salt, camphor, opium, matches, liquor, and tobacco. The government also 
imposed strict regulations on private trade. 
By the end of 1946, the Chen Yi administration probably controlled “even 
more economic activity than had the Japanese” (Lai, Myers, and Wei 1991: 87). 
Even before the wave of refugees from the mainland in 1949, many mainland-
ers were employed in the bureaucracy, including the state enterprises. Stein-
hoff has estimated that the numbers of mainlanders employed by state enter-
prises more than doubled between 1946 and 1949; in 1949 they accounted 
for more than one-third of the total (1980: 61). Many lacked experience in 
the jobs they were allocated, and a process of rationalization of employment 
began in the early 1950s. Numbers of both mainlanders and Taiwanese work-
ing in the state enterprises fell. It is probable that some moved into private 
sector activities, although these were largely the province of indigenous Tai-
wanese. After the land reform was implemented, Taiwanese landlords received 
compensation for the land they had surrendered in the form of government 
bonds and stock in former Japanese companies; some of them at least used 
these assets to build up new enterprises (ibid.: 59).
Taiwanese and mainlanders did not meld easily into a unifi ed nation. 
They were in many cases divided by language; many indigenous Taiwanese 
had little command of Mandarin and were more fl uent in Japanese (Wade 
1990: 232). Few mainlanders who arrived in 1949 understood either Japanese 
or the local dialects. After the ruthless suppression of the 1947 uprising, there 
was little appetite on the part of the native Taiwanese for further political 
dissent. Rather they acquiesced in a division of labor that saw the mainland 
arrivals disproportionately represented in the civil service, the military, and 
key professions such as teaching. In this sense, the arrivals from the mainland 
replaced the Japanese, who had accounted for around half the government 
and professional jobs in the colonial era (see Table 6.4). Indigenous Taiwanese 
found it easier to move into industry and commerce, where they had, in spite 
of considerable discrimination, been able to make some headway under the 
Japanese. For example, Taiwan Plastic, which grew into a vast conglomerate 
after 1960, was founded by a businessman who began as a rice trader in the 
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Japanese era (Kobayashi 1996: 331). By the mid-1970s, more than 70 percent 
of the three hundred largest companies in Taiwan were controlled by native 
Taiwanese (Wade 1990: 262). 
In a divided Korea, the situation was different again. In North Korea, the 
adoption of a strict socialist model led to the elimination of most forms of 
private enterprise by the end of the 1950s. In South Korea, most scholars have 
viewed the postarmistice years as characterized by rampant cronyism, where 
Japanese properties and aid dollars, largely from the United States, were dis-
tributed to business groups friendly to the Rhee regime at very low prices. 
It was thus possible for fi rms with the right connections to make “massive 
profi ts with no further effort than a bit of paper work in ordering imports” 
(Jones and Sakong 1980: 277). In addition, businesses with good political and 
bureaucratic connections received low interest loans, tax benefi ts, and other 
privileges. This was a situation not unlike that which the Benteng program 
created in Indonesia, although in the Korean case large infl ows of foreign aid 
greatly added to the opportunities for rent seeking. Jones and Sakong have 
drawn a parallel between the charismatic political talents of Rhee and those of 
Sukarno, and argued that both were better suited to the creation and integra-
tion of a new nation than the development of an existing one (ibid.: 41). 
Jones and Sakong point out that this situation changed with the advent 
of the Park government (1980: 276). Under Park, fi rms were expected to make 
a convincing argument that the privileges conferred on them would be used 
productively. Good connections with the bureaucracy were still important, 
but as the supply of potential entrepreneurs increased, an element of compe-
tition was introduced into the process of securing the necessary government-
controlled inputs. At least some Koreans who had moved into business in the 
latter part of the colonial era or in the immediate aftermath of the Pacifi c War 
found that the business climate under Park allowed them to develop their 
business ventures without the impediments that hampered them under pre-
vious regimes. The introduction of a more open and competitive market for 
foreign exchange and a decline in aid fl ows eliminated an important cause of 
rent-seeking behavior. The Park government remained distrustful of foreign, 
and particularly Japanese, domination and did not encourage foreign fi rms 
to establish businesses in Korea. The absence of multinational companies in 
manufacturing, trade, and commerce created more space for indigenous fi rms. 
In this respect, Korea differed from Taiwan and even more from Southeast Asia 
after 1960. 
It is striking how many of the policy debates in the former colonial ter-
ritories in the decade after 1945 revolved around issues of ownership of pro-
ductive assets (foreign or local, state or private, indigenous or migrant Asian). 
But it was clear, at least to the more thoughtful nationalists, that whatever 
their ultimate ownership, if assets were to be properly managed, it would be 
necessary to develop a domestic class of professional managers and techni-
cally trained workers. Throughout the region, whether in the former Japanese 
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colonies or in Southeast Asia, colonial educational legacies especially at the 
tertiary level were at best modest and at worst nonexistent. It might have been 
true, as Jones and Sakong have argued in the Korean case, that potential man-
agers and technicians might have learned by watching rather than by doing 
in the Japanese factories established in the late colonial era (1980: 18). But 
such knowledge as the indigenous workers picked up was rapidly dissipated, 
not just in Korea but in other former colonies as well, through the disturbed 
years of the 1940s and 1950s. What was required was a dramatically increased 
supply of workers with the kinds of technical skills that modern industry and 
commerce demanded in the second part of the twentieth century.
The main exception to the shortage of skilled workers was the Philip-
pines, where, in the mid-1950s, numbers of graduates in science and technol-
ogy per 100,000 people were roughly the same as in Japan and substantially 
higher than elsewhere in Asia (Table 9.11). This was the result of the high 
secondary and tertiary enrollments there in the late colonial era. But in Tai-
wan and South Korea, gross enrollment ratios at the primary level (numbers of 
children enrolled as a percentage of total numbers in the seven to twelve age 
groups) had already caught up with the Philippines by the mid-1950s, and in 
South Korea gross enrollment ratios at the secondary level were higher (Table 
9.11). The growth in educational enrollments in South Korea from the 1950s 
onward meant that, by the 1970s, almost half the male labor force had at least 
secondary education (Booth 2003b: 153). 
Even in economies such as South Korea and Taiwan where, by the late 
1960s and early 1970s, the nonagricultural sectors of the economy were grow-
ing rapidly, it was not always easy to match the output of the educational 
Table 9.11. Educational Enrollments and Science and Technology Graduates 
in Asia, c. 1955
 Gross Enrollment Ratios Science and Technology
 Primary Secondary Graduates per 100,000 People
Japan 64 94 34.9
Philippines 54 25 34.2
India 27 18 18.1
Korea (South) 54 36 17.2
Taiwan 54 24 14.3
China 36 8 4.8
Thailand 51 14 3.3
Vietnam (South) 21 4 0.6
British Malaya 49 18 n.a.
Indonesia 39 8 n.a.
Burma 24 9 n.a.
Sources: United Nations UNESCO 1964: 103–105; United Nations ECAFE 1962: 34.
Note: n.a. = not available.
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system with the requirements of the labor market. A labor force survey carried 
out in South Korea in 1974 found that, although open unemployment was 
only around 6.5 percent, a further 13 percent of workers were “underutilized” 
in the sense that there was a mismatch between their qualifi cations and the 
work they were doing. In the Philippines, where growth was slower during the 
1960s, a 1968 survey found that around 10 percent of employed workers were 
underutilized using the mismatch criterion. Many were also working quite 
short hours (Hauser 1977: table 5). While rapid expansion of access to educa-
tion for the indigenous population was viewed by many postindependence 
politicians as one means of eradicating the legacy of the plural economy, fi nd-
ing productive jobs for the output of the education system proved more dif-
fi cult than many had realized. 
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Conclusions
M uch of the literature on economic development in East and Southeast Asia written during the 1970s and 1980s tended to emphasize the eco-
nomic policies adopted by the different governments that came to power in 
the postindependence era. Most economists wanting to explain the rapid 
growth of Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong, and Singapore from 1960 onward 
focused particularly on macroeconomic and exchange rate policies and on 
reforms of the trade regime. It was argued that prudent fi scal and monetary 
policies reduced infl ation and permitted governments to improve infrastruc-
ture and expand access to education, while the exchange rate regime and 
“open-type” trade policies provided an incentive climate conducive to the 
rapid growth of exports. These policy lessons were then disseminated by inter-
national development organizations and by leading academics to other parts 
of the developing world. They became infl uential in other parts of Southeast 
Asia during the 1970s and 1980s, and by the early 1990s, economies such 
as Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand had also achieved considerable success 
in accelerating the growth of manufactured exports. The World Bank (1993) 
attributed this success to getting the basics of economic policy right; their 
infl uential report on the “East Asian Miracle” argued that this policy package 
offered lessons to other, less successful, parts of the developing world. 
The success of the “East Asian” model was used not just by the World 
Bank but by many orthodox economists in Asia and elsewhere to challenge 
the infl uence of dependency theory, which argued that the antidevelopmental 
policies adopted by many colonial and postcolonial regimes in Latin America 
and elsewhere had left a legacy that made it unlikely that any underdeveloped 
economy in the second part of the twentieth century would benefi t from trade 
and investment links with the developed world. But as Kohli argued, in their 
criticisms of dependency theory, many economists “threw out the proverbial 
baby with the bathwater; they threw out the colonial pasts of the developing 
world. Instead of asking, could the roots of varying performances be located in 
a variety of colonial pasts, most developmentalists now focus on the nature of 
post-WWII states, social structures, and policy choices as the primary explana-
tions of divergent performances” (1994: 1288).
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Kohli’s remarks were aimed not just at mainstream economists, but also 
at some of their critics, such as Amsden (1989), whom he considered to have 
underestimated the importance of the Japanese legacy to the fashioning of the 
South Korean developmental state under Park. But other scholars have been 
inclined to see more discontinuities than continuities in the Korean story. 
Haggard, Kang, and Moon have argued that the few entrepreneurs who did 
manage to build up successful enterprises during the Japanese era would prob-
ably have emerged anyway, even if Japan had not been in charge (1997: 868). 
They are unimpressed with Kohli’s argument that the lineages of the devel-
opmental state in South Korea can be traced back to the Japanese and see the 
policies that emerged in the 1960s as being very much the product of their 
time and place. 
It has not been the purpose of this study to examine the specifi c debate 
over the Japanese colonial legacy in Korea or indeed in Taiwan, where there 
is greater consensus on the achievements of the Japanese, especially in agri-
culture and infrastructure development. My aim has been rather to place the 
debate concerning Japanese colonialism in a wider perspective through an 
examination of the record of other colonial regimes in Southeast Asia. By 
reviewing what was achieved and not achieved in British, Dutch, French, and 
American colonial possessions as well as in nominally independent Thailand, I 
argue that we are in a better position to assess the colonial legacies bequeathed 
to independent states throughout East and Southeast Asia. That the legacies 
were extremely mixed is hardly surprising, as most colonial regimes were pur-
suing a range of policies that changed over time as both internal and external 
circumstances changed. 
In all cases, colonial economic policies refl ected the pressures at work on 
the metropolitan powers, whether from business groups, political parties, or 
various lobby groups, some of which were, by the early twentieth century, 
suspicious of the economic benefi ts of colonial ventures to the metropolitan 
economies. Thus many of the differences noted in this study refl ect the very 
different aims and interests that the various colonial powers had in their Asian 
colonies in the early decades of the twentieth century. These interests also 
changed over time, as a result of both political changes in the metropolitan 
economies and changes in the international economy. The severe depression 
in the advanced capitalist economies in the early 1930s had an especially 
important impact on the Southeast Asian colonies because exports made a sig-
nifi cant contribution to total GDP, and falling demand for and prices of com-
modities such as sugar, rubber, and tin affected both government revenues 
and the incomes of many millions of small producers as well as employees of 
large estates and mining companies. Colonial governments were forced not 
just to intervene in commodity markets, but also to use various devices to 
encourage the emergence of new industries, especially in manufacturing. 
These variations in policies both over time and across colonial jurisdic-
tions mean that many of the generalizations in the literature about the eco-
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nomic impact of colonialism have to be modifi ed in the light of actual expe-
rience. In Chapter 3, the process of accommodating growing populations in 
agriculture was discussed, in both Taiwan and Korea and in various parts of 
Southeast Asia. It was argued that, in spite of much rhetoric about the desir-
ability of creating a prosperous farming sector with cultivators owning secure 
title to their land, this goal remained elusive in many parts of the region until 
the 1940s. Tenancy was widespread, and in the most densely settled areas, 
many cultivators owned either no land at all or such tiny parcels of land that 
it was impossible for them to scrape even a bare subsistence. They were forced 
to seek wage work where it was available or engage in various kinds of self-
employment in cottage industry or trade. 
The classical concept of vent for surplus was used by Myint to analyze the 
process by which unused land was brought under cultivation of export crops 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It involved the replica-
tion of existing technologies over more land and was not entirely applicable 
to either Taiwan or Korea, where much of the growth in production of rice for 
export came from cultivation of new varieties on existing land. In addition, 
even in the more land-abundant parts of Southeast Asia, the rapid growth in 
demand for export crops had made land a valuable and highly contested fac-
tor of production by the early twentieth century. Powerful business groups, 
often owned or backed by citizens of the colonial power, secured land from 
native cultivators, sometimes by using legal titling procedures that the indig-
enous populations did not understand or recognize. The result was that indig-
enous smallholders were sometimes not only prevented from expanding their 
own holdings but dispossessed of the land they were already cultivating. 
Governments reacted to these problems in various ways. Probably the 
strongest reaction was in British Malaya, where the Malay Reservation Enact-
ments placed strict controls on land alienation within the designated Malay 
reserves. But this policy was designed not so much to facilitate the cultivation 
of export crops by indigenous Malays as to encourage them to grow more 
rice, which was usually less profi table. Elsewhere colonial governments were 
inclined to a more laissez-faire approach to land matters, although in Indone-
sia the Dutch colonial government prevented land sales of indigenous land to 
foreigners including Chinese. Broadly speaking, as was argued in Chapter 4, 
governments in all the East and Southeast Asian colonies in the early part of 
the twentieth century were taking a much more activist role in the economy. 
Revenue sources were diversifi ed, and expenditures were devoted to a range 
of infrastructure projects as well as to education and health services. It was 
shown in Chapter 7 that the outcomes in terms of increased enrollments and 
improved health indicators, such as infant mortality rates, were often substan-
tial, although by the 1930s they varied considerably by colony.
It was argued in Chapter 5 that there was wide variation in balance of 
payments outcomes between colonies, which suggests that care should be 
exercised in making generalizations about “colonial drains.” Even between 
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the two Japanese colonies, there was a considerable difference. Taiwan ran 
large balance of payments surpluses for most years from 1915 through 1938, 
which were used in part to fund private capital outfl ows. In Korea, the current 
account was usually in defi cit, and after 1930 these defi cits became larger, 
refl ecting the huge capital infl ows from Japan into heavy industry and infra-
structure development, especially in the north. Within the Southeast Asian 
colonies, there was also considerable variation in balance of payments out-
comes. Although we do not have complete balance of payments for Burma, 
there can be little doubt that a substantial surplus was generated during the 
fi rst four decades of the twentieth century, and part of this surplus was used 
to fund government remittances to New Delhi. In Indonesia, as in Taiwan, 
the balance of payments surpluses were used mainly to fund private capital 
outfl ow. 
As was pointed out in Chapter 7, a well-informed observer, looking at 
the achievements, both economic and social, of the various colonial regimes 
in East and Southeast Asia in the late 1930s, would almost certainly have put 
Taiwan and the Philippines at the top of the list. Taiwan was impressive, not 
just for its social achievements, but also for the progress made in agricultural 
productivity. This in turn was the result of considerable investment in rural 
infrastructure as well as in the dissemination of high-yielding varieties of rice. 
No other Asian colony had similar success in achieving higher rice yields, 
although there was some progress in Korea and Java in increasing cropping 
ratios and disseminating improved seeds. Java, from the late nineteenth cen-
tury to the 1930s, also achieved remarkable results in developing new, higher-
yielding sugar varieties, But on the negative side, the Japanese in Taiwan also 
made little effort to develop the entrepreneurial capacities of the indigenous 
population. There was, for example, no equivalent of the popular credit sys-
tem that the Dutch had developed in Java. In the Philippines, where American 
involvement in industry and commerce was far less pervasive than Japanese 
involvement in Taiwan, indigenous Filipinos (admittedly including many of 
mixed Chinese and Spanish descent) owned a considerable share of nonagri-
cultural assets in the economy by the late 1930s. 
Fitting Thailand into the Southeast Asian picture is complicated by the 
fact that it was never formally a colony, although some writers have argued 
that the “Thai government acted as if it were a colonial government to pre-
serve its own continuity and to maintain domestic stability” (Resnick 1970: 
66). When one evaluates economic development in Thailand during the fi rst 
four decades of the twentieth century in a comparative perspective, there is 
some evidence that the Thai government was even more Catholic than the 
pope in implementing strictly conservative fi scal and monetary policy. In part 
this might have refl ected the presence of British fi nancial advisers, but in addi-
tion it appears that the government was reluctant to embark on any policy 
that might possibly have affected its sovereignty, including foreign borrow-
ing for infrastructure projects, such as irrigation or road development, which 
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would have yielded rates of return higher than the cost of borrowing. Nor 
were they keen to encourage foreign investment, either in estate agriculture 
or in industry. Thus the sorts of policy initiatives that the Dutch pursued in 
Indonesia after 1901 were not, by and large, viewed favorably by the Thai 
governing elite until well after the end of the Pacifi c War. 
During the early part of the 1940s, the world turned upside down for 
many in Southeast Asia. While the ignominious defeat at the hands of the 
Japanese of the Dutch, British, and American colonial regimes may have been 
welcomed by many, Japanese rule turned out to be an unmitigated disaster for 
the great majority of people in the region. The indiscriminate use of military 
scrip together with increased shortages of food and other basic needs led to 
mounting infl ation. The Japanese broke up the regional rice trade networks 
within Southeast Asia that had evolved over the previous decades and forced 
many regions to become largely self-suffi cient in food. While some land that 
had been used to grow tree crops was converted to food production, such 
land was usually not suitable for rice. Millions had to rely on root crops or 
whatever else they could grow locally. By 1945, many civilians in both urban 
and rural areas were dying of hunger and disease. In addition, many men were 
conscripted to work as laborers on public works projects; hunger and maltreat-
ment led to many deaths in their ranks as well. 
It was hardly surprising that, by the time of the Japanese surrender in 
August 1945, many people in the Southeast Asian colonies had decided that 
no foreign power, either European or Asian, could be trusted to govern them 
in their own interests. But the path to independence throughout the region 
was far from smooth. In the Philippines, the Americans honored previous 
pledges and granted complete independence in 1946, and the British gave 
Burma independence along with the rest of what had been British India. But 
both the Dutch and the French wanted to retain control over their South-
east Asian colonies. Bloody confl icts followed that were only resolved by the 
intervention of outside powers. The Dutch government, under considerable 
international pressure, conceded independence to Indonesia in late 1949; in 
French Indochina, the settlement reached at Geneva in 1954 provided only 
a temporary lull in a struggle that lasted three decades, until 1975. In the 
two Japanese colonies, the end of Japanese colonial rule was followed by a 
brutal takeover by KMT forces in Taiwan and partition and a destructive war 
in Korea. 
In the early 1950s, it was far from obvious that any former colony in 
East and Southeast Asia or Thailand had favorable economic prospects. The 
Philippines presented the most optimistic picture; the economy had recov-
ered rapidly from the damage of war, with substantial American aid, and by 
the mid-1950s had the highest per capita GDP in the region, after British 
Malaya, which was still a colony. The other former colonies took longer to 
catch up to prewar output, and some, including Indonesia and Burma, had 
not done so by 1960. Virtually everywhere in Southeast Asia, disputes over 
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land became more frequent and often more violent in the decade after 1945. 
Only in South Korea and Taiwan were the governments that emerged after 
the Pacifi c War both willing and able to push through effective land reforms. 
In both countries, cultivated holdings were mainly small and tenancy wide-
spread. The land reforms were thus mainly reforms in tenancy, with the large 
landlords being dispossessed and compensated with government bonds. In 
Southeast Asia, governments struggled with the problem of agrarian reform 
through the 1950s and 1960s, but vested interests were very powerful, and 
little was achieved. Only in communist-controlled North Vietnam was there 
substantial land redistribution, although the government’s attempts to set up 
collective farms met with considerable resistance and had to be modifi ed. 
In all the newly independent states in East and Southeast Asia, economic 
nationalism was pervasive, but it took very different forms. In South Korea 
and several parts of Southeast Asia, there was considerable hostility to foreign 
multinational fi rms, and foreign investment was not encouraged. In Indone-
sia, hostility to the continuing presence of Dutch companies in the estates 
sector, in manufacturing, and in banking and trade boiled over in the late 
1950s into wholesale nationalization of Dutch assets. In other parts of South-
east Asia, attitudes were less hostile but were hardly supportive of large-scale 
infl ows of foreign capital. Policies changed in Thailand in the late 1950s when 
General Sarit took over and set up the Board of Investment. By far the most 
friendly policies toward foreign investment were in British Malaya, where 
the government encouraged investment not just by British fi rms, but also by 
other European and American multinationals. When Singapore seceded from 
the Malaysian Federation in 1965, the government there made even more 
determined efforts to sell Singapore as a base for the Southeast Asian opera-
tions of foreign multinationals. 
Given all the changes, both economic and political, that swept through 
the former colonies of East and Southeast Asia in the two decades after the end 
of the Pacifi c War, it might appear that the evidence strongly supports those 
who argue that the legacies of colonialism, whether positive or negative, were 
rapidly eroded after 1945. While debates continued until the 1990s about 
what policies were crucial in accelerating growth in the two Japanese colonies 
after 1960, many participants appeared to argue that the Japanese legacy was 
only of minor importance. A large conference volume, produced in 1981 by 
a leading research institute in Taiwan, that examined the “experiences and 
lessons” of economic development in Taiwan had very little to say about the 
Japanese era at all (Academia Sinica 1981). Most of the participants at the con-
ference stressed macroeconomic and trade policies, while some also touched 
on the “grim battle for survival in Taiwan which put anti-colonialism largely 
out of people’s minds” (Arndt 1981: 137). This situation was contrasted with 
the situation in Indonesia in the 1950s, where a “backward-looking anti-colo-
nialism” was used by politicians to gain support for indigenist policies, many 
of which were damaging to economic growth.
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Such views can be contested; it is arguable that the battle for survival in 
Taiwan after 1949 was as much a battle on the part of native Taiwanese against 
the KMT government as one by the island as a whole against the mainland. 
But the fact remains that the KMT government, although dominated by main-
landers, did adopt policies that supported the Taiwanese business class in their 
efforts to diversify exports and move into a sustained process of export-led 
growth. Credit for moving toward more open economic policies has often 
been given to key policy makers such as K. Y. Yin, the minister of economics 
who was able to persuade his political colleagues of the need for a policy shift 
in the late 1950s (Galenson 1981: 77). But to the extent that these technocrats 
were advocating “open-type” trade policies and a stronger role for both indig-
enous Taiwanese and foreign private enterprise in the economy, they were in 
fact supporting an economic policy package that was the antithesis of what 
had been practiced under the Japanese until 1945. 
In several parts of Southeast Asia, the strong economic nationalism that 
emerged after 1945 was a reaction against colonial policies that had created 
the plural economy and the economic subordination of indigenous popula-
tions. Economic nationalism took different forms in different countries; in 
many parts of the region, state enterprises were encouraged as a means of 
diluting the infl uence of Chinese and other foreign businesses. But these were 
frequently badly managed and in some cases used as vehicles for the enrich-
ment of their managers, political parties, and the military. The disappointing 
economic performance of many state enterprises led to another round of reac-
tion in the 1960s. In Thailand and Indonesia, new economic strategies were 
adopted that were more supportive of foreign investment, and joint ventures 
were formed between foreign and domestic partners, who were often of Chi-
nese descent. But in Burma the reaction took the form of even more inward-
looking policies that strengthened the hold of the military over the economy 
and further isolated the country from the regional and global economy (Booth 
2003a: 149–153). 
In Korea, the regime of Park Chung Hee had at best dubious democratic 
credentials and treated its political opponents harshly. But it did give high 
priority to rapid economic growth as a policy goal, and it awarded various 
types of subsidies to companies willing and able to meet reasonably strict 
performance criteria. As Kang has argued, political considerations were often 
just as important as merit in the decisions as to which conglomerate received 
government assistance and how much (2002: 97). The lavish assistance pro-
vided to the favored few resulted in a number of ineffi ciencies, including 
chronic overcapacity. In addition, the agricultural sector was neglected, and 
considerable poverty remained in rural areas until the 1980s. But compared 
with several economies that in 1960 had a higher per capita GDP than South 
Korea, including both the Philippines and Malaysia, by 1995 the South Korean 
economy had performed consistently better and had not just achieved higher 
per capita GDP, but also managed to penetrate world markets with a range of 
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products, from consumer electronics to ships and motor vehicles, manufac-
tured and marketed under Korean brand names. In this sense, South Korea 
had forged ahead of most of the other former colonies of East and South-
east Asia. While some of the entrepreneuers behind the successes of the large 
Korean conglomerates may have had their start in the colonial era, most were 
“new men” in the sense that they had embarked on new initiatives in new 
industries after 1945.
Kang attributes at least part of the Korean success to a “mindset that was 
hell-bent on catching up to the Japanese” (2002: 186). Thus one important 
aspect of the Japanese legacy was that it provided its former colonies with a 
powerful example of rapid recovery from the appalling destruction of war and 
of sustained economic growth through the successful penetration of world 
markets for manufactures, together with a strong desire to compete with and 
outperform that example. In the Philippines, by contrast, it has been argued 
that the American colonial regime “blocked Americans from plundering the 
archipelago, but did nothing to prohibit its exploitation by Filipinos” (Kar-
now 1989: 223). Critics of the American legacy have argued that the political 
model that the Americans bequeathed to the Philippines was one of represen-
tative democracy, but the elected representatives were largely, if not entirely, 
drawn from landowners and business families (Hawes 1987: 25). Thus they 
could, and did, manage the economy largely in their own interests. Catching 
up with the American economy or that of Japan was not viewed as a priority. 
While there is some truth in these arguments, they do not seem entirely 
satisfactory in explaining postindependence outcomes across East and South-
east Asia. After all, however dysfunctional the American-style political system 
in the Philippines proved to be for economic development, the Philippine 
economy was hardly a complete economic failure until the early 1980s. The 
Philippines recovered faster from the devastation of the war than any other 
part of Asia, and economic growth was not much below the Asian average in 
the three decades from 1950 to 1980 (Balisacan and Hill 2003: 7). The poor 
performance in the 1980s has been attributed to Marcos, but it was Marcos 
who set aside the American political legacy when he closed down the con-
gress and declared martial law in 1972. Indeed, disillusion with the American 
political model as a means of achieving rapid economic success seems to have 
been widespread among the Philippine political elite by the 1970s. Karnow 
has argued that Marcos’ main political opponent, Benigno Aquino, was also 
doubtful that the Philippines could develop rapidly with an American-style 
constitution and openly admired more authoritarian rulers in prewar Europe 
and postwar Asia (1989: 360). 
In any comparative study of economic development, it is unwise to be 
too seduced by the attractions of historical determinism. If economies are to 
grow at a sustained rate over decades and if the expanded output is to be used 
to improve living standards for the great majority of the population, then it is 
essential that a political leadership emerge that gives economic growth high 
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priority in policy making. Such leaders did emerge in Japan in the 1950s and 
in most parts of East and Southeast Asia over the last four decades of the twen-
tieth century. They gave high priority to rapid economic growth as a means 
of catching up with the more advanced economies and produced the growth 
miracle that received so much attention in the literature on Asian economic 
development until 1997. The main exceptions to the “East Asian model” were 
Burma and the Philippines, but in neither case does it seem plausible to blame 
the failure to sustain rapid economic growth under Ne Win and Marcos on 
the British or American colonial legacies in these two countries. Had these two 
leaders had different policy priorities, they could have produced sustained 
growth, as Suharto was able to do in Indonesia and Park in South Korea. That 
they did not follow growth-promoting policies was a refl ection of their own 
personalities and predilections; other leaders could well have chosen different 
policies, with different results, not just for economic growth but also for the 
welfare of their citizens. 
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It is well known that Taiwan and South 
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achieved rapid growth and industrializa-
tion after 1960. Th e performance of former 
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Singapore, Burma, Vietnam, Laos, Cambo-
dia, Indonesia, and the Philippines) has been 
less impressive. Some scholars have attributed 
the diff erence to better infrastructure and 
greater access to education in Japan’s colonies. 
Anne Booth examines and critiques such 
arguments in this ambitious comparative 
study of economic development in East and 
Southeast Asia from the beginning of the 
twentieth century until the 1960s. 
Booth takes an in-depth look at the 
nature and consequences of colonial poli-
cies for a wide range of factors, including the 
growth of export-oriented agriculture and the 
development of manufacturing industry. She 
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the growth and diversifi cation of the market 
economy and on the welfare of indigenous 
populations. Indicators such as educational 
enrollments, infant mortality rates, and crude 
death rates are used to compare living stan-
dards across East and Southeast Asia in the 
1930s. Her analysis of the impact that Japan’s 
Greater Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere and 
later invasion and conquest had on the region 
and the living standards of its people leads 
to a discussion of the painful and protracted 
transition to independence following Japan’s 
defeat. Th roughout, Booth emphasizes the 
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great variety of economic and social policies 
pursued by the various colonial governments 
and the diversity of outcomes.
Lucidly and accessibly written, Colonial 
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